fanotify: Allow copying of file handle to userspace

jankara · jankara · commit b2d22b6bb33a · 2019-03-19T09:29:07.000+01:00
When file handle is embedded inside fanotify_event and usercopy checks are enabled, we get a warning like: Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)! WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110 mm/usercopy.c:78 Annotate handling in fanotify_event properly to mark copying it to userspace is fine. Reported-by: syzbot+2c49971e251e36216d1f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: a8b13aa ("fanotify: enable FAN_REPORT_FID init flag") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ static int copy_fid_to_user(struct fanotify_event *event, char __user *buf)
 {
 	struct fanotify_event_info_fid info = { };
 	struct file_handle handle = { };
+	unsigned char bounce[FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN], *fh;
 	size_t fh_len = event->fh_len;
 	size_t len = fanotify_event_info_len(event);
 
@@ -233,7 +234,16 @@ static int copy_fid_to_user(struct fanotify_event *event, char __user *buf)
 
 	buf += sizeof(handle);
 	len -= sizeof(handle);
-	if (copy_to_user(buf, fanotify_event_fh(event), fh_len))
+	/*
+	 * For an inline fh, copy through stack to exclude the copy from
+	 * usercopy hardening protections.
+	 */
+	fh = fanotify_event_fh(event);
+	if (fh_len <= FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN) {
+		memcpy(bounce, fh, fh_len);
+		fh = bounce;
+	}
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, fh, fh_len))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	/* Pad with 0's */
