Kažnjavanje prestupnika je svakako jedna od najznacajnijih drustvenih praksi za koju se može pruž... more Kažnjavanje prestupnika je svakako jedna od najznacajnijih drustvenih praksi za koju se može pružiti moralno opravdanje. Istraživanje razloga na osnovu kojih se ova praksa može opravdati predstavlja glavni predmet filozofskih analiza tzv. pravne kazne (legal punishment). Međutim, ovi razlozi se mogu pružiti u okviru dve glavne grupe teorija; to su utilitaristicke i retributivne teorije kazne. Kada je rec o utilitaristickim teorijama kazne, one razloge moralnog opravdanja kažnjavanja vide u poželjnim posledicama koje se tim kažnjavanjem postižu. S druge strane, retributivne teorije kazne razloge na osnovu kojih se izvodi moralno opravdanje kazne vide u tome sto se tom kaznom prestupniku „naplacuje dug“ i sto kazna predstavlja nesto sto prestupnik zaslužuje. Naravno, spor između zastupnika ove dve suprotstavljene grupe teorija nije od znacaja samo za filozofske rasprave o opravdanju institucije kažnjavanja. Naprotiv, obicno se smatra da se na osnovu resenja problema moralnog opravdanj...
The argument from moral psychology is one of the strongest arguments that non-cognitivists use ag... more The argument from moral psychology is one of the strongest arguments that non-cognitivists use against cognitivism-the metaethical position according to which our moral judgements express beliefs. According to this argument, once we put together the Humean theory of motivation and motivational internalism, we yield the conclusion that cognitivism cannot represent the correct view about the semantic function of moral discourse. I will first attempt to show that a neurological syndrome, called pain asymbolia (a rare condition caused by lesions to the posterior insula that produces complete, thoroughgoing indifference to pain), can be used in order to formulate a persuasive defence of the Humean theory of motivation. After that, I will consider motivational internalism and argue that, without additional empirical evidence, neither internalism nor externalism can provide a plausible explanation of the connection between moral judgements and motivation. In conclusion, I intend to defend the claim that, until more persuasive arguments in favour of internalism are presented, non-cognitivists should not rely on the argument from moral psychology in their attempts to refute cognitivism.
G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form ‘p, but I don’t believe ... more G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form ‘p, but I don’t believe that p’ are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say ‘Eliminativism is true, but of course I don’t believe it’s true’ sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri’s attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri’s counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.
According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is co... more According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is committed. I will first analyze New’s argument, along with the epistemic conditions for practicing prepunishment. I will then deal with an important conceptual objection, according to which prepunishment is not a genuine kind of ‘punishment’. After that, I will consider retributivism and present conclusive reasons for the claim that it cannot justify prepunishment without leading to paradoxical results. I shall then seek to establish that from the utilitarian point of view it is possible to provide a plausible justification of this practice. Finally, I shall attempt to defend the claim that the fact that utilitarianism can justify prepunishment in a satisfactory way is clearly a favourable characteristic of this ethical position.
The unconditional version of motivational internalism (UMI) says that if an agent sincerely judge... more The unconditional version of motivational internalism (UMI) says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counter-argument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, as well as all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument, do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgements about what is the best option available to them.
According to unconditional motivational internalism, there is an a priori constraint on an agent'... more According to unconditional motivational internalism, there is an a priori constraint on an agent's forming a sincere moral judgement, namely that she is, at least to some minimal extent, motivated to act as it dictates. In order to undermine this internalist position, proponents of motivational externalism typically appeal to the possibility of the amoralist—i.e. an individual who makes sincere moral judgements, but who is completely unmoved to act accordingly. This strategy is known as the challenge of amoralism. Against this strategy, I will argue that in order to represent a genuine case of amoralism, and a credible counterexample to unconditional motivational internalism, an agent would have to simultaneously satisfy an epistemically inconsistent set of conditions. Thus, the conclusion I will attempt to defend in this paper is that the challenge of amoralism does not succeed in posing a legitimate threat to unconditional motivational internalism.
Kažnjavanje prestupnika je svakako jedna od najznacajnijih drustvenih praksi za koju se može pruž... more Kažnjavanje prestupnika je svakako jedna od najznacajnijih drustvenih praksi za koju se može pružiti moralno opravdanje. Istraživanje razloga na osnovu kojih se ova praksa može opravdati predstavlja glavni predmet filozofskih analiza tzv. pravne kazne (legal punishment). Međutim, ovi razlozi se mogu pružiti u okviru dve glavne grupe teorija; to su utilitaristicke i retributivne teorije kazne. Kada je rec o utilitaristickim teorijama kazne, one razloge moralnog opravdanja kažnjavanja vide u poželjnim posledicama koje se tim kažnjavanjem postižu. S druge strane, retributivne teorije kazne razloge na osnovu kojih se izvodi moralno opravdanje kazne vide u tome sto se tom kaznom prestupniku „naplacuje dug“ i sto kazna predstavlja nesto sto prestupnik zaslužuje. Naravno, spor između zastupnika ove dve suprotstavljene grupe teorija nije od znacaja samo za filozofske rasprave o opravdanju institucije kažnjavanja. Naprotiv, obicno se smatra da se na osnovu resenja problema moralnog opravdanj...
The argument from moral psychology is one of the strongest arguments that non-cognitivists use ag... more The argument from moral psychology is one of the strongest arguments that non-cognitivists use against cognitivism-the metaethical position according to which our moral judgements express beliefs. According to this argument, once we put together the Humean theory of motivation and motivational internalism, we yield the conclusion that cognitivism cannot represent the correct view about the semantic function of moral discourse. I will first attempt to show that a neurological syndrome, called pain asymbolia (a rare condition caused by lesions to the posterior insula that produces complete, thoroughgoing indifference to pain), can be used in order to formulate a persuasive defence of the Humean theory of motivation. After that, I will consider motivational internalism and argue that, without additional empirical evidence, neither internalism nor externalism can provide a plausible explanation of the connection between moral judgements and motivation. In conclusion, I intend to defend the claim that, until more persuasive arguments in favour of internalism are presented, non-cognitivists should not rely on the argument from moral psychology in their attempts to refute cognitivism.
G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form ‘p, but I don’t believe ... more G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form ‘p, but I don’t believe that p’ are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say ‘Eliminativism is true, but of course I don’t believe it’s true’ sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri’s attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri’s counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.
According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is co... more According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is committed. I will first analyze New’s argument, along with the epistemic conditions for practicing prepunishment. I will then deal with an important conceptual objection, according to which prepunishment is not a genuine kind of ‘punishment’. After that, I will consider retributivism and present conclusive reasons for the claim that it cannot justify prepunishment without leading to paradoxical results. I shall then seek to establish that from the utilitarian point of view it is possible to provide a plausible justification of this practice. Finally, I shall attempt to defend the claim that the fact that utilitarianism can justify prepunishment in a satisfactory way is clearly a favourable characteristic of this ethical position.
The unconditional version of motivational internalism (UMI) says that if an agent sincerely judge... more The unconditional version of motivational internalism (UMI) says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counter-argument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, as well as all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument, do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgements about what is the best option available to them.
According to unconditional motivational internalism, there is an a priori constraint on an agent'... more According to unconditional motivational internalism, there is an a priori constraint on an agent's forming a sincere moral judgement, namely that she is, at least to some minimal extent, motivated to act as it dictates. In order to undermine this internalist position, proponents of motivational externalism typically appeal to the possibility of the amoralist—i.e. an individual who makes sincere moral judgements, but who is completely unmoved to act accordingly. This strategy is known as the challenge of amoralism. Against this strategy, I will argue that in order to represent a genuine case of amoralism, and a credible counterexample to unconditional motivational internalism, an agent would have to simultaneously satisfy an epistemically inconsistent set of conditions. Thus, the conclusion I will attempt to defend in this paper is that the challenge of amoralism does not succeed in posing a legitimate threat to unconditional motivational internalism.
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