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2020 – today
- 2023
[c20]Ronen Gradwohl
, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky:
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. EC 2023: 813- [i25]Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. CoRR abs/2302.00281 (2023) - 2022
- [j26]Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
The secretary recommendation problem. Games Econ. Behav. 134: 199-228 (2022) - [j25]Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication. Math. Oper. Res. 47(3): 2520-2545 (2022) - [c19]Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. SAGT 2022: 366-382 - [c18]Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Herd Design. EC 2022: 871-872 - [i24]Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. CoRR abs/2207.06929 (2022) - 2021
- [j24]Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Privacy, Patience, and Protection. Dyn. Games Appl. 11(4): 759-784 (2021) - [c17]Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky:
On Social Networks that Support Learning. EC 2021: 95-96 - [c16]Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication. SODA 2021: 637-652 - 2020
- [j23]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:
Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. 120: 16-27 (2020) - [j22]Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Rann Smorodinsky:
On the properties that characterize privacy. Math. Soc. Sci. 103: 59-68 (2020) - [j21]Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-issue social learning. Math. Soc. Sci. 104: 29-39 (2020) - [j20]Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Rann Smorodinsky:
On the behavioral implications of differential privacy. Theor. Comput. Sci. 841: 84-93 (2020) - [c15]Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
Prophet Inequalities for Bayesian Persuasion. IJCAI 2020: 175-181 - [c14]Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Secretary Recommendation Problem. EC 2020: 189 - [c13]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita:
Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC 2020: 641 - [c12]Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky:
A Cardinal Comparison of Experts. WINE 2020: 416-429 - [i23]Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR abs/2006.02048 (2020) - [i22]Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication. CoRR abs/2007.12489 (2020) - [i21]Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky:
On social networks that support learning. CoRR abs/2011.05255 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j19]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81(8): 3136-3161 (2019) - [j18]Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky:
On comparison of experts. Games Econ. Behav. 118: 94-109 (2019) - [c11]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge. EC 2019: 153-170 - [c10]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. EC 2019: 557-558 - [i20]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. CoRR abs/1905.03452 (2019) - [i19]Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Secretary Recommendation Problem. CoRR abs/1907.04252 (2019) - 2018
- [j17]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy. Math. Oper. Res. 43(4): 1252-1268 (2018) - [c9]Argyrios Deligkas, Erez Karpas, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky:
Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives. IJCAI 2018: 4743-4749 - [c8]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. EC 2018: 213-214 - [i18]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. CoRR abs/1805.11872 (2018) - [i17]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Segmentation, Incentives and Privacy. CoRR abs/1806.00966 (2018) - [i16]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Recommendation Systems and Self Motivated Users. CoRR abs/1807.01732 (2018) - 2017
- [j16]Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Perception games and privacy. Games Econ. Behav. 104: 293-308 (2017) - [c7]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:
Forecast Aggregation. EC 2017: 61-62 - [c6]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. EC 2017: 243-244 - [c5]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Crowdfunding Game. WINE 2017: 398-399 - [i15]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. CoRR abs/1705.01589 (2017) - [i14]Rann Smorodinsky, Shakhar Smorodinsky:
The Price of Anarchy in Hypergraph Coloring Games. CoRR abs/1706.05297 (2017) - [i13]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Crowdfunding Game. CoRR abs/1710.00319 (2017) - [i12]Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky:
On Comparison Of Experts. CoRR abs/1710.09461 (2017) - 2016
- [c4]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract. EC 2016: 757 - [i11]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Designing social networks for efficient learning. CoRR abs/1605.02489 (2016) - 2015
- [i10]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economic Recommendation Systems. CoRR abs/1507.07191 (2015) - 2014
- [j15]Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(1): 1:1-1:16 (2014) - [j14]Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky:
Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 7:1-7:28 (2014) - [i9]Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Subjective Perception Games and Privacy. CoRR abs/1409.1487 (2014) - 2013
- [j13]Inbar Aricha, Rann Smorodinsky:
Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms. Int. J. Game Theory 42(4): 931-946 (2013) - 2012
- [c3]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy. ITCS 2012: 203-213 - [c2]Kobbi Nissim, Claudio Orlandi, Rann Smorodinsky:
Privacy-aware mechanism design. EC 2012: 774-789 - [i8]Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signalling Competition and Social Welfare (Working Paper). CoRR abs/1203.6610 (2012) - [i7]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems. CoRR abs/1207.4165 (2012) - [i6]Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky:
Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1211.3293 (2012) - 2011
- [i5]Kobbi Nissim, Claudio Orlandi, Rann Smorodinsky:
Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1111.3350 (2011) - [i4]Sergey Kuniavsky, Rann Smorodinsky:
Equilibrium and Potential in Coalitional Congestion Games. CoRR abs/1111.3933 (2011) - [i3]Sergey Kuniavsky, Rann Smorodinsky:
Greediness and Equilibrium in Congestion Games. CoRR abs/1111.6156 (2011) - 2010
- [j12]Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Jonathan Weinstein:
Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations. J. Econ. Theory 145(6): 2203-2217 (2010) - [i2]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy. CoRR abs/1004.2888 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2007
- [j11]Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky:
The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information. J. Econ. Theory 137(1): 383-403 (2007) - 2006
- [j10]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations - The anonymous case. Games Econ. Behav. 55(2): 385-406 (2006) - 2005
- [j9]Rann Smorodinsky:
Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random. Math. Soc. Sci. 50(1): 3-11 (2005) - [i1]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations. Computing and Markets 2005 - 2004
- [j8]Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky:
Belief-based equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 157-171 (2004) - [j7]Abraham Neyman, Rann Smorodinsky:
Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games. Math. Oper. Res. 29(4): 739-775 (2004) - [c1]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems. UAI 2004: 528-535 - 2003
- [j6]Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Rakesh V. Vohra:
Calibration with Many Checking Rules. Math. Oper. Res. 28(1): 141-153 (2003) - 2001
- [j5]Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky:
Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games. Games Econ. Behav. 37(1): 26-39 (2001) - 2000
- [j4]Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky:
Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence. J. Econ. Theory 92(2): 318-342 (2000) - [j3]Rann Smorodinsky:
The reflection effect for constant risk averse agents. Math. Soc. Sci. 40(3): 265-276 (2000)
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [j2]Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky:
The speed of rational learning. Int. J. Game Theory 28(2): 199-210 (1999) - 1996
- [j1]Ehud Lehrer, Rann Smorodinsky:
Compatible Measures and Merging. Math. Oper. Res. 21(3): 697-706 (1996)
Coauthor Index
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