Abstract
Smart contracts are one of the most important applications of the blockchain. Most existing smart contract systems assume that for executing contract over a network of decentralized nodes, the outcome in accordance with the majority can be trusted. However, we observe that users involved with a smart contract may strategically take actions to manipulate execution of the contract for purpose to increase their own benefits. We propose an agent model, as the underpinning mechanism for contract execution over a network of decentralized nodes and public ledger, to address this problem and discuss the possibility of preventing users from manipulating smart contract execution by applying principles of game theory and agent based analysis.
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Chen, L., Xu, L., Shah, N., Gao, Z., Lu, Y., Shi, W. (2017). Decentralized Execution of Smart Contracts: Agent Model Perspective and Its Implications. In: Brenner, M., et al. Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10323. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_29
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