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{{Short description|Doctrines and plans for production and use of atomic weapons}}
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Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:
Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:


*Under what conditions does it serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons?
*Conditions which serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons
*What types of nuclear weapons should be developed?
*Types of nuclear weapons to be developed
*When and how should such weapons be used?
*How and when weapons are to be used


Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of [[military strategy]] because the immense and terrifying power of the weapons makes their use in seeking victory in a traditional military sense impossible.
Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of [[military strategy]]. The immense and terrifying power of the weapons makes their use, in seeking victory in a traditional military sense, impossible.


Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use, a crucial part of [[mutual assured destruction]].
Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use, a crucial part of [[mutually assured destruction]].


In the context of [[nuclear proliferation]] and maintaining the [[balance of power]], states also seek to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons as part of nuclear strategy.
In the context of [[nuclear proliferation]] and maintaining the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]], states also seek to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons as part of nuclear strategy.

==Nuclear deterrent composition==
The doctrine of [[mutual assured destruction]] (MAD) assumes that a nuclear deterrent force must be credible and survivable. That is, each deterrent force must survive a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike]] with sufficient capability to effectively destroy the other country in a [[second strike]]. Therefore, a first strike would be suicidal for the launching country.

In the late 1940s and 1950s as the [[Cold War]] developed, the [[United States]] and [[Soviet Union]] pursued multiple delivery methods and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. Three types of platforms proved most successful and are collectively called a "[[nuclear triad]]". These are air-delivered weapons (bombs or missiles), [[ballistic missile submarines]] (usually nuclear-powered and called SSBNs), and [[intercontinental ballistic missiles]] (ICBMs), usually deployed in land-based hardened [[missile silo]]s or on vehicles.

Although not considered part of the deterrent forces, all of the nuclear powers deployed large numbers of [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s in the Cold War. These could be delivered by virtually all platforms capable of delivering large conventional weapons.

{{Anchor|deter2016-01-29}}During the 1970s there was growing concern that the combined conventional forces of the [[Warsaw Pact|Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact]] could overwhelm the forces of [[NATO]]. It seemed unthinkable to respond to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact incursion into Western Europe with [[strategic nuclear weapon]]s, inviting a catastrophic exchange. Thus, technologies were developed to greatly reduce collateral damage while being effective against advancing conventional military forces. Some of these were [[Neutron bomb|low-yield neutron bombs]], which were lethal to tank crews, especially with tanks massed in tight formation, while producing relatively little blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout. Other technologies were so-called "suppressed radiation devices," which produced mostly blast with little radioactivity, making them much like conventional explosives, but with much more energy.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Solem|first=J. C.|year=1974|title=Tactical nuclear deterrence|journal=Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report LA-74-1362}}</ref>


== See also ==
== See also ==
{{Weapons of mass destruction}}
{{Weapons of mass destruction}}

* [[Military strategy]]
{{div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Assured destruction]]
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Bernard Brodie]]
* [[Counterforce]], [[Countervalue]]
* [[Counterforce]], [[Countervalue]]
* [[Cost-exchange ratio]]
* [[Decapitation strike]]
* [[Decapitation strike]]
* [[Deterrence theory|Deterrence]]
* [[Deterrence theory]]
* [[Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations]]
* [[Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations]]
* ''[[Dr. Strangelove or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb|Dr. Strangelove]]'' (1964), a film by [[Stanley Kubrick]], satirizing nuclear strategy.
* [[Fail-deadly]]
* [[Fail-deadly]]
* [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike]], [[Second strike]]
* [[Force de frappe]]
* [[Force de frappe]]
* [[First strike]], [[Second strike]]
* [[Game theory]], [[wargaming]]
* [[Herman Kahn]]
* [[Game theory]] & [[wargaming]]
* [[Madman theory]]
* [[Madman theory]]
* [[Massive retaliation]]
* [[Massive retaliation]]
* [[Military strategy]]
* [[Minimal deterrence]]
* [[Minimal deterrence]]
* [[Mutual assured destruction|Mutual assured destruction (MAD)]]
* [[Mutual assured destruction]] (MAD)
* [[Assured destruction]]
* [[No first use]]
* [[No first use]]
* [[National Security Strategy of the United States]]
* [[National Security Strategy of the United States]]
* [[Nuclear blackmail]]
* [[Nuclear blackmail]]
* [[Nuclear proliferation]]
* [[Nuclear proliferation]]
* [[Nuclear utilization target selection|Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS)]]
* [[Nuclear utilization target selection]] (NUTS)
* [[Nuclear weapons debate]]
* [[Single Integrated Operational Plan|Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)]]
* [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP)
* [[Strategic bombing]]
* [[Strategic bombing]]
* [[Tactical nuclear weapon]]s
* [[Tactical nuclear weapon]]s
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Bernard Brodie]]
* [[Herman Kahn]]
* [[Stanley Kubrick]]'s ''[[Dr. Strangelove or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb|Dr. Strangelove]]'' (1964), a film satirizing nuclear strategy.
* [[Thomas Schelling]]
* [[Thomas Schelling]]
{{div col end}}


== Bibliography ==
== Bibliography ==
Line 52: Line 70:
===Early texts===
===Early texts===
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Brodie, Bernard]]. ''The Absolute Weapon''. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1946.
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Brodie, Bernard]]. ''The Absolute Weapon''. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1946.
* Brodie, Bernard. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB137-1.html ''Strategy in the Missile Age'']. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
* Brodie, Bernard. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB137-1.html ''Strategy in the Missile Age'']. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
* Dunn, Lewis A. [http://www.ifri.org/downloads/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf ''Deterrence Today – Roles, Challenges, and Responses''] Paris: IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007.
* Dunn, Lewis A. [https://web.archive.org/web/20111207181216/http://ifri.org/downloads/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf ''Deterrence Today – Roles, Challenges, and Responses''] Paris: IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007.
* [[Herman Kahn|Kahn, Herman]]. ''On Thermonuclear War''. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
* [[Herman Kahn|Kahn, Herman]]. ''On Thermonuclear War''. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
* [[Henry Kissinger|Kissinger, Henry A]]. ''Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy''. New York: Harper, 1957.
* [[Henry Kissinger|Kissinger, Henry A]]. ''Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy''. New York: Harper, 1957.
* Schelling, Thomas C. ''Arms and Influence''. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
* Schelling, Thomas C. ''Arms and Influence''. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
* [[Albert Wohlstetter|Wohlstetter, Albert]]. [http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html "The Delicate Balance of Terror."] ''Foreign Affairs'' 37, 211 (1958): 211–233.
* [[Albert Wohlstetter|Wohlstetter, Albert]]. [https://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html "The Delicate Balance of Terror."] ''Foreign Affairs'' 37, 211 (1958): 211–233.


===Secondary literature===
===Secondary literature===
* Baylis, John, and John Garnett. ''Makers of Nuclear Strategy''. London: Pinter, 1991. ISBN 1-85567-025-9.
* Baylis, John, and John Garnett. ''Makers of Nuclear Strategy''. London: Pinter, 1991. {{ISBN|1-85567-025-9}}.
* [[Barry Buzan|Buzan, Barry]], and Herring, Eric. "The Arms Dynamic in World Politics". London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. ISBN 1-55587-596-3.
* [[Barry Buzan|Buzan, Barry]], and Herring, Eric. "The Arms Dynamic in World Politics". London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. {{ISBN|1-55587-596-3}}.
* [[Lawrence Freedman|Freedman, Lawrence]]. ''The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy''. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. ISBN 0-333-97239-2 .
* [[Lawrence Freedman|Freedman, Lawrence]]. ''The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy''. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. {{ISBN|0-333-97239-2}} .
* Heuser, Beatrice. ''NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000'' (London: Macmillan, hardback 1997, paperback 1999), 256p., ISBN 0-333-67365-4
* Heuser, Beatrice. ''NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000'' (London: Macmillan, hardback 1997, paperback 1999), 256p., {{ISBN|0-333-67365-4}}
* Heuser, Beatrice. ''Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Belief Systems in Britain, France and the FRG'' (London: Macmillan, July 1998), 277p., Index, Tables. ISBN 0-333-69389-2
* Heuser, Beatrice. ''Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Belief Systems in Britain, France and the FRG'' (London: Macmillan, July 1998), 277p., Index, Tables. {{ISBN|0-333-69389-2}}
* Heuser, Beatrice. "[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=1295548 Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Strategies]", ''Contemporary European History'' Vol. 7 Part 3 (November 1998), pp.&nbsp;311–328.
* Heuser, Beatrice. "[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=1295548 Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Strategies]", ''Contemporary European History'' Vol. 7 Part 3 (November 1998), pp.&nbsp;311–328.
* Heuser, Beatrice. "[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a782383756~frm=titlelink Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives"], ''Comparative Strategy'' Vol. 12 No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1993), pp.&nbsp;437–457.
* Heuser, Beatrice. "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives", ''Comparative Strategy'' Vol. 12 No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1993), pp.&nbsp;437–457.
* Kaplan, Fred M. ''The Wizards of Armageddon''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. ISBN 0-671-42444-0.
* Kaplan, Fred M. ''The Wizards of Armageddon''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. {{ISBN|0-671-42444-0}}.
* Rai Chowdhuri, Satyabrata. '' Nuclear Politics: Towards A Safer World'', Ilford: New Dawn Press, 2004.
* Rai Chowdhuri, Satyabrata. '' Nuclear Politics: Towards A Safer World'', Ilford: New Dawn Press, 2004.
* Rosenberg, David. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960." ''International Security'' 7, 4 (Spring, 1983): 3–71.
* Rosenberg, David. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960." ''International Security'' 7, 4 (Spring, 1983): 3–71.
* [[Thomas Schelling|Schelling, Thomas C]]. ''The Strategy of Conflict''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
* [[Thomas Schelling|Schelling, Thomas C]]. ''The Strategy of Conflict''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
* Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw–Hill, 1993. ISBN 0-07-059352-3.
* Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw–Hill, 1993. {{ISBN|0-07-059352-3}}.


== References ==
== References ==
<references />
<references />


[[Category:Nuclear strategies]]
[[Category:Nuclear strategy| ]]
[[Category:Nuclear warfare]]
[[Category:Nuclear warfare]]

Latest revision as of 01:31, 31 May 2024

Nuclear strategy involves the development of doctrines and strategies for the production and use of nuclear weapons.

As a sub-branch of military strategy, nuclear strategy attempts to match nuclear weapons as means to political ends. In addition to the actual use of nuclear weapons whether in the battlefield or strategically, a large part of nuclear strategy involves their use as a bargaining tool.

Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:

  • Conditions which serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons
  • Types of nuclear weapons to be developed
  • How and when weapons are to be used

Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of military strategy. The immense and terrifying power of the weapons makes their use, in seeking victory in a traditional military sense, impossible.

Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use, a crucial part of mutually assured destruction.

In the context of nuclear proliferation and maintaining the balance of power, states also seek to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons as part of nuclear strategy.

Nuclear deterrent composition

[edit]

The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) assumes that a nuclear deterrent force must be credible and survivable. That is, each deterrent force must survive a first strike with sufficient capability to effectively destroy the other country in a second strike. Therefore, a first strike would be suicidal for the launching country.

In the late 1940s and 1950s as the Cold War developed, the United States and Soviet Union pursued multiple delivery methods and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. Three types of platforms proved most successful and are collectively called a "nuclear triad". These are air-delivered weapons (bombs or missiles), ballistic missile submarines (usually nuclear-powered and called SSBNs), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), usually deployed in land-based hardened missile silos or on vehicles.

Although not considered part of the deterrent forces, all of the nuclear powers deployed large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in the Cold War. These could be delivered by virtually all platforms capable of delivering large conventional weapons.

During the 1970s there was growing concern that the combined conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact could overwhelm the forces of NATO. It seemed unthinkable to respond to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact incursion into Western Europe with strategic nuclear weapons, inviting a catastrophic exchange. Thus, technologies were developed to greatly reduce collateral damage while being effective against advancing conventional military forces. Some of these were low-yield neutron bombs, which were lethal to tank crews, especially with tanks massed in tight formation, while producing relatively little blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout. Other technologies were so-called "suppressed radiation devices," which produced mostly blast with little radioactivity, making them much like conventional explosives, but with much more energy.[1]

See also

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

Early texts

[edit]

Secondary literature

[edit]
  • Baylis, John, and John Garnett. Makers of Nuclear Strategy. London: Pinter, 1991. ISBN 1-85567-025-9.
  • Buzan, Barry, and Herring, Eric. "The Arms Dynamic in World Politics". London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. ISBN 1-55587-596-3.
  • Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. ISBN 0-333-97239-2 .
  • Heuser, Beatrice. NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London: Macmillan, hardback 1997, paperback 1999), 256p., ISBN 0-333-67365-4
  • Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Belief Systems in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan, July 1998), 277p., Index, Tables. ISBN 0-333-69389-2
  • Heuser, Beatrice. "Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Strategies", Contemporary European History Vol. 7 Part 3 (November 1998), pp. 311–328.
  • Heuser, Beatrice. "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives", Comparative Strategy Vol. 12 No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1993), pp. 437–457.
  • Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. ISBN 0-671-42444-0.
  • Rai Chowdhuri, Satyabrata. Nuclear Politics: Towards A Safer World, Ilford: New Dawn Press, 2004.
  • Rosenberg, David. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960." International Security 7, 4 (Spring, 1983): 3–71.
  • Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
  • Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw–Hill, 1993. ISBN 0-07-059352-3.

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Solem, J. C. (1974). "Tactical nuclear deterrence". Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report LA-74-1362.