Russia under Vladimir Putin

Putinism (The Putin regime) is the ideology, priorities, and policies of the Putin system of government. The term is used in the Western press and by Russia analysts and often with a negative connotation, to describe the political system of a Russia under President (2000-2008) and, subsequently, Prime-Minister Vladimir Putin, where much of political and financial powers are controlled by siloviki, i.e. people with state security background, coming from the total of 22 governmental security and intelligence agencies, such as FSB, Police, Army. Many of these people share their career background with Putin, or, are his personal friends. (See also Political groups during Vladimir Putin's presidency)

The political system under Putin was primarily characterized by liberal economic policies, a lack of transparency in governance, cronyism and pervasive corruption, which assumed in Putin's Russia "a systemic and institutionalized form", according to a report by Boris Nemtsov as well as other sources. Between 1999 and autumn 2008 Russia's economy grew at a sready pace, which some experts have attributed to the sharp rouble devaluation of 1998, Yeltsin-era structural reforms, rising oil price and cheap credit from western banks. In Michael McFaul's opinion (June 2004), Russia's "impressive" short-term economic growth "came simultaneously with the destruction of free media, threats to civil society and an unmitigated corruption of justice."

In foreign affairs, the regime sought to emulate the former Soviet Union's grandeur, belligerence and expansionism. In November 2007, Simon Tisdall of The Guardian pointed out that "just as Russia once exported Marxist revolution, it may now be creating an international market for Putinism", as "more often than not, instinctively undemocratic, oligarchic and corrupt national elites find that an appearance of democracy, with parliamentary trappings and a pretence of pluralism, is much more attractive, and manageable, than the real thing."

Yevgeniya Albats described the regime under Putin as mild authoritarianism falling far short of the excesses of Stalinism.

The US economist Richard W. Rahn (September 2007) called Putinism "a Russian nationalistic authoritarian form of government that pretends to be a free market democracy", which "owes more of its lineage to fascism than communism;" noting that "Putinism depended on the Russian economy growing rapidly enough that most people had rising standards of living and, in exchange, were willing to put up with the existing soft repression", he predicted that "as Russia's economic fortunes changed, Putinism was likely to become more repressive."

What is Putinism?

Putinism is the ideology, priorities, and policies of the Putin system of government. Sociologists, economists and politologists emphasize different features of the system.

KGB/FSB influence

Putin and Nikolai Patrushev at a meeting of the board of the Federal Security Service

According to some scholars, Russia under Putin had been transformed into the "FSB state" . Putin himself admitted that "there is no such thing as a former KGB man" and that "a group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission."

Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya believed in August 2004 that there had been no seizure of power, but rather siloviki were called into service by Russian elites, their rise into power starting from about 1996.

Former Securitate general, defector and CIA contingent cooperator Ion Mihai Pacepa speculates in interview for conservative FrontPage Magazine that "former KGB officers are running" Russia, and that FSB, which he calls "the KGB successor" has the right to monitor the population electronically , control political process, search private property, cooperate with employees of the federal government, create front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prisons.

Various 2006 estimates show that Russia has above 200,000 members of FSB, or one FSB employee for every 700 citizens of Russia (exact number of FSB staff is a state secret of Russian Federation). General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defence, as well as staff of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces aren't submitted to the Federal Security Service, although FSB might be interested in monitoring these structures, as they intrinsically involve state secrets and various degrees of admittance to them. The Law on Federal Security Service which defines its functions and establishes its structure doesn't involve such tasks as managing strategic branches of national industry, controlling political groups, or infiltrating the federal government.

"Under Russian Federation President and former career foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, an "FSB State" composed of chekists has been established and is consolidating its hold on the country. Its closest partners are organized criminals. In a world marked by a globalized economy and information infrastructure, and with transnational terrorism groups utilizing all available means to achieve their goals and further their interests, Russian intelligence collaboration with these elements is potentially disastrous", said politologist Julie Anderson.

The Russian historian Yuri Felshtinsky compared the takeover of the Russian state by the siloviki to an imaginary scenario of the Gestapo coming to power in Germany after World War II. He pointed out a fundamental difference between the secret police and ordinary political parties, even totalitarian ones, such as the Soviet Communist Party. The Russian secret police organizations are wont to employ the so called active measures and Extra-judicial killings. Hence, they killed Alexander Litvinenko and directed Russian apartment bombings and other terrorism acts in Russia to frighten the civilian population and achieve their political objectives, according to Felstinsky.

Former KGB officer Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy claim that the entire country works for the FSB, and further claimed that the FSB controls everything in Russia, including the Russian Army and the Russian Orthodox Church‎

"Vladimir Putin's Russia is a new phenomenon in Europe: a state defined and dominated by former and active-duty security and intelligence officers. Not even fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union — all undoubtedly much worse creations than Russia - were as top-heavy with intelligence talent", said former Middle East specialist at the CIA, Reuel Marc Gerecht.

One of the leading members of Putin's ruling elite, Nikolai Patrushev, Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (August 1999 - May 2008) and, subsequently, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, was known for his propagating the idea of Chekists as "neo-aristocrats" (Template:Lang-ru).

Sociological data

According to Dr. Mark Smith (March 2003), some of the main features of Putin's regime were: development of a corporatist system by pursuing close ties with business organizations, social stability and co-optation of opposition parties. He determined three main groupings in Putin's early leadership: 1) the siloviki, 2) economic liberals and 3) supporters of "the Family", i.e. those who were close to Yeltsin.

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who carried out a sociological research in 2004, put the relative number of siloviki in the Russian political elite at 25%. In Putin's "inner circle" which constitutes about 20 people, amount of siloviks rises to 58%, and fades to 18-20% in Parliament and 34% in the Government. According to Kryshtanovskaya, there was no capture of power as Kremlin bureaucracy has called siloviks in order to "restore order". The process of siloviks coming into power has allegedly started since 1996, Boris Yeltsin's second term. "Not personally Yeltsin, but the whole elite wished to stop the revolutionary process and consolidate the power." When silovik Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime Minister in 1999, the process boosted. According to Olga, "Yes, Putin has brought siloviks with him. But that's not enough to understand the situation. Here's also an objective aspect: the whole political class wished them to come. They were called for service... There was a need of a strong arm, capable from point of view of the elite to establish order in the country."

Kryshtanovskaya also noted that there were people who had worked in structures "affiliated" with KGB/FSB. Structures usually considered as such are the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Governmental Communications Commission, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Press Agency News and others. "The itself work in such agencies doesn't involve necessary contacts with special services, but makes to think about it." Summing up numbers of official and "affiliated" siloviks she got an estimate of 77% of such in the power.

According to Russian Public Opinion Foundation 2005 investigation, 34% of respondents think "there is a lack of democracy in Russia because democratic rights and freedoms are not observed", and also point on the lack of law and order. In the same time, 21% of respondents are sure there's too much of democracy in Russia; many of them point on the same drawbacks as the previous group: "the lack of law and order, irresponsibility and non-accountability of politicians". According to the Foundation, "As we can see, Russians' negative opinions about democracy are based on their dissatisfaction with contemporary conditions, while some respondents think the democratic model is not suitable in principal." Considering the modern regime, "It is interesting that most respondents think Putin's government marks the most democratic epoch in Russian history (29%), while second place goes to Brezhnev's times (14%). Some people mentioned Gorbachev and Yeltsin in this context (11% and 9%, respectively)"

At the end of 2008, Lev Gudkov, based on the Levada Center polling data, pointed out the near-disappearance of public opinion as a socio-political institution in Putin's Russia and its replacement with the still-efficacious state propaganda.

Liberal economic policies

July 9, 2000, in speaking to Parliament, Putin advocated liberal economy policies. In 2001 Putin introduced flat tax rate of 13%; the corporate rate of tax was also reduced from 35 percent to 24 percent; Small businesses also get better treatment. The old system with high tax rates has been replaced by a new system where companies can choose either a 6 percent tax on gross revenue or a 15 percent tax on profits.

In February 2009, Putin called for a single VAT rate that would be "as low as possible" (at the time it stood at an average rate of 18 percent): it could be reduced to between 12 percent and 13 percent. Overall tax burden was lower in Russia under Putin than in most European countries.

See also: Russian financial crisis of 2008–2009

Corporatism and state intervention in economy

According to Dr. Mark Smith (March 2003), Putin's regime had developed a "corporatist system" in the sense, that under him the Kremlin was interested in close ties with business organizations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Delovaya Rossiya, and the trade union federation (FNPR.) This was a part of the regime's attempts to involve broad sectors of society in the making and implementation of policy.

There is a school of thought, which says that a number of Putin's steps in the economy (notably the fate of Yukos) were signs of a shift toward a system normally described as state capitalism, where "the entirety of state-owned and controlled enterprises are run by and for the benefit of the cabal around Putin — a collection of former KGB colleagues, Saint Petersburg lawyers, and other political cronies."

According to Andrei Illarionov, advisor of Vladimir Putin until 2005, Putin's regime was a new socio-political order, "distinct from any seen in our country before": members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators had taken over the entire body of state power, followed an omerta-like behavior code, and were "given instruments conferring power upon others – membership “perks”, such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through those agencies, every significant resource in the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members"

Members of the Corporation formed an isolated caste. According to an anonymous former KGB general cited by The Economist, “A Chekist is a breed <…> A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged .

Jason Bush, chief of the Moscow bureau of the magazine Business Week has commented in December 2006 on troubling in his opinion growth of government's role: "The Kremlin has taken control of some two dozen Russian companies since 2004, including oil assets from Sibneft and Yukos, as well as banks, newspapers, and more. Despite his sporadic support for pro-market reforms, Putin has backed national champions such as energy concerns Gazprom and Rosneft. The private sector's share of output fell from 70% to 65% last year, while state-controlled companies now represent 38% of stock market capitalization, up from 22% a year ago."

The Financial Times on 20th September, 2008, when the global financial crisis had started to hit the well-being of top Russian tycoons, said: "Putinism was built on the understanding that if tycoons played by Kremlin rules they would prosper."

Although Russia's state intervention in the economy had been usually heavily critized in the West, a study by Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) in 2008 showed that state intervention had had a positive impact to corporate governance of many companies in Russia: the formal indications of the quality of corporate governance in Russia were higher in companies with state control or with a stake held by the government.

In December 2008, Anders Åslund pointed out that Putin’s chief project had been "to develop huge, unmanageable state-owned mastodons, considered “national champions.”"

Single-party bureaucratic state

Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and commentator Kara-Murza define Putinism in Russia as "a one party system,censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business"

Russia's nascent middle class showed few signs of political activism under the regime, as Masha Lipman reported: "As with the majority overall, those in the middle-income group have accepted the paternalism of Vladimir Putin's government and remained apolitical and apathetic."

In December 2007, the Russian sociologist Igor Eidman (VCIOM) categorized the Putin regime as "the power of bureaucratic oligarchy" which had "the traits of extreme right-wing dictatorship — the dominance of state-monopoly capital in the economy, silovoki structures in governance, clericalism and statism in ideology".

In August 2008, The Economist wrote about the virtual demise of both Russian and Soviet intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia and noted: "Putinism was made strong by the absence of resistance from the part of society that was meant to provide intellectual opposition."

In early February 2009, Aleksander Auzan, an economist and board member at a research institute set up by Dmitry Medvedev, said that in the Putin system, "there is not a relationship between the authorities and the people through Parliament or through nonprofit organizations or other structures. The relationship to the people is basically through television. And under the conditions of the crisis, that can no longer work."

About the same time, Vladimir Ryzhkov pointed out that a bill Medvedev had sent to the State Duma in late January 2009, when signed into law, will allow Kremlin-friendly regional legislatures to remove opposition mayors who were elected by popular vote: "It is no coincidence that Medvedev has taken aim at the country's mayors. Mayoral elections were the last bastion of direct elections after the Duma cancelled the popular vote for governors in 2005. Independent mayors were the only source of political competition against governors who were loyal to the Kremlin and United Russia. Now one of the few remaining checks and balances against the monopoly on executive power in the regions will be removed. After the law is signed by Medvedev, the power vertical will be extended one step further to reach every mayor in the country.

Cronyism and corruption

Freedom House Index of Russia as percentage to the average OECD data, Calculations by Andrei Illarionov

Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky considered Putinism to be "the highest and culminating stage of bandit capitalism in Russia”. He believed: "Russia is not corrupt. Corruption is what happens in all countries when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today’s Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politicians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have privatized the country’s wealth and taken control of its financial flows."

Such views were shared by politologist Julie Anderson who said the same person can be a Russian intelligence officer, an organized criminal, and a businessman , who quoted the former CIA Director James Woolsey as saying: "I have been particularly concerned for some years, beginning during my tenure, with the interpenetration of Russian organized crime, Russian intelligence and law enforcement, and Russian business. I have often illustrated this point with the following hypothetical: If you should chance to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really interesting possibility is that he may be all three and that none of those three institutions have any problem with the arrangement."

According to politologist Glinsky, "The idea of Russia, Inc.--or better, Russia, Ltd.--derives from the Russian brand of libertarian anarchism viewing the state as just another private armed gang claiming special rights on the basis of its unusual power." "This is a state conceived as a «stationary bandit» imposing stability by eliminating the roving bandits of the previous era", he said.

In April 2006, Putin himself expressed extreme irritation about the de facto privatization of the customs sphere, where smart officials and entrepreneurs "merged in ecstasy" (Moscow News, April 21).

According to the estimates published in "Putin and Gazprom" by Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, Putin and his friends pilfered assets of $80 billion from Gazprom during his second term as president.

On February 29, 2009, the Russian billionaire Alexander Lebedev claimed that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's strategy for economic recovery was based on cronyism and was fueling corruption; he also said: "We have two Putins. There are lots of words, but the system doesn't work."

Restoring functionality of government

The concept of "Putinism" was described in a positive sense by Russian political scientist Andranik Migranyan. According to Migranyan, Putin came into office when the economy was "totally decentralized", and "the state had lost central authority, while the oligarchs robbed the country and controlled its power institutions." Putin has restored hierarchy of power, ending the omnipotence of regional elites as well as destroying political influence of "oligarchs and oligopolies in the federal center." The Family, Yeltsin-era non-institutional center of power, was ruined, which, according to Migranyan, in turn undercut the positions of the actors, such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, who had sought to privatize the Russian state "with all of its resources and institutions".

Migranyan sees enhancement of the role of the law enforcement agencies as an attempt to set barriers against criminals, "particularly those in big business".

He asserts, "The state, having restored its effectiveness and control over its own resources, has become the largest corporation responsible for establishing the rules of the game".

Migranyan sees modern Russia as democracy, at least formally: "If democracy is the rule by a majority and the protection of the rights and opportunities of a minority, the current political regime can be described as democratic, at least formally. A multiparty political system exists in Russia, while several parties, most of them representing the opposition, have seats in the State Duma."

The major drawback of the Russian democracy, according to Migranyan, is inability of the civil society to rule the state, underdevelopment of public interests. He sees that as the consequence of Yeltsin's era Family-ruled state being unable to pursue "a favorable environment for mid-sized and small businesses".

A similar opinion was expressed by the major Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 2007 interview to Der Spiegel: "Putin has inherited plundered and downtrodden country with demoralized and grown poor majority of the population. And he took on its possible — to be noted, gradual, slow — recovering."

Rehabilitation of the Soviet past and patriotism

In April, 2005, in his formal address to Russia's Parliament, Putin famously said: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself."

In September 2003, Putin was quoted as saying, "The Soviet Union is a very complicated page in the history of our peoples. It was heroic and constructive, and it was also tragic. But it is a page that has been turned. It’s over, the boat has sailed. Now we need to think about the present and the future of our peoples."

In February 2004, Putin said: "It is my deep conviction that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a national tragedy on a massive scale. I think the ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the citizens in the post-Soviet space, the CIS countries, have gained nothing from it. On the contrary, people have been faced with a host of problems." He went on to say, "Incidentally, at that period, too, opinions varied, including among the leaders of the Union republics. For example, Nursultan Nazarbayev was categorically opposed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and he said so openly proposing various formulas for preserving the state within the common borders. But, I repeat, all that is in the past. Today we should look at the situation in which we live. One cannot keep looking back and fretting about it: we should look forward." In December 2007, he said in the interview to the Time magazine: "Russia is an ancient country with historical, profound traditions and a very powerful moral foundation. And this foundation is a love for the Motherland and patriotism. Patriotism in the best sense of that word. Incidentally, I think that to a certain extent, to a significant extent, this is also attributable to the American people."

In August 2008, The Economist noted: "Russia today is ruled by the KGB elite, has a Soviet anthem, servile media, corrupt courts and a rubber-stamping parliament. A new history textbook proclaims that the Soviet Union, although not a democracy, was “an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society”."

In November, 2008, International Herald Tribune stated:

"The Kremlin in the Putin era has often sought to maintain as much sway over the portrayal of history as over the governance of the country. In seeking to restore Russia's standing, Putin and other officials have stoked a nationalism that glorifies Soviet triumphs while playing down or even whitewashing the system's horrors. As a result, throughout Russia, many archives detailing killings, persecution and other such acts committed by the Soviet authorities have become increasingly off-limits. The role of the security services seems especially delicate, perhaps because Putin is a former KGB agent who headed the agency's successor, the FSB, in the late 1990s."

State-sponsored global PR effort

Shortly after the Beslan terror act in September 2004, Putin enhanced the Kremlin-sponsored program aimed at "improving Russia's image" abroad; according to an unnamed former Duma deputy, there existed a classified article in the RF federal budget that provided for financing measures to this purpose.

One of the major projects of the program was the creation in 2005 of Russia Today - a rolling English-language TV news channel providing 24 hour news coverage, modeled on CNN. Towards its start-up budget, $30 million of public funds were allocated. A CBS News story on the launch of Russia Today quoted Boris Kagarlitsky as saying it was "very much a continuation of the old Soviet propaganda services". In 2007, Russia Today employed nearly 100 English-speaking special correspondents worldwide.

Russia's deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin said in August 2008, in the context of the Russia-Georgia conflict: "Western media is a well-organized machine, which is showing only those pictures that fit in well with their thoughts. We find it very difficult to squeeze our opinion into the pages of their newspapers."

William Dunbar, who was reporting then for Russia Today from Georgia, said he had not been on air since he mentioned Russian bombing of targets inside Georgia on 9th August 2008, and had to resign over what he claimed was biased coverage by the outlet.

Variety magazine quoted an unnamed "senior journalist" with Russia Today as saying: "My view is that Russia Today is not particularly biased at all. When you look at the Western media, there is a lot of genuflection towards the powers that be. Russian news coverage is largely pro-Russia, but that is to be expected."

The PR efforts notwithstanding, according to an opinion poll released in February 2009 by the BBC World Service, Russia's image around the world had taken a dramatic dive in 2008: forty-two percent of respondents said they had a "mainly negative" view of Russia, according to the poll, which surveyed more than 13,000 people in 21 countries in December and January.

Nominal transfer of presidential power (2008)

File:Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin edit.jpg

Vladimir Putin and his successor Dmitry Medvedev

Most commentators, analysts and politicians concurred in 2008 and early 2009, that the transfer of presidential powers that took place in May 2008, was in name only and Putin continued to retain the number one position in Russia's effective power hierarchy, with Dmitry Medvedev being "Russia’s notional president". At the end of 2008, Nezavisimaya gazeta pointed out this novelty in Russia's political life: the president is in no position to criticize the premier, the government, or ministers; the Duma, in turn, is in no position to criticize its leader's cabinet.

Nikolai Petrov, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center said: "What we see right now is the dominant role of Putin. We see him as a real head of state <…> This is not surprising. We are still living in Putin's Russia."

On February 1, 2009, an analytical piece in The International Herald Tribune said: "Putin is still considered Russia's paramount leader, but by taking the title of prime minister, he may have deprived himself of a fall-guy-in-waiting. That role traditionally has gone to Russia's prime ministers; Yeltsin repeatedly dismissed his during the 1998 default. So far, Putin has instead made a scapegoat of the United States, saying it was at the heart of Russia's crisis, rather than Moscow's over-reliance on the export of natural resources."

Ideology

Political scientist Irina Pavlova said that chekists were not merely a corporation of people united to expropriate financial assets; they had long-standing political objectives of transforming Moscow to the Third Rome and an ideology of "containing" the United States. Columnist George Will emphasized in 2003 the nationalistic nature of Putinism: "Putinism is becoming a toxic brew of nationalism directed against neighboring nations, and populist envy, backed by assaults of state power, directed against private wealth. Putinism is a national socialism without the demonic element of its pioneer <…>". According to Illarionov, the ideology of chekists is Nashism (“ours-ism”), the selective application of rights".

According to Dmitri Trenin (2004), Head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, the then Russia was one of the least ideological countries around the world: "Ideas hardly matter, whereas interests reign supreme. It is not surprising then that the worldview of Russian elites is focused on financial interests. Their practical deeds in fact declare In capital we trust." Trenin described Russia's elite involved in the process of policy-making as people who largely owned the country. Most of them were not public politicians, but the majority were bureaucratic capitalists. According to Trenin, "having survived in a ruthless domestic business and political environment, Russian leaders are well adjusted to rough competition and will take that mindset to the world stage." However, Trenin called Russian-Western relations, from Moscow’s perspective, "competitive, but not antagonistic". He said, "Russia does not crave world domination, and its leaders do not dream of restoring the Soviet Union. They plan to rebuild Russia as a great power with a global reach, organized as a supercorporation."

According to Trenin, Russians "no longer recognize U.S. or European moral authority", i.e. values gap. He said, "from the Russian perspective, there is no absolute freedom anywhere in the world, no perfect democracy, and no government that does not lie to its people. In essence, all are equal by virtue of sharing the same imperfections. Some are more powerful than others, however, and that is what really counts."

The Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky believed (October 2007) that "Putin builds the world's Russia" as opposed to a nation state such as Alexander Lukashenko's Belarus. According to Pavlovsky, Russia's power had to be a model one, i.e. the power that would offer itself to others as a kind of a model to emulate (the USA being one such example).

Russian Communists' view

In November 2008, Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of Russian Federation (the largest opposition group within Russia with its 13% of seats in the national Parliament) in his speech before the 13th Party Congress made these remarks on the system established in Russia under Putin:

"To act effectively and confidently the Party must understand in what situation it exists and works. What are the historical perspectives of our movement? What are the key internal and external factors to be borne in mind?

First. The state-controlled media and the United Russia, together with their underlings in the Duma, keep saying that the regime is solid and has a brilliant future. They are drumming it into people’s heads that the Russian state has left the dire crisis behind it and that we are entering an era of resurgent Russian power under the leadership of Medvedev and Putin. There are many people in the country who want and are ready to believe it because they are tired of two decades of degradation, hopelessness and national humilitation. The people are longing for a return to justice, order and normal life and respond credulously to the Kremlin’s promises and handouts.

Second. Objectively, Russia’s position remains complicated, not to say dismal. The population is dying out. Thanks to the “heroic efforts” of the Yeltsinites the country has lost 5 out of the 22 million square kilometers of its historical territory. Russia has lost half of its production capacity and has yet to reach the 1990 level of output. Our country is facing three mortal dangers: de-industrialization, de-population and mental debilitation.

The ruling group has neither notable successes to boast of nor a clear plan of action. All its activities are geared to a single goal: to stay in power at all costs. Until recently it has been able to keep in power due to the “windfall” high world prices for energy. Its social support rests on the notorious “vertical power structure” which is another way of saying intimidation and blackmail of the broad social strata and the handouts that power chips off the oil and gas pie and throws out to the population in crumbs, especially on the eve of elections.

Third. The capitalist paradise our people were promised back in 1991 has remained a mirage. It is crumbling before our eyes. Instead of a paradise the people have to support 100 dollar billionaires and 200,000 millionaires. Meanwhile a severe financial and production crisis has set in. That accounts for the natural and tangible interest in past Soviet experience and the ideas of social justice. The present administration, under the pressure of public sentiments, increasingly has to adopt left-wing patriotic rhetoric.

All this prompts a very important conclusion: we are on the threshold of major social-political shifts and changes both in the world and in our country. This requires from us new approaches, new ideas and a new quality of work."

Prognosis and aftermath

In mid-December, 2008, Andrey Piontkovsky believed that due to the farcical nature of Putinism, lack of any underpinning ideological project, its exceedingly narrow social base, the dismantling thereof may well occur without much pain; the first psychological step in this direction being the destruction of Putin's mythical image of Russia's "national leader". In late December, 2008, former Presidential aide Georgy Satarov said that, considering the crisis, the country was moving from the Putin era to a new phase - the collapse of the system.

In late December, 2008, The Moscow Times stated: "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's reputation as a Teflon leader is showing scratches as some Russians start to see a growing disconnect between the realities of the financial crisis and Putin's public posture as the nation's savior. Posters openly insulting Putin were among those waved at a rally of thousands of motorists against a hike in import duties for used cars in Vladivostok for the past two weekends. Earlier, only radical members from the banned National Bolshevik Party had dared to attack Putin in public." The newspaper also noted that Russia's political commentators who had earlier refrained from criticizing Putin were now openly attacking him in Russian print, radio and online media. The latter fact was interpreted by political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin as an indication of a ongoing cracking in the consensus of the elite.

On December 28, 2008, Catherine Belton of The Financial Times observed that the problems with Russia's economy, which had thitherto been largely fueled by the rising oil price, appeared to be denting the air of invincibility that Putin had taken on since 2000.

In mid-January 2009, Russia's liberal magazine The New Times, citing unnamed Kremlin officials, maintained that there was a growing rift between Medvedev and Putin and that the former was seeking to distance himself from the latter.

On Februry 1, 2009, Clifford J. Levy in The International Herald Tribune said: "Over the last eight years, as Vladimir Putin has amassed ever more power, Russians have often responded with a collective shrug, as if to say: Go ahead, control everything - as long as we can have our new cars and amply stocked supermarkets, our sturdy ruble and cheap vacations in the Turkish sun. But now the worldwide financial crisis is abruptly ending an oil-driven economic boom here, and the unspoken contract between Putin and his people is being thrown into doubt. In newspaper articles, among political analysts, even in corners of the Kremlin, questions can be heard. Will Russians admire Putin as much when oil is at $40 a barrel as they did when it was at $140 a barrel? And if Russia's economy seriously falters, will his system of hard, personal power prove to be a trap for him? Can it relieve public anger, and can he escape the blame?"

In early February 2009, Russian politician Vladimir Ryzhkov, speaking of Russia's leadership's further anti-democracy steps, concluded: "Russia's near future is becoming increasingly unpredictable as the gap widens between reality and official rhetoric. As the federal budget deficit increases along with inflation, while the ruble falls to new levels against the dollar, the very existence of Putin's authoritarian power vertical is in danger of collapsing along with the economy."

About the same time Jim Rogers, an international investor and co-founder, along with George Soros, of the Quantum Fund, as a memeber of a panel of experts at the Russia Forum 2009, ventured this forecast: "I am not optimistic about the continuous stability of Russia. There's a good chance Russia will continue to disintegrate into more than one country."

On February 5, 2009, Russia's liberal democratic political movement (the movement comprises such opposition politicians as Garry Kasparov, Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov, Ilya Yashin), citing the regime's "total helplessness and flagrant incompetence", maintained that "the dismantling of Putinism" and restoration of democracy in Russia were prerequisites for any successful anti-crisis measures and demanded that Putin's government resign.

See also

• Sovereign democracy
• Nashi (youth movement)
• Yeltsinism
• Corporatism
• Chekism

Further reading

• Edward Lucas The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West , Palgrave Macmillan (February 19, 2008), ISBN 0230606121.
• Putin’s Militocracy by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White
• Russia under Putin. The making of a neo-KGB state., The Economist, Aug 23, 2007
• Russia's government. Putin's people., The Economist, Aug 23, 2007
• The power of Chekists is incredibly stable by Olga Kryshtanovskaya
• The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State, Anderson, Julie (2006), International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 19:2, 237 - 288.
• The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State Anderson, Julie (2007), International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 20:2, 258 - 316
• Russia: Death and resurrection of the KGB By J. Michael Waller, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization
• A Rogue Intelligence State? Why Europe and America Cannot Ignore Russia By Reuel Marc Gerecht
• Siloviki model collection of publications about the Siloviki model on website of the Institute for Economic Analysis Template:Ru icon/Template:En icon
• Living Larger in the New Russia, by Gregory L. White, November 3, 2007
• Judy Shelton (2008-09-03). "The Market Will Punish Putinism". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2008-09-09.