Talk:Inverse gambler's fallacy

First, I don't think we need to be taking stances on whether inferences to multiple worlds do or do not commit the inverse gambler's fallacy. There is supposed to be a little neutrality, especially when it comes to controversial philosophical issues. That's why I originally just said "Defenders of the argument under criticism usually appeal to an observational selection effect that, allegedly, makes all the difference. But it would take us far afield to address this response." There is no need to try to solve everything.

Second, the stance taken doesn't even make sense to me. The article now says that, since the universe is a specified run, then it's not a fallacy to infer multiple universes. But the fact that the universe is a specified run supports the claim that the fallacy is committed, it doesn't undermine it.

>From the article: "The multiple universe hypothesis makes it more likely that life-permitting constants turn up in some universe or another. But it does not affect the probability that they turn up here in our universe (on this specified 'run'); that probability remains as low as it ever was."

A general, non-specified existence claim is confirmed. But the non-general, specified existence claim is not confirmed. Arguing that life-permission is just such a specified existence claim therefore undermines the inference to many universes.

DrRetard

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I find the topic interesting, although somehow I find the discussion (both in the article and here on the talk page) difficult to follow. I studied probability and statistics in high school, and I know how to do simple calculations about lottery tickets and whether I'm safer in a car or an airplane.

Is this topic related somehow to the likelihood that God exists or not? --Ed Poor

No. My understanding of this article is this: there is a commonly-used argument that goes roughly "it's highly improbable that life came to be in the universe -- surely then, something must have put it in motion." This is fallacious reasoning. That does not mean god does not exist, or that god does exist -- it merely says that one argument is not valid. -- Tarquin

The original article as I understood it implied that said argument was valid. When you read it for the first time (a few hours ago) I had probably already rewritten its end and turned its conclusion upside down. Actually, I've had the impression that the whole original article just aimed at introducing and justifying that argument; hence the thing looses cohesion if the conclusion is reversed. But I'm quite sensitive on the invalidity of that argument, so my reading may be biased. -- FvdP 17:39 Oct 8, 2002 (UTC)

(but see below) -- FvdP 18:32 Oct 8, 2002 (UTC)

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There are two different arguments that can be said to fall under "inverse gambler's fallacy":

1. a "proof" that multiple universes exist
2. a counterargument to the following theist argument that God exists: "it's highly improbable that life came to be in the universe -- surely then, something must have put it in motion."

These things are quite different. The fallacy may or may not apply to 1 (multiple universes), it probably does, I'm not definitely sure. What I (FvdP) and (I thought) Hacking are after is its application to 2 (God's existence), and there I stand that the inverse gambler's fallacy clearly does not apply. My guess is that the misunderstaning between us (FvdP & DrRetard) is mainly a misunderstanding about whether the article's arguments address point 1 (multiple universes) or point 2 (God's existence).

Now point by point:

• First, I don't think we need to be taking stances on whether inferences to [multiple worlds or God's existence] do or do not commit the inverse gambler's fallacy ? Yes we should, because by presenting Hacking's argument, the article is taking stance anyway.

• Second, the stance taken doesn't even make sense to me. The article now says that, since the universe is a specified run, then it's not a fallacy to infer multiple universes. But the fact that the universe is a specified run supports the claim that the fallacy is committed, it doesn't undermine it. I agree with you that applied to the multiple universes hypothesis, my stance does not make sense. But as explained above, it was really about God's existence (in my intent at least).

Actually, I must confess (after a few readings of the article) that I don't understand Hacking's point. Would he be actually fighting on 1 (against multiple worlds) rather than 2 (for the "fine-tuning" pro-God argument) ? (Or is he by chance equating the two questions ?)

My point is really about this: "and if there are, then life-permitting constants had to come up somewhere or another, why not here?. To which Hacking somehow answers "why would they appear here ?". I say "why here ? But simply because we are here ! the choice of our universe, because it's by definition the choice of a universe where life exists, is biased towards finding fine-tuned universe parameters (regardless of the existence of a designer)". It's like stopping on the next dice run that issues a 6-6. That surely increases the probability of someone seing a 6-6.

Probability arguments for or against God's existence lead us in muddy waters anyway ;-)

FvdP 18:32 Oct 8, 2002 (UTC)

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First, the point of the original article: Hey, there's this fallacy. We have a tendency to commit this fallacy. We have an even stronger tendency in certain contexts. There's a popular response to an argument for theism, and this response might commit the fallacy.

I'll answer by inserting indented comments as they'll be (mostly) short. FvdP 20:36 Oct 11, 2002 (UTC).

Second, my personal convictions: there is no God, and the fine-tuning argument is pure codswallop. I still find the issues interesting, though.

Same here (but you know that already). FvdP

Third, some specific responses.

No. My understanding of this article is this: there is a commonly-used argument that goes roughly "it's highly improbable that life came to be in the universe -- surely then, something must have put it in motion." This is fallacious reasoning. That does not mean god does not exist, or that god does exist -- it merely says that one argument is not valid.

The original article doesn't address such an argument. Rather, the article addresses a popular response to the fine-tuning argument for theism. Here's the response: "The obtaining of such wildly improbable life-permitting cosmological constants is good evidence that there are many other universes; and this explanation is at least as good as the God-explanation." The article doesn't say whether this response is good or bad. It says that the response might commit the fallacy, and that there's a debate about whether it does.

The original article as I understood it implied that said argument was valid"

The original article says nothing about the validity, soundness, or persuasiveness of the fine-tuning argument itself. Rather, it addresses, without deciding, a popular response to the argument. In any case, I'd never say that the fine-tuning argument is any good; I think it's codswallop.

"There are two different arguments that can be said to fall under "inverse gambler's fallacy":

1. a "proof" that multiple universes exist
2. a counterargument to the following theist argument that God exists: "it's highly improbable that life came to be in the universe -- surely then, something must have put it in motion."

These things are quite different. The fallacy may or may not apply to 1 (multiple universes), it probably does, I'm not definitely sure. What I (FvdP) and (I thought) Hacking are after is its application to 2 (God's existence), and there I stand that the inverse gambler's fallacy clearly does not apply. My guess is that the misunderstaning between us (FvdP & DrRetard) is mainly a misunderstanding about whether the article's arguments address point 1 (multiple universes) or point 2 (God's existence)."

Hacking thinks that the "oscillating universe" version of the popular "multiple universe" response commits the fallacy. White and Dowe think that all versions of the popular response commit the fallacy. Nobody, so far as I know, think that the fine-tuning argument commits the fallacy. I mean, sure, there's a hell of a lot wrong with the fine-tuning argument, in my opinion. But it doesn't fallaciously infer from an improbable result that there are or have been many trials of a similar nature. And that fallacious inference, after all, is the inverse gambler's fallacy.

OK. FvdP

*First, I don't think we need to be taking stances on whether inferences to [multiple worlds or God's existence] do or do not commit the inverse gambler's fallacy ? Yes we should, because by presenting Hacking's argument, the article is taking stance anyway.

This is just bizarre. In any philosophy article, you have to present arguments. The key is to try to give the arguments a fair shake, even if you disagree with them; and you have to try to give popular criticisms a fair shake, even if you think the argument is good and the criticisms lousy. None of this is 'taking a stance', the way that, say, an Everything2 article might do. When an issue is controversial, with bright people on both sides, then try not to take a stance. Simple enough, I would think.

Simple enough ? Simple enough if we agree on words, and on the fact that the question is indeed disputable. About words, please take into account the fact that I'm not a native english speaker. By "the article is taking stance" I meant "the article takes position in favour of Hacking's argument that (some) proof a the multiple worlds hypothesis commits the i.v.f.". And this because (1) Hacking is taking stance this way; (2) the article seems to take Hacking's argument as granted and does not even present the contradictory view ("the argument to the multiple worlds does not commit the inverse gambler's fallacy"); (3) hence the article is taking stance.

I believe that if the answer is obvious and undisputed, even a philosophy article should take stance. (This has more to do with NPOV than with philosophy, actually). My error was believing that the answer was fairly obviously opposite to Hacking's (I no longer think so), so that we should take stance accordingly (even while at the same time presenting Hacking's argument).

And finally, no need to patronize me with "Simple enough", thanks. Don't forget that in this dispute too, there are relatively bright people on both sides, even though I might be dense at times. FvdP

Actually, I must confess (after a few readings of the article) that I don't understand Hacking's point. Would he be actually fighting on 1 (against multiple worlds) rather than 2 (for the "fine-tuning" pro-God argument) ? (Or is he by chance equating the two questions ?)

Hacking thinks that someone who looks at the (alleged) improbability of life-permitting constants and thence infers the existence of many previous oscillating universes is committing the inverse gambler's fallacy. Just because the improbable result would show up on some run doesn't mean it would show up on this run. So it's improper to infer multiple runs.

My point is really about this: "and if there are, then life-permitting constants had to come up somewhere or another, why not here?. To which Hacking somehow answers "why would they appear here ?". I say "why here ? But simply because we are here ! the choice of our universe, because it's by definition the choice of a universe where life exists, is biased towards finding fine-tuned universe parameters (regardless of the existence of a designer)". It's like stopping on the next dice run that issues a 6-6. That surely increases the probability of someone seing a 6-6.

But no one disagrees with this. If there are many universes, then there's nothing surprising about us living in a universe with the improbable bundle of life-permitting constants. The question is whether we can infer that there are indeed many universes, from the observation that we live in such a universe. Just because a hypothesis, if known true, would render an improbable result unsurprising doesn't make it OK to infer the hypothesis from the observation of the improbable result.

I have no problem with that argument expressed in that way.

Could you also please identify yourself ? You did not sign, you were not logged-in, so all I know is your IP address. A nickname would be better (e.g. are you DrRetard or not ?) This would give a better sense of continuity in the discussion, in case you already participated or will participate more.

FvdP 20:36 Oct 11, 2002 (UTC)

Yeah, sorry, it logged me out and I was in a hurry to be done with the post! I apologize for any patronizing tone. And if my original article caused all this confusion, then it probably does need some rewriting! For one thing, I'll try to present the response to Hacking, et al. in greater detail than before. --DrRetard