User talk:Parsecboy: Difference between revisions
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:Thanks, yeah, everything went ok. And the pain killers they prescribed me (a liquid version of [[percocet]]) isn't actually messing with my head at all. So here I am :) [[User:Parsecboy|Parsecboy]] ([[User talk:Parsecboy#top|talk]]) 15:18, 21 March 2009 (UTC) |
:Thanks, yeah, everything went ok. And the pain killers they prescribed me (a liquid version of [[percocet]]) isn't actually messing with my head at all. So here I am :) [[User:Parsecboy|Parsecboy]] ([[User talk:Parsecboy#top|talk]]) 15:18, 21 March 2009 (UTC) |
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== Something for you == |
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|style="font-size: x-large; padding: 0; vertical-align: middle; height: 1.1em;" | '''The ''[[Wikipedia:WikiProject_Military_history/Awards#A-Class_medals|Military history A-Class medal]]'''''  |
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|style="vertical-align: middle; border-top: 1px solid lightsteelblue;" | For prolific work on {{SMS|Von der Tann}}, {{SMS|Moltke|1910}} and {{Sclass|Nassau|battleship|6}}, promoted to A-Class between February and March 2009, you are hereby awarded the [[Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Awards/ACM|A-Class Medal]]. [[User:Roger Davies|<span style="color:maroon; font-variant:small-caps">'''Roger Davies'''</span>]] <sup>[[User talk:Roger Davies|'''talk''']]</sup> 07:22, 23 March 2009 (UTC) |
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Revision as of 07:22, 23 March 2009
Nominations for the Military history WikiProject coordinator election
The Military history WikiProject coordinator selection process has started; to elect the coordinators to serve for the next six months. If you are interested in running, please sign up here by 23:59 (UTC) on 13 March!
This has been an automated delivery by BrownBot (talk) 19:55, 8 March 2009 (UTC)
high seas fleet
I was recently looking at the battle of Jutland article, which lead me to the grand fleet article, and then to the High seas fleet. On Grand fleet i found a partial order of battle at Jutland, which reproduced in a less complete way the one at [order of battle at Jutland] referenced by the battle article. Since I felt it a bad idea to keep essentially the same (complicated! and subtly different) list in two places, i just scratched the one at GF and linked to the OOBAJ article. I then found the HSF had just the same situation, so scratched that one too. I noticed it had some extra info so i copied that across, and I added some more names from Corbett's Naval operations. Today I noticed that it was you who had just added the order of battle to HSF. Hope youre not too put out about that, but I don't really think the exact same list ought to be in more than one place.
Corbett also has info about the submarines and airships and their commanders, though I have not got round to adding it yet, and also lists some british ships which were undergoing repairs. I was thinking that they probably ought to be mentioned, particularly since the list of ships which made it to Jutland is being used in articles about the whole fleet.
I was thinking that the HSF article ought to be expanded with more detail of what the fleet did etc, and how its numbers changed through the war. The kaiserliche marine article now has a history of the buildup of the german navy and a section on WWI. I would suggest the HSF article ought to be better integrated somehow with the KM article. I'm not quite sure though when the HSF as such came into existence. If it was basically just for WWI as with the grand fleet, then it might work as a 'main article' from the KM one doing the WWI stuff in more detail. The KM article is lacking in such detail at the moment. Sort of, the raison d'etre for the Kaiserliche Marine, but if KM contained a decent summary of the navy during the war, then it would be rather long. So it needs a sub article. Anyway, I'm rambling. having just spent some hours adding to the order of battle myself, i might feel a wee bit upset if someone came along and rubbed it out. Sandpiper (talk) 19:31, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
- Oh, yeah, I saw your removal of the order of battle. I had forgotten that there was a separate order of battle article for Jutland, and thought that the HSF article should have an OoB since the Grand Fleet did. Since the information is at the other article, it seems perfectly fine to me to not replicate the data in each of the fleet articles.
- As far as I know, the High Seas Fleet was only created in 1913 (when Ingenohl assumed command), so it would be similar to the Grand Fleet in that regard. I agree that the article should be a "main article" for the KM article. As you may have noticed, I've been doing work on many of the individual ship and ship-class articles; eventually, I'll get around to improving the HSF article. Regards, Parsecboy (talk) 22:29, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
- Yes I did. Havn't looked at the articles, but I was independantly thinking perhaps the German side was a bit underrepresented. Sandpiper (talk) 22:40, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
- Yeah, it generally is underrepresented. Tarrant's Jutland: The German Perspective is a pretty good book, but it only covers the battles of the North Sea from 1914–1916. There's nothing on Spee, the operations in the Baltic, or Goeben's activities. Parsecboy (talk) 22:51, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
- All terribly romantic in a knights in armour sort of way, that business of Spee and cradock. one was as bad as the other, expecting to end up dead but going through the process of slugging it out. As a general point, I don't think we trace the history of the war very well. The way the articles on battles are structured, the campaign boxes dont automatically link, say, north sea to south atlantic and you don't get a feel for the cause and effect of one upon the next. We also miss some of the not quite battles where say, the germans sortied again after Jutland and did not simply give up after that battle.
- Yeah, it generally is underrepresented. Tarrant's Jutland: The German Perspective is a pretty good book, but it only covers the battles of the North Sea from 1914–1916. There's nothing on Spee, the operations in the Baltic, or Goeben's activities. Parsecboy (talk) 22:51, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
- Yes I did. Havn't looked at the articles, but I was independantly thinking perhaps the German side was a bit underrepresented. Sandpiper (talk) 22:40, 9 March 2009 (UTC)
Just read your nassau article: the standard description seems to be that Nassau's guns could not depress enough to hit spitfire. However, the first hand witnesses describe spitfire healing over more than she ever had before, and Nassau similarly tipped sideways during the collision. If they were trying to fire at that moment, then the deck might have been leaning as much as full gun elevation in normal times. Just a thought, was wondering how accurate that couldn't depress the guns line was. Have been reading about the jutland destroyer night actions: we don't have a good description of what happened. I never got a feel for the destroyers being blown to pieces from either the description here in the Jutland article, or say Massie, where the summary descriptions didnt put across to me how serious the fighting was. Show a signal lamp: two minutes later deck's a complete wreck with hundreds of shells being fired at point blank range. The short descriptions made the destroyers sound a bit wimpy, what with them all colliding with each other as well. I also got the impression from reading the detail that Scheer was demonstrating some skill and determination as he threaded through the destroyers. The initial impression from the short summary descriptions is that he was a bit of an idiot for getting in a mess with the grand fleet, and got panned for his second approach. But now i think it more a calculated risk which was certainly not a suicide mission. He really survived three contacts with a significantly superior force and pretty much got away with it. I have put some of the details now into two separate destroyer articles and am beginning to think a 'main article' night action at jutland could be quite long. I don't blame jellicoe for turning away from torpedos, which caused a lot of fuss at the time, but whether it was his fault or not, the night action was a real mess up. Notwithstanding what I said about Scheer, he shouldn't have been able to get away with it and perhaps he knew it. Sandpiper (talk) 00:04, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
- Tarrant's account of the Nassau/Spitfire collision indicates that the Nassau heeled over 10 degrees when the ships collided, and that the forward guns fired as the ships scraped past each other. I'm not sure if the ship had settled back down by then, or if she was still leaning over; I doubt we'll find a source that is as specific as we'd need it to be to get the right answer. Just comparing Spitfire to Rheinland (you can use the figures standing on both decks to get a rough estimate of their approximate relative sizes), it seems unlikely that the Nassau's guns would have been able to depress low enough to hit the Spitfire directly alongside, even if the ship was totally level.
- I think a separate "night actions" article would be worthwhile; Tarrant's book has about 25 pages on the night engagements. There seems to be quite a bit of worthwhile information that's not in the Jutland article. And yes, the Jutland article doesn't give any indication just how savage the fighting was during the British torpedo attacks. I agree with your assessment of the battle; I really don't think the failure to engage the Germans during the night was Jellicoe's fault; too many of his subordinates failed to report their sightings, and they also failed to engage the ships they did encounter. Jellicoe doesn't appear to have had the whole picture; it would have been irresponsible to commit his fleet to a night engagement based on spotty information (especially considering the British disadvantage at night fighting). My understanding is that decades of increasing regimentation robbed the RN officer corps of its "Nelsonian initiative", and so many commanders refused to act without express orders from their superiors. I think you're right; had the British been more on the ball, they would have badly mauled the HSF, perhaps even annihilated it (but given the German advantages in shells/propellant/handling and internal subdivision, etc., it probably would have been a costly victory). Also, Scheer seems to have been very determined to force his way through the British destroyers; both times his dreadnoughts began to turn away from the British destroyers, he immediately ordered "Durchhalten" and sent his ships back towards Horns Reef. It doesn't seem that he was going to allow anything to stand in his way. Parsecboy (talk) 17:23, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
Beatty has been criticised for his failures to send signals and the incompetence of his flag officer. The behaviour of the destroyers might perhaps suggest this sort of failing was totally widespread, so not so much Beatty's fault. There are a copule of eye witness descriptions of the collision in 'Jutland 1916 by steel and hart'
“ | the two ships met end on, port bow to port bow, we steaming at almost 27 knots, she steaming at not less than 10 knots (perhaps 20 or more). You can imagine how the eigthth inch plate of a destroyer would feel such a blow. I can recollect a fearful crash, then being hurled across the deck, and feeling Spitfire rolling over to starboard as no sea ever made her roll. As we bumped, the enemy opened fire with their foc'sle guns, though luckily they could not depress them to hit us, but the blast of the guns cleared everything before it. Our foremast came tumbling down, our for'ard searchlight found its way from its platform above the fore-bridge down to the deck, and the foremost funnell was blown back until it rested neatly between the two foremost ventilation cowls, like the hinginf funnel of a penny river steamboat. Lieutenant Athelstan Bush. spitfire. p314 | ” |
“ | we sustained a direct hit on the forward group of lights and, soon after, rammed HMS Spitfire which had not seen us. The destroyer brushed against the 15cm gun in my casemate and ripped it and its carriage from the deck. Just a few seconds before the collision I had been looking through the telescopic sight on the right side of the gun but was then called away to my proper battle station of the starboard side, because destroyers were reported there. thus i stood right in the doorway of the middle casemate which lay between the two 15cm gun casemates. With the tilt of the ship, the armour plated door struck me on the right foot and the back. we believed the british ship to be destroyed at the time, especially as a great number of pieces of wreckage, both great and small, were floating round us. Cadet Heinz Bonatz, Sms Nassau p.316. | ” |
- It does seem to me that it was pretty endemic: Malaya's captain, as well as the V BS commander, Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas both failed to report their sighting of the German fleet. Moltke also made a similar escape from the II BS dreadnoughts during the night; the British commanders had thought it better to remain semi-concealed in the darkness rather than attempt to destroy the battlecruiser.
- Bennett's Naval Battles of the First World War has what I'm assuming is a paraphrased version of the first quote (some of the same phrases, but different in some places). It makes it seem as though the guns were fired directly during the collision, when the Nassau was heeled over 10 degrees. Something I read today (maybe Massie or Tarrant) state that the Nassau continued firing as the ships scraped by each other, but it's still not clear exactly what happened. Parsecboy (talk) 20:02, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
This is a bit long, but i was reading your bit in Nassau about Tirpitz fight for money. This does not accord well with whats in Herwig, Luxury fleet, which I used for the Kaiserliche marine article. so, big quote coming up
“ | Fisher's Dreadnought and Invincible "leaps", coupled with the other reforms affecting personnel, training, gunnery, tactics, and fleet concentration, effectively blunted the German naval challenge of 1900. In terms of both quality and quantity, Fisher in 1906 torpedoed Tirpitz's calculated risk embodied in the 2:3 ratio. Superior German personnel and materiel were now a fiction. Moreover, Germany already spent about 6o per cent of her total income on the Army. Where was the money for the Dreadnoughts to come from? These ships entailed a cost increase of 15-20 million GM per unit over the last class of Deutschlands and, taken together with the requisite canal and harbour-channel dredging and widening (that between 1907 and 1918 cost 244. million GM), posed a horrendous dilemma. Failure to accept the British challenge meant, in effect, abandoning Tirpitz's master plan. Acceptance would inaugurate a monstrous naval race until financial attrition forced one of the participants out of the contest.
It is interesting to note that Tirpitz in 1906-7 did not once put forth the argument that Fisher's Dreadnought policy cancelled British naval superiority and hence accorded all other naval powers an equal chance to catch up. In fact, Tirpitz was deeply disturbed by the news of the "super" battleship and battle-cruiser building across the North Sea. Throughout the summer of 1906 he buried himself in his Black Forest retreat and did his best to avoid the Kaiser. For the latter had quickly recognized that the Dreadnought was, in reality, Cuniberti's design from Jane's Fighting Ships in 1903, and he once again harassed Tirpitz with his "fast capital ship" project. 58 "Luxury" Fleet Tirpitz was in a quandary. A decision to build Dreadnoughts would now remove all camouflage from German intentions and make it clear to British leaders that Berlin intended to compete with the Royal Navy. Such a mammoth fleet could not be hidden. But the cost factor was highly alarming. Tirpitz had carefully worked out his Etappenplan so that naval construction would be based upon the expansion of German industry and trade, that is, displacement of ships would be raised only slowly, about 2,000 tons per series, over an extended period, in order not to cause alarm in London and to keep cost increases within limits. Tirpitz initially still hoped that he could get away with an increase in displacement to 16,ooo tons. German canal, harbour and shipyard facilities would be taxed to the utmost even with this increase; the locks at Wilhelmshaven restricted beam to 23.2 metres, and any ships of greater displacement than the Braunschweig or the Deutschland threatened to run aground in the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal. On 22 September 1905 the decisive meeting concerning Dreadnought building was held in Tirpitz's Berlin office; the opening of parliament was, by then, only a few weeks away. The state secretary from the start placed a unit cost ceiling of 36.5 million GM on Dreadnoughts. The cost limit for battle-cruisers was simultaneously set at 27.5 million GM. The displacement of the new battleships was to be kept below 19,ooo tons. Tirpitz's staff came up with a figure of 940 million GM to be requested from the Reichstag - in addition to 6o million GM for dredging the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal. Captain Eduard v. Capelle, Tirpitz's most trusted intimate, calculated that the naval expansion would necessitate an annual increase in taxation of 130 million GM. It was estimated that this budget would take the Reich as far as 1910-11, when a sixty-ship plan was to be laid before the deputies. In other words, Tirpitz now decided to pick up the gauntlet that he felt Fisher had thrown him. For in order to stand a genuine chance against a British fleet in the North Sea, he could not allow his forces to be more than numerically one-third weaker than the enemy's. Nor could he permit British quality to be substantially higher than his own. If the master plan were to be salvaged, there was no choice other than to proceed with the naval race. Chancellor v. Bülow accepted the naval increases by 19 September 1905; Wilhelm II gave his approval on 4 October 1905. But there remained the Reichstag. The international crisis over Morocco was now exploited to the full for this purpose. In addition, The Dreadnought Challenge 59 the Russian fleet's skirmish with British fishing trawlers off the Dogger Bank and Arthur Lee's indiscreet "Copenhagen" talk had whipped up public enthusiasm for naval increases. In May 19o6, after a final altercation with the Kaiser over the "fast capital ship" project, during which Tirpitz tendered his resignation in pure Bismarckian fashion in order to force approval of his plans, the expansion was passed as a Supplementary Bill .(Novelle). It called for the construction of six cruisers as well as the aforementioned outlay of 94o million GM for Dreadnought building and canal, harbour and dock improvements. The total constituted a 35 per cent increase over the Second Navy Bill of 1900. Two Dreadnoughts and one battle-cruiser were annually to be laid down. The four ships of the Nassau series (Nassau, Posen, Rheinland, Westfalen) were laid down between June and August 1907 with the greatest secrecy ever attempted by German yards. In contrast to the Dreadnought, the chief designer, Hans Bürkner, placed greater stress on protection than on armaments, and accordingly established the general principle that the thickness of the belt armour was to be equivalent to the calibre of the heavy guns. The first German "super" battleships were launched in 19o8 and completed in 1909-10 at an average cost of 37.4 million GM each, thereby surpassing Tirpitz's ceiling of 36.5 million GM. Bürkner's insistence on optimum underwater protection resulted in a honeycomb type of hull subdivision; the Nassau had sixteen, and her successors nineteen, watertight compartments. This, in turn, required the wider beam which enhanced stability. But the main innovation centred round Nassau's armament. Reciprocating engines took up a great deal of space at midlength, and hence the mounting of the six turrets, all at the same level, was not very .successful. Superfiring turrets were out of the question as no room could be found for their magazines and lifts. Bürkner therefore had to choose hexagonal mountings with two turrets at the sides. This, of course, meant that in firing broadsides, Nassau had to do without two turrets (four guns) at the sides. The Germans were in (his way inferior in design to the British one-centre line, one-wing system. Only in firing forward and aft were the Germans able to bring a maximum number of guns to bear. In other words, trebling the number of guns resulted only in doubling the metal weight of broadside over the Deutschland class. Turbines were out of the question, partly because Tirpitz favoured them only for cruisers, 6o "Luxury" Fleet and partly because the Navy Office's construction department had in 1905 still ruled that "use of turbines in heavy warships does not recommend itself". The Nassau class was outfitted with twelve 28 cm, twelve 15 cm and sixteen 8.8 cm guns, and eventually comprised the First Squadron of the High Sea Fleet. German Dreadnoughts were known up to 1914 for their smaller calibre guns (28 cm as opposed to 3o.5 cm at first), their thicker armour (300 mm compared with 279 mm), and their slower speed (20 kn versus 22 kn). They were recognized as having better underwater compartmentation and hence greater stability. (Table 9). |
” |
it goes on about battlecruisers and them gets back to the budget issue. Don't know if you want to see? Sandpiper (talk) 19:52, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
- That sounds like an interesting read. I've got to run off for a bit, but I'll read through it when I get back. I've actually got a couple of books on the building of the German navy: Goodall's By Order of the Kaiser and Weir's Building the Kaiser's Navy, I'll have to check them and see what they have to say. Parsecboy (talk) 20:02, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
Could you take a look at this article again? some added a mess of tags today that i don't really think are justified, so I'd like to see your opinion, also could you have a look at rating it again? since its appears to have been waiting some time within the terrorism project page for a rating. thanks Sherzo (talk) 01:38, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
Teller-Ulam design
Thanks for the move. I tried like 5 times to get this page moved back where it belonged, got reverted by IPs etc... Headbomb {ταλκκοντριβς – WP Physics} 13:17, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
- Yup, no problem. Parsecboy (talk) 13:21, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
what
i dont understand your message.Fld300b (talk) 20:21, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
oh
i now understand. i tought that was an arical. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Fld300b (talk • contribs) 20:27, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
Imperial Triple Crown jewels
Thank you for contributions to the project, Great work, especially on Amagi class battlecruiser - it's no Bird of Prey, though it does look formidable :P -- May you wear the crowns well. Cirt (talk) 21:49, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
- Well, how can anything that's armed with puny 16" guns compete with photon torpedoes? Parsecboy (talk) 22:03, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
- response on my talk page -MBK004 22:05, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
Who watches your talk?
...<_< —Ed 17 (Talk / Contribs) 00:48, 14 March 2009 (UTC)
- Lol, nice one, Ed. Parsecboy (talk) 12:58, 14 March 2009 (UTC)
Coordinator Elections
As a member of the WikiProject that is running as a Coordinator, it always gives me great pleasure when members get involved. Thank you, it really shows that some of the members truly car about the future of the WikiProject. Keep up the Good Work. Have A Great Day! Lord R. T. Oliver The Olive Branch 00:55, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
Great opinion of the Cooption, I see you put some thought into it, Keep Up the Good Work! Have A Great Day! Lord R. T. Oliver The Olive Branch 02:11, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
- Yeah, I look forward to having more coords around after the election; there's always plenty of work to go around. And, we got some good coords during the last period by co-option, so I don't think it's a bad thing. Regards, Parsecboy (talk) 02:42, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
- (Cross your fingers on my bid for coordinator it is coming down to the wire) Have A Great Day! Lord R. T. Oliver The Olive Branch 21:22, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
Your not leaving us are you? Is that what you mean by you are going out of Commission? Have A Great Day! Lord R. T. Oliver The Olive Branch 23:26, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
- Oh, of course not :) I'm getting my tonsils out on Friday, and I don't think I'll be able to do much while I'll still be on pain-killers. Good times, right? Parsecboy (talk) 23:28, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
- Oh Ok well good luck on the tonsils, Have A Great Day! Lord R. T. Oliver The Olive Branch 00:54, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks, I'm not really looking forward to it :) (and not just because I'll be away from the Wiki for the longest block of time since I started, lol) Parsecboy (talk) 00:58, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
Yavuz
Would this link help you? :) —Ed 17 (Talk / Contribs) 16:33, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
- It looks like it has some things that aren't in Conway's and Gröner's. I'll have to bookmark that for when I eventually get around to working on Goeben/Yavuz. Thanks! Parsecboy (talk) 16:36, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
Per regeuested "Monetary-disequilibrium theory" title change
Thank you. --Thomasmeeks (talk) 17:06, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
- Glad to be of help! Parsecboy (talk) 17:15, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
Military history WikiProject coordinator election
The Military history WikiProject coordinator election has started. We will be selecting coordinators from a pool of eighteen to serve for the next six months. Please vote here by 23:59 (UTC) on Saturday, 28 March! Thank you.
This has been an automated delivery by BrownBot (talk) 01:54, 21 March 2009 (UTC)
Good To See Ya
Good to see that the Painkillers are working, Hope everything went alright. Have A Great Day! Lord R. T. Oliver The Olive Branch 15:16, 21 March 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks, yeah, everything went ok. And the pain killers they prescribed me (a liquid version of percocet) isn't actually messing with my head at all. So here I am :) Parsecboy (talk) 15:18, 21 March 2009 (UTC)
Something for you
The Military history A-Class medal | ||
For prolific work on SMS Von der Tann, SMS Moltke (1910) and Error: {{sclass}} invalid format code: 6. Should be 0–5, or blank (help), promoted to A-Class between February and March 2009, you are hereby awarded the A-Class Medal. Roger Davies talk 07:22, 23 March 2009 (UTC) |