Syllabus - Théorie de La Finance D - Entreprise-Modif
Syllabus - Théorie de La Finance D - Entreprise-Modif
Syllabus - Théorie de La Finance D - Entreprise-Modif
Objectifs d’apprentissage
- Connaître et comprendre les principales théories de la finance d’entreprise.
- Comprendre les facteurs qui influent sur la structure de capital de l’entreprise.
- Comprendre les facteurs qui influent sur la politique de dividende de
l’entreprise.
- Comprendre l’incidence de la structure de propriété et du contrôle sur les
décisions financières.
1
Principaux thèmes
Evaluation
Modalité Durée épreuve % de la note
- Contrôle continu Assiduité-Participation 10%
Structure du cours
2
3 Cours La théorie de l'efficience des marchés financiers : MM. M’RABET
- La notion d’efficience des marchés & El FARISSI
- Les formes et tests empiriques d’efficience
-La finance comportementale
Cours La valeur de la firme et la structure de financement : MM. El FARISSI
4 - L’indépendance de la structure financière & M’RABET
- La théorie de l’arbitrage ("Trade-off theory")
- La théorie du market-timing
5 Cours La théorie du signal : MM.El FARISSI
- La théorie du financement hiérarchique (Pecking order & M’RABET
theory)
- La politique de dividende comme mode de
signalisation
Interrogation écrite
3
Références
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Bachelier, L., "Théorie de la spéculation", Annales de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure, 1900.
Bhattacharya, S., 1979, "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy and the 'Bird in the Hand'
Fallacy ", Bell Journal of Economics 1, 259-270.
Black, F., and M. Scholes, 1973, "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities", Journal
of Political Economy, 637-659.
Fama, E., 1965, "Random Walks in Stock Market Prices", Financial Analysts Journal 21, 55–
59.
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 53-82.
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Financial Economics 6, 95–101.
Jensen, M., 1986, "Agency Costs of free cash Flows, Corporate finance and takeover",
American Economic Review 76, 323-329
Kim, E., 1978, "A Mean-Variance Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Corporate Debt
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Leverage", Journal of Finance 28, 911-922.
Leland, H., and H. Pyle, 1977, "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and
Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance 32, 371-387.
Merton, R.C., 1973, "Theory of Rational Option Pricing", Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science, 141-183.
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have Information that Investors do not Have", Journal of Financial Economics, 187-221.
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Approach", Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40.
Samuelson, P., 1965, "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly", Industrial
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Scott, J., 1977, “Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure”, Journal of
Finance 32, 1-19.
Shleifer, R., and A. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance
52, 737-783.