perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2

amluto · torvalds · commit 0161028b7c8a · 2016-05-09T17:57:12.000-07:00
Allowing unprivileged kernel profiling lets any user dump follow kernel
control flow and dump kernel registers.  This most likely allows trivial
kASLR bypassing, and it may allow other mischief as well.  (Off the top
of my head, the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR output during /dev/urandom reads
could be quite interesting.)

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ allowed to execute.
 perf_event_paranoid:
 
 Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged
-users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  The default value is 1.
+users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  The default value is 2.
 
  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
 >=0: Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_IOC_LOCK
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct srcu_struct pmus_srcu;
  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
  */
-int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 1;
+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
 
 /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
 int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
