x86: Slightly tweak the access_ok() C variant for better code

H. Peter Anvin · H. Peter Anvin · commit a740576a4abf · 2013-12-27T17:02:53.000-08:00
gcc can under very specific circumstances realize that the code sequence: foo += bar; if (foo < bar) ... ... is equivalent to a carry out from the addition. Tweak the implementation of access_ok() (specifically __chk_range_not_ok()) to make it more likely that gcc will make that connection. It isn't fool-proof (sometimes gcc seems to think it can make better code with lea, and ends up with a second comparison), still, but it seems to be able to connect the two more frequently this way. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFzPBdbfKovMT8Edr4SmE2_=%2BOKJFac9XW2awegogTkVTA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline int __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
 {
 	/*
 	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
@@ -55,7 +55,9 @@ static inline int __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, uns
 
 	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
 	addr += size;
-	return (addr < size) || (addr > limit);
+	if (addr < size)
+		return true;
+	return addr > limit;
 }
 
 #define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ static inline int __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, uns
  * this function, memory access functions may still return -EFAULT.
  */
 #define access_ok(type, addr, size) \
-	(likely(__range_not_ok(addr, size, user_addr_max()) == 0))
+	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, user_addr_max()))
 
 /*
  * The exception table consists of pairs of addresses relative to the
