x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL

darrenkenny · KAGA-KOKO · commit af189c95a371 · 2018-02-02T23:13:57.000+01:00
Fixes: 117cc7a ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {

Original file line number	Diff line number	Diff line change
`@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];`
`150`	`150`	`* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest`
`151`	`151`	`* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both`
`152`	`152`	`* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future`
`153`		`- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT might it be avoided.`
	`153`	`+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL might it be avoided.`
`154`	`154`	`*/`
`155`	`155`	`static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)`
`156`	`156`	`{`