arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions

ctmarinas · wildea01 · commit cab15ce604e5 · 2016-08-25T18:00:29.000+01:00
The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing
the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU
implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still
access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect
against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such
protection must enable features like SECCOMP.

This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros
to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that
pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't
set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the
pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults.

Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
@@ -70,12 +70,13 @@
 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC		__pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
 #define PAGE_READONLY		__pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
 #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
+#define PAGE_EXECONLY		__pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
 
 #define __P000  PAGE_NONE
 #define __P001  PAGE_READONLY
 #define __P010  PAGE_COPY
 #define __P011  PAGE_COPY
-#define __P100  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __P100  PAGE_EXECONLY
 #define __P101  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
 #define __P110  PAGE_COPY_EXEC
 #define __P111  PAGE_COPY_EXEC
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@
 #define __S001  PAGE_READONLY
 #define __S010  PAGE_SHARED
 #define __S011  PAGE_SHARED
-#define __S100  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __S100  PAGE_EXECONLY
 #define __S101  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
 #define __S110  PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
 #define __S111  PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
 #define pte_write(pte)		(!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE))
 #define pte_exec(pte)		(!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN))
 #define pte_cont(pte)		(!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_CONT))
-#define pte_user(pte)		(!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_USER))
+#define pte_ng(pte)		(!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_NG))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
 #define pte_hw_dirty(pte)	(pte_write(pte) && !(pte_val(pte) & PTE_RDONLY))
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)];
 #define pte_dirty(pte)		(pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte))
 
 #define pte_valid(pte)		(!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID))
-#define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \
-	((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID)
+#define pte_valid_global(pte) \
+	((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == PTE_VALID)
 #define pte_valid_young(pte) \
 	((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF))
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
 	 * Only if the new pte is valid and kernel, otherwise TLB maintenance
 	 * or update_mmu_cache() have the necessary barriers.
 	 */
-	if (pte_valid_not_user(pte)) {
+	if (pte_valid_global(pte)) {
 		dsb(ishst);
 		isb();
 	}
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 			pte_val(pte) &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
 		else
 			pte_val(pte) |= PTE_RDONLY;
-		if (pte_user(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
+		if (pte_ng(pte) && pte_exec(pte) && !pte_special(pte))
 			__sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr);
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -251,8 +251,7 @@ static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 good_area:
 	/*
 	 * Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
-	 * occurred. If we encountered a write or exec fault, we must have
-	 * appropriate permissions, otherwise we allow any permission.
+	 * occurred.
 	 */
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
 		fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 	int fault, sig, code;
-	unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC;
+	unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE;
 	unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
 
 	if (notify_page_fault(regs, esr))
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm,
  *		w: (no) no	w: (no) no	w: (copy) copy	w: (no) no
  *		x: (no) no	x: (no) yes	x: (no) yes	x: (yes) yes
  *
+ * On arm64, PROT_EXEC has the following behaviour for both MAP_SHARED and
+ * MAP_PRIVATE:
+ *								r: (no) no
+ *								w: (no) no
+ *								x: (yes) yes
  */
 pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
 	__P000, __P001, __P010, __P011, __P100, __P101, __P110, __P111,
