@@ -3182,40 +3182,43 @@ REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC;
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query that database would take protective action at the beginning of each
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session. Specifically, they would begin each session by
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setting <varname>search_path</varname> to the empty string or otherwise
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- removing non-superuser- writable schemas
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+ removing schemas that are writable by non-superusers
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from <varname>search_path</varname>. There are a few usage patterns
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easily supported by the default configuration:
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem>
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- <!-- "DROP SCHEMA public" is inferior to this REVOKE, because pg_dump
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- doesn't preserve that DROP.
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-
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- A database owner can attack the database's users via "CREATE SCHEMA
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+ <para>
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+ Constrain ordinary users to user-private schemas.
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+ To implement this pattern, first ensure that no schemas have
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+ public <literal>CREATE</literal> privileges. Then, for every user
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+ needing to create non-temporary objects, create a schema with the
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+ same name as that user, for example
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+ <literal>CREATE SCHEMA alice AUTHORIZATION alice</literal>.
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+ (Recall that the default search path starts
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+ with <literal>$user</literal>, which resolves to the user
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+ name. Therefore, if each user has a separate schema, they access
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+ their own schemas by default.) This pattern is a secure schema
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+ usage pattern unless an untrusted user is the database owner or
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+ holds the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> privilege, in which case no
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+ secure schema usage pattern exists.
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+ </para>
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+ <!-- A database owner can attack the database's users via "CREATE SCHEMA
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trojan; ALTER DATABASE $mydb SET search_path = trojan, public;". A
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CREATEROLE user can issue "GRANT $dbowner TO $me" and then use the
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database owner attack. -->
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+
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<para>
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- Constrain ordinary users to user-private schemas. To implement this,
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- first issue <literal>REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM
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- PUBLIC</literal>. Then, for every user needing to create non-temporary
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- objects, create a schema with the same name as that user. Recall that
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- the default search path starts with <literal>$user</literal>, which
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- resolves to the user name. Therefore, if each user has a separate
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- schema, they access their own schemas by default. After adopting this
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- pattern in a database where untrusted users had already logged in,
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- consider auditing the public schema for objects named like objects in
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- schema <literal>pg_catalog</literal>. This pattern is a secure schema
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- usage pattern unless an untrusted user is the database owner or holds
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- the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> privilege, in which case no secure
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- schema usage pattern exists.
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- </para>
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- <para>
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- If the database originated in an upgrade
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- from <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> 14 or earlier,
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- the <literal>REVOKE</literal> is essential. Otherwise, the default
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- configuration follows this pattern; ordinary users can create only
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- temporary objects until a privileged user furnishes a schema.
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+ In <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> 15 and later, the default
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+ configuration supports this usage pattern. In prior versions, or
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+ when using a database that has been upgraded from a prior version,
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+ you will need to remove the public <literal>CREATE</literal>
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+ privilege from the <literal>public</literal> schema (issue
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+ <literal>REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC</literal>).
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+ Then consider auditing the <literal>public</literal> schema for
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+ objects named like objects in schema <literal>pg_catalog</literal>.
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</para>
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+ <!-- "DROP SCHEMA public" is inferior to this REVOKE, because pg_dump
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+ doesn't preserve that DROP. -->
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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