What is the relationship between formal, "general" logic and transcendental logic? Is t... more What is the relationship between formal, "general" logic and transcendental logic? Is the former prior to the latter or is it the other way round? Can the one be deduced and derived from the other or based upon it? There is a widespread controversy among philosophers concerning these questions.1 In any case, most of them accept the assumption that one of these logics should be prior to the other. As for me, I don't accept this assumption at all, and in this paper I attempt to show that such a priority is impossible, since the two logics are but different uses or employments of the same under standing {Verstand). Kant apeaks of the unity of human reason (Vernunft), the pure theoretical reason and the pure practical reason. The difference between the two is but that of a use or an employment (Gebrauch or Anwendung).2 Two uses can be made of the same reason. By 'reason' I mean the whole scope of the a priori forms?of intuitions, concepts (categories), principles, ideas, imperatives etc., all of which should be united coherently and organically in one system. Hence, by 'reason' I mean the four components of reason in the wide sense: the a priori forms of sensation, understanding, power of judge ment and Reason in its strict sense, as the faculty of ideas. Kant has to prove, therefore, that the unity of each of these components (e.g., of the power of judgement) is not broken down by its different uses (in this example, the reflective use?the teleological use of judgement?and the constitutive use? in the schematism of categories by time). In any case, it seems that Kant has failed to prove the unity of the practical and the theoretical use of reason, and all his "attempts" to display the "same" components of reason in his First and Second Critiques are nothing but an unconvincing attempt to solve the problem by "bureaucratical" devices such as forced analogies, far-fetched ex amples etc. Actually, the analogy between the structures of the two reasons is quite artificial: what have the dialectic of pure reason and that of the practical reason really in common? On the other hand, there is room for a more con vincing analogy such as that between the autonomy of practical reason and the autonomy of reason concerning the sublime (in the Third Critique). Be that as it may, our problem here is whether the two uses of the human understanding3?the general, "analytical" use (employment) qua formal logic and the specific "synthetic" use qua transcendental logic?are but two
From Mendeleev’s time on, the Periodic Table has been an attempt to exhaust all the chemical poss... more From Mendeleev’s time on, the Periodic Table has been an attempt to exhaust all the chemical possibilities of the elements and their interactions, whether these elements are known as actual or are not known yet as such. These latter elements are called “eka-elements” and there are still some of them in the current state of the Table. There is no guarantee that they will be eventually discovered, synthesized, or isolated as actual. As long as the actual existence of eka-elements is predicted, they cannot be considered as actual but only as purely possible. Given that eka-elements are chemical pure possibilities, a possibilist approach, entitled “panenmentalism,” can gain support as well as an important implication.
Panenmentalist possibilities are individual pure possibilities existing independently of any mind... more Panenmentalist possibilities are individual pure possibilities existing independently of any mind, actual reality, and possible-world conception. These possibilities are a priori accessible to our intellect and imagination. In this paper, I attempt to shed some panenmentalist light on the discovery of chemical branched chain reactions and its implications on biology and cancer research. I also examine the case of the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction which, at first, was believed to be impossible. Finally, I proceed to examine through a panenmentalist lens Szilard’s discovery of the possibility of physical chain reactions and Mullis’s discovery of a polymerase chain reaction. All these major actual discoveries clearly depend on the discovery of the relevant panenmentalist possibilities and the ways in which they relate to one another.
Regardless or independent of any actuality or actualization and exempt from spatiotemporal and ca... more Regardless or independent of any actuality or actualization and exempt from spatiotemporal and causal conditions, each individual possibility is pure. Actualism excludes the existence of individual pure possibilities, altogether or at least as existing independently of actual reality. In this paper, I demonstrate, on the grounds of my possibilist metaphysics—panenmentalism—how some of the most fascinating scientific discoveries in chemistry could not have been accomplished without relying on pure possibilities and the ways in which they relate to each other (for instance, in theoretical models). The discoveries are the following: Dan Shechtman’s discovery of quasicrystals; Linus Pauling’s alpha helix; the discovery of F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario J. Molina concerning the destruction of the atmospheric ozone layer; and Neil Bartlett’s noble gas compounds. On the grounds of the analysis of these cases, actualism must fail, whereas panenmentalism gains support.
What is the relationship between formal, "general" logic and transcendental logic? Is t... more What is the relationship between formal, "general" logic and transcendental logic? Is the former prior to the latter or is it the other way round? Can the one be deduced and derived from the other or based upon it? There is a widespread controversy among philosophers concerning these questions.1 In any case, most of them accept the assumption that one of these logics should be prior to the other. As for me, I don't accept this assumption at all, and in this paper I attempt to show that such a priority is impossible, since the two logics are but different uses or employments of the same under standing {Verstand). Kant apeaks of the unity of human reason (Vernunft), the pure theoretical reason and the pure practical reason. The difference between the two is but that of a use or an employment (Gebrauch or Anwendung).2 Two uses can be made of the same reason. By 'reason' I mean the whole scope of the a priori forms?of intuitions, concepts (categories), principles, ideas, imperatives etc., all of which should be united coherently and organically in one system. Hence, by 'reason' I mean the four components of reason in the wide sense: the a priori forms of sensation, understanding, power of judge ment and Reason in its strict sense, as the faculty of ideas. Kant has to prove, therefore, that the unity of each of these components (e.g., of the power of judgement) is not broken down by its different uses (in this example, the reflective use?the teleological use of judgement?and the constitutive use? in the schematism of categories by time). In any case, it seems that Kant has failed to prove the unity of the practical and the theoretical use of reason, and all his "attempts" to display the "same" components of reason in his First and Second Critiques are nothing but an unconvincing attempt to solve the problem by "bureaucratical" devices such as forced analogies, far-fetched ex amples etc. Actually, the analogy between the structures of the two reasons is quite artificial: what have the dialectic of pure reason and that of the practical reason really in common? On the other hand, there is room for a more con vincing analogy such as that between the autonomy of practical reason and the autonomy of reason concerning the sublime (in the Third Critique). Be that as it may, our problem here is whether the two uses of the human understanding3?the general, "analytical" use (employment) qua formal logic and the specific "synthetic" use qua transcendental logic?are but two
From Mendeleev’s time on, the Periodic Table has been an attempt to exhaust all the chemical poss... more From Mendeleev’s time on, the Periodic Table has been an attempt to exhaust all the chemical possibilities of the elements and their interactions, whether these elements are known as actual or are not known yet as such. These latter elements are called “eka-elements” and there are still some of them in the current state of the Table. There is no guarantee that they will be eventually discovered, synthesized, or isolated as actual. As long as the actual existence of eka-elements is predicted, they cannot be considered as actual but only as purely possible. Given that eka-elements are chemical pure possibilities, a possibilist approach, entitled “panenmentalism,” can gain support as well as an important implication.
Panenmentalist possibilities are individual pure possibilities existing independently of any mind... more Panenmentalist possibilities are individual pure possibilities existing independently of any mind, actual reality, and possible-world conception. These possibilities are a priori accessible to our intellect and imagination. In this paper, I attempt to shed some panenmentalist light on the discovery of chemical branched chain reactions and its implications on biology and cancer research. I also examine the case of the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction which, at first, was believed to be impossible. Finally, I proceed to examine through a panenmentalist lens Szilard’s discovery of the possibility of physical chain reactions and Mullis’s discovery of a polymerase chain reaction. All these major actual discoveries clearly depend on the discovery of the relevant panenmentalist possibilities and the ways in which they relate to one another.
Regardless or independent of any actuality or actualization and exempt from spatiotemporal and ca... more Regardless or independent of any actuality or actualization and exempt from spatiotemporal and causal conditions, each individual possibility is pure. Actualism excludes the existence of individual pure possibilities, altogether or at least as existing independently of actual reality. In this paper, I demonstrate, on the grounds of my possibilist metaphysics—panenmentalism—how some of the most fascinating scientific discoveries in chemistry could not have been accomplished without relying on pure possibilities and the ways in which they relate to each other (for instance, in theoretical models). The discoveries are the following: Dan Shechtman’s discovery of quasicrystals; Linus Pauling’s alpha helix; the discovery of F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario J. Molina concerning the destruction of the atmospheric ozone layer; and Neil Bartlett’s noble gas compounds. On the grounds of the analysis of these cases, actualism must fail, whereas panenmentalism gains support.
This book discusses and analyses the contribution of mind-independent individual literary pure po... more This book discusses and analyses the contribution of mind-independent individual literary pure possibilities in exploring and understanding actual reality. The relationship between literary imagination, literary possibilities, and actual reality poses a major philosophical problem in the field of metaphysics of literature. In a detailed analysis of some literary masterpieces (by Proust, Kafka, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Thomas Mann, Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner), I attempt to demonstrate that actual reality actualizes or “imitates” literary pure possibilities. Hence, such masterpieces should be treated not as romans a clef but, instead, as paradigm-cases on whose basis we grasp and understand actual reality.
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019
This book discusses and analyses the contribution of mind-independent individual literary pure po... more This book discusses and analyses the contribution of mind-independent individual literary pure possibilities in exploring and understanding actual reality. The relationship between literary imagination, literary possibilities, and actual reality poses a major philosophical problem in the field of metaphysics of literature. In a detailed analysis of some literary masterpieces (by Proust, Kafka, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Thomas Mann, Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner), I attempt to demonstrate that actual reality actualizes or “imitates” literary pure possibilities. Hence, such masterpieces should be treated not as romans a clef but, instead, as paradigm-cases on whose basis we grasp and understand actual reality.
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Papers by Amihud Gilead