Papers by Eva-Maria Düringer
Routledge eBooks, Jul 12, 2023
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This paper outlines Jesse Prinz's theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily... more This paper outlines Jesse Prinz's theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and con- cludes that Prinz's theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action.
Evaluating Emotions, 2014
The main disadvantages of realist accounts of value are their difficulties in providing a plausib... more The main disadvantages of realist accounts of value are their difficulties in providing a plausible ontology and epistemology of values. While it is easy for the value realist to say wherein lies the objectivity of values, he will find it hard to explain what kind of thing values are and how we come to know about them. J. L. Mackie takes these difficulties as his main weapon in his attack on value realism. People who want to defend the view that values are objective, Mackie says, have to commit to the view that values are part of the fabric of the world, and that we come to know them through a faculty of intuition that is unlike all our other faculties. This view is problematic in that values end up having both a very queer ontology and epistemology. Therefore, according to Mackie, we should not believe that values are objective and, hence, drop value realism.
Evaluating Emotions, 2014
Emotion Review, 2012
In this comment we take up two points made by Douglas Hollan in his article “Emerging Issues in t... more In this comment we take up two points made by Douglas Hollan in his article “Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy,” and discuss their possible philosophical implications. Hollan‘s concept of complex empathy may give rise to the idea that we can learn about other people’s beliefs via empathy, which is something we do not believe is possible. Furthermore, Hollan’s description of possible negative effects of empathy, such as manipulations of a person on the basis of knowledge about their emotions, might pose a problem for proponents of care ethics, who generally start from the assumption that empathy fosters altruistic behavior.
Evaluating Emotions, 2014
How are emotions related to values? In this first chapter I want to tackle this question from Fra... more How are emotions related to values? In this first chapter I want to tackle this question from Franz Brentano’s point of view. Like many proponents of the perceptual theory of emotions today, Brentano claims that we gain evaluative knowledge by having correct emotions. Unlike today’s proponents of the perceptual theory of emotions, he accounts for this by an analogy between emotions and judgements. Perhaps, one might think, he should in this case be classed rather with those philosophers who take emotions to be value judgements, but this conclusion would be hasty, for Brentano does not think that emotions are judgments — they are like judgements in important respects. I think it is, however, correct to say that Brentano does not develop a perceptual theory of emotions, either. Rather, he takes both judgements and emotions to be affirming or rejecting reactions to objects that are presented to us perceptually. Furthermore, he takes it that just as correct judgements reveal what is true, correct emotions reveal what is good. Given that the latter claim is very close to central tenets of today’s proponents of the perceptual theory of emotions, and given that Brentano’s account of it does not seem to have received very much attention in the contemporary debate, I think it is a good starting point to our enquiry into the nature of the relation between emotions and values.
Philosophical Topics, 2013
We say of people who act morally that they deserve to be happy, especially when acting morally co... more We say of people who act morally that they deserve to be happy, especially when acting morally comes at the price of happiness. We find this thought, especially in a Kantian framework, puzzling. If we define morality and its value independently of happiness, how can it be that we deserve happiness when we act morally? We seek to answer these questions by first looking at Kant’s discussion of a causal connection of morality and happiness in the highest good, which we do not find explanatorily satisfying, before examining possible good-makers of happiness that might explain why happiness is, even for a Kantian, a proper reward for moral behaviour.
Evaluating Emotions, 2014
The first two chapters looked at two indirect arguments for a perceptual theory of emotions. Neit... more The first two chapters looked at two indirect arguments for a perceptual theory of emotions. Neither Brentano nor McDowell claims that emotions are perception-like states, but their analogies can easily be taken to support such a claim. Brentano wants to use his analogy to show that we gain knowledge about values via our emotions, which is a central tenet of perceptual theories of emotions. And McDowell wants to use his analogy to show that values are response-dependent, and it seems a comparatively small step from an ontologica1 response-dependence to an epistemo logical relation between a response and that which it constitutes. I argued that both analogies are flawed. Brentano’s analogy is intrinsically flawed, that is, it yields results that are different from, and more difficult than, the ones that Brentano thought it yielded, and McDowell’s analogy seems difficult to sustain when it comes to the crucial element of the conditions under which the relevant responses are appropriate.
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2009
Evaluating Emotions, 2014
In the last chapter I developed what I believe to be a plausible definition of what it means to c... more In the last chapter I developed what I believe to be a plausible definition of what it means to care about something, an argument for the claim that what we genuinely care about is thereby of value, and a definition of relations between objects of our care and particular situations in the world as secondary values. Towards the end of Chapter 4 and also towards the end of the previous chapter I already provided a sketch of what I believe to be the most adequate model describing the relation between emotions and values: emotions are felt physical reactions to appraisals of secondary values. In this chapter I want to put the pieces of the puzzle together: emotions, that is felt physical reactions to appraisals of secondary values, can be explained as felt desires or felt desire satisfactions that result directly from our caring about certain objects and perceptions of particular relations between these cared-for objects and the world.
Journal of Literary Theory
It is often claimed that we cannot desire fictional states of affairs when we are aware of the fa... more It is often claimed that we cannot desire fictional states of affairs when we are aware of the fact that we cannot interact with fictional worlds. But the experiences we have when we read an engaging novel, watch a horror film or listen to a gripping story are certainly very similar to desires: we hope that the lovers get together, we want the criminal to get caught, we long for the hero to make his fortune. My goal in this paper is to outline the reasons why we might find it difficult to call these experiences genuine desires and to argue that they are not good reasons. In the second section I look at three reasons in particular: first, the reason that, if we genuinely desired fictional outcomes, we would act in silly or dangerous ways; second, the reason that, if we genuinely desired fictional outcomes, we would change plot lines if we had the chance, which in fact, however, we would not; and third, the reason that, if we genuinely desired fictional outcomes, we would not think it...
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Some recent theories of emotion propose that emotions are perceptions of value laden situations a... more Some recent theories of emotion propose that emotions are perceptions of value laden situations and thus provide us with epistemic access to values. In this paper I take up Mark Wynn’s application of this theory to religious experience and try to argue that his McDowell-inspired account of intentional emotions leads to limitations for the justificatory force of religious experiences and to difficult questions about the metaphysical status of the object of religious experiences: if emotions and religious experiences are largely similar, then, just as emotions, religious experiences cannot justify beliefs about the existence of objects, but merely beliefs about certain qualities they might have. Also, if emotions and religious experiences are largely similar, then, just as the objects of emotions, the object of religious experience turns out to be essentially mind-dependent.
Evaluating Emotions, 2014
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Being understanding is a moral virtue. But what exactly is it that an understanding person does e... more Being understanding is a moral virtue. But what exactly is it that an understanding person does excellently? And what exactly makes it a moral virtue, rather than (merely) an intellectual one? Stephen Grimm suggests that an understanding person judges other people’s moral failings accurately without being too permissive or too judgemental. I argue against this view and develop an alternative one. First I demonstrate that judging other people’s failures accurately is neither necessary nor sufficient for being understanding and that Grimm leaves the moral nature of being understanding underexplored. I then draw on a related discussion on the moral virtue of open-mindedness and argue that a virtue is a moral one when it is a corrective to selfish and other weak inclinations that pull us away from feeling and acting as the situation demands. In order to fill in what this means in the case of being understanding, I turn to Iris Murdoch’s notion of attention. Being understanding, I argue,...
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Papers by Eva-Maria Düringer