Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, 1986
Publisher Summary The concept of role is to provide a key to understand the ways in which a perso... more Publisher Summary The concept of role is to provide a key to understand the ways in which a person's behavior and identity are related to the culture to which he belongs. And accordingly, roles provide the most important of the links between sociology and social psychology. Role theory does constitute an important advance over associationist or behaviorist accounts of the socializing process. The use of the concept of role by social scientists—and connected concepts, such as role-internalization, role-expectation, etc.—seems to be drawn in two different directions. On the one hand, roles will be regarded as assignments—that is, as something that a person can be given by others, and that he may or may not accept. On the other hand, roles will be regarded as affectations—that is, as ways in which persons present themselves, and which others may or may not credit. The issue concerning the relation between roles and behavior are altogether different, depending on which of these notions one has in mind.
Peter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgme... more Peter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgment on matters like the sense of words, the rationality of actions, or the validity of arguments. His critique had both what we might call a local strandthe insight that criteria of thought and action are not universal but vary between cultures and between practicesand a personal strandthe insight that those local criteria are ultimately given shape through the particular applications made of them by individuals. These strands are prominent, for instance, in Winch's discussion of cross-cultural understanding as well as his treatment of the distinction between valid reasoning and illicit persuasion.
Contents: T. Kurten: Introduction - L. Hertzberg: Legitimacy and the Political Community - O. Lag... more Contents: T. Kurten: Introduction - L. Hertzberg: Legitimacy and the Political Community - O. Lagerspetz: Peter Winch on Political Legitimacy - T. Kurten/V. Paivansalo: Legitimacy, Trust and Religion in a Nordic Perspective - P. Slotte/M. Scheinin: Captain, Fire Brigade or Icebreaker? Political Legitimacy as a Rationale in Human Rights Adjudication - M. Lindfelt: Legitimacy, Constitutionalism and European Integration - J. Molander: Reconciliation, Transitional Justice and the Legitimacy of the State - H. Jokinen: The Quest for Legitimacy in Conflict Resolution through Restorative Justice - L. Kanckos/M. Bjorkgren: Legitimacy Challenges in Gender Politics - Challenges to Political Legitimacy in Parliamentary Debates Concerning LGBT Rights, Assisted Reproduction and Domestic Violence.
We are all familiar with robots and other computers producing linguistic expressions. The essay d... more We are all familiar with robots and other computers producing linguistic expressions. The essay discusses the question in what sense these speech-like phenomena can be regarded as an outcome of what might be called learning to talk. The question might also be rephrased as follows: in what sense can a talking robot be considered a speaker. In the debate becoming a speaker is often construed as an ability to connect signs with objects. As was shown by Wittgenstein this conception of being a speaker is highly impoverished. To be a speaker is to be able to express oneself by means of words. This ability is connected with having a life, which robots lack. What concerns me in this discussion is not so much the ongoing debate about what robots can and cannot do. Rather, it is the light it may throw on what it means for a human being to learn to talk.
Human beings, unlike animals, will sometimes be in conflict with themselves. An animal may, of co... more Human beings, unlike animals, will sometimes be in conflict with themselves. An animal may, of course, be torn in opposite directions by its desires. The classical case in point is Buridan’s ass, but I am not sure whether Buridan’s thought experiment provides a realistic picture of asinine behaviour. For a different example, we might think about a dog hesitating about jumping across a fire in order to get to its master. Here, our only ground for speaking about a conflict between its fear of the fire and its desire to join its master is the fact that it hesitates. The conflict, we might say, is the hesitation.
In Philosophical Investigations (Part II, xi) Wittgenstein draws attention to a contrast between ... more In Philosophical Investigations (Part II, xi) Wittgenstein draws attention to a contrast between the ways in which we discuss on the one hand human motives, feelings, sensations and the like, and on the other hand, for example, the colours of things or mathematical propositions: Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four? — Does this shew the former to be mathematical certainty? — ′Mathematical certainty ′ is not a psychological concept. The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game. (PI p. 224)1 ′While you can have complete certainty about someone else ′s state of mind, still it is always merely subjective, not objective, certainty. ′ — These two words betoken a difference between language-games. (PI p. 225) Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their judgments of colour? What would it be like for them not to? — One man would say a flower was red which another called blue, and so on. — But what right should we have to call these people ′s words red and blue our ′colour-words ′? (PI p. 226)
Most of us, at one time or another, will have been struck by a thought that we might wish to expr... more Most of us, at one time or another, will have been struck by a thought that we might wish to express in the following words: ‘I could have been born in a different time and place, my position in life and all my personal characteristics could have been completely different from what they are; how amazing then that it should have fallen to my lot to live my life, the only life I shall ever live, as this particular individual rather than any other.’ This thought need not derive from a sense that there is anything unusual about one's life; what it expresses, rather, may be the sense that there is something gratuitous or contingent about one's being any particular individual at all. This sense of contingency might be connected with a feeling of gratitude, perhaps of responsibility towards others less fortunate in life; or it might be bound up with envy, or pride, or self-pity, etc.
i. Many of us, from time to time, have been haunted by the following thought: 'One day, scien... more i. Many of us, from time to time, have been haunted by the following thought: 'One day, science will tell us all about the causes of human behaviour. And when that day comes, we can no longer hold people morally responsible for their actions.' This thought derives from two basic convictions. On the one hand, we are convinced that a person cannot be held responsible if his behaviour is caused. And on the other hand, we are convinced that all our actions have a causal background, and that one day science will uncover it. The reasoning behind the latter conviction is this. It is obvious that, in a particular situation, for someone to perform a given action, there is a given range of movements, some of which he must perform or omit. (I may sign a cheque or fire a gun any number of ways, but I have to do it some way.) And bodily movements are produced by physiological conditions in accordance with empirical laws. They belong to a compact system of states and processes, where everything that happens is connected with other states and processes in an indefinite number of ways. Thus, consider a person signing a contract. For him not to sign it-nor even try to-his movements would have to be quite different from what they are. We would find it impossible to imagine that he could have moved in that other way, unless the state of his body had been significantly different. Such is the view we take of human behaviour. This may seem a roundabout way of stating the problem of freedom and determinism. My reasons for choosing it are twofold. First, I want to suggest that the problem of freedom can arise even if one thinks, as I do; that determinism is not a meaningful theory about the world. Secondly, I also wish to suggest that one cannot get around the problem by arguing, as some have, in the following way: 'one cannot ascribe physiological causes to actions, but only to the movements that human actions consist of. Since the same action can be performed by means of different movements, it does not follow from the fact that movements are causally
In this essay I aim to clarify, and critically discuss, Winch’s thinking about punishment. Winch ... more In this essay I aim to clarify, and critically discuss, Winch’s thinking about punishment. Winch approached the philosophy of punishment in two essays. In “Ethical Reward and Punishment” (1970) he discussed a remark in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which he interpreted as marking a sharp distinction between punishment in an ethical and a legal sense, a view which he endorsed. Against this, I argue that the two concepts of punishment are interdependent. In fact, in “‘He’s to Blame!’” (1989) Winch foregoes this sharp distinction. There he discusses the traditional philosophical concern with seeking for a justification of punishment. This quest is misconceived, he argues, because the practice of punishment is itself partly constituted by what justificatory concerns are relevant to it. If the justification of those concerns is taken to be an open question, the object of our inquiry is dissolved. I attempt to clarify this argument, partly by reference to the distinction between punishment and revenge. I end by discussing a problematic remark of Winch’s in which he seems once more to open up the possibility of asking for a wholesale justification of punishment.
Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, 1986
Publisher Summary The concept of role is to provide a key to understand the ways in which a perso... more Publisher Summary The concept of role is to provide a key to understand the ways in which a person's behavior and identity are related to the culture to which he belongs. And accordingly, roles provide the most important of the links between sociology and social psychology. Role theory does constitute an important advance over associationist or behaviorist accounts of the socializing process. The use of the concept of role by social scientists—and connected concepts, such as role-internalization, role-expectation, etc.—seems to be drawn in two different directions. On the one hand, roles will be regarded as assignments—that is, as something that a person can be given by others, and that he may or may not accept. On the other hand, roles will be regarded as affectations—that is, as ways in which persons present themselves, and which others may or may not credit. The issue concerning the relation between roles and behavior are altogether different, depending on which of these notions one has in mind.
Peter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgme... more Peter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgment on matters like the sense of words, the rationality of actions, or the validity of arguments. His critique had both what we might call a local strandthe insight that criteria of thought and action are not universal but vary between cultures and between practicesand a personal strandthe insight that those local criteria are ultimately given shape through the particular applications made of them by individuals. These strands are prominent, for instance, in Winch's discussion of cross-cultural understanding as well as his treatment of the distinction between valid reasoning and illicit persuasion.
Contents: T. Kurten: Introduction - L. Hertzberg: Legitimacy and the Political Community - O. Lag... more Contents: T. Kurten: Introduction - L. Hertzberg: Legitimacy and the Political Community - O. Lagerspetz: Peter Winch on Political Legitimacy - T. Kurten/V. Paivansalo: Legitimacy, Trust and Religion in a Nordic Perspective - P. Slotte/M. Scheinin: Captain, Fire Brigade or Icebreaker? Political Legitimacy as a Rationale in Human Rights Adjudication - M. Lindfelt: Legitimacy, Constitutionalism and European Integration - J. Molander: Reconciliation, Transitional Justice and the Legitimacy of the State - H. Jokinen: The Quest for Legitimacy in Conflict Resolution through Restorative Justice - L. Kanckos/M. Bjorkgren: Legitimacy Challenges in Gender Politics - Challenges to Political Legitimacy in Parliamentary Debates Concerning LGBT Rights, Assisted Reproduction and Domestic Violence.
We are all familiar with robots and other computers producing linguistic expressions. The essay d... more We are all familiar with robots and other computers producing linguistic expressions. The essay discusses the question in what sense these speech-like phenomena can be regarded as an outcome of what might be called learning to talk. The question might also be rephrased as follows: in what sense can a talking robot be considered a speaker. In the debate becoming a speaker is often construed as an ability to connect signs with objects. As was shown by Wittgenstein this conception of being a speaker is highly impoverished. To be a speaker is to be able to express oneself by means of words. This ability is connected with having a life, which robots lack. What concerns me in this discussion is not so much the ongoing debate about what robots can and cannot do. Rather, it is the light it may throw on what it means for a human being to learn to talk.
Human beings, unlike animals, will sometimes be in conflict with themselves. An animal may, of co... more Human beings, unlike animals, will sometimes be in conflict with themselves. An animal may, of course, be torn in opposite directions by its desires. The classical case in point is Buridan’s ass, but I am not sure whether Buridan’s thought experiment provides a realistic picture of asinine behaviour. For a different example, we might think about a dog hesitating about jumping across a fire in order to get to its master. Here, our only ground for speaking about a conflict between its fear of the fire and its desire to join its master is the fact that it hesitates. The conflict, we might say, is the hesitation.
In Philosophical Investigations (Part II, xi) Wittgenstein draws attention to a contrast between ... more In Philosophical Investigations (Part II, xi) Wittgenstein draws attention to a contrast between the ways in which we discuss on the one hand human motives, feelings, sensations and the like, and on the other hand, for example, the colours of things or mathematical propositions: Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four? — Does this shew the former to be mathematical certainty? — ′Mathematical certainty ′ is not a psychological concept. The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game. (PI p. 224)1 ′While you can have complete certainty about someone else ′s state of mind, still it is always merely subjective, not objective, certainty. ′ — These two words betoken a difference between language-games. (PI p. 225) Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their judgments of colour? What would it be like for them not to? — One man would say a flower was red which another called blue, and so on. — But what right should we have to call these people ′s words red and blue our ′colour-words ′? (PI p. 226)
Most of us, at one time or another, will have been struck by a thought that we might wish to expr... more Most of us, at one time or another, will have been struck by a thought that we might wish to express in the following words: ‘I could have been born in a different time and place, my position in life and all my personal characteristics could have been completely different from what they are; how amazing then that it should have fallen to my lot to live my life, the only life I shall ever live, as this particular individual rather than any other.’ This thought need not derive from a sense that there is anything unusual about one's life; what it expresses, rather, may be the sense that there is something gratuitous or contingent about one's being any particular individual at all. This sense of contingency might be connected with a feeling of gratitude, perhaps of responsibility towards others less fortunate in life; or it might be bound up with envy, or pride, or self-pity, etc.
i. Many of us, from time to time, have been haunted by the following thought: 'One day, scien... more i. Many of us, from time to time, have been haunted by the following thought: 'One day, science will tell us all about the causes of human behaviour. And when that day comes, we can no longer hold people morally responsible for their actions.' This thought derives from two basic convictions. On the one hand, we are convinced that a person cannot be held responsible if his behaviour is caused. And on the other hand, we are convinced that all our actions have a causal background, and that one day science will uncover it. The reasoning behind the latter conviction is this. It is obvious that, in a particular situation, for someone to perform a given action, there is a given range of movements, some of which he must perform or omit. (I may sign a cheque or fire a gun any number of ways, but I have to do it some way.) And bodily movements are produced by physiological conditions in accordance with empirical laws. They belong to a compact system of states and processes, where everything that happens is connected with other states and processes in an indefinite number of ways. Thus, consider a person signing a contract. For him not to sign it-nor even try to-his movements would have to be quite different from what they are. We would find it impossible to imagine that he could have moved in that other way, unless the state of his body had been significantly different. Such is the view we take of human behaviour. This may seem a roundabout way of stating the problem of freedom and determinism. My reasons for choosing it are twofold. First, I want to suggest that the problem of freedom can arise even if one thinks, as I do; that determinism is not a meaningful theory about the world. Secondly, I also wish to suggest that one cannot get around the problem by arguing, as some have, in the following way: 'one cannot ascribe physiological causes to actions, but only to the movements that human actions consist of. Since the same action can be performed by means of different movements, it does not follow from the fact that movements are causally
In this essay I aim to clarify, and critically discuss, Winch’s thinking about punishment. Winch ... more In this essay I aim to clarify, and critically discuss, Winch’s thinking about punishment. Winch approached the philosophy of punishment in two essays. In “Ethical Reward and Punishment” (1970) he discussed a remark in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which he interpreted as marking a sharp distinction between punishment in an ethical and a legal sense, a view which he endorsed. Against this, I argue that the two concepts of punishment are interdependent. In fact, in “‘He’s to Blame!’” (1989) Winch foregoes this sharp distinction. There he discusses the traditional philosophical concern with seeking for a justification of punishment. This quest is misconceived, he argues, because the practice of punishment is itself partly constituted by what justificatory concerns are relevant to it. If the justification of those concerns is taken to be an open question, the object of our inquiry is dissolved. I attempt to clarify this argument, partly by reference to the distinction between punishment and revenge. I end by discussing a problematic remark of Winch’s in which he seems once more to open up the possibility of asking for a wholesale justification of punishment.
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