The volume aims to explore the relationship between the theoretical modelling and the mental repr... more The volume aims to explore the relationship between the theoretical modelling and the mental representation of the perceived multiplicity of lexical meanings. The collection is divided into three thematic sections, discussing psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic evidence concerning polysemy; theoretical considerations regarding the representation of different types of meaning variation phenomena; and polysemy connected (in a variety of ways) to syntactic constructions. A common theme for the contributions is the recognition that consideration of a range of so far neglected types of evidence (both from within and from outside of linguistics proper) is essential to achieve further progress in polysemy research.
In this chapter we shall see how the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure proposes to deal wi... more In this chapter we shall see how the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure proposes to deal with adjectival polysemy of synaesthetic and double-function types. The no-polysemy view, according to which all meanings of a synaesthetic or double-function adjective map onto the same psychologically primitive concept, was mentioned quite early in the book and it is now time to see what precisely it amounts to.
In the previous chapter I suggested that so-called synaesthetic metaphors may not be metaphors af... more In the previous chapter I suggested that so-called synaesthetic metaphors may not be metaphors after all. In this and the next chapters I address the issue of physical-psychological adjectival polysemy (for example, ‘sharp’ in ‘sharp knife’ and ‘sharp person’) in order to suggest how the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure can handle this group of expressions.
Up to now I have been using the word ‘concept’ either provisionally defining it or relying on the... more Up to now I have been using the word ‘concept’ either provisionally defining it or relying on the reader’s intuitive grasp of it. Now it is time to get more precise on the issue.
Have you ever wondered why you call chilli peppers hot? Of course, you might say because your mou... more Have you ever wondered why you call chilli peppers hot? Of course, you might say because your mouth feels hot when you take a bite. Yes, but why does it feel hot? What makes you describe chillies as ‘hot’? Why do use the same word as in ‘hot stove’ or ‘hot day’?
In the previous chapter we saw that the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure can be extended ... more In the previous chapter we saw that the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure can be extended to account for physical-psychological adjectival polysemy. Unlike the standard assumption theories, the no-polysemy view denies that psychological meanings of double-function adjectives are their metaphoric or secondary meanings. A standard assumption theorist may object to this by invoking evidence from psycholinguistic studies in normal and brain-damaged subjects. The purpose if this chapter is therefore to show that some assumptions people have as far as the literal-metaphorical distinction is concerned are not so well grounded as they may appear.
Eve Sweetser characterizes linguistic categorization as depending not only on our referential cap... more Eve Sweetser characterizes linguistic categorization as depending not only on our referential capacities but also, and most importantly, ‘on our metaphorical and metonymic structuring of our perceptions of the world’ (1990, p. 9). In Chapter 2, discussing Lakoff and Johnson’s work, I formulated a number of objections to the general validity of experientialist proposals. In this chapter I consider a particular set of quasi metaphors (synaesthetic and double-function adjectives) for which cognitive semantics cannot provide a sufficiently simple and uniform explanation.
A good while before cognitive linguistics became popular, lexical semanticists (at least some of ... more A good while before cognitive linguistics became popular, lexical semanticists (at least some of them) began to develop an interest in concepts and conceptual structure. In a book called Language and Perception (1976), George Miller and Philip Johnson-Laird proposed to give a psychological theory of semantics, in which the relationship between perceptual and lexical structures is mediated by the conceptual structure. Conceptual thought is that which relates perception and language: ‘[p]ercepts and words are merely avenues into and out of this conceptual structure’ (p. vii).
Today many metaphor researchers work in the framework of cognitive linguistics. The cognitive lin... more Today many metaphor researchers work in the framework of cognitive linguistics. The cognitive linguistics revolution began in 1980 with the publication of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. In their book, Lakoff and Johnson amassed an amazing number of examples showing that the way we talk about abstract domains appears to be systematically structured by the way we talk about certain more concrete domains. Thus, we talk about theories and arguments as if they were buildings: theories can have support and arguments can be demolished. These observations gave rise to the theory of conceptual metaphor which moved metaphor out of language into our conceptual organization. According to Lakoff and Johnson, linguistic expressions such as ‘to demolish a theory’ or ‘the foundation of a theory’ are not isolated expressions but parts of the conceptual metaphor theories are buildings.
In the last chapter we talked about the ‘hot’ polysemy. Another interesting example of physical-p... more In the last chapter we talked about the ‘hot’ polysemy. Another interesting example of physical-physical polysemy are so-called synaesthetic metaphors. ‘Bright sounds’ and ‘loud colours’, ‘sharp tastes’ and ‘heavy smells’ pervade our speech. Expressions such as these are called ‘synaesthetic’ because they make associations between different sensory modalities. Synaesthesia (from Greek syn, ‘together’ and aisthesis, ‘perception’) is a particular kind of perceptual experience in which the perception of a stimulus from one sensory modality is accompanied by perceptual experience from some other modality. Thus, in the most common case of synaesthetic experience — coloured hearing — sounds induce simultaneous perceptions of colour. As we shall see, the perceptual nature of synaesthesia has been firmly established by recent research. For a relatively small number of people, synaesthesiae are real, just as our ordinary perceptual experiences are real for us.
I have thrown into one melting pot informational atomism, the causal theory of reference, denotat... more I have thrown into one melting pot informational atomism, the causal theory of reference, denotational semantics, and the theory of cognitive embodiment, but I hope that instead of getting a scary monster I have told you a story about the relationship between language and conceptual structure that may at least be partly true. The main objective of this book was to argue that there is a lot more literalness in language than has traditionally been supposed. I have argued this on the example of synaesthetic and double-function adjectives, and I hope to have eliminated them from the class of metaphors. In the course of this book I have also mentioned many other examples, but I am not as much committed to my treatment of them as I am to my treatment of synaesthetic and double-function adjectives.
A comprehensive guide to the main positions, debates, key figures and problems as well as importa... more A comprehensive guide to the main positions, debates, key figures and problems as well as important terms in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy of Mind A-Z contains entries on historical and contemporary key figures, explaining the importance of the longstanding debates and how the contemporary field has been shaped. It covers both traditional and current topics, and even those topics that are only beginning to emerge. It includes a wide range of philosophy of mind, from Plato and Leibniz to externalism and the frame problem, from Husserl to neural Darwinism, from mental causation to the problem of consciousness. All of these issues are explained in compact clearly written entries where difficult topics are introduced with the help of numerous examples. Philosophy of Mind A-Z is a reliable and friendly guide for anyone studying philosophy of mind or cognitive science, or simply interested in the many sides and facets of our mental life.
Do you like talking to people who smile at you coldly and give you sharp replies? Or do you prefe... more Do you like talking to people who smile at you coldly and give you sharp replies? Or do you prefer people who greet you warmly and are sweet with you? What kind of strong things do you value: strong relationships, strong governments, strong tastes? What kind of soft things do you appreciate: soft pillows, soft colours, soft voices? Deep people intrigue us and provoke admiration, while deep grief is sometimes too much to bear. Bright light may be blinding, but bright music sets us into a cheerful mood, and bright children with bright eyes are a delight to every parent. Connoisseurs may have a penchant for dry wine, but people with a dry sense of humour often put off their collocutors.…
Page 1. The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay?* MARINA RAKOVA Abstract The indi... more Page 1. The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay?* MARINA RAKOVA Abstract The indisputable advantage of cognitive linguistics is that it places questions of metaphor and polysemy in the broader perspective of human cognition and conceptual organization. ...
The volume aims to explore the relationship between the theoretical modelling and the mental repr... more The volume aims to explore the relationship between the theoretical modelling and the mental representation of the perceived multiplicity of lexical meanings. The collection is divided into three thematic sections, discussing psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic evidence concerning polysemy; theoretical considerations regarding the representation of different types of meaning variation phenomena; and polysemy connected (in a variety of ways) to syntactic constructions. A common theme for the contributions is the recognition that consideration of a range of so far neglected types of evidence (both from within and from outside of linguistics proper) is essential to achieve further progress in polysemy research.
In this chapter we shall see how the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure proposes to deal wi... more In this chapter we shall see how the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure proposes to deal with adjectival polysemy of synaesthetic and double-function types. The no-polysemy view, according to which all meanings of a synaesthetic or double-function adjective map onto the same psychologically primitive concept, was mentioned quite early in the book and it is now time to see what precisely it amounts to.
In the previous chapter I suggested that so-called synaesthetic metaphors may not be metaphors af... more In the previous chapter I suggested that so-called synaesthetic metaphors may not be metaphors after all. In this and the next chapters I address the issue of physical-psychological adjectival polysemy (for example, ‘sharp’ in ‘sharp knife’ and ‘sharp person’) in order to suggest how the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure can handle this group of expressions.
Up to now I have been using the word ‘concept’ either provisionally defining it or relying on the... more Up to now I have been using the word ‘concept’ either provisionally defining it or relying on the reader’s intuitive grasp of it. Now it is time to get more precise on the issue.
Have you ever wondered why you call chilli peppers hot? Of course, you might say because your mou... more Have you ever wondered why you call chilli peppers hot? Of course, you might say because your mouth feels hot when you take a bite. Yes, but why does it feel hot? What makes you describe chillies as ‘hot’? Why do use the same word as in ‘hot stove’ or ‘hot day’?
In the previous chapter we saw that the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure can be extended ... more In the previous chapter we saw that the no-polysemy view of conceptual structure can be extended to account for physical-psychological adjectival polysemy. Unlike the standard assumption theories, the no-polysemy view denies that psychological meanings of double-function adjectives are their metaphoric or secondary meanings. A standard assumption theorist may object to this by invoking evidence from psycholinguistic studies in normal and brain-damaged subjects. The purpose if this chapter is therefore to show that some assumptions people have as far as the literal-metaphorical distinction is concerned are not so well grounded as they may appear.
Eve Sweetser characterizes linguistic categorization as depending not only on our referential cap... more Eve Sweetser characterizes linguistic categorization as depending not only on our referential capacities but also, and most importantly, ‘on our metaphorical and metonymic structuring of our perceptions of the world’ (1990, p. 9). In Chapter 2, discussing Lakoff and Johnson’s work, I formulated a number of objections to the general validity of experientialist proposals. In this chapter I consider a particular set of quasi metaphors (synaesthetic and double-function adjectives) for which cognitive semantics cannot provide a sufficiently simple and uniform explanation.
A good while before cognitive linguistics became popular, lexical semanticists (at least some of ... more A good while before cognitive linguistics became popular, lexical semanticists (at least some of them) began to develop an interest in concepts and conceptual structure. In a book called Language and Perception (1976), George Miller and Philip Johnson-Laird proposed to give a psychological theory of semantics, in which the relationship between perceptual and lexical structures is mediated by the conceptual structure. Conceptual thought is that which relates perception and language: ‘[p]ercepts and words are merely avenues into and out of this conceptual structure’ (p. vii).
Today many metaphor researchers work in the framework of cognitive linguistics. The cognitive lin... more Today many metaphor researchers work in the framework of cognitive linguistics. The cognitive linguistics revolution began in 1980 with the publication of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. In their book, Lakoff and Johnson amassed an amazing number of examples showing that the way we talk about abstract domains appears to be systematically structured by the way we talk about certain more concrete domains. Thus, we talk about theories and arguments as if they were buildings: theories can have support and arguments can be demolished. These observations gave rise to the theory of conceptual metaphor which moved metaphor out of language into our conceptual organization. According to Lakoff and Johnson, linguistic expressions such as ‘to demolish a theory’ or ‘the foundation of a theory’ are not isolated expressions but parts of the conceptual metaphor theories are buildings.
In the last chapter we talked about the ‘hot’ polysemy. Another interesting example of physical-p... more In the last chapter we talked about the ‘hot’ polysemy. Another interesting example of physical-physical polysemy are so-called synaesthetic metaphors. ‘Bright sounds’ and ‘loud colours’, ‘sharp tastes’ and ‘heavy smells’ pervade our speech. Expressions such as these are called ‘synaesthetic’ because they make associations between different sensory modalities. Synaesthesia (from Greek syn, ‘together’ and aisthesis, ‘perception’) is a particular kind of perceptual experience in which the perception of a stimulus from one sensory modality is accompanied by perceptual experience from some other modality. Thus, in the most common case of synaesthetic experience — coloured hearing — sounds induce simultaneous perceptions of colour. As we shall see, the perceptual nature of synaesthesia has been firmly established by recent research. For a relatively small number of people, synaesthesiae are real, just as our ordinary perceptual experiences are real for us.
I have thrown into one melting pot informational atomism, the causal theory of reference, denotat... more I have thrown into one melting pot informational atomism, the causal theory of reference, denotational semantics, and the theory of cognitive embodiment, but I hope that instead of getting a scary monster I have told you a story about the relationship between language and conceptual structure that may at least be partly true. The main objective of this book was to argue that there is a lot more literalness in language than has traditionally been supposed. I have argued this on the example of synaesthetic and double-function adjectives, and I hope to have eliminated them from the class of metaphors. In the course of this book I have also mentioned many other examples, but I am not as much committed to my treatment of them as I am to my treatment of synaesthetic and double-function adjectives.
A comprehensive guide to the main positions, debates, key figures and problems as well as importa... more A comprehensive guide to the main positions, debates, key figures and problems as well as important terms in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy of Mind A-Z contains entries on historical and contemporary key figures, explaining the importance of the longstanding debates and how the contemporary field has been shaped. It covers both traditional and current topics, and even those topics that are only beginning to emerge. It includes a wide range of philosophy of mind, from Plato and Leibniz to externalism and the frame problem, from Husserl to neural Darwinism, from mental causation to the problem of consciousness. All of these issues are explained in compact clearly written entries where difficult topics are introduced with the help of numerous examples. Philosophy of Mind A-Z is a reliable and friendly guide for anyone studying philosophy of mind or cognitive science, or simply interested in the many sides and facets of our mental life.
Do you like talking to people who smile at you coldly and give you sharp replies? Or do you prefe... more Do you like talking to people who smile at you coldly and give you sharp replies? Or do you prefer people who greet you warmly and are sweet with you? What kind of strong things do you value: strong relationships, strong governments, strong tastes? What kind of soft things do you appreciate: soft pillows, soft colours, soft voices? Deep people intrigue us and provoke admiration, while deep grief is sometimes too much to bear. Bright light may be blinding, but bright music sets us into a cheerful mood, and bright children with bright eyes are a delight to every parent. Connoisseurs may have a penchant for dry wine, but people with a dry sense of humour often put off their collocutors.…
Page 1. The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay?* MARINA RAKOVA Abstract The indi... more Page 1. The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay?* MARINA RAKOVA Abstract The indisputable advantage of cognitive linguistics is that it places questions of metaphor and polysemy in the broader perspective of human cognition and conceptual organization. ...
Uploads
Papers by Marina Rakova