Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest trójstopniowa analiza pozytywnego (positiva) użycia teologi... more Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest trójstopniowa analiza pozytywnego (positiva) użycia teologii przez Karola Darwina w pierwszym wydaniu O powstawaniu gatunków. Po pierwsze, skupię się na występującym w tym dziele języku teologicznym, który przejawia się we fragmentach dotyczących pojmowalności Boga, Jego uczciwości, sposobów stwarzania, związku między Nim a prawami przyrody i tego, że nie odpowiada On za istniejące w przyrodzie cierpienia. Twierdzę, że Darwin użył teologii pozytywnej, aby uzasadnić teorię dziedziczenia z modyfikacjami (oraz nadać jej kształt) i podważyć ideę specjalnego stworzenia. Po drugie, przedstawię krytyczną analizę tej teologii, biorąc za podstawę późniejsze przemyślenia Darwina, aby pokazać, że z epistemicznego punktu widzenia w teologii pozytywnej obecnej w O powstawaniu gatunków można dostrzec różne wewnętrzne napięcia. Po trzecie, skupię się na względnym epistemicznym znaczeniu teologii pozytywnej dla argumentacji przedstawionej w dziele Darwina. Wszy...
The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most f... more The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most famous polemics for common ancestry. In this essay, I analyze Gould’s argument in several steps. First, I attempt to reconstruct the argument in both deductive and likelihood formulations. I contend that both versions of the argument rest on a theological claim—namely, that God would not (likely) create or allow a suboptimal panda’s thumb. I then argue that a wide range of people are not rationally obligated to accept this theological claim. Next, I give special attention to the likelihood formulation’s emphasis on a contrastive argument for evolution over special creation. I contend that a great number of people are not rationally obligated to accept this formulation either. I next consider and reply to an objection that Gould never intended the panda argument as an apologetic for evolution (and an attack on special creation) but rather as a critique of adaptationism. Finally, I argue th...
The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most f... more The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most famous polemics for common ancestry. In this essay, I analyze Gould’s argument in several steps. First, I attempt to reconstruct the argument in both deductive and likelihood formulations. I contend that both versions of the argument rest on a theological claim—namely, that God would not (likely) create or allow a suboptimal panda’s thumb. I then argue that a wide range of people are not rationally obligated to accept this theological claim. Next, I give special attention to the likelihood formulation’s emphasis on a contrastive argument for evolution over special creation. I contend that a great number of people are not rationally obligated to accept this formulation either. I next consider and reply to an objection that Gould never intended the panda argument as an apologetic for evolution (and an attack on special creation) but rather as a critique of adaptationism. Finally, I argue that the panda argument conflicts with Gould’s broader views about the human mind and the relationship between theology and science. I also note along the way that the shortcomings of the panda argument apply to a number of other arguments for evolutionary theory. To be sure, I do not criticize evolution itself or the comprehensive grounds for it. Instead, my primary aims are to analyze the panda argument and suggest that caution is in order about similar arguments as well.
A longstanding question in science and religion is whether standard evolutionary models are compa... more A longstanding question in science and religion is whether standard evolutionary models are compatible with the claim that the world was designed. In The Compatibility of Evolution and Design, theologian E. V. Rope Kojonen constructs a powerful argument that not only are evolution and design compatible, but that evolutionary processes (and biological data) strongly point to design. Yet Kojonen’s model faces several difficulties, each of which raise hurdles for his understanding of how evolution and design can be harmonized. First, his argument for design (and its compatibility with evolution) relies upon a particular view of nature in which fitness landscapes are “fine-tuned” to allow proteins to evolve from one form to another by mutation and selection. But biological data run contrary to this claim, which poses a problem for Kojonen’s design argument (and, as such, his attempt to harmonize design with evolution). Second, Kojonen appeals to the bacterial flagellum to strengthen his case for design, yet the type of design in the flagellum is incompatible with mainstream evolutionary theory, which (again) damages his reconciliation of design with evolution. Third, Kojonen regards convergent evolution as notable positive evidence in favor of his model (including his version of design), yet convergent evolution actually harms the justification of common ancestry, which Kojonen also accepts. This, too, mars his reconciliation of design and evolution. Finally, Kojonen’s model damages the epistemology that undergirds his own design argument as well as the design intuitions of everyday “theists on the street”, whom he seeks to defend. Thus, despite the remarkable depth, nuance, and erudition of Kojonen’s account, it does not offer a convincing reconciliation of ‘design’ and ‘evolution’.
AbstractIn The Evolution-Creation Struggle, Michael Ruse seeks to answer, ‘Why is there so much c... more AbstractIn The Evolution-Creation Struggle, Michael Ruse seeks to answer, ‘Why is there so much controversy surrounding evolutionary theory?’ He does so by tracing the historical development of the theory and the two major reactions to it. These major reactions, for and against, are not just views about science, but full blooded ‘rival religions.’ They each have a system of origins, morality, and eschatology. So the conflict over evolutionary theory persists because it is a clash between incompatible worldviews. This review praises Ruse’s analysis on a number of points but also argues that he stumbles in three ways. First, he fails to explain that a key aspect of the origins debate concerns disagreement about the definition of science. Second, Ruse improperly uses his own (problematic) definition of science, with little argument, in order to rule competing views out of science. Third, Ruse misrepresents the epistemology of non-Darwinians as relying on faith, emotion, and mystery ins...
The British Journal for the History of Science, 2011
This essay examines Darwin's positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of t... more This essay examines Darwin's positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyses the Origin's theological language about God's accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify (and inform) descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin's mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin's positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin's overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin's science.
We argue that a number of biology (and evolution) textbooks face a crippling dilemma. On the one ... more We argue that a number of biology (and evolution) textbooks face a crippling dilemma. On the one hand, significant difficulties arise if textbooks include theological claims in their case for evolution. (Such claims include, for example, 'God would never design a suboptimal panda's thumb, but an imperfect structure is just what we'd expect on natural selection.') On the other hand, significant difficulties arise if textbooks exclude theological claims in their case for evolution. So, whether textbooks include or exclude theological claims, they face debilitating problems. We attempt to establish this thesis by examining 32 biology (and evolution) textbooks, including the Big 12 -- that is, the top four in each of the key undergraduate categories (biology majors, non-majors, and evolution courses). In Section 2 of our article , we analyze three specific types of theology these texts use to justify evolutionary theory. We argue that all face significant objections. In Section 3, we step back from concrete cases and, instead, explore broader problems created by having theology in general in biology textbooks. We argue that the presence of theology -- of whatever kind -- comes at a significant cost, one that some textbook authors are likely unwilling to pay. In Section 4, we consider the alternative: Why not simply get rid of theology? Why not just ignore it? In reply, we marshal a range of arguments why avoiding God-talk raises troubles of its own. Finally, in Section 5, we bring together the collective arguments in Sections 2-4 to argue that biology textbooks face an intractable dilemma. We underscore this difficulty by examining a common approach that some textbooks use to solve this predicament. We argue that this approach turns out to be incoherent and self-serving. The poor performance of textbooks on this point highlights just how deep the difficulty is. In the end, the overall dilemma remains: God-talk or no God-talk?
This essay analyzes Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous article, ‘‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Exce... more This essay analyzes Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous article, ‘‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution,’’ in which he presents some of his best arguments for evolution. I contend that all of Dobzhansky’s arguments hinge upon sectarian claims about God’s nature, actions, purposes, or duties. Moreover, Dobzhansky’s theology manifests several tensions, both in the epistemic justification of his theological claims and in their collective coherence. I note that other prominent biologists—such as Mayr, Dawkins, Eldredge, Ayala, de Beer, Futuyma, and Gould—also use theology-laden arguments. I recommend increased analysis of the justification, complexity, and coherence of this theology.
This essay examines Darwin’s positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the O... more This essay examines Darwin’s positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyzes the Origin’s theological language about God’s accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws, and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify (and inform) descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin’s mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin’s positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin’s overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin’s science.
Although scholars have paid careful attention to the naturalistic content of the Origin, less foc... more Although scholars have paid careful attention to the naturalistic content of the Origin, less focus has been given to Darwin’s strategic deployment of methodological naturalism in the volume. A close inspection shows that he did not use methodological naturalism statically in the six editions of the Origin; instead, he strategically and progressively invoked methodological naturalism in the six editions of the Origin in order to enhance the persuasiveness of his theory and to marginalize special creation from the scientific discussion. In particular, Darwin’s explicit use of methodological naturalism in later editions of the Origin was animated less by epistemic reasons and more by expedient ones. Thus, while Darwin personally may have had sound epistemic grounds for methodological naturalism, his increasing deployment of the method in the Origin seems to have been mainly for the purpose of winning converts to his theory and ostracizing special creation rather than making a strong empirical and philosophical case per se for his position.
This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for thei... more This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can never be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly always be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly “God hypotheses,” on the other hand, can never be scientifically confirmed—again, no matter what the evidence—but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Methodological naturalism not only leads to this self-serving dynamic, but does not appear to serve a meaningful epistemic purpose in the contest between philosophical naturalism and theism and so, for these reasons, ought to be set aside.
Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest trójstopniowa analiza pozytywnego (positiva) użycia teologi... more Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest trójstopniowa analiza pozytywnego (positiva) użycia teologii przez Karola Darwina w pierwszym wydaniu O powstawaniu gatunków. Po pierwsze, skupię się na występującym w tym dziele języku teologicznym, który przejawia się we fragmentach dotyczących pojmowalności Boga, Jego uczciwości, sposobów stwarzania, związku między Nim a prawami przyrody i tego, że nie odpowiada On za istniejące w przyrodzie cierpienia. Twierdzę, że Darwin użył teologii pozytywnej, aby uzasadnić teorię dziedziczenia z modyfikacjami (oraz nadać jej kształt) i podważyć ideę specjalnego stworzenia. Po drugie, przedstawię krytyczną analizę tej teologii, biorąc za podstawę późniejsze przemyślenia Darwina, aby pokazać, że z epistemicznego punktu widzenia w teologii pozytywnej obecnej w O powstawaniu gatunków można dostrzec różne wewnętrzne napięcia. Po trzecie, skupię się na względnym epistemicznym znaczeniu teologii pozytywnej dla argumentacji przedstawionej w dziele Darwina. Wszy...
The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most f... more The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most famous polemics for common ancestry. In this essay, I analyze Gould’s argument in several steps. First, I attempt to reconstruct the argument in both deductive and likelihood formulations. I contend that both versions of the argument rest on a theological claim—namely, that God would not (likely) create or allow a suboptimal panda’s thumb. I then argue that a wide range of people are not rationally obligated to accept this theological claim. Next, I give special attention to the likelihood formulation’s emphasis on a contrastive argument for evolution over special creation. I contend that a great number of people are not rationally obligated to accept this formulation either. I next consider and reply to an objection that Gould never intended the panda argument as an apologetic for evolution (and an attack on special creation) but rather as a critique of adaptationism. Finally, I argue th...
The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most f... more The panda’s thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most famous polemics for common ancestry. In this essay, I analyze Gould’s argument in several steps. First, I attempt to reconstruct the argument in both deductive and likelihood formulations. I contend that both versions of the argument rest on a theological claim—namely, that God would not (likely) create or allow a suboptimal panda’s thumb. I then argue that a wide range of people are not rationally obligated to accept this theological claim. Next, I give special attention to the likelihood formulation’s emphasis on a contrastive argument for evolution over special creation. I contend that a great number of people are not rationally obligated to accept this formulation either. I next consider and reply to an objection that Gould never intended the panda argument as an apologetic for evolution (and an attack on special creation) but rather as a critique of adaptationism. Finally, I argue that the panda argument conflicts with Gould’s broader views about the human mind and the relationship between theology and science. I also note along the way that the shortcomings of the panda argument apply to a number of other arguments for evolutionary theory. To be sure, I do not criticize evolution itself or the comprehensive grounds for it. Instead, my primary aims are to analyze the panda argument and suggest that caution is in order about similar arguments as well.
A longstanding question in science and religion is whether standard evolutionary models are compa... more A longstanding question in science and religion is whether standard evolutionary models are compatible with the claim that the world was designed. In The Compatibility of Evolution and Design, theologian E. V. Rope Kojonen constructs a powerful argument that not only are evolution and design compatible, but that evolutionary processes (and biological data) strongly point to design. Yet Kojonen’s model faces several difficulties, each of which raise hurdles for his understanding of how evolution and design can be harmonized. First, his argument for design (and its compatibility with evolution) relies upon a particular view of nature in which fitness landscapes are “fine-tuned” to allow proteins to evolve from one form to another by mutation and selection. But biological data run contrary to this claim, which poses a problem for Kojonen’s design argument (and, as such, his attempt to harmonize design with evolution). Second, Kojonen appeals to the bacterial flagellum to strengthen his case for design, yet the type of design in the flagellum is incompatible with mainstream evolutionary theory, which (again) damages his reconciliation of design with evolution. Third, Kojonen regards convergent evolution as notable positive evidence in favor of his model (including his version of design), yet convergent evolution actually harms the justification of common ancestry, which Kojonen also accepts. This, too, mars his reconciliation of design and evolution. Finally, Kojonen’s model damages the epistemology that undergirds his own design argument as well as the design intuitions of everyday “theists on the street”, whom he seeks to defend. Thus, despite the remarkable depth, nuance, and erudition of Kojonen’s account, it does not offer a convincing reconciliation of ‘design’ and ‘evolution’.
AbstractIn The Evolution-Creation Struggle, Michael Ruse seeks to answer, ‘Why is there so much c... more AbstractIn The Evolution-Creation Struggle, Michael Ruse seeks to answer, ‘Why is there so much controversy surrounding evolutionary theory?’ He does so by tracing the historical development of the theory and the two major reactions to it. These major reactions, for and against, are not just views about science, but full blooded ‘rival religions.’ They each have a system of origins, morality, and eschatology. So the conflict over evolutionary theory persists because it is a clash between incompatible worldviews. This review praises Ruse’s analysis on a number of points but also argues that he stumbles in three ways. First, he fails to explain that a key aspect of the origins debate concerns disagreement about the definition of science. Second, Ruse improperly uses his own (problematic) definition of science, with little argument, in order to rule competing views out of science. Third, Ruse misrepresents the epistemology of non-Darwinians as relying on faith, emotion, and mystery ins...
The British Journal for the History of Science, 2011
This essay examines Darwin's positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of t... more This essay examines Darwin's positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyses the Origin's theological language about God's accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify (and inform) descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin's mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin's positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin's overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin's science.
We argue that a number of biology (and evolution) textbooks face a crippling dilemma. On the one ... more We argue that a number of biology (and evolution) textbooks face a crippling dilemma. On the one hand, significant difficulties arise if textbooks include theological claims in their case for evolution. (Such claims include, for example, 'God would never design a suboptimal panda's thumb, but an imperfect structure is just what we'd expect on natural selection.') On the other hand, significant difficulties arise if textbooks exclude theological claims in their case for evolution. So, whether textbooks include or exclude theological claims, they face debilitating problems. We attempt to establish this thesis by examining 32 biology (and evolution) textbooks, including the Big 12 -- that is, the top four in each of the key undergraduate categories (biology majors, non-majors, and evolution courses). In Section 2 of our article , we analyze three specific types of theology these texts use to justify evolutionary theory. We argue that all face significant objections. In Section 3, we step back from concrete cases and, instead, explore broader problems created by having theology in general in biology textbooks. We argue that the presence of theology -- of whatever kind -- comes at a significant cost, one that some textbook authors are likely unwilling to pay. In Section 4, we consider the alternative: Why not simply get rid of theology? Why not just ignore it? In reply, we marshal a range of arguments why avoiding God-talk raises troubles of its own. Finally, in Section 5, we bring together the collective arguments in Sections 2-4 to argue that biology textbooks face an intractable dilemma. We underscore this difficulty by examining a common approach that some textbooks use to solve this predicament. We argue that this approach turns out to be incoherent and self-serving. The poor performance of textbooks on this point highlights just how deep the difficulty is. In the end, the overall dilemma remains: God-talk or no God-talk?
This essay analyzes Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous article, ‘‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Exce... more This essay analyzes Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous article, ‘‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution,’’ in which he presents some of his best arguments for evolution. I contend that all of Dobzhansky’s arguments hinge upon sectarian claims about God’s nature, actions, purposes, or duties. Moreover, Dobzhansky’s theology manifests several tensions, both in the epistemic justification of his theological claims and in their collective coherence. I note that other prominent biologists—such as Mayr, Dawkins, Eldredge, Ayala, de Beer, Futuyma, and Gould—also use theology-laden arguments. I recommend increased analysis of the justification, complexity, and coherence of this theology.
This essay examines Darwin’s positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the O... more This essay examines Darwin’s positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyzes the Origin’s theological language about God’s accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws, and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify (and inform) descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin’s mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin’s positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin’s overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin’s science.
Although scholars have paid careful attention to the naturalistic content of the Origin, less foc... more Although scholars have paid careful attention to the naturalistic content of the Origin, less focus has been given to Darwin’s strategic deployment of methodological naturalism in the volume. A close inspection shows that he did not use methodological naturalism statically in the six editions of the Origin; instead, he strategically and progressively invoked methodological naturalism in the six editions of the Origin in order to enhance the persuasiveness of his theory and to marginalize special creation from the scientific discussion. In particular, Darwin’s explicit use of methodological naturalism in later editions of the Origin was animated less by epistemic reasons and more by expedient ones. Thus, while Darwin personally may have had sound epistemic grounds for methodological naturalism, his increasing deployment of the method in the Origin seems to have been mainly for the purpose of winning converts to his theory and ostracizing special creation rather than making a strong empirical and philosophical case per se for his position.
This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for thei... more This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can never be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly always be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly “God hypotheses,” on the other hand, can never be scientifically confirmed—again, no matter what the evidence—but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Methodological naturalism not only leads to this self-serving dynamic, but does not appear to serve a meaningful epistemic purpose in the contest between philosophical naturalism and theism and so, for these reasons, ought to be set aside.
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Papers by Stephen Dilley
analyze the panda argument and suggest that caution is in order about similar arguments as well.
and design compatible, but that evolutionary processes (and biological data) strongly point to design. Yet Kojonen’s model faces several difficulties, each of which raise hurdles for his understanding of
how evolution and design can be harmonized. First, his argument for design (and its compatibility with evolution) relies upon a particular view of nature in which fitness landscapes are “fine-tuned” to allow proteins to evolve from one form to another by mutation and selection. But biological
data run contrary to this claim, which poses a problem for Kojonen’s design argument (and, as such, his attempt to harmonize design with evolution). Second, Kojonen appeals to the bacterial flagellum to strengthen his case for design, yet the type of design in the flagellum is incompatible with mainstream evolutionary theory, which (again) damages his reconciliation of design with evolution. Third, Kojonen regards convergent evolution as notable positive evidence in favor of his model
(including his version of design), yet convergent evolution actually harms the justification of common ancestry, which Kojonen also accepts. This, too, mars his reconciliation of design and evolution. Finally, Kojonen’s model damages the epistemology that undergirds his own design argument as well as the design intuitions of everyday “theists on the street”, whom he seeks to defend. Thus, despite the remarkable depth, nuance, and erudition of Kojonen’s account, it does not offer a convincing
reconciliation of ‘design’ and ‘evolution’.
analyze the panda argument and suggest that caution is in order about similar arguments as well.
and design compatible, but that evolutionary processes (and biological data) strongly point to design. Yet Kojonen’s model faces several difficulties, each of which raise hurdles for his understanding of
how evolution and design can be harmonized. First, his argument for design (and its compatibility with evolution) relies upon a particular view of nature in which fitness landscapes are “fine-tuned” to allow proteins to evolve from one form to another by mutation and selection. But biological
data run contrary to this claim, which poses a problem for Kojonen’s design argument (and, as such, his attempt to harmonize design with evolution). Second, Kojonen appeals to the bacterial flagellum to strengthen his case for design, yet the type of design in the flagellum is incompatible with mainstream evolutionary theory, which (again) damages his reconciliation of design with evolution. Third, Kojonen regards convergent evolution as notable positive evidence in favor of his model
(including his version of design), yet convergent evolution actually harms the justification of common ancestry, which Kojonen also accepts. This, too, mars his reconciliation of design and evolution. Finally, Kojonen’s model damages the epistemology that undergirds his own design argument as well as the design intuitions of everyday “theists on the street”, whom he seeks to defend. Thus, despite the remarkable depth, nuance, and erudition of Kojonen’s account, it does not offer a convincing
reconciliation of ‘design’ and ‘evolution’.