Susan Pockett
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Papers by Susan Pockett
(1) an individual person or self can be identified with that individual’s consciousness and thus that (2) consciousness can cause behaviour. In this paper I assemble a body of experimental and philosophical evidence suggesting that both of these beliefs might be mistaken. I discuss some of the practical and philosophical implications of the idea that consciousness does not in fact cause behaviour and conclude that it is not only a serious academic possibility but also an (almost) intuitively acceptable idea that consciousness may be epiphenomenal.
(1) an individual person or self can be identified with that individual’s consciousness and thus that (2) consciousness can cause behaviour. In this paper I assemble a body of experimental and philosophical evidence suggesting that both of these beliefs might be mistaken. I discuss some of the practical and philosophical implications of the idea that consciousness does not in fact cause behaviour and conclude that it is not only a serious academic possibility but also an (almost) intuitively acceptable idea that consciousness may be epiphenomenal.