Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5
This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibili... more This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibility.” It aims to disambiguate and revise the notions of attributability and accountability that Watson’s essay introduced and to clarify the relation between them. It distinguishes mere negative descriptions of an individual from negative attitudes toward that individual, and further distinguishes negative attitudes that constitute criticism from other attitudes that constitute blame. Accepting Watson’s idea that an act or trait is attributable to someone just in case it discloses a feature of an agent’s self, the essay argues that attributability (of a fault) is sufficient to justify criticism of an individual; blame and public sanctions, by contrast, require accountability.
Developing a vision of morality that is at once compelling and comprehensive is an enormous task.... more Developing a vision of morality that is at once compelling and comprehensive is an enormous task. The questions and answers all interlock, making it difficult to know where to start. Most of us, I think, just jump in, with whatever issue or controversy grabs us. We make what headway we can with the section of the moral puzzle on which we choose to work and hope or trust that when we or others work on other sections, the results will fit smoothly, consistently, even supportively with our current attempts. This seems to me to be a useful way to think about Samuel Scheffler's excellent book, Human Morality. The book takes on a significant section of the moral puzzle, addressing the questions of how much morality demands and of how morality is related to self-interest. Scheffler himself is admirably sensitive to the number of interlocking claims involved in the discussion of these topics, and his careful distinctions among questions of morality's content, its scope, its authority, and its deliberative role are extremely helpful for anyone wanting to think clearly about these issues. In what follows I shall be concerned to call attention to some related issues that lurk in the background. These are the issues that Scheffler must hope will be resolved in ways that fit smoothly with his claims. More generally, these are issues that those who are, like me, sympathetic to Scheffler's views, will need eventually to address in order more completely and persuasively to defend the proposal that Human Morality puts forward and to link it to other issues that are equally central to a comprehensive moral theory. The proposal is basically that morality be understood as "a reasonable and humane phenomenon" (6), neither coincident with self-interest nor diametrically opposed to it. While morality places substantial constraints on what in-
Page 1. ASYMMETRICAL FREEDOM 151 freedom of will, furtlher specification of that notion may lhelp... more Page 1. ASYMMETRICAL FREEDOM 151 freedom of will, furtlher specification of that notion may lhelp to explain wlhy determinism makes free will problematic by making it clear wlhy determinism represents a clhallenge to autonomy thus specified. ... lem of free will. ...
The notion of rule utilitarianism (a twentieth-century addition to the canon of utilitarian thoug... more The notion of rule utilitarianism (a twentieth-century addition to the canon of utilitarian thought) has been discussed under two main headings—ideal-rule utilitarianism and 'indirect' utilitarianism. The distinction between them is often hazy. But we can sketch out each perspective along three different dimensions, contrasting the two conceptions of rule utilitarianism at each of three main hinge points: (1) the grounding of rules, (2) the allowed complexity of rules, (3) the conflict of rules. These two profiles constitute ideal types, but they help us see that we can regiment and focus utilitarian intuitions in two quite distinct ways. An interesting test case is provided by J.S. Mill. He has been associated with each of these perspectives (with a utilitarianism of ideal rules by R.B. Brandt and with indirect utilitarianism by John Gray), but careful attention to Mill's main arguments indicates, I believe, that he adheres to neither consistently, though he is closer t...
In his recent book and earlier articles, Derek Parfit has made an impressive case for the truth o... more In his recent book and earlier articles, Derek Parfit has made an impressive case for the truth of reductionism with respect to persons. Having strongly argued for this metaphysical thesis, Parfit goes on to suggest that it has normative implications. In particular, he claims that, ...
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5
This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibili... more This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibility.” It aims to disambiguate and revise the notions of attributability and accountability that Watson’s essay introduced and to clarify the relation between them. It distinguishes mere negative descriptions of an individual from negative attitudes toward that individual, and further distinguishes negative attitudes that constitute criticism from other attitudes that constitute blame. Accepting Watson’s idea that an act or trait is attributable to someone just in case it discloses a feature of an agent’s self, the essay argues that attributability (of a fault) is sufficient to justify criticism of an individual; blame and public sanctions, by contrast, require accountability.
Developing a vision of morality that is at once compelling and comprehensive is an enormous task.... more Developing a vision of morality that is at once compelling and comprehensive is an enormous task. The questions and answers all interlock, making it difficult to know where to start. Most of us, I think, just jump in, with whatever issue or controversy grabs us. We make what headway we can with the section of the moral puzzle on which we choose to work and hope or trust that when we or others work on other sections, the results will fit smoothly, consistently, even supportively with our current attempts. This seems to me to be a useful way to think about Samuel Scheffler's excellent book, Human Morality. The book takes on a significant section of the moral puzzle, addressing the questions of how much morality demands and of how morality is related to self-interest. Scheffler himself is admirably sensitive to the number of interlocking claims involved in the discussion of these topics, and his careful distinctions among questions of morality's content, its scope, its authority, and its deliberative role are extremely helpful for anyone wanting to think clearly about these issues. In what follows I shall be concerned to call attention to some related issues that lurk in the background. These are the issues that Scheffler must hope will be resolved in ways that fit smoothly with his claims. More generally, these are issues that those who are, like me, sympathetic to Scheffler's views, will need eventually to address in order more completely and persuasively to defend the proposal that Human Morality puts forward and to link it to other issues that are equally central to a comprehensive moral theory. The proposal is basically that morality be understood as "a reasonable and humane phenomenon" (6), neither coincident with self-interest nor diametrically opposed to it. While morality places substantial constraints on what in-
Page 1. ASYMMETRICAL FREEDOM 151 freedom of will, furtlher specification of that notion may lhelp... more Page 1. ASYMMETRICAL FREEDOM 151 freedom of will, furtlher specification of that notion may lhelp to explain wlhy determinism makes free will problematic by making it clear wlhy determinism represents a clhallenge to autonomy thus specified. ... lem of free will. ...
The notion of rule utilitarianism (a twentieth-century addition to the canon of utilitarian thoug... more The notion of rule utilitarianism (a twentieth-century addition to the canon of utilitarian thought) has been discussed under two main headings—ideal-rule utilitarianism and 'indirect' utilitarianism. The distinction between them is often hazy. But we can sketch out each perspective along three different dimensions, contrasting the two conceptions of rule utilitarianism at each of three main hinge points: (1) the grounding of rules, (2) the allowed complexity of rules, (3) the conflict of rules. These two profiles constitute ideal types, but they help us see that we can regiment and focus utilitarian intuitions in two quite distinct ways. An interesting test case is provided by J.S. Mill. He has been associated with each of these perspectives (with a utilitarianism of ideal rules by R.B. Brandt and with indirect utilitarianism by John Gray), but careful attention to Mill's main arguments indicates, I believe, that he adheres to neither consistently, though he is closer t...
In his recent book and earlier articles, Derek Parfit has made an impressive case for the truth o... more In his recent book and earlier articles, Derek Parfit has made an impressive case for the truth of reductionism with respect to persons. Having strongly argued for this metaphysical thesis, Parfit goes on to suggest that it has normative implications. In particular, he claims that, ...
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