Research in global strategic management, May 19, 2004
Previous studies on international competitive strategies identify a number of loosely defined str... more Previous studies on international competitive strategies identify a number of loosely defined strategy types and suggest that the choice among them is based on their relative productive efficiency (i.e. ability to exploit such factors as economies of scale, economies of scope, and location economies). Our analysis highlights the additional role of motivational efficiency. We propose that the proportion of available productive efficiency that is actually realized under each strategy depends on the motivational efficiency of the best possible incentive system for implementing the strategy. Our conceptual framework allows the identification of precise theoretical relationships for empirical measurement and testing.
A key characteristic of the product life cycle (PLC) is the depletion of the product's market pot... more A key characteristic of the product life cycle (PLC) is the depletion of the product's market potential due to technological obsolescence. Based on this concept, we develop a stochastic model for evaluating market entry and exit decisions during the PLC under uncertainty. The model explicates the conditions for the optimality of a two-threshold policy based on the estimated earnings potential of the product, and can be used by manufacturing firms to assess entry and exit decisions under such conditions. To aid the applications of the model in actual decision situations, we also provide the procedures for computing the exact and approximate values of the two thresholds.
This paper studies the problem of contracting between two firms when they try to exploit their co... more This paper studies the problem of contracting between two firms when they try to exploit their complementary resources in a collaborative venture (CV), but their performance in the CV cannot be precisely verified by the other party or by a third-party arbiter. Using a mathematical model that treats performance verifiability as a continuous variable, the paper first establishes that a party whose performance cannot be perfectly verified has an incentive to shirk if it is paid only a flat fee and that this shirking problem is more severe as its performance is less verifiable. Then, the paper shows in a general setting that a contract under which each party shares a fraction of the output is superior to a contract under which one of them is paid only a flat fee when performance verifiability is sufficiently low. In addition, with some specific assumptions about the forms of the revenue and cost functions, the paper also shows that a party’s share of the venture’s residual output in the equilibrium is an increasing function of its productivity and a decreasing function of its opportunity cost. Finally, the numerical examples constructed in the paper suggest that a contract which combines the self-enforcing mechanism of output sharing with the third-party enforcement mechanism of arbitration generally performs better than a contract that utilizes only one of these mechanisms.
Research in global strategic management, May 19, 2004
Previous studies on international competitive strategies identify a number of loosely defined str... more Previous studies on international competitive strategies identify a number of loosely defined strategy types and suggest that the choice among them is based on their relative productive efficiency (i.e. ability to exploit such factors as economies of scale, economies of scope, and location economies). Our analysis highlights the additional role of motivational efficiency. We propose that the proportion of available productive efficiency that is actually realized under each strategy depends on the motivational efficiency of the best possible incentive system for implementing the strategy. Our conceptual framework allows the identification of precise theoretical relationships for empirical measurement and testing.
A key characteristic of the product life cycle (PLC) is the depletion of the product's market pot... more A key characteristic of the product life cycle (PLC) is the depletion of the product's market potential due to technological obsolescence. Based on this concept, we develop a stochastic model for evaluating market entry and exit decisions during the PLC under uncertainty. The model explicates the conditions for the optimality of a two-threshold policy based on the estimated earnings potential of the product, and can be used by manufacturing firms to assess entry and exit decisions under such conditions. To aid the applications of the model in actual decision situations, we also provide the procedures for computing the exact and approximate values of the two thresholds.
This paper studies the problem of contracting between two firms when they try to exploit their co... more This paper studies the problem of contracting between two firms when they try to exploit their complementary resources in a collaborative venture (CV), but their performance in the CV cannot be precisely verified by the other party or by a third-party arbiter. Using a mathematical model that treats performance verifiability as a continuous variable, the paper first establishes that a party whose performance cannot be perfectly verified has an incentive to shirk if it is paid only a flat fee and that this shirking problem is more severe as its performance is less verifiable. Then, the paper shows in a general setting that a contract under which each party shares a fraction of the output is superior to a contract under which one of them is paid only a flat fee when performance verifiability is sufficiently low. In addition, with some specific assumptions about the forms of the revenue and cost functions, the paper also shows that a party’s share of the venture’s residual output in the equilibrium is an increasing function of its productivity and a decreasing function of its opportunity cost. Finally, the numerical examples constructed in the paper suggest that a contract which combines the self-enforcing mechanism of output sharing with the third-party enforcement mechanism of arbitration generally performs better than a contract that utilizes only one of these mechanisms.
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