Books by Søren Overgaard
Phenomenology Philosophy of Mind (especially philosophy of perception and social cognition)
Papers by Søren Overgaard
Synthese, 2024
Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see a... more Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see an object unless one visually differentiates it from its immediate surroundings. This paper, however, sounds a sceptical note. Based on suggestions by Dretske (2007) and Gibson (2002 [1972]), I articulate two 'principles of occlusion' and argue that each principle admits of a reading on which it is both plausible and incompatible with the differentiation condition. To resolve the inconsistency, I suggest we abandon the differentiation condition.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Jul 25, 2013
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2023
In a recent issue of the JHP, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation o... more In a recent issue of the JHP, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
Mind
In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, b... more In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen’s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The upshot of the paper is that cases of backlighting do have important philosophical lessons to teach us after all – lessons concerning the notion of perceptual occlusion.
Philosophy Compass
There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve r... more There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are to be located vis-à-vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau-Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.
Philosophical Studies, 2022
Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that ... more Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that reports. But the proposals they have made have one striking feature in common: they are demonstrably false. Going against the trend, I suggest we stop trying to lump together seeing-as and seeing-that. Instead, we need to realize that there is a deep logical kinship between seeing-as reports and seeing-objects reports.
Erkenntnis, 2021
Naive Realists have recently proposed that illusions occur in circumstances that are ‘non-paradig... more Naive Realists have recently proposed that illusions occur in circumstances that are ‘non-paradigmatic’ or with which we are insufficiently familiar. While this proposal may work for many of the illusions philosophers normally discuss, I argue in this paper that there are other illusions that do not fit this pattern. In particular, the vertical-horizontal illusion (VHI) occurs in circumstances that are both familiar and paradigmatic, while disappearing (or becoming attenuated) in more unusual circumstances.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2020
“Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it re... more “Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it refers to something people do – for example, inferences they make about others’ expectations. On the other hand, it refers to a particular theoretical model of those things that people do. If the concept of TTOM is to have any future, this ambiguity must be redressed.
The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 2020
Perception seems like it puts us directly in touch with real things in our environment. But accor... more Perception seems like it puts us directly in touch with real things in our environment. But according to a popular view, perception actually does no such thing. Perceptual experiences are internally generated imagery, and we don’t see what is really out there. I call this view “the Hard-Nosed View,” and I argue that it is deeply problematic. In fact, the view is self-defeating: it undermines the very evidence supposed to establish or support the view. Indeed, if perceptual experiences are just internally generated images that generally don’t reflect what is really out there, the very notion of a scientific finding is put in jeopardy. So, the Hard-Nosed View had better be false.
Synthese, 2019
According to the Group Mind Hypothesis, a group can have beliefs over and above the beliefs of th... more According to the Group Mind Hypothesis, a group can have beliefs over and above the beliefs of the individual members of the group. Some maintain that there can be group mentality of this kind in the absence of any group-level phenomenal consciousness. We present a challenge to the latter view. First, we argue that a state is not a belief unless the owner of the state is disposed to access the state's content in a corresponding conscious judgment. Thus, if there is no such thing as group consciousness, then we cannot literally ascribe beliefs to groups. Secondly, we respond to an objection that appeals to the distinction between 'access consciousness' and 'phenomenal consciousness'. According to the objection, the notion of consciousness appealed to in our argument must be access consciousness, whereas our argument is only effective if it is about phenomenal consciousness. In response, we question both parts of the objection. Our argument can still be effective provided there are reasons to believe a system or creature cannot have access consciousness if it lacks phenomenal consciousness altogether. Moreover, our argument for the necessary accessibility to consciousness of beliefs does concern phenomenal consciousness.
Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 2017
2. The latter proposals are roughly those offered by so-called "theory-theorists" and "simulation... more 2. The latter proposals are roughly those offered by so-called "theory-theorists" and "simulation theorists," respectively. For contemporary phenomenologists pressing the argument just outlined, see (e.g.) Gallagher (2008), Krueger (2012), Ratcliffe (2007), Zahavi (2011). Krueger (forthcoming) provides a lucid summary of the debates surrounding DSP.
Husserl Studies, 2017
Claude Romano (2012) and Andrea Staiti (2015) have recently discussed Husserl's account of percep... more Claude Romano (2012) and Andrea Staiti (2015) have recently discussed Husserl's account of perception in relation to debates in current analytic philosophy between so-called ''conjunctivists'' and ''disjunctivists''. Romano and Staiti offer strikingly different accounts of the nature of illusion and hallucination, and opposing readings of Husserl. Romano thinks hallucinations and illusions are fleeting, fragile phenomena, while Staiti claims they are inherently retrospective phenomena. Romano reads Husserl as being committed to a form of conjunctivism that Romano rejects in favour of a version of disjunctivism. Staiti, by contrast, claims that, from a Husserlian viewpoint, conjunctivism and disjunctivism are equally untenable. I suggest that both Romano and Staiti offer implausible accounts of illusions and hallucinations, and deliver premature verdicts on Husserl in relation to the analytic debates on perception.
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Books by Søren Overgaard
Papers by Søren Overgaard