Abstract
We study the problem of assigning applicants to jobs. Each applicant has a weight and provides a preference list, which may contain ties, ranking a subset of the jobs. An applicant x may prefer one matching over the other (or be indifferent between them, in case of a tie) based on the jobs x gets in the two matchings and x’s personal preference. A matching M is popular if there is no other matching M′ such that the weight of the applicants who prefer M′ over M exceeds the weight of those who prefer M over M′.
We present two algorithms to find a popular matching, or in case none exists, to establish so. For the case of strict preferences we develop an O(n+m) time algorithm. When ties are allowed a more involved algorithm solves the problem in \(O(\min(k \sqrt{n}, n) m)\) time, where k is the number of distinct weights the applicants are given.
Research supported by NSF Awards CCR 0113192 and CCF 0430650.
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Mestre, J. (2006). Weighted Popular Matchings. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4051. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_62
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_62
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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