Papers by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Feb 1, 2013
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
In ‘Mind the Value Gap’, the author takes the liberty of assuming that his main points and argume... more In ‘Mind the Value Gap’, the author takes the liberty of assuming that his main points and arguments in the book are correct. This allows him to address in a more direct fashion certain issues that would arise if there were a value divide with cracks extending far and wide into our evaluative and normative notions. The discussion paints a somewhat bleak picture of our relation to values and reasons. Whatever it is that we do, and that calls for justification, we find ourselves stuck with a split vision of our deliberative opportunities. We can start from what is either good or good for us or someone. The reasons belonging to the impersonal side of the gap do not affect the reasons on the personal side, and vice versa. In this, the book’s final chapter, the author voices some thoughts about whether, and to what extent, we should mind the value gap. Several approaches to the value gap are considered.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
‘Challenging Mooreanism’ puts forward some arguments against Mooreanism, the formal view that eit... more ‘Challenging Mooreanism’ puts forward some arguments against Mooreanism, the formal view that either final good-for is an incoherent value notion or, ultimately, at best a disguised reference to what is finally good. The chapter concludes that Mooreans bar us from making some evaluations, which, in principle, we should be able to endorse or reject on substantive grounds. Mooreanism is therefore in at least some respects, inferior to value dualism. The arguments focus on the so-called ‘localisation manoeuvre’, which Mooreans tend to employ in order to argue that they can in fact make sense of some uses of ‘good for someone’. The general idea behind this manoeuvre is to reduce claims such as ‘x is good for a’ to claims about non-relational goodness located in a, or at least related to a in some relevant way. Mooreans will not insist that this is always possible. Sometimes people are linguistically confused when they maintain that something is finally good for someone. However, sometimes speakers make sense even if they express themselves in terms of what is finally good for a person, and when that happens, they locate a non-relational good to the person. Or so the Mooreans argue. The arguments against Mooreanism turn on some evaluations referring to overall and pro tanto values that Mooreanism qua formal value theory should be able to analyse. However, it is argued that the localisation manoeuvre cannot be applied to these evaluations.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
Any fitting-attitude (FA) analysis which understands value ultimately in terms of reasons and pro... more Any fitting-attitude (FA) analysis which understands value ultimately in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes will have limited wiggle room if it is to respect the kind of radical division between good and good-for that earlier chapters have outlined. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other corresponding to the analysis of good-for. ‘The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes’ outlines why the latter, ‘attitudinal’ approach is preferable. Unfortunately, the attitudinal approach faces a challenging problem: the logical consequence argument. According to it, the attitudinal approach has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also, necessarily, non-relationally good. That is bad news—especially if you are a value dualist. The next chapter (Chap. 8) is devoted to resolving this issue.
Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by cert... more Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
The main aim in ‘FA and Motivating Reasons’ is to clear the ground for the discussion in Chapter ... more The main aim in ‘FA and Motivating Reasons’ is to clear the ground for the discussion in Chapter 11 by drawing attention to some notions and distinctions that help us to understand the core elements of fitting-attitude analysis (FA). In particular, the distinction between explanatory and motivating reason plays a core part in this and the next chapter. In light of this distinction, the focus is on whether we should accept either ‘the guise of the good thesis’ or the more plausible ‘guise of reason thesis’. Eventually (in Chapter 11), it is argued that we should endorse neither of these. While the previous chapters gave us a positive insight (they lead to a modification of the FA pattern of analysis), this—and the next chapter also, as we shall see—will mainly have a negative impact. It suggests we should refrain from introducing certain modifications of FA analysis that at first sight might seem compelling.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
Evaluations about what is good (period) and what is good for someone shape much of ethics. The tw... more Evaluations about what is good (period) and what is good for someone shape much of ethics. The two value notions ‘good’ and ‘good for’ mark the deep-rooted divide between the impersonally and personally valuable—the value divide on which The Value Gap centres. Past and contemporary philosophers have argued it is a mistake to believe that these two value notions give rise to unresolvable value conflicts. This book argues that they are wrong. Part I considers two views to that effect, which share the idea that one of the two value notions is either flawed or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. The views disagree, however, about whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed concept. These approaches deny the central idea of this work, namely that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. Part II provides an analysis of impersonal and personal goodness in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the analysis’ key elements—reasons and pro- and con-attitudes—the book challenges a common idea, namely that our beliefs about practical and moral dilemmas can be dismissed as being conceptually confused. The gap between favouring what is good and what is good for someone appears insurmountable.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
The background of ‘Good-For Unitarianism’ is the following: It has been suggested that the author... more The background of ‘Good-For Unitarianism’ is the following: It has been suggested that the author’s analysis of good-for from 2011 introduced a new sense of the expression ‘good for’ and that ‘good for’ accordingly is an ambiguous expression. This suggestion is by no means far-fetched. However, there are also reasons, as this chapter will evince, to question that the author’s proposal turns ‘good for’ into a strict ambiguous term. Good-for unitarianism is the view that final goodness-for can be given a single unambiguous conceptual analysis. Good-for disunitarians hold that non-instrumental good-for comes in two (or more) varieties. The chapter outlines some arguments in favour of disunitarianism, but concludes that these arguments fail to show that unitarianism is false. A distinction is next made between narrow and wide unitarianism. According to an influential kind of narrow unitarianism, there is an analytic connection between well-being and good-for. Wide unitarianism is open to there being very different kinds of bearers of good-for. The narrow version is rejected. The chapter thereafter presents some possible scenarios that support wide unitarianism and its core idea that good-for conceptually admits of more value bearers than what is bearing well-being.
Abstract is not available
Notre Dame philosophical reviews, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 2, 2021
‘Good and Good-For’ introduces three views concerning the distinction between final goodness and ... more ‘Good and Good-For’ introduces three views concerning the distinction between final goodness and final goodness-for. These two value notions mark the divide between the impersonally (non-relationally) and personally (relationally) valuable—the value gap which this book is about. Two of the views—‘Mooreanism’ and ‘good-for monism’—deny there is any gap at all. Both reject value dualism, the theory that final goodness and final goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The book’s discussion of good and good-for depicts these as being about two kinds of property (not necessarily in a realistic sense). According to Mooreanism, either final good-for is an incoherent value notion or, ultimately, at best a disguised reference to what is finally good. Good-for monists reverse this, and insist that either final good is an incoherent value notion or, ultimately, at best one referring to what is finally good for someone or something. Dualism in its turn does not imply that anything that is good-for someone is also good, or vice versa. Intuitively, there could be things that are good for a person which do not carry any impersonal value, or vice versa.
Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2014). Konjunktiv... more Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2014). Konjunktiva fakta och distinktionen mellan agent-neutrala och relativa skäl. (s. 1-11). Lund University.
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Papers by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen