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Jennifer Szende

McMaster University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of Guelph, Philosophy Department, Post-Doc

Trent University, Philosophy, Adjunct

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I completed my doctorate in the Department of Philosophy at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada in May 2013. My dissertation examined liberal theories of global justice and human rights. I have taught Political Philosophy at the University of Guelph, Biomedical Ethics and Cyberethics in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, and Gender and Environmental Justice in the Department of Gender Studies at Trent University, and Social and Political Philosophy at Queen's University. I have completed postdoctoral fellowships at the University of Guelph and the Centre de Recherche en Ethique at l'Universite de Montreal.
Supervisors: Margaret Moore and Will Kymlicka

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University of Delaware

The University of Texas at Austin

Birkbeck College, University of London

Richard Bellamy

University College London

University of Cologne

Shaun Gallagher

University of Memphis

Utrecht University

Armando Marques-Guedes

UNL - New University of Lisbon

University of the Basque Country, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

University of Genova

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Papers by Jennifer Szende

Relational value, land, and climate justice

Journal of Global Ethics, Jan 2, 2022

Springer eBooks, 2011

The harm principle is a liberty-limiting principle in the sense that it justifies interference or... more The harm principle is a liberty-limiting principle in the sense that it justifies interference or coercion from the state in order to prevent individuals from harming others. The principle is predicated on the value of autonomy, the idea that individuals who are mentally competent and of legal age are best suited to decide for themselves how to References

Beitz and the Problem with a State-Focused Approach to Human Rights

Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated... more Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated by a concern for the enforcement of human rights in modern international practice. However, the focus on states in his human rights project generates a tension between the universal aspirations of individual human rights and the vulnerable individuals who through rendition or state failure find themselves outside the international state system. This paper argues that Beitz and other theorists of human rights make a mistake when they define human rights in statist terms. The scope of a theory of human rights must include all human beings, even if not simply in virtue of their humanity. The aspiration for human rights to be political and not metaphysical is interesting and admirable, but the human scope of human rights must be retained in order for human rights to retain their critical force

Relational value, land, and climate justice

Journal of Global Ethics

Planning in the Void: Autonomy Amid Pandemic Constraints

Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, 2020

Planning in the Void: Autonomy Amid Pandemic Constraints

Global justice, sovereignty, and the problem of perspective

Journal of International Political Theory, 2019

This article argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem ... more This article argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem of perspective, and that this worry exhibits a gendered character. Within a liberal domestic theory of justice, the public/private distinction has been repeatedly shown to be bad for women because it creates a domain for injustice that becomes invisible to public policy and the law. This article argues that state-centered theories of global justice create an analogous space that is cut off from questions of global justice. The article therefore suggests that this way of framing questions of global justice is problematic, and is problematic for women in particular. Just as the public/private distinction in liberal domestic justice leaves cases of injustice outside the vision of the law, the hard distinction between the domestic (state) sphere and the international realm of justice leaves cases of injustice invisible to international law. For the question of global justice, the privileging of sovereignty and non-intervention compromises the ability of the theory to achieve its purported goal of universal justice.

Selective humanitarian intervention: moral reason and collective agents

Journal of Global Ethics, 2012

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might ... more This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents.

Tesón, Fernando

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

The Heart of Human Rights, written by Allan Buchanan

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Humanitarian Military Intervention

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

Humanitarian Aid

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 256 pages. ISBN: 9780199572458 (hbk.). Hardback: £16.99

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011

Global Justice, Sovereignty, and the Problem of Perspective

Journal of International Political Theory, 2019

This paper argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem of... more This paper argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem of perspective, and that this worry exhibits a gendered character. Within a liberal domestic theory of justice, the public/private distinction has been repeatedly shown to be bad for women because it creates a domain for injustice that becomes invisible to public policy and the law. This paper argues that state-centered theories of global justice create an analogous space that is cut off from questions of global justice. The paper therefore suggests that this way of framing questions of global justice is problematic, and is problematic for women in particular. Just as the public/private distinction in liberal domestic justice leaves cases of injustice outside the vision of the law, the hard distinction between the domestic (state) sphere and the international realm of justice leaves cases of injustice invisible to international law. For the question of global justice, the privileging of sovereignty and non-intervention compromise the ability of the theory to achieve its purported goal of universal justice.

Thriving in the desert: theorizing food, justice and climate change

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

Food Deserts, Justice, and the Distributive Paradigm

Jennifer Szende Postdoctoral Fellow, CRÉ Forthcoming in Jill Dieterle (Ed.) Just Food: Philosophy... more

Selective Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Reason and Collective Agents

Journal of Global Ethics, Apr 2012

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might ... more This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents.

Book Review: The Idea of Human Rights

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Nov 2011

Book Review: Ethics and Foreign Intervention

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Jan 1, 2006

Relational value, land, and climate justice

Journal of Global Ethics, Jan 2, 2022

Springer eBooks, 2011

The harm principle is a liberty-limiting principle in the sense that it justifies interference or... more The harm principle is a liberty-limiting principle in the sense that it justifies interference or coercion from the state in order to prevent individuals from harming others. The principle is predicated on the value of autonomy, the idea that individuals who are mentally competent and of legal age are best suited to decide for themselves how to References

Beitz and the Problem with a State-Focused Approach to Human Rights

Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated... more Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated by a concern for the enforcement of human rights in modern international practice. However, the focus on states in his human rights project generates a tension between the universal aspirations of individual human rights and the vulnerable individuals who through rendition or state failure find themselves outside the international state system. This paper argues that Beitz and other theorists of human rights make a mistake when they define human rights in statist terms. The scope of a theory of human rights must include all human beings, even if not simply in virtue of their humanity. The aspiration for human rights to be political and not metaphysical is interesting and admirable, but the human scope of human rights must be retained in order for human rights to retain their critical force

Relational value, land, and climate justice

Journal of Global Ethics

Planning in the Void: Autonomy Amid Pandemic Constraints

Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, 2020

Planning in the Void: Autonomy Amid Pandemic Constraints

Global justice, sovereignty, and the problem of perspective

Journal of International Political Theory, 2019

This article argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem ... more This article argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem of perspective, and that this worry exhibits a gendered character. Within a liberal domestic theory of justice, the public/private distinction has been repeatedly shown to be bad for women because it creates a domain for injustice that becomes invisible to public policy and the law. This article argues that state-centered theories of global justice create an analogous space that is cut off from questions of global justice. The article therefore suggests that this way of framing questions of global justice is problematic, and is problematic for women in particular. Just as the public/private distinction in liberal domestic justice leaves cases of injustice outside the vision of the law, the hard distinction between the domestic (state) sphere and the international realm of justice leaves cases of injustice invisible to international law. For the question of global justice, the privileging of sovereignty and non-intervention compromises the ability of the theory to achieve its purported goal of universal justice.

Selective humanitarian intervention: moral reason and collective agents

Journal of Global Ethics, 2012

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might ... more This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents.

Tesón, Fernando

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

The Heart of Human Rights, written by Allan Buchanan

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Humanitarian Military Intervention

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

Humanitarian Aid

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 256 pages. ISBN: 9780199572458 (hbk.). Hardback: £16.99

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011

Global Justice, Sovereignty, and the Problem of Perspective

Journal of International Political Theory, 2019

This paper argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem of... more This paper argues that a state-centered theory of global justice exhibits an epistemic problem of perspective, and that this worry exhibits a gendered character. Within a liberal domestic theory of justice, the public/private distinction has been repeatedly shown to be bad for women because it creates a domain for injustice that becomes invisible to public policy and the law. This paper argues that state-centered theories of global justice create an analogous space that is cut off from questions of global justice. The paper therefore suggests that this way of framing questions of global justice is problematic, and is problematic for women in particular. Just as the public/private distinction in liberal domestic justice leaves cases of injustice outside the vision of the law, the hard distinction between the domestic (state) sphere and the international realm of justice leaves cases of injustice invisible to international law. For the question of global justice, the privileging of sovereignty and non-intervention compromise the ability of the theory to achieve its purported goal of universal justice.

Thriving in the desert: theorizing food, justice and climate change

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, 2011

Food Deserts, Justice, and the Distributive Paradigm

Jennifer Szende Postdoctoral Fellow, CRÉ Forthcoming in Jill Dieterle (Ed.) Just Food: Philosophy... more

Selective Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Reason and Collective Agents

Journal of Global Ethics, Apr 2012

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might ... more This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents.

Book Review: The Idea of Human Rights

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Nov 2011

Book Review: Ethics and Foreign Intervention

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Jan 1, 2006

Humanitarian Intervention, Global Justice, and the Problem of Perspective

This paper examines a worry about the epistemology of global injustice, which I call the problem ... more This paper examines a worry about the epistemology of global injustice, which I call the problem of perspective for a theory of global justice. Although the literature on global justice frequently invokes questions of distributive justiceand global poverty in particular -I will rely on a broader definition of global justice inclusive of issues of human rights and their enforcement, justice in international trade, just war, and humanitarian intervention. Of these, humanitarian intervention is taken as paradigmatic of the type of global justice decision-making with which I am concerned.

Food Deserts, Justice, and the Distributive Paradigm

This paper employs the example of injustice in food distribution to examine Young's critique of t... more This paper employs the example of injustice in food distribution to examine Young's critique of the distributive paradigm. Young argues that many theories of justice inflate the significance of distribution, and thereby misunderstand the central role played by social processes of oppression and domination. The concept of a 'food desert' is defined by a relative lack of access to nutritious food in a geographically defined area, and moreover by a population's related deprivation and lack of access to nutritious food. A food desert is thus a distributional concept. But food deserts are also characterized as oppressive outcomes of social processes of domination and oppression. Hence, they simultaneously represent an example of both the distributive paradigm, and an expanded definition of injustice as argued for by Young. This paper examines the example of food deserts in light of Young's critique of the distributive paradigm, and finds the example instructive.

Towards a Theory of Global Environmental Justice

Theories of global justice and environmental justice, have developed parallel theories over the l... more Theories of global justice and environmental justice, have developed parallel theories over the last two decades. Both have been motivated by a social justice consideration for the worst off. Increasingly, theories of global justice are tackling questions of environmental concern, and theories of environmental concern have begun to investigate global ramifications of their claims. This paper presents a preliminary investigation into how insights developed on the global justice side can be fruitfully applied to the question of global environmental justice, and can thereby begin to bridge the gap.

Young and the Problem of Pseudo-Oppression

Young's account of oppression starts from the use of the term by emancipatory social movements su... more Young's account of oppression starts from the use of the term by emancipatory social movements such as the civil rights movement. Young employs Wittgensteinian methodology including a use theory of meaning. This paper examines the implications for her work of the adoption of the language of oppression and emancipation by groups on the far right. Their adoption of the language of oppression affects the meaning of the term and provides contradictory answers about how to understand such uses of the term. The example reveals an underlying tension in Young's argument, and more generally in language-use arguments for political purposes.

Is Global Justice Bad for Women?

This paper argues that a cosmopolitan theory of global justice is better for women than a state-c... more

Beitz and the Problem with a State-Focused Approach to Human Rights

Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated... more Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated by a concern for the enforcement of human rights in modern international practice. However, the focus on states in his human rights project generates a tension between the universal aspirations of individual human rights and the vulnerable individuals who through rendition or state failure find themselves outside the international state system. This paper argues that Beitz and other theorists of human rights make a mistake when they define human rights in statist terms. The scope of a theory of human rights must include all human beings, even if not simply in virtue of their humanity. The aspiration for human rights to be political and not metaphysical is interesting and admirable, but the human scope of human rights must be retained in order for human rights to retain their critical force.

Statement of Teaching Philosophy

Buchanan Heart of Human Rights Review

Assessing Analytic and Evaluative Skills Using Multiple Choice

On Knowing the 'why' and the impossibility of ethical AI

Recently, the idea of 'ethical AI' has been gaining traction, and while the project is much neede... more Recently, the idea of 'ethical AI' has been gaining traction, and while the project is much needed, a worry about a decontextualized principle-driven ethics takes on added dimensions for the project of ethical AI. Indeed, the absence of context remains a general worry for many aspects of AI. This paper reflects on two arguments for deeply context-sensitive ethics-namely, particularism and feminist ethics-and argues that they demonstrate a tension in the pursuit of ethical AI. Particularism argues that principles are suspect because in the right context, any putative principle could switch valence. Feminist ethics and feminist epistemology are also deeply contextual, and argue that contextual values are relevant to all types of theory justification. Ultimately, I argue that a truly ethical AI must find a way to resolve this deep tension. The idea and importance of 'ethical AI' has been gaining traction, and that is undoubtedly a good thing. Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, and data mining have been developed to perform or streamline complex processes and tasks. However, many of these tasks are fraught with ethical complexity.