Papers by Kristen Intemann
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Jan 13, 2023
There are many ways that trust plays a crucial role in science, both between researchers and betw... more There are many ways that trust plays a crucial role in science, both between researchers and between researchers and various communities impacted by their research. Scientific practices can operate in ways that either facilitate, or undermine, trust in science. This contribution will examine the role of science communication in facilitating (or undermining) public trust in science and science-based policy recommendations. This will be done by looking at some potential failures in the public communication of science during the COVID-19 pandemic that have the potential to undermine trust in scientists. Finally, I draw out lessons that this case has for how we might improve science communication practices.
Routledge eBooks, Mar 27, 2017
Routledge eBooks, Nov 30, 2020
Public Affairs Quarterly, Jul 1, 2017
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dec 7, 2020
Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific "hype," or sensationalized exagge... more Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific "hype," or sensationalized exaggeration, in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism in a variety of fields (e.g., Caulfield and Condit 2012). Yet, how "hype" is being conceived varies. I will argue that hype is best understood as a particular kind of exaggeration, one that explicitly or implicitly exaggerates various positive aspects of science in ways that undermine the goals of science communication in a particular context. This account also makes clear the ways that value judgments play a role in judgments of "hype," which has implications for detecting and addressing this problem.
Springer eBooks, 2011
Partly in response to feminist concerns about bias in science, there has been a recent trend towa... more Partly in response to feminist concerns about bias in science, there has been a recent trend towards viewing good science as democratic science (eg, Kitcher 2001; Solomon 2001; Longino 2002). One similarity of these approaches is that democratic science is conceived ...
Philosophy of Science, Dec 1, 2005
Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethi... more Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethical or political commitments could play a positive role in good science by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and underdetermination of theories by observation. I examine several different interpretations of the claim that feminist values could play a legitimate role in theory justification and show that none of them follow from a logical gap between theory and observation. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach for defending the possibility that feminist political commitments could play a legitimate role in science.
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 2010
Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defend... more Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into ''feminist standpoint empiricism.'' Over twenty years ago, Sandra Harding distinguished views that are still seen as largely constituting the terrain in feminist philosophy of science. In particular, she distinguished and endorsed ''standpoint feminism'' over ''feminist empiricism,'' which she described as the view that instances of male bias are merely cases of ''bad science'' that could be eliminated if scientists more rigorously adhered to empiricist methods and norms for scientific research (Harding 1986, 1991, 111-20). Since that time, numerous articles in Hypatia have been devoted to clarifying, strengthening, and defending both feminist empiricism and standpoint
The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender and Sexuality Studies, Apr 21, 2016
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 2010
SAGE Publications, Inc. eBooks, Dec 23, 2014
Social Epistemology, Jul 1, 2009
Despite the National Science Foundation's recent clarification of the Broader Impacts Criterion u... more Despite the National Science Foundation's recent clarification of the Broader Impacts Criterion used in grant evaluation, it is not clear that this criterion is being understood or applied consistently by grant writers or reviewers. In particular, there is still confusion about how to interpret the requirement for broadening the participation of under-represented groups in science and scepticism about the value of doing so. Much of this stems from uncertainty about why the participation of under-represented groups is desirable or beneficial in the first place. This paper distinguishes three different rationales for the importance of diversity in science and draws out the implications for the kind of diversity that is desirable, as well as how the diversity requirement of the Broader Impacts Criterion should be applied and weighed against other criteria in reviewing particular grants. I argue that there are epistemic, as well as social, benefits to diversity that can help promote scientific progress.
European journal for philosophy of science, Jan 18, 2015
While it is widely acknowledged that science is not "free" of non-epistemic values, there is disa... more While it is widely acknowledged that science is not "free" of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties (
Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2010
Science & education, Dec 19, 2006
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews
There are many ways that trust plays a crucial role in science, both between researchers and betw... more There are many ways that trust plays a crucial role in science, both between researchers and between researchers and various communities impacted by their research. Scientific practices can operate in ways that either facilitate, or undermine, trust in science. This contribution will examine the role of science communication in facilitating (or undermining) public trust in science and science-based policy recommendations. This will be done by looking at some potential failures in the public communication of science during the COVID-19 pandemic that have the potential to undermine trust in scientists. Finally, I draw out lessons that this case has for how we might improve science communication practices.
The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Philosophy of Science, 2020
Public Affairs Quarterly, 2017
Several empirical studies purportedly demonstrate the existence of a scientific consensus on clim... more Several empirical studies purportedly demonstrate the existence of a scientific consensus on climate change. Such studies have been pursued as a response to concerns that private industries and think tanks have "manufactured" public doubt and derailed regulatory policies. While there is overwhelming evidence for anthropogenic global warming, studies aiming to empirically establish the existence of consensus rely on several problematic assumptions about the nature of consensus and the role of consensus in policy making. Even more worrisome, reinforcing such assumptions in public may actually undermine, rather than increase, trust in climate science.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific “hype,” or sensationalized exagge... more Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific “hype,” or sensationalized exaggeration, in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism in a variety of fields (e.g., Caulfield and Condit 2012). Yet, how “hype” is being conceived varies. I will argue that hype is best understood as a particular kind of exaggeration, one that explicitly or implicitly exaggerates various positive aspects of science in ways that undermine the goals of science communication in a particular context. This account also makes clear the ways that value judgments play a role in judgments of “hype,” which has implications for detecting and addressing this problem.
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Papers by Kristen Intemann