This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy a... more This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson’s object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson’s claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.
Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continu... more Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are 'too many thinkers' associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including thinking. As a result, the animalist must also posit 'too many thinkers' where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism.
In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constituti... more In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constitution with respect to the notion of vague identity. Some proponents of the constitution theory see it as an advantage of their account that analysing the spatial and temporal vagueness of objects in terms of the relation of vague constitution avoids commitment to vague identity, which is seen as a controversial notion. I argue that even though the constitution theory may plausibly be applied to the phenomenon of vague boundaries, it fails to account fully for other cases of spatial and temporal vagueness. There are what I call ‘mid-extension’ vagueness cases, in which the tools of the constitution theory applied in the analysis of boundary vagueness are insufficient to avoid commitment to vague identity.
Manipulace je často využívaný způsob mezilidského ovlivňování, který může mít celou řadu podob. P... more Manipulace je často využívaný způsob mezilidského ovlivňování, který může mít celou řadu podob. Pojem manipulace bývá obvykle analyzován v populárně-psychologických publikacích a filozofické pozornosti se mu zatím příliš nedostalo. Přesto vyvolává řadu zajímavých otázek, zejména ve vztahu k autonomii, racionalitě a moralitě. Cílem této práce je na pozadí kontroverzních příkladů poskytnout konceptuální analýzu pojmu manipulace. Postupně je představeno několik filozofických teorií, které jsou kriticky zhodnoceny a aplikovány na kontroverzní příklady. Autor obhajuje tvrzení, že za všemi nejrůznějšími podobami manipulace se skrývá jedna nutná podmínka – zatajení skutečné intence manipulátora.
The goal of this paper is to assess three arguments that have been proposed to rebut the idea tha... more The goal of this paper is to assess three arguments that have been proposed to rebut the idea that the notion of indeterminate identity is incoherent. In the first part, the author presents Gareth Evans' argument purporting to show the incoherence of indeterminate identity. Next, the author assesses a rebuttal proposed by E. J. Lowe. Although the rebuttal seems sound, Harold Noonan has shown that its scope is limited. After that, a rebuttal by Peter van Inwagen is analysed. The author compares it with Lowe's and shows that consistent application of the principles van Inwagen uses leads to objects having inconsistent properties. In the final part, it is shown that although the answer proposed by Terence Parsons seems superior to both van Inwagen's and Lowe's, its scope is also limited. As a result, Evans' argument seems to stand unrefuted by these three counterarguments.
This is a pre-print of an article published in Acta Analytica. The final authenticated version is... more This is a pre-print of an article published in Acta Analytica. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00407-y
The paper focuses on the nature and moral status of manipulation. I analyse a popular account of manipulation by Robert Noggle and assess a challenge that has been posed by Moti Gorin. I argue that Noggle's theory can fend off the challenge. The analysis is instructive in that it enables one to look more closely at the nature of manipulation. I argue, contrary to some proposed accounts, that manipulation essentially involves deception about the manipulator's intentions. Secondly, since manipulation contains an element of deception, it is, I maintain, prima facie immoral. Finally, I analyze and explain away several examples of allegedly morally non-problematic manipulation.
In Mariana Szapuová, Martin Nuhlíček (eds.) Mezi vedou a morálkou. Perspektívy naturalizmu. Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, 2017
Práce se zaměřuje na otázku, zda je možné zdůvodnit lidské hodnoty výhradně jejich odvozením z fa... more Práce se zaměřuje na otázku, zda je možné zdůvodnit lidské hodnoty výhradně jejich odvozením z faktů. Analyzuji teorie dvou populárních proponentů naturalistického redukcionismu hodnot – koncepce Patricie Churchlandové a Sama Harrise – a ukazuji, že jejich argumenty jsou nedostatečné. V závěru tvrdím, že existují základní hodnoty, které nejsou dále zdůvodnitelné, a tedy ani zdůvodnitelné pomocí faktů.
The paper focuses on one of the identity-related practical concerns discussed in contemporary deb... more The paper focuses on one of the identity-related practical concerns discussed in contemporary debate on personal identity – self-concern. The dominant view seems to be that a person’s concern for her future selves is preconditioned by the person’s ability to anticipate the experiences of the future selves and that, as a result, a psychological theory of personal identity is required to justify self-concern. I argue that self-concern in its most general form is not preconditioned by the possibility of anticipation. I provide examples showing that a person may legitimately be concerned for her future selves even if those selves are unconscious or dead, that is, in states that the person cannot anticipate. I contend that self-concern is not rooted in our desire to have positive experiences, but in our desire to live meaningful lives. Since the value of our lives can be influenced by events that only take place after we cease to exist, I further argue that certain posthumous states of affairs relevant to our lives can also be the legitimate target of an indirect sort of self-concern. Inspired by Marya Schechtman’s theories, I develop a form of the narrative theory of personal identity in the sense of characterization and show that narrative continuity can be both a source of meaning in a person’s life and a ground for the person’s self-concern. It turns out that the sort of identity that justifies non-anticipatory self-concern cannot be numerical identity, because it does not provide the persistence conditions of people.
This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal... more This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis provides the persistence conditions for persons. I argue that if the subjective theories purport to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpretation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns. I argue that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well.
In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deepl... more In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deeply interconnected with our various person-related practical concerns. The Person Life View she develops responds to a number of claims currently accepted by many scholars in the personal identity debate, including the claim that personal identity does not matter in the grounding of our person-related practical concerns, and the claim that individual practical concerns are justified by a number of different relations. Schechtman argues that personal identity does matter and that it grounds all our person-related practical concerns. I will argue that these conclusions are enabled by a series of redefinitions of established concepts made by Schechtman. I will make these redefinitions explicit. I will further argue that the Person Life View has implausible consequences both in personal ontology and in normative guidance.
In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related pr... more In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.
The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to esta... more The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements—Hume’s Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris’ attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris’ attempt fails.
This work presents an analysis of the analogy between scientific and ethical theories with respec... more This work presents an analysis of the analogy between scientific and ethical theories with respect to their testability, explanatory potential and the causal relevance of the entities they postulate. Critics of ethical theories often claim that ethical theories are in fundamental contrast to scientific theories as they cannot be tested by empirical methods. While scientific facts are objective and open to empirical investigation, moral facts are mere expressions of subjective attitudes towards objective facts, and thus fall out of the scope of legitimate, scientific knowledge. We believe that this picture of such a deep contrast between science and ethics is based on a naïve conception of both types of theories. If we accept a more sophisticated view of scientific activity, interesting analogies begin to turn up. This paper attempts to assess critically some of the analogies.
The work analyzes two competing arguments in the issue of abortion and shows that each requires a... more The work analyzes two competing arguments in the issue of abortion and shows that each requires a different theory of personal identity. Further, I analyze those theories and show what moral premises they are compatible with and what implications there are for the abortion debate.
This article deals with epistemic justification of faith by means of private religious evidence. ... more This article deals with epistemic justification of faith by means of private religious evidence. It assumes foundationalism and the internalist concept of epistemic duty and argues that the method of acquaintance of God by means of the process of private experience cannot be regarded by an atheist / naturalist to be a reliable method. Therefore, conversion just on the basis of such experience must be seen as epistemically unjustified. Further, an argument as to the atheist's epistemic dishonesty for not seeking the verification of the God hypothesis despite its being a legitimate hypothesis is rebutted.
Článek pojednává o novomeinongovských teoriích existence a objektu. Stěžejním problémem je otázka... more Článek pojednává o novomeinongovských teoriích existence a objektu. Stěžejním problémem je otázka, do jaké míry jsou tyto teorie konzistentní s posibilismem, který zastával Meinong. Autor rekonstruuje naivní teorii objektu, která představuje meinongovský posibilismus. Dále zkoumá po řadě koncepce T. Parsonse, W. Rapaporta a E. Zalty a analyzuje jejich vztah k naivní teorii objektu a jejich řešení paradoxů této koncepce. Dospívá k závěru, že novomeinongovské teorie se v řešení existenčních tvrzení s naivní teorií radikálně rozchází a jejich řešení je naopak blízké aktualistickému pojetí existence. V závěru ukazuje, že spor posibilistů a aktualistů je jen terminologický.
This essay presents a comparison of modal theories with flexible and constant domain of individua... more This essay presents a comparison of modal theories with flexible and constant domain of individuals. Whatś called the simplest quantified modal logic represents the latter type. However, it has some controversial consequences: the fact that all objects of discourse exist necessarily, and the fact that to every merely possible object there corresponds an actual one. These drawbacks are eliminated by the Kripke models, which postulate possible worlds with a flexible domain of objects. Proponents of TIL return to the theory with the constant domain and attempt to elucidate what mistakes lead Kripkeś followers to endorsement of models with the flexible domain, and explain-away the alleged problems of the constant domain. This work aims at clarifying the character of the attitude of TIL proponents and showing that the arguments for accepting the constant domain they provide are not completely satisfactory due to the role proper names play in their theory.
Polemika s prací Černý, D., Personální identita a interrupce. Filosofický časopis 62, 2014, č. 6,... more Polemika s prací Černý, D., Personální identita a interrupce. Filosofický časopis 62, 2014, č. 6, s. 825-818.
Polemika s prací Kočnar. O. (2008): Náboženská zkušenost jako justifikace víry v Boha. Pro-Fil 2/... more Polemika s prací Kočnar. O. (2008): Náboženská zkušenost jako justifikace víry v Boha. Pro-Fil 2/2008.
This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy a... more This paper focuses on Jessica Wilson’s determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy and its relationship to the concept of vague identity. The determinable-based account comprises a distinction between meta-level and object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. I first argue that the distinction cannot be clearly applied to some theories. In particular, I argue that even though Wilson categorizes the constitution account of metaphysical indeterminacy as a meta-level account, from one perspective it can be defensibly regarded as an object-level account, because it is bound to posit genuinely indeterminate states of affairs and provides an explanation of boundary indeterminacy that is structurally analogous to the explanation provided by Wilson’s object-level account. This interim conclusion is important, because it has been argued that the constitution account, when applied to some more complex types of boundary indeterminacy, cannot avoid commitment to vague identity, in spite of the declarations of some of its proponents. The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue that, contrary to Wilson’s claims, the determinable-based account must embrace vague identity too.
Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continu... more Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are 'too many thinkers' associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including thinking. As a result, the animalist must also posit 'too many thinkers' where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism.
In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constituti... more In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constitution with respect to the notion of vague identity. Some proponents of the constitution theory see it as an advantage of their account that analysing the spatial and temporal vagueness of objects in terms of the relation of vague constitution avoids commitment to vague identity, which is seen as a controversial notion. I argue that even though the constitution theory may plausibly be applied to the phenomenon of vague boundaries, it fails to account fully for other cases of spatial and temporal vagueness. There are what I call ‘mid-extension’ vagueness cases, in which the tools of the constitution theory applied in the analysis of boundary vagueness are insufficient to avoid commitment to vague identity.
Manipulace je často využívaný způsob mezilidského ovlivňování, který může mít celou řadu podob. P... more Manipulace je často využívaný způsob mezilidského ovlivňování, který může mít celou řadu podob. Pojem manipulace bývá obvykle analyzován v populárně-psychologických publikacích a filozofické pozornosti se mu zatím příliš nedostalo. Přesto vyvolává řadu zajímavých otázek, zejména ve vztahu k autonomii, racionalitě a moralitě. Cílem této práce je na pozadí kontroverzních příkladů poskytnout konceptuální analýzu pojmu manipulace. Postupně je představeno několik filozofických teorií, které jsou kriticky zhodnoceny a aplikovány na kontroverzní příklady. Autor obhajuje tvrzení, že za všemi nejrůznějšími podobami manipulace se skrývá jedna nutná podmínka – zatajení skutečné intence manipulátora.
The goal of this paper is to assess three arguments that have been proposed to rebut the idea tha... more The goal of this paper is to assess three arguments that have been proposed to rebut the idea that the notion of indeterminate identity is incoherent. In the first part, the author presents Gareth Evans' argument purporting to show the incoherence of indeterminate identity. Next, the author assesses a rebuttal proposed by E. J. Lowe. Although the rebuttal seems sound, Harold Noonan has shown that its scope is limited. After that, a rebuttal by Peter van Inwagen is analysed. The author compares it with Lowe's and shows that consistent application of the principles van Inwagen uses leads to objects having inconsistent properties. In the final part, it is shown that although the answer proposed by Terence Parsons seems superior to both van Inwagen's and Lowe's, its scope is also limited. As a result, Evans' argument seems to stand unrefuted by these three counterarguments.
This is a pre-print of an article published in Acta Analytica. The final authenticated version is... more This is a pre-print of an article published in Acta Analytica. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00407-y
The paper focuses on the nature and moral status of manipulation. I analyse a popular account of manipulation by Robert Noggle and assess a challenge that has been posed by Moti Gorin. I argue that Noggle's theory can fend off the challenge. The analysis is instructive in that it enables one to look more closely at the nature of manipulation. I argue, contrary to some proposed accounts, that manipulation essentially involves deception about the manipulator's intentions. Secondly, since manipulation contains an element of deception, it is, I maintain, prima facie immoral. Finally, I analyze and explain away several examples of allegedly morally non-problematic manipulation.
In Mariana Szapuová, Martin Nuhlíček (eds.) Mezi vedou a morálkou. Perspektívy naturalizmu. Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, 2017
Práce se zaměřuje na otázku, zda je možné zdůvodnit lidské hodnoty výhradně jejich odvozením z fa... more Práce se zaměřuje na otázku, zda je možné zdůvodnit lidské hodnoty výhradně jejich odvozením z faktů. Analyzuji teorie dvou populárních proponentů naturalistického redukcionismu hodnot – koncepce Patricie Churchlandové a Sama Harrise – a ukazuji, že jejich argumenty jsou nedostatečné. V závěru tvrdím, že existují základní hodnoty, které nejsou dále zdůvodnitelné, a tedy ani zdůvodnitelné pomocí faktů.
The paper focuses on one of the identity-related practical concerns discussed in contemporary deb... more The paper focuses on one of the identity-related practical concerns discussed in contemporary debate on personal identity – self-concern. The dominant view seems to be that a person’s concern for her future selves is preconditioned by the person’s ability to anticipate the experiences of the future selves and that, as a result, a psychological theory of personal identity is required to justify self-concern. I argue that self-concern in its most general form is not preconditioned by the possibility of anticipation. I provide examples showing that a person may legitimately be concerned for her future selves even if those selves are unconscious or dead, that is, in states that the person cannot anticipate. I contend that self-concern is not rooted in our desire to have positive experiences, but in our desire to live meaningful lives. Since the value of our lives can be influenced by events that only take place after we cease to exist, I further argue that certain posthumous states of affairs relevant to our lives can also be the legitimate target of an indirect sort of self-concern. Inspired by Marya Schechtman’s theories, I develop a form of the narrative theory of personal identity in the sense of characterization and show that narrative continuity can be both a source of meaning in a person’s life and a ground for the person’s self-concern. It turns out that the sort of identity that justifies non-anticipatory self-concern cannot be numerical identity, because it does not provide the persistence conditions of people.
This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal... more This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis provides the persistence conditions for persons. I argue that if the subjective theories purport to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpretation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns. I argue that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well.
In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deepl... more In a recent book, Marya Schechtman argues that people are practical units whose identity is deeply interconnected with our various person-related practical concerns. The Person Life View she develops responds to a number of claims currently accepted by many scholars in the personal identity debate, including the claim that personal identity does not matter in the grounding of our person-related practical concerns, and the claim that individual practical concerns are justified by a number of different relations. Schechtman argues that personal identity does matter and that it grounds all our person-related practical concerns. I will argue that these conclusions are enabled by a series of redefinitions of established concepts made by Schechtman. I will make these redefinitions explicit. I will further argue that the Person Life View has implausible consequences both in personal ontology and in normative guidance.
In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related pr... more In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.
The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to esta... more The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements—Hume’s Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris’ attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris’ attempt fails.
This work presents an analysis of the analogy between scientific and ethical theories with respec... more This work presents an analysis of the analogy between scientific and ethical theories with respect to their testability, explanatory potential and the causal relevance of the entities they postulate. Critics of ethical theories often claim that ethical theories are in fundamental contrast to scientific theories as they cannot be tested by empirical methods. While scientific facts are objective and open to empirical investigation, moral facts are mere expressions of subjective attitudes towards objective facts, and thus fall out of the scope of legitimate, scientific knowledge. We believe that this picture of such a deep contrast between science and ethics is based on a naïve conception of both types of theories. If we accept a more sophisticated view of scientific activity, interesting analogies begin to turn up. This paper attempts to assess critically some of the analogies.
The work analyzes two competing arguments in the issue of abortion and shows that each requires a... more The work analyzes two competing arguments in the issue of abortion and shows that each requires a different theory of personal identity. Further, I analyze those theories and show what moral premises they are compatible with and what implications there are for the abortion debate.
This article deals with epistemic justification of faith by means of private religious evidence. ... more This article deals with epistemic justification of faith by means of private religious evidence. It assumes foundationalism and the internalist concept of epistemic duty and argues that the method of acquaintance of God by means of the process of private experience cannot be regarded by an atheist / naturalist to be a reliable method. Therefore, conversion just on the basis of such experience must be seen as epistemically unjustified. Further, an argument as to the atheist's epistemic dishonesty for not seeking the verification of the God hypothesis despite its being a legitimate hypothesis is rebutted.
Článek pojednává o novomeinongovských teoriích existence a objektu. Stěžejním problémem je otázka... more Článek pojednává o novomeinongovských teoriích existence a objektu. Stěžejním problémem je otázka, do jaké míry jsou tyto teorie konzistentní s posibilismem, který zastával Meinong. Autor rekonstruuje naivní teorii objektu, která představuje meinongovský posibilismus. Dále zkoumá po řadě koncepce T. Parsonse, W. Rapaporta a E. Zalty a analyzuje jejich vztah k naivní teorii objektu a jejich řešení paradoxů této koncepce. Dospívá k závěru, že novomeinongovské teorie se v řešení existenčních tvrzení s naivní teorií radikálně rozchází a jejich řešení je naopak blízké aktualistickému pojetí existence. V závěru ukazuje, že spor posibilistů a aktualistů je jen terminologický.
This essay presents a comparison of modal theories with flexible and constant domain of individua... more This essay presents a comparison of modal theories with flexible and constant domain of individuals. Whatś called the simplest quantified modal logic represents the latter type. However, it has some controversial consequences: the fact that all objects of discourse exist necessarily, and the fact that to every merely possible object there corresponds an actual one. These drawbacks are eliminated by the Kripke models, which postulate possible worlds with a flexible domain of objects. Proponents of TIL return to the theory with the constant domain and attempt to elucidate what mistakes lead Kripkeś followers to endorsement of models with the flexible domain, and explain-away the alleged problems of the constant domain. This work aims at clarifying the character of the attitude of TIL proponents and showing that the arguments for accepting the constant domain they provide are not completely satisfactory due to the role proper names play in their theory.
Polemika s prací Černý, D., Personální identita a interrupce. Filosofický časopis 62, 2014, č. 6,... more Polemika s prací Černý, D., Personální identita a interrupce. Filosofický časopis 62, 2014, č. 6, s. 825-818.
Polemika s prací Kočnar. O. (2008): Náboženská zkušenost jako justifikace víry v Boha. Pro-Fil 2/... more Polemika s prací Kočnar. O. (2008): Náboženská zkušenost jako justifikace víry v Boha. Pro-Fil 2/2008.
This book presents a contribution to the discussion on the relationship between personal identity... more This book presents a contribution to the discussion on the relationship between personal identity and various identity-related practical concerns, such as egoistic concern, responsibility, compensation and anticipation. I map and scrutinize the development of the discussion in the past 30 years, focusing primarily on Derek Parfit’s groundbreaking theory of personal identity and practical concerns and the responses that it has stimulated. Parfit has argued that our identity-related practical concerns have been grounded in the wrong theory of personal identity – non-reductionism – according to which the holding of personal identity over time consists in a fact which is independent of the existence of the body, the brain, and all the physical and mental processes occurring in them, such as the continuing existence of a soul. When we realize the mistake and adopt the reductionist view of personal identity according to which the existence of a person only consists in the existence of the above facts and processes, we will be rationally required to reform our practical concerns to correspond to the new theory of human nature. In many instances, the reform will be quite radical, leading to extremely counter-intuitive revisions, as the relations that unify a person in time may weaken over time and, according to Parfit, our concerns should reflect that fact. One of the central claims of Parfit’s theory, which will be disputed in the book, is that our practical concerns should not be grounded in the unity of the whole person, but in a temporally shorter unity, that is, the unity of the self, defined by the relation of psychological connectedness, which holds to various degrees over time. Several philosophers have attacked the methodological assumptions of Parfit’s theory. I first assess M. Johnston’s critique, according to which it is a mistake to think that our identity-related practical concerns are grounded in a metaphysical theory of personal identity. According to Johnston, they are justified independently of any theoretical accounts of human nature by being deeply ingrained in our nature and interpersonal interactions and very difficult to suppress. Drawing on Jonathan Haidt’s observations about the nature of human moral beliefs, which are, too, reported to be deeply ingrained in human nature and difficult to reform, I argue for the general claim that the fact that a trait or an attitude is deeply ingrained in human nature and difficult to change does not mean that it is justified and should not be reformed. Many of our natural beliefs, attitudes and concerns are clearly wrong and call for a reform even if such a reform will be a very difficult and long process. I further argue that a theoretical account of human nature, including a metaphysical theory of personal identity, is needed to provide the guidelines for the required reform. Next, I turn to a cluster of theories that I term subjective theories of personal identity. They are exemplified by the theories of C. Korsgaard, M. Schechtman, and C. Rovane, and share the feature that they regard persons as essentially active agents, who constitute their own identity by adopting a sort of pro attitude toward their mental states and actions. These theories also share the claim that our identity-related practical concerns can be given a much more plausible account if we realize that persons constitute their identity in the described way. However, my analysis leads me to the conclusion that it is actually very difficult to see what exactly the theories attempt to achieve. I argue that if they purport to provide the persistence criteria for human beings, they lead to paradoxes. Alternatively, they may only be defining certain practically relevant roles – moral identities – that ground our identity-related practical concerns. Using several examples I show that none of the proposed mechanisms of self-constitution can provide a plausible grounding for all of the identity-related practical concerns. Finally, I revisit Parfit’s theory to show that certain aspects of the theory make use of a self-constitution mechanism as well, and, therefore, must be rejected. The chapter on subjective theories is followed by an assessment of a claim inherent in all psychological theories of personal identity, including Parfit’s, namely that dramatic objective changes in a person’s psychology may result in the demise of the person and its replacement by another person. I confront the claim with a non-philosophical perspective provided by a psychiatric expert opinion, and then argue, on the basis of a detailed analysis of our beliefs about the appropriateness of self-concern, responsibility and compensation, that the claim cannot be accepted. Even the most radical psychological changes in realistic scenarios are consistent with the preservation of many other original traits of the person, which, in turn, ground our continuing concerns about and attitudes to the person. The analysis of the concerns shows how wide the gap between our actual concerns and the revised form of concerns suggested by Parfit is. I, therefore, turn to Parfit’s claim that the acceptance of reductionism necessitates the proposed revision of the concerns. I argue for the claim that the weakening of a person’s relation to her future self does not rationally obligate a corresponding weakening of the identity-related practical concerns, as Parfit believes. I also claim that relations other than psychological continuity and connectedness may matter to people in their practical interactions. This leads me to embrace a position that has been called pluralism. In the final chapter I outline the pluralist perspective on practical concerns represented by the claim that different practical concerns are justified by different relations. In the exposition of the pluralist perspective I follow the work of D. Shoemaker. Next, I turn to worries about the pluralist perspective expressed by M. Schechtman in her latest book. Schechtman believes that pluralism is in clash with our everyday experience of persons as necessarily unified entities. I distinguish two interpretations of pluralism and show that the clash only emerges if we accept an interpretation of pluralism which is contaminated with metaphysical problems anyway. Then I show that there is a benign interpretation of pluralism, which does not lead to the objectionable fragmentation of persons. I also scrutinize Schechtman’s new theory, developed in an attempt to fend off the threat of pluralism. Schechtman provides a definition of human person which makes it the appropriate target of all of our practical concerns. I express worries about the vagueness of the definition and claim that we already have a reasonable definition of human persons in terms of biological continuity. I argue that it is the human organism, defined by biological continuity, which is the proper target of our concerns. But I simultaneously maintain the pluralist perspective in claiming that sameness of the organism is a necessary, but not always sufficient condition for the legitimate expression of our concerns, and different concerns may have different sufficient conditions. This leads me to the conclusion that in many cases it is not personal identity that grounds our identity-related practical concerns. The last pages of the book focus on thought experiments, since these seem to provide evidence against my claim that biological continuity is a necessary condition for the expression of our identity-related practical concerns. I present several examples illustrating the belief that our intuitions about cases described in many bizarre thought experiments actually depend on the detail of the description of the scenario, and, thus, do not generate firm beliefs. Following Snowdon I then show that several thought experiments used by proponents of the psychological theory of personal identity against the claim that biological continuity is a necessary condition for the legitimate expression of identity-related practical concerns fail to establish that conclusion. At the end I put forth some general thoughts about why I believe thought experiments are not the most efficient tool to analyze our practical concerns.
Práce představuje expozici a kritiku psychologické teorie osobní identity v její historické a sou... more Práce představuje expozici a kritiku psychologické teorie osobní identity v její historické a současné podobě a obhajobu biologického pojetí osobní identity. Expozice psychologické teorie vychází z díla J. Locka a na něj navazující vlivné teorie D. Parfita, která je podrobena detailní kritice. Součástí práce je také kritika tzv. teorie konstituce L. R. Bakerové, která má vysvětlit problematický vztah mezi osobami a organismy. Dospívám k závěru, že tento projekt ztroskotává a s ním i psychologická teorie. Parfit však vnáší do teorie osobní identity také úvahy o jejím praktickém významu. Těmi se také podrobně zabývám a s jistými výhradami přijímám Parfitovo přesvědčení, že na numerické identitě osob prakticky nezáleží. Poznatky z kritiky psychologické teorie pak uplatňuji v obhajobě biologické teorie lidské identity, tzv. animalismu.
Summary
The thesis presents an exposition and a critique of the psychological theory of personal identity in its historical and current form and a defense of the biological theory of personal identity. The exposition of the psychological theory is based on J. Locke´s theory and Parfit´s influential conception, which develops Locke´s ideas. Apart from a detailed critique of Parfit´s thoughts I also analyze L. R. Baker´s constitution theory, the role of which is to explain the problematic relation between people and organisms in psychological theory. I conclude that constitution theory fails and with it the whole project of psychological theory of personal identity. However, Parfit has also influenced the theory of personal identity with his ideas on its practical significance. I deal with them in detail and, with some reservations, I accept Parfit´s conviction that numerical identity of people does not practically matter. The findings are then applied in the exposition and defense of the biological theory of personal identity – animalism.
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Papers by Radim Bělohrad
The paper focuses on the nature and moral status of manipulation. I analyse a popular account of manipulation by Robert Noggle and assess a challenge that has been posed by Moti Gorin. I argue that Noggle's theory can fend off the challenge. The analysis is instructive in that it enables one to look more closely at the nature of manipulation. I argue, contrary to some proposed accounts, that manipulation essentially involves deception about the manipulator's intentions. Secondly, since manipulation contains an element of deception, it is, I maintain, prima facie immoral. Finally, I analyze and explain away several examples of allegedly morally non-problematic manipulation.
The paper focuses on the nature and moral status of manipulation. I analyse a popular account of manipulation by Robert Noggle and assess a challenge that has been posed by Moti Gorin. I argue that Noggle's theory can fend off the challenge. The analysis is instructive in that it enables one to look more closely at the nature of manipulation. I argue, contrary to some proposed accounts, that manipulation essentially involves deception about the manipulator's intentions. Secondly, since manipulation contains an element of deception, it is, I maintain, prima facie immoral. Finally, I analyze and explain away several examples of allegedly morally non-problematic manipulation.
I map and scrutinize the development of the discussion in the past 30 years, focusing primarily on Derek Parfit’s groundbreaking theory of personal identity and practical concerns and the responses that it has stimulated. Parfit has argued that our identity-related practical concerns have been grounded in the wrong theory of personal identity – non-reductionism – according to which the holding of personal identity over time consists in a fact which is independent of the existence of the body, the brain, and all the physical and mental processes occurring in them, such as the continuing existence of a soul. When we realize the mistake and adopt the reductionist view of personal identity according to which the existence of a person only consists in the existence of the above facts and processes, we will be rationally required to reform our practical concerns to correspond to the new theory of human nature. In many instances, the reform will be quite radical, leading to extremely counter-intuitive revisions, as the relations that unify a person in time may weaken over time and, according to Parfit, our concerns should reflect that fact. One of the central claims of Parfit’s theory, which will be disputed in the book, is that our practical concerns should not be grounded in the unity of the whole person, but in a temporally shorter unity, that is, the unity of the self, defined by the relation of psychological connectedness, which holds to various degrees over time.
Several philosophers have attacked the methodological assumptions of Parfit’s theory. I first assess M. Johnston’s critique, according to which it is a mistake to think that our identity-related practical concerns are grounded in a metaphysical theory of personal identity. According to Johnston, they are justified independently of any theoretical accounts of human nature by being deeply ingrained in our nature and interpersonal interactions and very difficult to suppress. Drawing on Jonathan Haidt’s observations about the nature of human moral beliefs, which are, too, reported to be deeply ingrained in human nature and difficult to reform, I argue for the general claim that the fact that a trait or an attitude is deeply ingrained in human nature and difficult to change does not mean that it is justified and should not be reformed. Many of our natural beliefs, attitudes and concerns are clearly wrong and call for a reform even if such a reform will be a very difficult and long process. I further argue that a theoretical account of human nature, including a metaphysical theory of personal identity, is needed to provide the guidelines for the required reform.
Next, I turn to a cluster of theories that I term subjective theories of personal identity. They are exemplified by the theories of C. Korsgaard, M. Schechtman, and C. Rovane, and share the feature that they regard persons as essentially active agents, who constitute their own identity by adopting a sort of pro attitude toward their mental states and actions. These theories also share the claim that our identity-related practical concerns can be given a much more plausible account if we realize that persons constitute their identity in the described way. However, my analysis leads me to the conclusion that it is actually very difficult to see what exactly the theories attempt to achieve. I argue that if they purport to provide the persistence criteria for human beings, they lead to paradoxes. Alternatively, they may only be defining certain practically relevant roles – moral identities – that ground our identity-related practical concerns. Using several examples I show that none of the proposed mechanisms of self-constitution can provide a plausible grounding for all of the identity-related practical concerns. Finally, I revisit Parfit’s theory to show that certain aspects of the theory make use of a self-constitution mechanism as well, and, therefore, must be rejected.
The chapter on subjective theories is followed by an assessment of a claim inherent in all psychological theories of personal identity, including Parfit’s, namely that dramatic objective changes in a person’s psychology may result in the demise of the person and its replacement by another person. I confront the claim with a non-philosophical perspective provided by a psychiatric expert opinion, and then argue, on the basis of a detailed analysis of our beliefs about the appropriateness of self-concern, responsibility and compensation, that the claim cannot be accepted. Even the most radical psychological changes in realistic scenarios are consistent with the preservation of many other original traits of the person, which, in turn, ground our continuing concerns about and attitudes to the person.
The analysis of the concerns shows how wide the gap between our actual concerns and the revised form of concerns suggested by Parfit is. I, therefore, turn to Parfit’s claim that the acceptance of reductionism necessitates the proposed revision of the concerns. I argue for the claim that the weakening of a person’s relation to her future self does not rationally obligate a corresponding weakening of the identity-related practical concerns, as Parfit believes. I also claim that relations other than psychological continuity and connectedness may matter to people in their practical interactions.
This leads me to embrace a position that has been called pluralism. In the final chapter I outline the pluralist perspective on practical concerns represented by the claim that different practical concerns are justified by different relations. In the exposition of the pluralist perspective I follow the work of D. Shoemaker. Next, I turn to worries about the pluralist perspective expressed by M. Schechtman in her latest book. Schechtman believes that pluralism is in clash with our everyday experience of persons as necessarily unified entities. I distinguish two interpretations of pluralism and show that the clash only emerges if we accept an interpretation of pluralism which is contaminated with metaphysical problems anyway. Then I show that there is a benign interpretation of pluralism, which does not lead to the objectionable fragmentation of persons.
I also scrutinize Schechtman’s new theory, developed in an attempt to fend off the threat of pluralism. Schechtman provides a definition of human person which makes it the appropriate target of all of our practical concerns. I express worries about the vagueness of the definition and claim that we already have a reasonable definition of human persons in terms of biological continuity. I argue that it is the human organism, defined by biological continuity, which is the proper target of our concerns. But I simultaneously maintain the pluralist perspective in claiming that sameness of the organism is a necessary, but not always sufficient condition for the legitimate expression of our concerns, and different concerns may have different sufficient conditions. This leads me to the conclusion that in many cases it is not personal identity that grounds our identity-related practical concerns.
The last pages of the book focus on thought experiments, since these seem to provide evidence against my claim that biological continuity is a necessary condition for the expression of our identity-related practical concerns. I present several examples illustrating the belief that our intuitions about cases described in many bizarre thought experiments actually depend on the detail of the description of the scenario, and, thus, do not generate firm beliefs. Following Snowdon I then show that several thought experiments used by proponents of the psychological theory of personal identity against the claim that biological continuity is a necessary condition for the legitimate expression of identity-related practical concerns fail to establish that conclusion. At the end I put forth some general thoughts about why I believe thought experiments are not the most efficient tool to analyze our practical concerns.
Summary
The thesis presents an exposition and a critique of the psychological theory of personal identity in its historical and current form and a defense of the biological theory of personal identity. The exposition of the psychological theory is based on J. Locke´s theory and Parfit´s influential conception, which develops Locke´s ideas. Apart from a detailed critique of Parfit´s thoughts I also analyze L. R. Baker´s constitution theory, the role of which is to explain the problematic relation between people and organisms in psychological theory. I conclude that constitution theory fails and with it the whole project of psychological theory of personal identity. However, Parfit has also influenced the theory of personal identity with his ideas on its practical significance. I deal with them in detail and, with some reservations, I accept Parfit´s conviction that numerical identity of people does not practically matter. The findings are then applied in the exposition and defense of the biological theory of personal identity – animalism.