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Fleshing out a massacre: the storming of Shelford House and social forgetting in Restoration England

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ABSTRACT

This article investigates the circumstances behind the slaughter of a royalist garrison in Nottinghamshire in November 1645, using the case study as a window into wider issues regarding the relationship between the memorialisation of the British Civil Wars and the fragility of Charles II's regime in the years following the Restoration. Contemporary sources illustrate how the factors which gave rise to the massacre gave both parliamentarian and royalist leaders impelling motives to wipe the incident from their respective narratives of the conflict.

The civil wars which ravaged the British Isles in the mid-seventeenth century are estimated to have caused the deaths of around 540,000 men, women and children.¹ Most of the fatalities occurred not in momentous battles, but as a consequence of localised low-intensity warfare. Rival garrisons competed for local resources, mounting raids to plunder, disrupt and demoralise communities in enemy-held territory. Regional commanders routinely pooled resources to facilitate larger operations against obscure locations which the flow of war had momentarily imbued with strategic significance. Shelford House was just such a place. In November 1645, this Nottinghamshire garrison, an integral part of the defensive network surrounding the royalist citadel of Newark-on-Trent, was attacked by a parliamentarian taskforce led by Colonel-General Sydenham Poyntz. Having gained the outer ramparts after a particularly costly assault, Poyntz suddenly ordered his bruised and bloodied men to show the 200-strong garrison no mercy. By the time the order was rescinded, around eighty per cent of the defenders had been slain.

There were far worse slaughters during the wars in Charles I's three kingdoms – particularly in Ireland – but the carnage at Shelford was horrific for such a minor action. Despite this, the incident has barely been mentioned in the historiography of the Civil Wars: just as Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion* noted only that Shelford had been besieged, so three centuries later Barbara Donagan, the foremost authority on seventeenth-century military codes and conduct, mentioned the storming merely to illustrate the efficacy of early modern weaponry.² More pertinently, Shelford has been completely overlooked in recent studies of civil-war massacres, despite the likelihood that in England only the royalist assaults on Bolton

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¹ I. Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms* (2007), p. 436.

² E. Hyde, earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England begun in the Year 1641* (Oxford, 1706), vol. 2, part 2, p. 722; B. Donagan, *War in England 1642-1649* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 76, 78, 84.

(1644) and Leicester (1645) resulted in greater bloodshed.³ As a result, the most fulsome consideration of Shelford has been a brief narration of events in Alfred Wood's 1937 study of civil-war Nottinghamshire, and a partisan account in the private memoirs of Lucy Hutchinson, wife of the parliamentarian governor of Nottingham.⁴ Clearly, as Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver have observed, 'the arithmetic of a catastrophe does not determine the pattern of its reception and subsequent remembrance.'⁵

The extent to which academia has become interested in how communities memorialise their past can be seen in the proliferation of theoretical literature on the subject since the 1980s.⁶ There is now an impressive catalogue of memory studies predicated on the early modern era, with the Restoration period well represented by the scholarship of Jonathan Sawday, Mark Stoyle, Matthew Neuman, Erin Peters and Edward Legon.⁷ Although the model of 'collective memory' formulated by the twentieth-century sociologist Maurice Halbwachs has been heavily criticised, his tenets remain influential: namely, that memories are socially constructed; that there is a strong link between memory and identity; and that memories exist within a spatial and temporal context.⁸ Advocates of 'social memory', in seeking to address the shortcomings of Halbwachs' model, have stressed that the construction of communal memories is a fluid and multivalent process, saturated with ideological significance. It has been argued that early modern English regimes were well aware of this, although none were ever completely able to dictate the social memory of their populations.⁹ Barbara Misztal has observed that social forgetting reflects a society's need to eliminate those segments of social memory which interfere with its present-day functioning.¹⁰ Restoration scholars have embraced this relationship between social memory and social forgetting, although the resulting dialectic has invariably been presented as a contest between a dominant Cavalier-Anglican establishment and the beaten remnants of Puritanism. Peters, like Neufeld, discerns 'a single, unified, pro-royalist, and anti-republican collective, through which forms of remembering and forgetting the past were at once subtly encouraged and directly

³ W. Coster, 'Massacre and codes of conduct in the English Civil War', in *The Massacre in History*, ed. M. Levene and P. Roberts (Oxford, 1999), 89-105; Inga Jones, 'A sea of blood? Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1641-1653', in *Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity throughout History*, ed. P. Dwyer and L. Ryan (Oxford, 2012), 63-78.

⁴ A. C. Wood, *Nottinghamshire in the Civil War* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 101-3; L. Hutchinson, 'The life of John Hutchinson', Nottinghamshire Archives (DD/HU4).

⁵ *The Memory of Catastrophe*, ed. P. Gray and K. Oliver (Manchester, 2004), p. 7.

⁶ Critical surveys of the literature can be found in the introductions to A. Wood, *The Memory of the People: Custom and Popular Senses of the Past in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2013), especially pp. 15-29; and in J. Pollman, *Memory in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800* (Oxford, 2017), especially pp. 3-14.

⁷ J. Sawday, 'Re-writing a revolution: history, symbol and text at the Restoration', *The Seventeenth Century*, vol. 7, no 2 (Autumn 1992), pp. 171-99; M. Stoyle, 'Memories of the maimed: the testimony of Charles I's former soldiers, 1660-1730', *History*, vol. 88, no. 290 (2003), pp. 204-26; M. Neufeld, *The Civil Wars after 1660: Public Remembering in Late Stuart England* (Woodbridge, 2013); E. Peters, *Commemoration and Oblivion in Royalist Print Culture, 1658-1667* (Cham, Switzerland, 2017); E. Legon, *Revolution Remembered: Seditious Memories after the British Civil Wars* (Manchester, 2019).

⁸ Wood, *Memory of the People*, p. 16.

⁹ Neufeld, pp. 5-6; Wood, *Memory of the People*, pp. 19, 25; Pollman, p. 13.

¹⁰ B. A. Misztal, 'Collective memory in a global age: learning how and what to remember', *Current Sociology*, vol. 58, no. 1 (January 2010), p. 30. Misztal's influence is obvious in the work of the foremost historian of 'social forgetting': G. Beiner, *Forgetful Remembrance: Social Forgetting and Vernacular Historiography of a Rebellion in Ulster* (Oxford, 2018), p. 24.

¹¹ Peters, p. 59; Neufeld, pp. 11-12.

commanded.¹¹ It will be argued here that the social forgetting of Shelford runs counter to this perception, revealing instead serious divisions within the pro-royalist collective, largely engendered by intense anxiety regarding the public's social memories of foreigners and Catholics within the ranks of Charles I's armies.

Shelford's relative anonymity – both then and now – is ironic given that far smaller incidents have figured so prominently in the narrative of the Civil Wars. Some, such as Bartholomley church, acquired instant notoriety at the time; others were enshrined in folk memory by phrases such as 'Stinchcombe quarter'. In August 1645 a royalist force led by Prince Rupert attacked the Gloucestershire village of Stinchcombe. One of Rupert's subordinates recorded that they slew forty-six parliamentary defenders, for the loss of two royalist soldiers. Fourteen parliamentarians taken prisoner were then executed in revenge for the deaths of a similar number of royalists in Canon Frome some weeks earlier. The parliamentary governor of Gloucester reported that the royalists had murdered twenty prisoners, and by the time the news reached London the alleged number of victims had grown even larger.¹¹ Historians of the Civil Wars have cited such small-scale atrocities to demonstrate how narratives could be manipulated, and a minor incident transformed into a *cause célèbre*.¹² Few, if any, have entertained the possibility that much larger massacres might deliberately have been kept out of the public eye.

This article will first explain how circumstances conspired to produce a massacre at Shelford on 3 November 1645. Far from being a genteel civil war, the conflict in England was pockmarked by acts of barbarity. By 1645 these had become increasingly frequent, driven by factors such as fear, revenge, xenophobia and anti-Catholicism. Having undertaken many assaults around England during three years of conflict, soldiers on both sides had become used to vicious hand-to-hand fighting in claustrophobic surroundings. The consequences of this brutalising process were very evident during the storming of Shelford House. The second half of the article will examine how and why the massacre was erased from the public memory. As will be seen, the trauma of the civil wars remained deeply imprinted in the national psyche long after the fighting had ceased, and ethnic and religious bigotry remained as potent as ever. There are therefore many reasons why the hidden history of Shelford has much to offer wider debates about massacre, memory and social forgetting.

The Stanhope family had acquired the Augustinian priory at Shelford following Henry VIII's dissolution of the monasteries. Over the course of the next century they fashioned the property into a moated estate, crowned by a substantial mansion.¹³ Philip Stanhope, earl of Chesterfield declared for King Charles soon after the outbreak of civil war in 1642. He began to patrol the Vale of Belvoir with a contingent

¹¹ 'The journal of Prince Rupert's marches', ed. C. H. Firth, *English Historical Review*, vol. 13, no. 52 (October 1898), 729-741 at p. 740; J. Clarke, *The Clarke Papers, 1647-1650*, ed. C. Firth (1990), part 2, pp. 25, 38; Historical Manuscripts Commission, *The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland* (1891), i, p. 250; J. Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State: The Fourth Part* (8 vols., 1701), i, pp. 127-8; B. Whitelock *Memorials of the English Affairs* (1732), p. 166.

¹² E.g., G. Hudson, 'Northern civil-war atrocity at Barthomley Church, 1643, revisited', *Northern History*, vol. 46, no. 2 (2009), 329-332.

¹³ W. Dickinson, *Antiquities Historical, Architectural, Chorographical and Itinerary in Nottinghamshire and the Adjacent Counties* (2 vols., 1801), i, pp. 310-11.

of cavalry, intent on curtailing the activities of local parliamentarians.¹⁴ With his principal seat in Derbyshire already in enemy hands, the earl operated from Shelford, at the north-western end of the Vale.

Shelford lay nine miles east of the parliamentary garrison of Nottingham, and twelve miles south-west of Newark. The royalists were quick to appreciate the strategic importance of Newark, and sent a Scottish veteran, Sir John Henderson, to fortify the town in December 1642. Henderson incorporated Belvoir Castle, Wiverton Hall, Thurgarton House and Shelford House into a mutually supportive network of garrisons to shield Newark against incursions from parliamentary forces based in Nottingham, Derby and Leicester. In January 1643 Lord Chesterfield departed on a mission to secure Lichfield, leaving Shelford House in the care of his son and namesake, Philip Stanhope.

Shelford's garrison consisted of an understrength cavalry regiment, named after the king's infant son Henry, duke of Gloucester. Philip Stanhope, the regiment's lieutenant-colonel, was confirmed as governor. The garrison also contained a handful of foot soldiers. A list of indigent Cavaliers published by the Restoration authorities in 1663 indicates that Stanhope's officers (and in all probability the men who followed them) were not local. Some came from elsewhere in Nottinghamshire, others from Lincolnshire and Yorkshire.¹⁵

First and foremost, Shelford functioned as a forward observation post, staging regular mounted patrols to monitor parliamentary activity. The estate was also an assembly point for the Newarkers' raids against Nottingham, and held the prisoners taken during these raids until they could be transferred to Newark.¹⁶ Shelford was therefore a considerable irritant to Nottingham's governor, Colonel John Hutchinson. Nevertheless, Hutchinson and his colleagues in Leicester and Derby were reluctant to denude their garrisons to besiege a place they knew to be strongly fortified, and which could quickly summon reinforcements from Newark.

Shelford's moat was wide and deep, with the River Trent forming one of its three sides. Although the other two sides were no longer full of water they remained treacherously boggy.¹⁷ Henderson had served in Europe, where it was standard procedure to cut a deeper narrow slot along the middle of the moat, supplemented by wooden poles studded with spikes known as 'entanglements' or 'turnpikes'. Shelford was ringed with a palisade around the inside edge of the moat, at the base of sloping ramparts. It was also standard practice to embed a ring of sharpened 'fraises' or 'storm poles' around the ramparts to obstruct the deployment of scaling ladders.¹⁸

Shelford's inner defences consisted of a series of earthworks known as 'half-moons', each with a ditch in front. A half-moon preserved at Wiverton indicates that these were substantial constructions, designed to serve as redoubts should the enemy surmount the ramparts.¹⁹ Soldiers retreating to Shelford's half-moons would be covered by musketeers firing from the upper windows of the mansion. As a result

¹⁴ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 113.

¹⁵ Anon., *A list of officers claiming to sixty thousand pounds etc.* (1663), column 57; P. Newman, *Royalist Officers in England and Wales 1642-1660: A Biographical Dictionary* (New York, 1981), pp. 333-4, 356, 417.

¹⁶ The National Archives of the U.K. (hereafter T.N.A.) SP 28/240, fo. 423.

¹⁷ Royal Commission on Historical Monuments (hereafter R.C.H.M.), *Newark on Trent: The Civil War Siegeworks* (1964), p. 46 – a reference I owe to the kindness of Mark Pearce; Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 244.

¹⁸ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 244; Robert Ward, *Anima'dversions of warre* (1639), pp. 35-106 (esp. p. 86), 369-70; E. Wagner, *European Weapons and Warfare 1618-1648* (1979), pp. 201, 225.

¹⁹ R.C.H.M., *Newark*, p. 46. Ward, pp. 39, 47.

of these strong defences the estate was left relatively unmolested until the late autumn of 1645.

Following his defeat at the battle of Naseby on 14 June 1645, King Charles fled north-west from Northamptonshire with the remnants of his field army. Parliament's victorious New Model Army marched into southwestern England to mop up royalist resistance there. The king's nephew Prince Rupert had been detailed to hold Bristol, but yielded the city in early September. Further north, Charles was defeated in Cheshire by regional parliamentary forces commanded by Colonel-General Sydenham Poyntz. He retreated across the Midlands with Poyntz snapping at his heels, reaching Newark in mid-October. The Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered Poyntz to hold the king there, pending the arrival of Parliament's Scottish Covenanter allies. Because the Scots were then heavily engaged near Carlisle the royalists had time to regroup. Newark had no spare accommodation for Charles' battered army, so he dispersed it around the outlying garrisons. Philip Stanhope was ordered to billet the Queen's Regiment of Horse at Shelford.

The Queen's Regiment consisted largely of Europeans who had volunteered to escort Henrietta-Maria back to England in 1643. Parliamentarians were sensitive to the presence of foreign Catholics in the royalist army, and propagandists routinely exaggerated their numbers.²⁰ However, it is clear that this particular unit was indeed largely composed of French and Walloons.²¹ Soon after its inception, the regiment was strengthened by an influx of recruits from Lancashire. The available evidence suggests that these Lancastrian volunteers were also Catholics; certainly, parliamentary commentators had already noted the prevalence of Catholicism in the county.²² This was sufficient to guarantee vitriolic coverage in the parliamentary press. Over the next two years the 'French Papists of the Queenes Regiment' were accused of murder, gang-rape and pillage. They were portrayed as 'thievish, treacherous, beastly, bugging' creatures, whose cruel excesses were smugly indulged by their patron Henrietta-Maria.²³ The queen's old nemesis William Prynne associated her 'omnipotent, over-ruling power' at Court with the 'foraine *Irish, French, Walloon Popish Forces*' which he claimed had been brought in to cut English throats and extirpate the Protestant religion.²⁴ The regiment was present at the storming of Burton-on-Trent in 1643 and participated in the sack of Leicester in May 1645 – two places where accounts of royalist maltreatment of prisoners and civilians are particularly compelling. Even royalist officials privately complained that the regiment's troopers were 'ravenous wolves' and 'the queens hownds'.²⁵ Parliamentary soldiers gave short shrift to any members of the regiment who fell into their hands.²⁶ By October 1645 the regiment had been severely depleted by hard campaigning. With all the French officers gone, Major Lawrence Clifton, a

²⁰ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 242.

²¹ P. Newman, 'The Royalist Army in Northern England' (2 vols., unpublished University of York DPhil thesis, 1978), ii, p. 169; M. Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers: an Ethnic History of the English Civil War* (2005), pp. 95, 100.

²² Anon., *A catalogue of the lords, knights and gentlemen (of the Catholick religion) that were slain in the late war* (n.l., c. 1660); Newman, 'Royalist Army in Northern England', ii, pp. 171-8; J. M. Gratton, 'The earl of Derby's Catholic army', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire & Cheshire*, 137 (1987), pp. 32-3.

²³ Thomason E.2[11], *The Kingdome's Weekly Intelligencer* (9-16 July 1644), p. 511; Thomason E.16[10], *A copie of the kings message sent by the duke of Lennox* (1644), p. 5; Thomason E.2[19], *The Scottish Dove* (13-19 July 1644), p. 317. For details, see Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers*, pp. 98-101, 137-8.

²⁴ William Prynne, *The soveraigne power of parliaments and kingdoms* (1643), sig. A3, p. 34.

²⁵ *Lords Journals* (1644-5), vii, p. 623; Devon Record Office 3004/A/PW/ 4/1, quoted in Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers*, p. 101.

²⁶ Thomason E.1182[3], George Wharton, *England's iliads in a nut-shell* (1645), sig. [B7].

Lancastrian Catholic, had assumed command of the remaining 150 officers and men. Their arrival brought Shelford's establishment up to around 200 soldiers.

Poyntz circled cautiously around the western perimeter of the Newark network, edging towards Southwell. The Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered regional commanders to lend the general as many men as possible, having already sent him a brigade of Londoners. With this mixed force, he was to cover any attempt by the king to break out to the north.²⁷ Most of Poyntz's men had combat experience, but they were strangers to one another, speaking in different accents and dialects, and can hardly have possessed much *esprit de corps*. Furthermore, even after Colonel Hutchinson brought reinforcements from Nottingham, Poyntz did not enjoy numerical superiority over the royalist forces in the region. Prince Rupert had brought extra cavalry into the area. In disgrace following the loss of Bristol, Rupert had argued with the king on arriving in Newark, and had been ordered to leave the town. He withdrew, but only to Belvoir Castle. Poyntz therefore had to guard against potential incursions from Belvoir as well as from Newark.²⁸

Given this dual threat, and the necessity of avoiding a major engagement, it might seem strange that Poyntz should now decide to attack Shelford. In fact this was the logical solution to several pressing problems. The parliamentarians needed to get closer to Newark in order to keep Charles bottled up. John Hutchinson advised that it was first necessary to neutralise Shelford and Wiverton, as cavalry from these two garrisons would otherwise disrupt the parliamentary rear.²⁹ Poyntz had additional concerns, in that his soldiers were mutinous, short of supplies, and disgruntled by lack of pay.³⁰ He feared that if he retreated, or even tried to hold his position, his patchwork taskforce would disintegrate. An assault on Shelford House would keep his troops occupied; victory would boost their morale, and provide Parliament with a useful new stronghold. Consequently, having received further reinforcements from Lincolnshire, Poyntz turned south towards Shelford.

The parliamentarians surrounded the royalist position on 1 November 1645.³¹ John Hutchinson obtained Poyntz's permission to make a personal appeal to Philip Stanhope. The two men were first cousins, and Hutchinson had hopes that their family relationship might enable him to broker a peaceful surrender. Stanhope sent back 'a very scornfull, huffing replie, in which one of his expressions was that he should lay Nottingham Castle as flatt as a pancake.'³² Behind this joke lay a cruel reality: during three years of war Nottingham had suffered many casualties as a result of Newarker raids, sorties in which Stanhope's cavalry had been prominent.³³ In April 1645, an overwhelming force of Newarkers had surprised the small fort guarding Nottingham's bridges over the River Trent. Having slaughtered most of the garrison, the royalists had then plundered the neighbouring villages.³⁴ Lucy Hutchinson echoed the bitterness felt by Nottingham's inhabitants when she later recalled how the dead had been carried through the town in a solemn procession on their way to burial. These, she wrote, had been 'very good & stout men, though it

²⁷ Thomason E.307[6], *The True Informer* (25 October 1645), p. 2016; Clarendon, *History*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 720.

²⁸ Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Portland MSS*, i, p. 278; *Lords' Journals*, vii, pp. 678-9; Thomason E.308[28], *Mercurius Veridicus*, no. 28 (2-8 November, 1645), p. 206.

²⁹ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 243.

³⁰ H.M.C., *Portland MSS*, i, pp. 252, 278, 295, 304.

³¹ *Lords' Journals*, vii, p. 678 (Poyntz to Lord Gray of Warke, 3 November 1645).

³² Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 243.

³³ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fos. 210, 237.

³⁴ *Commons' Journals*, iv, p. 118 (22 April 1645); Wood, *Nottinghamshire*, p. 90.

avail'd them not in their last need when a multitude had seiz'd them unawares.'³⁵ The grief felt by their families is evident in numerous petitions to the Nottinghamshire parliamentary county committee. A distraught Margaret Robinson, for example, attested that she had been left destitute since her husband had died defending the fort, and feared that she might soon lose her home. Nottingham's leaders were sympathetic, and vowed to help her to the utmost of their power.³⁶ The conduct of the Nottingham contingent at Shelford would show that empathy for the victims of the April raid had fostered an intense hatred for those held responsible for their suffering.

Poyntz's Leicestershire contingent had even more cause to hate the Shelford garrison. Many of the royalists manning Shelford's defences had participated in the pillaging of their county the previous May. Leicester had been carried by storm, and much of the plunder had been taken back to the Newarker garrisons. Sensational accounts of Leicester's ordeal abounded, and even the most restrained reports declared that women and children had been killed, and prisoners murdered. Scottish defenders had been singled out for particularly brutal treatment, at the behest, one observer suggested, of Catholics serving in the king's army.³⁷ Such tales can hardly have been lost on the Scots serving in the Nottingham garrison, several of whom were now poised to participate in the assault on Shelford.³⁸

Sydenham Poyntz began to deploy his forces. Colonel Hutchinson's men moved into Shelford village, situated just east of the estate, and flushed out a detachment Stanhope had left in the church tower. One of the royalists was recognised as a turncoat from the Nottingham garrison. Hutchinson threatened to execute him for desertion, prompting the frightened youth to divulge all he knew about Shelford's defences in return for his life.³⁹ Poyntz, who had hitherto been frustrated by the poor intelligence he had received from the Nottinghamshire parliamentary county committee, now had detailed information about the stronghold, and the identity of the royalist soldiers within.⁴⁰ The parliamentarians knew exactly who they were facing.

On 3 November Poyntz formally summoned Stanhope to surrender. Should the summons be refused, the parliamentarian general warned, the garrison must 'expect the strictest rigour of a resolved Enemy.'⁴¹ The conventions regarding sieges were apparently so ubiquitously understood that military writers rarely bothered to discuss them in their manuals.⁴² Hugo Grotius' *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625) acknowledged the besieger's right to punish 'obstinate resistance'.⁴³ A beleaguered governor who agreed to negotiate before combat commenced could usually secure terms which respected the lives and honour of his officers and men. By contrast, those manning garrisons which fought on in the face of hopeless odds were considered little better than common murderers, and could be treated accordingly.⁴⁴ Commanders generally exercised a level of restraint towards civilians if a town was captured after prolonged

³⁵ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 238.

³⁶ T.N.A. SP 28/241, fo. 82. See also SP 28/241, fos. 78, 212, 591.

³⁷ Thomason E.288[4], *A perfect relation of the taking of Leicester* (1645), pp. 3, 5.

³⁸ T.N.A. SP 28/240, fo. 608; 28/241, fo. 531.

³⁹ Anon., *A catalogue of the names of the new lords created by the king* (1645), p. 7; Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 244.

⁴⁰ H.M.C., *Portland MSS*, i, p. 306 (Poyntz to the Speaker of the Commons, 9 November 1645).

⁴¹ *A catalogue of the names*, p. 6.

⁴² Ward, p. 339.

⁴³ Hugo Grotius, *The illustrious Hugo Grotius on the law of warre and peace* (English edition, 1654), pp. 596-8.

⁴⁴ Thomason E.2124[2], *A catechisme for souldiers* (1659), p. 11.

resistance, but examples such as Burton, Bolton and Leicester show that they did not always do so. In any case, Shelford House was not a town but a military garrison. Stanhope declared in reply that he held Shelford for the king, and was willing to die in its defence. 'I am confident soone to lessen your Number', he wrote, adding that the garrison needed no relief.⁴⁵

At four o'clock that afternoon Poyntz launched simultaneous assaults against the east and west ramparts. He had left his men very little daylight within which to achieve their objectives, but probably feared that to delay further might encourage Newark and Belvoir to march to the garrison's relief.⁴⁶ Lucy Hutchinson subsequently learned from Nottingham officers involved in the attack that the affair began badly:

They found many difficulties more than they expected, for after they had fill'd up the ditches with faggots and pitcht their scaling ladders, they were twenty staves too short, and the enemie from the top of the workes threw downe Loggs of wood which would sweepe off a whole ladder full of men at once.⁴⁷

Colonel Webb's Londoners were beaten away from the west ramparts, allowing the royalists to reinforce the eastern side of the estate.⁴⁸ The trapped defenders fought with a ferocity borne of desperation. The parliamentarians admired a 'stout man' who held the eastern rampart against them until he fell riddled with bullets; Colonel Richard Sandys conceded that the ramparts were 'defended gaily, and disputed halfe an houre at swords point after wee got to the top of the works'; John Hughes wrote that he and his comrades were 'gallantly entertained by the enemy'; whilst Poyntz reported that 'we fell on with much Resolution on all Sides, and were entertained for Half an Hour with like Courage.'⁴⁹

John Hutchinson led some Nottinghamshire infantry over the ramparts, only to discover that the Queen's Regiment had fallen back to the half-moons. The royalist troopers killed several of Hutchinson's men, as did musketeers firing from the upper windows of the house. To make matters worse, royalists from the western ramparts were now streaming around either end of the half-moons. Lieutenant-Colonel George Hutchinson, seeing his brother in danger, desperately tried to reach the gatehouse in order to admit the parliamentary cavalry. Outside, at the base of the ramparts, Colonel Sandys fretted that his soldiers were 'growing faint', having repeatedly been repulsed.⁵⁰ Just as the attack was about to falter, Major Christopher Ennis and some dismounted cavalry managed to hack their way into the gatehouse and let down the drawbridge.⁵¹ The parliamentarians poured in, and the slaughter began in earnest. With his force now fully committed inside the Shelford estate, Poyntz had even more cause to fear the arrival of a royalist relief force. It was

⁴⁵ *A catalogue of the names*, p. 6.

⁴⁶ Thomason E.308[19], 'C. W.', *A full relation of the desperate design of the malignants* (1645), p. 5.

⁴⁷ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 245.

⁴⁸ The Nottinghamshire parliamentary county committee papers attest to the heavy casualties suffered by the Londoners: T.N.A. SP28/241, fos. 184, 310, 471, 473, 479, 483, 485, 497, 719.

⁴⁹ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 245; *A catalogue of the names*, p. 7; Thomason E.308[19], 'C. W.', p. 5; *Lords Journals*, vii, pp. 678-9.

⁵⁰ Thomason E.308[19], 'C. W.', p. 5.

⁵¹ T.N.A. SP28/241, fo. 21 (Sydenham Poyntz to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, Bingham, 3 November 1645). Major Christopher Ennis was part of the garrison of Newport Pagnell, but in September had been sent to reinforce Poyntz: T.N.A. SP16/510, fo. 143.

essential to overcome the defenders as quickly as possible. The general began to whip his men into a killing frenzy, yelling that they should give the royalists no quarter.⁵² Contemporary accounts do not disclose how long the killing continued after the outer defences had been breached, nor how the parliamentarians conducted themselves once victory was assured. Historians are left to infer such information from the bitterly contested memories – and the selective amnesia – of the opposing sides.

Seventeenth-century military commanders had little time, resources or inclination to maintain detailed casualty records. A broadsheet commissioned by John Hancock in 1647 indicates that some readers were curious to know how many common soldiers had been slain in major actions, but, as Ian Atherton has observed, counting dead soldiers was normally a way of claiming or magnifying victory, not an act of remembrance. The tallies could have been used for the purposes of memorialisation, but in practice this simply did not happen. Even Hancock's broadsheet supports Atherton's contention that such memorialisation as did occur 'was skewed by conventions of social hierarchy'.⁵³

Counting dead civilians was a different matter. Parliamentary pamphleteers were quick to publicise the sufferings of English communities ravaged by royalist forces.⁵⁴ Their empathy was sincere, but it was also a conscious attempt to influence hearts and minds within the wider population. A disgusted royalist cleric accused parliamentarians of compounding their disloyalty by attempting to turn their rebellion into a vulgar 'people's war'.⁵⁵ Such social and cultural tensions surface in an eyewitness account of Prince Rupert's storming of Bolton, published by order of Parliament in 1644. At the core of the pamphlet, sandwiched between more conventional observations of 'persons of good quality' involved in Bolton's defence, is a string of humble civilian victims, replete with names, details of their suffering and, in some cases, murder at the hands of Rupert's soldiers.⁵⁶ The exactitude of the narrative enabled the anonymous author to present himself as a reliable eyewitness, whilst at the same time reinforcing the trope that Cavaliers were godless predators with no regard for innocent lives or property. Parliamentary army officers killed and wounded at Bolton were named in the pamphlet, whilst their royalist opponents were anonymised.⁵⁷ This was a common tactic: most writers during the Civil Wars were

⁵² Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 247; 'C. W.', pp. 5-6; *A catalogue of the names*, pp. 7-8.

⁵³ Thomason 669.f.11[30], Anon., *A catalogue of the earles, lords, knights, generalls, collonels, lieutenant-collonels, majors, captains and gentlemen of worth and quality slain on the Parliament and Kings side, since the beginning of our uncivil civil warrs; with the number of common soldiers slain on both sides* (1647); I. Atherton, 'Battlefields, burials and the English Civil Wars, in *Mortality, Medical Care and Military Welfare in the British Civil Wars*, ed. D. Appleby and A. Hopper (Manchester, 2018), p. 27.

⁵⁴ See allegations of royalist cruelty at Brentford and Acton in Thomason E.127[19], Anon., *The valiant resolution of the seamen* (1642), sigs. [A3v-A4v]. Similar reports were published about Rupert's storming of Birmingham, in Thomason E.100[8], Anon. *Prince Rupert's burning love to England discovered in Birmingham's flames* (1643), pp. 5-6, and Thomason E.96[9], Robert Porter, *A true relation of Prince Rvperts barbarous cruelty against the towne of Birmingham* (1643), sigs. [A2-A3]. Allegations were also made regarding Burton-on-Trent: Thomason E.61[12], William Robinson, *Stafford-shires misery set forth in a true relation from Stafford* (1643), pp. 3-4. Reports of Bolton and Leicester are discussed elsewhere in this article.

⁵⁵ Thomason E.398[19], Jasper Mayne, *Ochlo-machia, or the peoples war, examined according to the principles of scripture and reason* (Oxford, 1647), pp. 19, 33-34.

⁵⁶ Thomason E.7[1], Anon., *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton* (1644), p. 4.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

assiduous in consecrating fallen officers on their own side, whilst denigrating those enemy dead they could not otherwise consign to oblivion. The royalist cleric Bruno Ryves argued that there was little point in commemorating parliamentary foes because,

...their Officers being for the most part Trades-men, of small quality, and less fortunes, when any of them were slaine (as doubtless there are many more than are come to our knowledge) there was little cause to bewaile their losse, and lesse to eternize their memories.⁵⁸

Such elitism was not confined to royalist literature. Common soldiers were held in low regard within early modern society, with the result that neither side showed much appetite for honouring their own troops, much less those of the enemy. The Boltonian eyewitness had little to say about the soldiers who had died defending his town. Indeed, he admitted that he had no idea of the military casualties incurred by either side, because so many had been buried in 'obscure places'.⁵⁹ Accounts of Shelford are similarly vague. Nicholas Foster, buried in the churchyard of nearby Gedling three days after having been slain at Shelford, was an exceptional case.⁶⁰ His body had probably been taken home by Gedling's rector, Laurence Palmer, who had raised a troop of horse there for Parliament, and had led it into battle.⁶¹ Most of the men killed at Shelford appear to have shared the fate of so many other soldiers killed in the Civil Wars, receiving little more than a murmured prayer from a military chaplain as they were rolled into hastily-dug pits. In common with numerous other civil-war sites, the location of Shelford's pits appears to have been instantly forgotten. The social elite certainly had a horror of such posthumous anonymity, which is why such pains were taken to locate dead relatives and comrades after a battle. However, the notion that plebeians had as much right to a permanent public memorial as a gentleman would have been considered ridiculous in the seventeenth century, and perhaps even subversive.

For all these reasons it is unsurprising that parliamentary accounts failed to disclose how many of Poyntz's men had been lost in the assault. Ryves' estimate that sixty parliamentarians had been killed seems plausible given the numbers of wounded who subsequently received medical care in Nottingham.⁶² Some individuals were singled out for praise, again, very much in line with contemporaneous social convention. Poyntz commended the courage of Major Ennis in official despatches.⁶³ Lucy Hutchinson naturally believed that John and George Hutchinson had been the true heroes of the hour, alleging that her husband had personally killed 'the Captaine of the Papists'.⁶⁴ The Nottinghamshire parliamentary county committee endorsed Captain Andrew Abernathy's petition with a comment that the Scotsman's good service at Shelford deserved due recognition.⁶⁵ The same committee paid the surgeon's bill for a local man, Henry Vickers, who had been

⁵⁸ Bruno Ryves, *Micro-chronicon* (1647), sig. [H2v]

⁵⁹ Thomason E.7[1], *An exact Relation*, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Nottinghamshire Archives, PR 26045 – a reference I owe to the kindness of Richard Burman.

⁶¹ Wood, *Nottinghamshire*, p. 56.

⁶² Ryves, *Micro-chronicon*, sig. E3. In common with many contemporary writers, Ryves used the Julian calendar, and therefore dated the storming to late October.

⁶³ T.N.A. SP 18/155, fo. 21.

⁶⁴ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 245.

⁶⁵ T.N.A. SP 28/240, fo. 608.

'dangerously wounded at Shelford', and admitted that he deserved a greater reward, 'though they be not in a condition to give him what otherwise they would.'⁶⁶ Vickers was only a sergeant, and the committee members did not bother to state what had happened at Shelford to make him an especially deserving case. Nevertheless, local justices were equally appreciative, and eventually granted him a generous pension.⁶⁷ Vickers' documentation, like those pertaining to other parliamentarian soldiers killed or maimed during the storming of Shelford, mirrors the attitude of most civil-war counties; that much as the authorities acknowledged their moral obligations to those who had suffered in their service, soldiers' names were recorded to ensure the efficient administration of maintenance payments, not to construct a civic roll of honour.

The cursory comments in the Nottinghamshire committee papers reveal even less interest in soldiers from outside the county. Some wounded men from Leicestershire and London were named in the committee's accounts, but in other cases the county treasurer simply recorded payments to anonymous 'poor wounded soldier[s]' from these places.⁶⁸ The committee showed more interest in preserving the details of civilian claimants, such as Margaret Newton (who had lost her husband at Shelford), Elizabeth Taylor and Margaret Webster (both of whom had lost sons there).⁶⁹

The parliamentarian accounts are more forthcoming as regards the royalist casualties. In a letter published only days after the storming, Richard Sandys estimated that they had killed 140 royalists, and had spared thirty. He claimed that he had personally intervened to relieve the sufferings of Philip Stanhope, whom he had found lying desperately injured.⁷⁰ Lucy Hutchinson alleged that Stanhope had hidden during the fight, but on being discovered had been mortally wounded. His assailants had then stripped him, and thrown him onto a dung heap. According to Lucy's account, her brother-in-law George had come across the scene soon afterwards, and had directed that the young royalist be carried to his own quarters and attended by a surgeon. Notwithstanding journalistic attempts to anonymise enemy officers, such episodes demonstrate that the instinct of most gentlemen was to preserve the dignity and honour of their fellow gentry, particularly those bound by ties of friendship or family. George and John Hutchinson kept vigil by the bedside as their cousin's life ebbed away.⁷¹

John Hughes informed a friend that 'of 200 there is not above 40 got quarter.' He stressed that most of the dead were members of the Queen's Regiment.⁷² Poyntz's official report told a similar story: 'They were in all near Two Hundred, most of the Queen's Regiment being there. About Forty of them escaped with their Lives, and are brought Prisoners into this Town; the rest put to the Sword.'⁷³ The Committee of Both Kingdoms forwarded Poyntz's report to Sir Thomas Fairfax, again emphasising that most of those slain had been members of the Queen's Regiment.⁷⁴ The parliamentarian newssheet *Mercurius Veridicus* held Shelford's defenders

⁶⁶ T.N.A. SP 28/241, fo. 86.

⁶⁷ Nottinghamshire Archives, C/QSM/1/13, fo. 13.

⁶⁸ T.N.A. SP 28/241, fos. 198, 471, 473, 477, 479, 483, 485.

⁶⁹ T.N.A. SP 28/241, fos. 331, 363, 755, 1068.

⁷⁰ Thomason E.308[19], 'C. W.', pp. 5-6.

⁷¹ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fos. 246-7.

⁷² *A catalogue of the names*, p. 7

⁷³ *Lords' Journals*, vii, pp. 678-9.

⁷⁴ T.N.A. SP 21/22, fo. 49.

entirely responsible for their own doom, commenting that they had chosen 'to dye in their obstinacy [rather than] aske for quarter'.⁷⁵ John Vicars concurred, and contended that the slaughter at Shelford had saved lives elsewhere, noting that Wiverton Hall had surrendered on terms a few days after Shelford's demise. 'Worton [Wiverton] had been very strong', Vicars wrote, 'but Shelford-Quarter frightened them sorely.'⁷⁶ He omitted to mention that the defenders of Belvoir Castle had reacted very differently when Poyntz had attempted to capture it a week or so later.

Belvoir's defences were even stronger than Shelford's. Poyntz suffered heavy casualties when he attempted to storm the castle, and was unable to starve the defenders into submission until January 1646. Despite this, his magnanimous treatment of the garrison once it had surrendered was very different from the bloody denouement at Shelford.⁷⁷ There are a number of reasons why this should have been so. Firstly, the governor, Sir Gervase Lucas, was more diplomatic than Stanhope had been. Secondly, he was fortunate enough to ask for terms at a time when Poyntz was again desperately attempting to stave off a mutiny.⁷⁸ Thirdly, the Belvoir garrison appears to have consisted almost entirely of English Protestants.⁷⁹

It seems clear that Shelford's garrison had been treated more brutally because of the prevalence of foreign Catholics within its ranks. The ratio between those given quarter and those 'put to the sword' is suspiciously close to the ratio between Stanhope's original garrison and the Queen's Regiment – a regiment whose presence at Shelford was repeatedly emphasised in parliamentary correspondence, and whose speech would have made them readily identifiable. No accounts from French or Walloon sources have come to light, not least because it is unlikely that any survived. Lucy Hutchinson privately ascribed their deaths to divine Providence:

It pleas'd God to lead them into that path he had ordain'd for their destruction, who being all Papists would not receive quarter, nor were they much offer'd it, being kill'd in the heate of the contest, but not a man of them escap'd.⁸⁰

There is an internal contradiction between the statement that the Catholic royalists were offered little or no quarter, and the assertion that they were all killed in the heat of combat; but numerous studies have highlighted the extent to which Lucy Hutchinson was willing to rework evidence in order to show her own people in the best light.⁸¹ Nevertheless, her belief in Providence was sincere, and she cannot have been the only Puritan to have seen God's hand in the destruction of the Queen's Regiment. After all, parliamentary commentators had previously declared that these same men were the vanguard of a grand Catholic plot to exterminate English

⁷⁵ Thomason E.308[28], *Mercurius Veridicus*, p. 207.

⁷⁶ John Vicars, *Magnalia Dei Anglicana* (1646), pp. 314, 316.

⁷⁷ *Lords' Journals* (3 Feb. 1646), viii, pp. 141-2.

⁷⁸ Thomason E.309[38], Sydenham Poyntz, *Major Gen: Poyntz's letter to the honorable William Lenthal Esq* (1645), p. 5.

⁷⁹ Many of Belvoir's garrison came from Northamptonshire (e.g. Northamptonshire Archives QSR 1/63, fo. 60).

⁸⁰ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fos. 247-8.

⁸¹ D. Norbrook, 'Memoirs and oblivion: Lucy Hutchinson and the Restoration', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, vol. 75, no. 2 (Summer 2012), p. 236; M. Bennett, "'Every county had more or lesse the civill warre within it selfe": the realities of war in Lucy Hutchinson's Midland shires, *The Seventeenth Century*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2015), pp. 203-4.

Protestantism. Remarkably, after rushing to publish Poyntz's letter, and those of his subordinates, the parliamentary press then chose to focus on the weapons and ammunition seized at Shelford. No further details were given regarding the dead – foreign, Catholic or otherwise.⁸² Such reticence contrasted markedly with the triumphalism which had greeted the fall of Basing House only a month earlier.

Basing House in Hampshire, the foremost Catholic garrison in England, had long been an affront to parliamentary sensibilities. *The Scottish Dove* described Basing as an abomination which sheltered 'agents of the Devill and Pope'.⁸³ Parliament celebrated Oliver Cromwell's successful storming of the place in October 1645 with a day of thanksgiving, whilst *Mercurius Civicus* publicly declared that Basing's destruction was a mark of 'the propitious hand of providence'.⁸⁴ Parliamentary estimates of the royalist casualties varied wildly, from 42 dead, to a report in *The Kingdomes Weekly Post* which claimed that the entire garrison had been wiped out by Cromwell's men screaming 'Down with the Papists!'.⁸⁵ Setting aside this fanciful account, the figures indicate that between thirteen and sixty-three per cent of Basing's defenders were killed. This is significantly lower than the mortality reported at Shelford. Those historians willing to quantify the death toll at Basing have all arrived at a figure close to Hugh Peters' estimate of 100 (around twenty per cent).⁸⁷ Peters was an eyewitness to the events in Hampshire. If his account is accurate then Shelford was not only considerably worse than Basing in percentage terms, but also in absolute numbers killed.

Of course, a massacre is not necessarily defined by the number of bodies, but rather the manner in which they died. Osteoarchaeologists working on burials at other conflict sites have been able to discern which soldiers were killed in the heat of combat, which executed in cold blood, and which subjected to frenzied assault.⁸⁶ However, it is precisely because common soldiers were habitually buried in obscure places during the Civil Wars that so few have been unearthed and analysed.⁸⁷ Until archaeologists locate and examine Shelford's burial pits, it is only possible to infer a massacre, principally by comparing the silence that quickly descended with the public cacophony surrounding incidents such as Basing. Lucy Hutchinson's hostile

⁸² *England's Remembrancer* (1646, Wing E3033), p. 7; Thomason E.510[8], 'I. W.', *The jubilee of England* (1646), p. 2; Thomason E.329[15], *The Lord George Digby's cabinet* (1646), p. 6; Thomason 669.f.10[72], Josiah Ricraft, *A perfect table of two hundred and four victories obtained* (1646), broadsheet; Thomason 669.f.10[46], Josiah Ricraft, *A perfect list of the many victories by God's blessing obtained* (1646), broadsheet; Anon., *A perfect table of three hundred forty and three victories obtained* (1646, Wing P1526), broadsheet; Josiah Ricraft, *The civil warres of England* (1649, Wing R1428), p. 148.

⁸³ Thomason E.305[6], *The Scottish Dove*, no. 104 (10-16 October, 1644), p. 820.

⁸⁴ Thomason E.305[5], *Mercurius Civicus*, no. 125 (9-16 October, 1645), p. 1096. See also Thomason E.307[2], Anon., *A looking-glasse for the popish garrisons* (1645), pp. 1-2.

⁸⁵ Thomason E.305[5], *Mercurius Civicus*, no. 125, p. 1202; Thomason E.305[8], Thomason E.305[8], Hugh Peters, *The full and last relation of all things concerning Basing-House* (1645), p. 3; Thomason E.305[6], *The Scottish Dove*, no. 104, p. 821; Thomason E. 305[9], *The True Informer*, no. 26 (18 October 1645), p. 206; Thomason E.305[10], *Mercurius Veridicus*, no. 25 (11-18 October, 1645), p. 180; Thomason E.304[28], *The Kingdomes Weekly Post* (15 October, 1645), p. 1.

⁸⁷ W. Emberton, *Love Loyalty: the Close and Perilous Siege of Basing House 1643-1645* (Basingstoke, 1972), p. 90 (although Emberton endorses *Mercurius Veridicus* on p. 117); S. R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War* (4 vols., Windrush Press edn., 1987), ii, p. 364; C. Carlton, *Going to the Wars* (1992), p. 179.

⁸⁶ See <https://www.bradford.ac.uk/life-sciences/arch-sci/research/biological-anthropology-research-centre/projects/towton-mass-grave-project/> [accessed 1 February 2019]; A. Schurger, 'The Archaeology of the Battle of Lutzen' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015).

⁸⁷ Atherton, p. 29. Burials discovered in York, Carrickmines and Durham have been linked with the British Civil Wars.

comments and the repeated emphasis on the presence of the Queen's Regiment in parliamentary officers' letters all give rise to the suspicion that many of Shelford's defenders did not die in battle. This in itself was not necessarily a reason for reticence: parliamentary journalists had already justified the killing of royalist women after the fighting at Naseby, as they had certain individuals slain after Basing's surrender, by alleging that the victims had antagonised their killers. Moreover, the journalists had taken pains to stress (perhaps erroneously) that the camp followers at Naseby were 'wives of the bloody Rebels in Ireland', armed with 'long Irish knives' with which to cut the throats of the wounded. This xenophobic anti-Catholic stereotype, shaped by social memories articulated in works such as Foxe's *Actes and Monuments*, and reinforced by London's press coverage of the Irish Catholic uprising, rendered the Naseby women guilty by virtue of association with historical crimes, in addition to their perceived ethnicity, weaponry and demeanour.⁸⁸ Shelford had seen the providential eradication of a particularly notorious group of foreign Catholics, men who had been publicly identified by parliamentarians as enemies of God and tormentors of the godly; so why did parliamentary journalists not celebrate the fact?

The answer may lie in the rhetoric of massacre which had been crafted by godly Protestants over the preceding century, and which was even then being brought to a crescendo in the lurid accounts of the Irish Rebellion.⁸⁹ Royalist depredations in civil-war England, particularly those associated with Charles I's foreign nephew Prince Rupert, had already been explicitly linked to the murder of Protestant settlers in Ireland, and the Bartholomew's Day massacres in sixteenth-century France.⁹⁰ Having thus characterised these massacres as wanton acts of mass-murder committed by foreigners, Catholics and royalists, parliamentary writers could scarcely concede that their own soldiers were capable of equal depravity. Scripture sanctioned the killing of God's enemies in cold blood, but even godly violence had to be proportionate and legitimate. Gratuitous cruelty against women, children and helpless prisoners without good cause had always been considered unchristian.⁹¹ In 1649 the Commonwealth would feel it necessary to publish a detailed justification of the New Model's conduct at Wexford, whereas the mass murder of prisoners at Dungan's Hill and Knockanuss in 1647 was discretely glossed over.⁹² The fact that the press coverage of Shelford became similarly taciturn seems highly suspicious.

⁸⁸ Vicars, pp. 163-4; Thomason E.305[5], *Mercurius Civicus*, no. 125, p. 1202; E. Shagan, 'Constructing discord: ideology, propaganda, and English responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (Jan 1997), pp. 11-14.

⁸⁹ The crescendo would come a year after the events at Shelford, with John Temple's *The Irish Rebellion* (1646).

⁹⁰ Thomason E.238[15], Anon., *A vvarning peece for London being a true relation of the bloody massacre of the Protestants in Paris, by the Papists and Cavileers* (1642), frontispiece; Thomason E.188[2], Anon., *Reasons and arguments* (1642), p. 6; Wing H2910A, François Hotman, *A patterne of popish peace* (1644), sigs. A2-[A3v]; Thomason 669.f.10[106], Anon., *Englands vvolfe with eagles clavves* (1645), broadsheet; Thomason E.99[14], I. W., *The bloody prince* (1644), pp. 4, 7, 14-15, 18.

⁹¹ B. Donagan, 'Atrocity, war crime, and treason in the English Civil War', *American Historical Review*, vol. 99, no. 4 (October, 1994), p. 1142. Even during the Crusades, Richard I's massacre of the Muslim inhabitants of Acre caused disquiet among his co-religionists: *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, trans. H. Nicholson (Aldershot, 2001), p. 231, n. 7; Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, trans. D. Richards (Aldershot, 2002), p. 164.

⁹² Thomason E.575[39], Anon., *A perfect and particuler relation of the severall marches and proceedings of the armie in Ireland* (n.l., 1649), p. 8; Thomason E.402[27], Michael Jones, *An exact and full relation of the great victory obtained against the rebels at Dungs-Hill* (1647), p. 10; Thomason E.418[10], Anon, *A perfect*

This suspicion is compounded by the fact that allegations were made regarding the behaviour of Poyntz' soldiers. In February 1647, in the course of petitioning the House of Lords for financial assistance, the earl of Chesterfield alleged that two of his sons had been murdered in the conflict, one of whom had been

...most barbarously killed and murdered in one of your Petitioner's houses, and with him also about seven score more then slaine, not sparing the killing of some children, slashing and wounding of one Gentlewoman, and other women that could not be in armes, with other unheard of barbarousness, both to the living and dead.⁹³

The Lords rejected Chesterfield's petition, prompting the earl to forward it to a stationer for publication.⁹⁴ His allegations were not inconceivable: children had been slain at Leicester, and several had died when Prince Rupert had stormed Liverpool in 1644.⁹⁵ One of the reasons why parliamentary troopers had killed and slashed the royalist women at Naseby was to avenge injuries inflicted on their own camp followers a year earlier in Cornwall.⁹⁶ Chesterfield's accusation that the dead had been mutilated at Shelford is all the more plausible not because such acts were unprecedented (as he claimed), but rather because they had considerable precedent. Similar atrocities feature in historical narratives of British and Irish conflicts as far back as the fifteenth century, inevitably with a strong ethnic dimension. Over the course of the Civil Wars, royalists and parliamentarians made heated claims and counter-claims that each had desecrated the other's tombs and cadavers.⁹⁷ Of course, it is possible that Chesterfield's victims were merely figments of his imagination. No independent evidence has emerged to corroborate his allegations, nor is there any indication as to how he came by the information. Nevertheless, the brutality he described had such huge propaganda potential that it is remarkable that no royalist journalist ever utilised it. As it is, Chesterfield's pamphlet was not widely circulated (no copy ever found its way into George Thomason's collection), probably because most of Shelford's dead, being plebeian foreign Catholics, were unsuitable for martyrdom. By contrast, the desecration of the Lucas family vault during the siege of Colchester in 1648, and the summary executions of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle after the town's surrender, became an instant *cause celebre* for royalist supporters, spawning a string of elegies.⁹⁸ The Lucases were English, Protestant and members of the social elite. Bruno Ryves made no reference to Chesterfield's petition, although he was adamant that a massacre had taken place at Shelford, asserting that Stanhope and 'near 200 others were slain by the mercilesse enemies, after they had entred the house'. He

narrative of the battle of Knocknones (n.l., 1647), pp. 9, 10; M. Ó Siocrhú, 'Atrocity, codes of conduct and the Irish in the British Civil Wars 1641-1653', *Past & Present*, no. 195 (May, 2007), pp. 71-2.

⁹³ Philip Stanhope, earl of Chesterfield, *To the right honourable the Lords* (1646/7, Wing C3784B), sig. [A3].

⁹⁴ *Lords' Journals* (13 February 1647), ix, p. 13.

⁹⁵ Leicestershire and Rutland Record Office, BR 11/18/23A, fo. 449; Thomason E.288[4], *A perfect relation of the taking of Leicester*, p. 3; Liverpool Record Office, 920 MOO/371.

⁹⁶ M. Stoye, 'The road to Farndon Field: explaining the massacre of the royalist women at Naseby', *English Historical Review*, vol. 123, no. 503 (2008), 895-923, at p. 899.

⁹⁷ Atherton, p. 27.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* The elegies are discussed at length in A. Brady, 'Dying with honour: literary propaganda and the Second English Civil War', *Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, no. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 9-30.

named several of the gentlemen who had been killed, omitting to mention that all apart from Stanhope had been Catholics.⁹⁹ As we have seen, Ryves' overriding concern was to promote the inherent gentility, fidelity and honour of the royalist cause, and to contrast it with the squalid ignobility of rebellion; this, for many royalists (although not all) momentarily overrode inconvenient issues of ethnicity and religion.

It is nevertheless significant that from 1647 onwards royalist accounts of Shelford began to focus on Philip Stanhope. The governor's uncomplicated Protestantism allowed royalist writers to place him in rarefied company. In 1650, in the course of comparing parliamentarians to the worst barbarians in history, one declared,

Yet our barbarous Blood-suckers of England, have out gone [*sic*] them in cruelties, witness the butchering and unhumane using of that ever to be praised noble Lord, my Lord of *Northampton* at *Hopton-Heath*; the barbarous massacring in cold blood of Col. *Stanhope* in *Shelford* Garrison, and Sir *Charls Lucas*, and Sir *Geo: Lisle* at *Colchester*, *cum multis aljis*, O bloody Tygers!¹⁰⁰

Such episodes had by this time been eclipsed by the momentous events of the Regicide. The sufferings of individual Cavaliers rapidly became sub-plots to the central royalist tragedy of King Charles the martyr. Just as the Regicide was pushing Shelford to the margins of royalist consciousness it was also being forgotten by supporters of the new Commonwealth: Shelford had become yesterday's news because the victor was now yesterday's man.

In common with many conservative Presbyterians, Poyntz had deprecated the growth of radicalism within the parliamentary alliance. By 1647 Independents were describing him as a member of 'that viperous brood of rigid Presbyters' disaffected from the Commonwealth. Poyntz fled the country, and offered his services to Charles II.¹⁰³ Presbyterian turncoats had their uses, and following the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 it was expedient to draw a veil over their past careers. The Act of Oblivion and Indemnity (1660) required Charles II's subjects to forget the troubled past for a minimum of three years, but some royalists were signally unwilling to do so.¹⁰¹ In an enlarged edition of his *Chronicle of the late intestine war* (1663), James Heath blamed Poyntz for the Shelford massacre. Poyntz was not present to defend himself; he was last recorded in the Leeward Islands in 1650, and may well have been dead by 1663.¹⁰² Heath appears to have had access to some survivors' testimonies, for he added new information on events inside the house during the storming: 'Some Gentlemen getting within a Seiling till the fury was over, found

⁹⁹ Ryves, *Micro-Chronicon*, sigs. E3, G3, [G5v], [G6v], [G8v].

¹⁰⁰ Thomason E.597[6], Anon., *A briefe description of the two revolted nations of Holland and England* (1650), p. 3.

¹⁰³ Thomason E.404[6], Anon., *The arraignment and impeachment of Major Generall Massie, Sir William Waller, Col. Poyntz, etc.* (1647), title page, p. 3; Thomason E.401[20], Anon., *A speedy hue and crie* (1647); Thomason E.401[12], Edward Massey, *The declaration of Generall Massey and Colonell Generall Poyntz* (1647); Thomason E.469[23], Sydenham Poyntz, *The vindication of Collonell Generall Points* (1648); *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/22695> [accessed 1 December 2018].

¹⁰¹ *Statutes of the Realm*, 12 Cha. II, c. 11, clause xxiv.

¹⁰² *O.D.N.B.*, s.v.

quarter; the Governor himself was killed in the defence after the house was entered.¹⁰³

Poyntz thereafter faded from the royalist narrative, as he had from the parliamentary one. By contrast, references to the Queen's Regiment were deliberately erased. One of the many issues facing Charles II and the newly-elected 'Cavalier Parliament' after the Restoration was the moral debt owed to royalist officers impoverished by their loyal service. In 1663 parliamentary commissioners published a list of over 5,600 officers who had applied for a share of the £60,000 bounty. Philip Stanhope's former officers were correctly recorded as members of the duke of Gloucester's Regiment. The surviving English officers of the Queen's Regiment, meanwhile, were listed as having served in the regiment of Lord St Albans.¹⁰⁷ Henry Jermyn, earl of St Albans had commanded the Queen's Regiment for a period, but he had never been a titular colonel. Henrietta-Maria's devoted confidante, St Albans was known to be sympathetic to the French Catholic interest. He was widely distrusted, having become notorious for his intrigues against fellow royalists whilst in exile. Nevertheless, his name was clearly less toxic than that of the Queen's Regiment. More research is needed on the character of the commissioners, and their attitude towards Catholics, but it is obvious what motivated their decision in this case.¹⁰⁴ During the 1640s parliamentary journalists had repeatedly averred that royalism had been infected by popish foreigners, and emasculated by a cabal of conniving females headed by Henrietta-Maria.¹⁰⁵ This propaganda had clearly been so effective that two decades later the restored monarchical regime still found it prudent to conceal the identity of the foreign Catholic regiment which had borne her name.

The re-writing of history after the Restoration affected the memorialisation of Shelford in other ways. A majority of MPs in the Cavalier Parliament believed that the monarchy could only be safeguarded if the population could be persuaded to embrace Anglicanism. Claims by Presbyterians and Catholics to have rendered the Crown faithful service were therefore unwelcome, as these threatened to contaminate the martyr cult of Charles I which lay at the heart of the Cavalier-Anglican project. Catholics were bewildered by the refusal of former colleagues to acknowledge the blood they had shed for the royalist cause. They took to print after the Restoration to express their dismay, and to reiterate their fidelity to the Crown.¹⁰⁶ A particular source of frustration was a work entitled *The royal martyrs*, printed by Thomas Newcomb in 1660. Whereas most Restoration royalist hagiographies, such as *England's black tribunall* and William Winstanley's *Loyall martyrology*, focused on an exclusive cadre of elite Cavalier-Anglican heroes, Newcomb's list was conceived as a comprehensive honour roll of fallen royalist officers and gentlemen-volunteers.¹⁰⁷ Naturally, Newcomb listed the gentlemen killed at Shelford: Philip

¹⁰³ James Heath, *A chronicle of the late intestine war* (2nd ed., 1663), p. 154.

¹⁰⁷ *List*, columns 57, 113.

¹⁰⁴ P. Newman, 'The 1663 list of indigent officers considered as a primary source for the study of the royalist army', *Historical Journal*, vol. 30, no. 4 (1987), 885-904, does not discuss these issues.

¹⁰⁵ L. Bowen, 'The Bedlam academy: royalist Oxford in civil-war news culture', *Media History*, vol. 23, no. 2 (2017), 199-217, at pp. 201-3, 205-6; A. Hopper, "'The popish army of the North": anti-Catholicism and parliamentary allegiance in civil-war Yorkshire', *Recusant History*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2000), 12-28, at pp. 21-2.

¹⁰⁶ E.g., Anon., *The good Catholick no bad subject* (1660); Eusebius Andrews, *The several arguments at law of Col. Eusebius at his trial* (1660).

¹⁰⁷ Anon., *The royal martyrs* (1660), broadsheet; Thomason E.1805[1], Anon., *England's black tribunall* (1660); William Winstanley, *The loyall martyrology* (1665).

Stanhope, Lawrence Clifton, Captain John Clifton, Mr Cary and Mr Jennings. Catholics promptly extracted their co-religionists from the honour roll, and printed the resulting list of fallen Catholic royalist officers in a broadsheet that mimicked the style, format and content of Newcomb's original publication. This was done so swiftly that the Oxford antiquary Anthony Wood was able to purchase a copy in May 1660.¹⁰⁸ The list was reproduced by Thomas Blount in his Catholic almanacs for 1661, 1662 and 1663.¹⁰⁹ The gentlemen killed under Stanhope's command were thereby publicly outed as Catholics. There was no immediate response from the Cavalier-Anglican establishment, which was at that moment preoccupied with ejecting puritan ministers from their livings, and repressing nonconformist literature. The backlash came after Robert Palmer, earl of Castlemaine appended the Catholic list to a diatribe entitled *The humble apology of the English Catholics* (1666).

The compilers of the Catholic list had merely intended to demonstrate that Catholics were loyal subjects. Castlemaine, a recent convert to Catholicism, struck a more controversial tone. In mercilessly exposing the hypocrisy of the Cavalier-Anglican metanarrative, the earl resurrected a spectre which royalists had always tried so desperately to exorcise. The terms 'papist' and 'Cavalier' had been synonymous during the late rebellion, Castlemaine reminded his readers, 'for there was never no Papist that was not deemed a Cavaleer, nor no Cavaleer that was not called a Papist.'¹¹⁰

The humble apology drew an angry response. A self-styled 'old constant royalist' argued that Catholics could never be true Cavaliers, and accused Castlemaine of attempting to sow division amongst Protestants.¹¹⁵ The old royalist was unimpressed by Castlemaine's 'bloody' list, arguing that Catholics had been duty-bound to fight for their sovereign.¹¹¹ An Anglican clergyman, William Lloyd questioned the accuracy of the Catholic list, accused its compilers of 'stealing martyrs', and wondered that they had not attempted to lay claim to Charles I himself. He pointed out that far more Protestants had lost their lives in the royalist cause than Catholics, and expressed outrage that 'their blood should be made use of to stop the Execution of those Laws [i.e. the laws against nonconformity and recusancy] for which they shed it'.¹¹²

Castlemaine hit back, savaging Lloyd in a lengthy rebuttal. His *Reply to the answer of the Catholique apology* (1668) again utilised the Catholic list, which had been enlarged by additional names supplied by bereaved Catholic families. The earl readily conceded that more Protestants had died fighting for the Stuart monarchy than Catholics, but noted that this was hardly surprising, since Catholics were 'not one hundredth part of the Nation'. Nevertheless, he calculated that 190 Catholic

¹⁰⁸ Anon., *A catalogue of the lords, knights, and gentlemen (of the Catholick religion) that were slain in the late warr, in defence of their king and country* (s.l., 1660?), broadsheet; *The Life and Times of Anthony Wood* (5 vols., 1891) ed. A. Clark, vol. 1, p. 317. A putative publication date of 1651/2 in *Early English Books Online* is based on an annotation in a later hand, but this work is markedly different from the royalist hagiographies published in the 1650s. The stylistic and circumstantial evidence all points to a publication date of 1660.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Blount, *Calendarium Catholicum* (s.l., 1661), sigs. [B6-13]. See also his *Calendarium Catholicum* (s.l., 1662) and *A new almanack* (1663).

¹¹⁰ Roger Palmer, earl of Castlemaine, *To all the royalists that suffered for his Majesty, and to the rest of the good people of England, the humble apology of the English Catholicks* (1666), p. 3.

¹¹⁵ Anon., *An answer to a pamphlet entitled the humble apology of the English Catholics, written by a royalist* (1667), pp. 4, 10, 11, 15.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹² William Lloyd, *The late apology in behalf of the papists* (1667), p. 45.

gentlemen had given their lives for the royalist cause, as opposed to the 212 Protestant gentlemen listed in Newcomb's collection.¹¹³

Such statistics threatened to breathe new life into the old Roundhead trope that Charles' army had been a horde of papists. Fallen Catholics had always been inconvenient for the royalist martyr cult, but Castlemaine's intervention had now rendered them anathematic. In *Memoires of the lives* (1668), the royalist hagiographer David Lloyd declared that, first and foremost, true Cavaliers had fought for the Protestant cause, and only in doing this had they genuinely served their sovereign.¹¹⁴ One of the examples he used to substantiate his thesis was Philip Stanhope. Lloyd embellished Stanhope's reputation, claiming that the governor had led the defence of Shelford's perimeter, and had been the first to die. He then contradicted himself by lauding the sacrifice made by Laurence and John Clifton. Lloyd, who was notoriously careless with his facts, was clearly unaware that the Clifton brothers, and two other officers commended on the same page, had been Catholics.¹¹⁵ Other Cavalier-Anglican writers were more sensitive to Shelford's Catholic associations, and that only Philip Stanhope should be mentioned by name.¹¹⁶

Similar considerations might explain Shelford's disappearance from Cavalier-Anglican almanacs by the beginning of the Restoration. George Wharton, one of the foremost purveyors of popular royalist literature, listed Shelford in his almanacs for 1648 and 1649. In 1650 he drew attention to the fact that the parliamentarian commander Thomas Rainborowe had been killed on the anniversary of the storming.¹¹⁷ Imprisonment, and the threat of execution, caused Wharton to temper his tone, and Shelford was one of several contentious entries to be omitted from the next few editions of his almanac.¹¹⁸ Richard Fitzsmith had no such qualms: highlighting the Rainborowe link in his almanac for 1654, he claimed that Shelford's entire garrison had been put to the sword, and even added a new martyr in the person of Major 'Bate' (although in actuality Major Pate had been slain elsewhere).¹¹⁹ It is clear from this that Shelford was still a familiar name among consumers of popular literature, even if the details of the event were somewhat hazy. Wharton reinserted Shelford into *Gesta Britannorum* in 1657, but this was its last appearance in his almanac: although surrounding entries, ranging from well-known events such as Basing to tiny scuffles such as Wormleighton House, remained in his

¹¹³ Roger Palmer, earl of Castlemaine, *A reply to the answer of the Catholique apology* (1668), p. 253. For discussions on the disproportionate representation of Catholic officers in the royalist army see: P. Newman, 'Roman Catholic royalists: papist commanders under Charles I and Charles II', *Recusant History*, 15 (1980), pp. 396-405, and Gratton, pp. 38-44.

¹¹⁴ David Lloyd, *Memoires of the lives, actions, sufferings & deaths of those noble, reverend and excellent personages that suffered by death, sequestration, decimation or otherwise for the Protestant religion, and the great principal thereof, allegiance to their sovereigne* (1668), pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 651, 670; Anthony Wood, *Athenae Oxoniensis* (2 vols., 1692), ii, sig. [A2].

¹¹⁶ E.g., Winstanley, *The loyall martyrology*, p. 68; Margaret Cavendish, duchess of Newcastle, *The life of the thrice noble, high and puissant prince William Cavendishe* (1667), p. 114.

¹¹⁷ George Wharton, *No merlin, nor mercury, but a new almanack* (s.l., 1648), sig. B3; *idem*, *Hemeroscopeion, or a new almanack* (1649), sig. B3; *idem*, *Hemeroscopeion the loyall almanack* (1650), sig. [C5]. Wharton, using the Julian calendar, dates the storming to 29 October 1644 in *No merlin*, whilst in *Hemeroscopeion* he gives dual dates of 29 October and 8 November 1645, to cater for readers used to the Julian or Gregorian calendars.

¹¹⁸ *O.D.N.B.*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/29165> [accessed 14 August 2019].

¹¹⁹ R. Fitzsmith, *Syzygasticon instauratum* (1654), sig. [E4]. See listing of Major Pate in *Royal martyrs*, broadsheet

chronology for 1658, Shelford was never mentioned again.¹²⁰ Almanac compilers rarely bothered to alter their chronologies from one year to the next, so Wharton had clearly taken a deliberate decision to remove this particular entry. This was not because he desired his readers to forget about the Civil Wars *per se*: in an annotated anthology of poems published in 1661, Wharton excoriated parliamentarians, praised numerous royalist martyrs, and declared Basing House to be a site of mass-murder.¹²¹ He made no mention of Shelford. Aside from his lucrative career in popular literature, Wharton was a government employee, who was eventually made a baronet, and appointed paymaster of the Ordnance. Jonathan Sawday has demonstrated that the Restoration regime was acutely sensitive about its public image, and assiduous in stage-managing 'all possible symbolic registers'.¹²² Given such constraints, Shelford, with its connotations of armed foreign Catholicism, was therefore exactly the sort of controversy an ambitious civil servant did well to avoid.

Philip Stanhope's absence from Sir Aston Cockayne's 1658 anthology of poems is harder to explain, for the poet was not only a royalist veteran and Catholic sympathiser, but also Stanhope's cousin.¹²³ The anthology contained several poems about the late wars, and, more pertinently, epigrams and epitaphs dedicated to several of his Stanhope relatives. Cockayne honoured his uncle Lord Chesterfield and four of the earl's sons in verse, not least Ferdinando (whom he noted as slain near Shelford, but who was in fact killed at West Bridgford in 1643), and Michael (killed during the Second Civil War of 1648).¹²⁴ All the more strange, therefore, that there was no mention of their brother Philip, nor any allusion to the storming of Shelford.

Shelford's descent into obscurity is reflected in its increasingly cursory treatment in the histories of the late seventeenth century. The antiquary Robert Thoroton surely knew far more about the events at Shelford than he disclosed in his *Antiquities of Nottinghamshire* (1677). Thoroton, a meticulous researcher and a staunch royalist, is thought to have spent most of the First English Civil War in Newark. More pertinently, he was a lifelong resident of the neighbouring village of Car Colston. Nevertheless, in *Antiquities of Nottinghamshire*, Thoroton noted merely that Shelford had been a royalist garrison, that Stanhope and many of his soldiers had perished, and that the house was afterwards burned. He was far more fulsome regarding the death of Philip's brother Ferdinando, whom he alleged had been treacherously killed by a parliamentarian soldier as he attempted to aid the inhabitants of a blazing house.¹²⁵ Thoroton's lack of interest in the storming of Shelford was typical of the histories of the rebellion which continued to appear at regular intervals throughout the rest of the century.¹²⁶ Only rehashed editions of Heath's *Chronicle* (1676), Wharton's *Works* (1683), Ryves' *Micro-chronicon*

¹²⁰ George Wharton, *Gesta Britannorum* (1657), sig. [Fv].

¹²¹ George Wharton, *Select and choice poems collected out of the labours or George Wharton esquire* (1661), pp. 4-7.

¹²² Sawday, 'Re-writing a revolution', pp. 171, 174.

¹²³ *O.D.N.B.*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/5819> [accessed 23 August 2019].

¹²⁴ Aston Cockayne, *A chain of golden poems* (1658), pp. 116, 144, 182, 183, 188.

¹²⁵ *O.D.N.B.*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/27371> [accessed 23 August 2019]; R. Thoroton, *The antiquities of Nottinghamshire* (1677), p. 148.

¹²⁶ E.g. William Dugdale, *A short view of the late troubles in England* (Oxford, 1681), p. 201; G. Wharton, *The works* (1683), p. 446; Roger Manley, *The history of the rebellions in England, Scotland and Ireland* (1691), p. 125; Louis Moréri, *The great historical, geographical and poetical dictionary* (1694), sig. O2.

(published under the title *Mercurius Rusticus* in 1685), and Blount's *Kalendarium Catholicum* (1686) reminded readers that anything untoward had taken place.¹²⁷

Memories undoubtedly survived within individual families affected by the events, although apart from Lucy Hutchinson's memoirs only one account has so far come to light. In 1712 the son of the Reverend Richard Benskin related details of his father's death to the Anglican hagiographer John Walker. Following his sequestration at the hand of Leicestershire's parliamentary committee, Benskin, then rector of Wanlip, had taken refuge in Shelford. He was, according to his son's testimony, killed on the main staircase of Shelford House whilst attempting to surrender.¹²⁸ On the face of things, this would seem exactly the sort of material John Walker was seeking. However, two years later, when he published his account of the sufferings of Church of England clergy during the Civil Wars and Interregnum Walker made no mention of the episode.

The most intriguing evidence of social forgetting comes from the village of Shelford itself. Sydenham Poyntz had intended to install a garrison in Shelford House following the storming, but during the night of 3 November the building was set alight. Lucy Hutchinson claimed that the fire had been started deliberately by the villagers, 'who had bene sorely infested by that Garrison, to prevent the keeping it by those who had taken it.'¹²⁹ Like so many communities the local inhabitants had found living cheek-by-jowl with a military garrison highly unpleasant, and ultimately dangerous. The impulse to remove Shelford House from the physical landscape appears to have been matched by an equally strong desire to erase it from the communal memory. Given that Shelford is still a small, close-knit community, it is strange that even long-established families appear to possess no discernible folk memory of the most important event in the village's history; neither are there any local ghost stories or commemorative place-names to parallel those found in abundance at other civil-war sites. Historians from Charles Phythian-Adams onwards have found folklore and place-naming helpful aids to uncovering hidden histories.¹³⁰ The task is harder, but no less worthwhile, when such tales and place-names are conspicuous by their absence, and where even the chief protagonist in the drama has been rendered virtually invisible. Following the Restoration, royalist notables such as Sir Charles Lucas, Sir George Lisle and Lord Capel were reinterred in ostentatious public ceremonies, and their tombstones engraved with emotive accounts of their martyrdom. Royalist survivors such as Sir William Compton and Colonel William Maxey were commemorated after their deaths by elaborate memorial tablets which bore copious testament to their loyal service. By contrast, the only evidence that the body of Philip Stanhope was laid to rest in Shelford parish church is a curt chiselled codicil on his mother's memorial tablet that he is 'here

¹²⁷ James Heath, *A chronicle of the late intestine war* (3rd edn, 1676); G. Wharton, *The works* (1683), p. 446; Bruno Ryves, *Mercurius Rusticus, or the countries complaint* (Cambridge, 1685), sig. [Bb7v]; Thomas Blount *Kalendarium Catholicum* (n.l., 1686), sigs. [B6, B6v, B7].

¹²⁸ Bodleian MS John Walker c.5, fol. 50; *Walker Revised*, ed. A. E. Matthews (1988), p. 231.

¹²⁹ Nottinghamshire Archives, DD/HU4, fo. 247.

¹³⁰ C. Phythian-Adams, *Local History and Folklore: A New Framework* (1975); Wood, *Memory of the People*, pp. 219-36, 271-86; A. Hughes, "'The accounts of the kingdom': memory, community and the English Civil War", *Past & Present*, vol. 230, sup. 11 (2016), p. 325. Many thanks to Laura Miller and various residents of Shelford for conversations on folk memories within the village.

likewise buried'.¹³¹ Stanhope's virtual anonymity in death seems a strange fate for a man whom journalists had initially placed in Charles I's posthumous lifeguard of royalist martyrs. However, it is entirely consistent with the other patterns of social forgetting which have conspired to erase the episode from history.

The bloody events at Shelford demonstrate how local history can speak to much wider issues.¹³⁷ In the quarter-century since Barbara Donagan urged colleagues to pay more attention to atrocities committed on English soil during the Civil Wars, scholarly opinion remains divided as to the extent of the brutality involved.¹³⁸ Martyr Bennett, Ian Gentles and Mark Stoye have all shown that the conflict in England could often be as vicious as anywhere else in the British Isles, particularly when aggravated by ethnic tensions.¹³² Other historians remain unconvinced: John Morrill has opined as recently as 2017 that 'the civil war in England was not so very uncivilized', and that 'the number of men in arms killed in cold blood [was] very limited'; while Blair Worden has written that the 'awareness of common nationhood was a restraining bond', and that 'ties of kinship and friendship that crossed party lines held savagery back.'¹³³ The case study of Shelford House challenges this traditional view, at the same time as demonstrating how the social forgetting of the massacre could allow such a narrative to emerge. The increasing permeability of disciplinary boundaries has enabled historians of the Civil Wars to tap into exciting scholarship on early modern emotion, literary studies and anthropology, and thus develop increasingly sophisticated methods of examining the nature and significance of such processes, rendering it ever more imperative that historians seek to understand the symbiotic relationship between a given event and its memorialisation.¹³⁴ It is no longer sufficient to recover forgotten episodes such as Shelford simply in order to insert them into the historical record; it is necessary to understand why they were omitted in the first place, why other events – such as Basing – may have been given undue prominence, and what this says about wider national narratives.

¹³¹ <http://southwellchurches.history.nottingham.ac.uk/shelford/hmonumnt.php> [accessed 25 September 2019]. Lucas and Lisle's tombstone can be seen in St Giles', Colchester; Capel's in St Cecilia's, Little Hadham; Compton's in Compton Wynates; and Maxey's in Bradwell-juxta-Coggeshall.

¹³⁷ The value of parochial history is appreciated by historians in many other areas of the discipline: see S. Mawby, 'The Caribbean in an international and regional context: revolution, neo-colonialism, and diaspora', *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire* (Oxford, 2018), p. 336; A. Biersack, 'Local knowledge, local history: Geertz and beyond', in *The New Cultural History*, ed. L. Hunt (1989), p. 74.

¹³⁸ Donagan, 'Atrocity', p. 1137.

¹³² E.g. M. Bennett, "'My plundered townes, my houses devastation": the Civil War and north Midlands life, 1642-1646', *Midland History*, vol. 22 (1997), pp. 35-50; Gentles, *English Revolution*, chapter 15; Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers*.

¹³³ J. Morrill, 'The English Revolution as a civil war', *Historical Research*, vol. 90, no. 250 (2017), 726-41, at pp. 738-9; B. Worden, *The English Civil Wars 1640-1660* (2009), p. 71.

¹³⁴ There is insufficient space here to do justice to the extensive fields of emotion, literature and anthropology, but their influence on early modern historiography is exemplified by works such as *Violence and Emotions in Early Modern Europe*, ed. S. Broomhall and S. Finn (2016); *Literature and the English Civil War*, ed. T. Healy and J. Sawday (Cambridge, 1990); and J. Walter, *Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution: the Colchester Plunderers* (Cambridge, 1999).

¹⁴² M. Levene, 'Introduction', in *The Massacre in History*, ed. Levene and Roberts, p. 5; Dwyer and Ryan, *Theatres of Violence*, p. xiv.

Such questions align neatly with a growing interest in massacre as a global phenomenon. The theoretical framework of massacre studies is still evolving; indeed, scholars working in the field have yet to agree on a definition of the term. The editors of two influential volumes have concluded that massacre is 'unquestionably a one-sided affair', normally conducted without physical danger to the perpetrators, and that 'those slaughtered are usually thus perceived of as victims; even as innocents.'¹⁴² The events at Shelford reveal that massacres are often far more complex than this. Few would dispute that the act of massacre represents an 'unequal relationship of power' at a given moment, but it does not follow that a massacre must necessarily be one-sided or the perpetrators immune from injury.¹³⁵ The assault on Shelford House began once its governor had refused to negotiate, triggering a struggle for the ramparts which inflicted considerable suffering on both sides. As the accounts make clear, the attackers were severely mauled in the initial stages of the assault, which almost certainly prompted acts of revenge once they had gained the ascendancy. However, despite the fact that Poyntz and his men had an even worse experience when attacking Belvoir Castle, they behaved very differently towards its garrison. If the earl of Chesterfield's accusations are to be believed, the slaughter at Shelford went far beyond that which was strictly necessary to achieve the set military objective, and instead became gratuitous, and even sadistic. Such depravity does not just happen on the spur of the moment; it must first be incubated.

Jacques Semelin has argued that whilst the circumstances of each massacre are unique, a massacre is invariably a rational response to a given situation.¹³⁶ In deconstructing the internal logic of the Shelford massacre, this article has sought to align the different levels of cultural conditioning and the social mentalities of the combatants with their reaction to unfolding events. Given the ubiquity and intensity of anti-Catholic feeling in England during the seventeenth century, Poyntz could hardly have wished for a better incentive to unite his mutinous and ill-assorted soldiery.¹⁴⁵ However, the Shelford massacre cannot be attributed solely to religious prejudice. Many Catholic defenders were spared after being captured at Basing, and Catholic-led garrisons such as Wiverton, Chillington Hall and Dudley Castle were able to negotiate peaceful capitulations. It is clear that the presence of the Queen's Regiment at Shelford made a critical difference, as it added a strong xenophobic element to the parliamentarians' instinctive anti-Catholicism.¹³⁷

Military training and the brutalising experience of combat went a long way towards transforming peaceable civilians into ruthless killers, at the same time as printed propaganda helped turn enemies into a villainous 'other' – although it is best to be cautious when conflating contemporaneous literature with the mentalities of civil-war soldiers.¹³⁸ David Nirenberg has drawn attention to the 'many ways in which individuals could invoke collective anxieties in order to attack minorities with whom

¹³⁵ Levene, 'Introduction', pp. 1, 4.

¹³⁶ J. Semelin, 'In consideration of massacre', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 3 (2001), 377-389, at p. 378.

¹⁴⁵ The seminal work on this topic is P. Lake, 'Anti-popery: the structure of a prejudice', in *Conflict in Early Stuart England*, ed. R. Cust and A. Hughes (1989), 72-106.

¹³⁷ For a discussion of emotional responses to 'hot ethnicities', see M. Ehala, 'Formation of territorial collective identities: turning history into emotion', *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, vol. 35, no. 1 (2014), 96-104, at pp. 98-9.

¹³⁸ S. J. Matt, 'Current emotion research in History: or, doing History from the inside out', *Emotion Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (January, 2011), 117-124, at p. 119; S. J. Matt, 'Introduction', in S. J. Matt and P. N. Stearns, *Doing Emotions History* (Urbana, IL, 2014), p. 5.

they found themselves in conflict.¹³⁹ Aside from an instinctive loathing for the Queen's regiment, many of Poyntz's soldiers had more immediate reasons for their animosity, believing (with some justification) that their home communities had been victimised by the violence and depredations of the troops lining Shelford's ramparts. Royalist atrocities at Trent Bridge and Leicester were local events, and still painfully fresh in the memory. This enabled the Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire contingents to rationalise the slaughter not simply as a tactical necessity, but also as 'a kind of execution of publique justice.'¹⁴⁰ There were therefore many reasons why Poyntz's men were predisposed to slaughter long before he ordered them to show Shelford's defenders no mercy.

Following Charles II's return, the Act of Oblivion and Indemnity (1660) effectively ordered his subjects to pretend that the wars had never happened. The foreigners and Catholics killed at Shelford, already anonymous, were soon rendered invisible. Their Protestant commander, despite his initial brush with fame, was seemingly too closely associated with them to avoid a similar descent into obscurity. Just as it had been politically inexpedient for parliamentarians to admit to mass-murder, so it became inconvenient for royalists to remember that Catholics had given their lives to defend the monarchy. Indeed, to borrow Nirenberg's phrase, the 'long-standing vocabularies of hatred' so evident in parliamentary literature were echoed in Cavalier-Anglican writing after the Restoration.¹⁵⁰ As a result, many royalist veterans refused to acknowledge Catholics as former comrades-in-arms, let alone as victims or innocents. Mark Stoye has rightly observed that 'the Restoration regime was acutely conscious of the potential power of the dead.'¹⁴¹ The patterns of erasure revealed by this present study indicate that even royalist corpses – particularly foreign Catholic ones – had the potential to divide the supposedly united pro-royalist collective. The self-induced national amnesia which ensued may have helped to facilitate the process of reconciliation within English communities, but it has ever after disguised the true depth and durability of the trauma engendered by Britain's bloody civil wars.

¹³⁹ D. Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ, 1996), p. 13.

¹⁴⁰ William Gouge, *The churches conquest over the sword* (1631), p. 214, quoted in Donagan, 'Atrocity', p. 1141. See also P. Olsthoorn, 'Situations and dispositions: how to rescue the military virtues from social psychology', *Journal of Military Ethics*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2017), pp. 88-9.

¹⁵⁰ Nirenberg, p. 9.

¹⁴¹ M. Stoye, 'Remembering the English Civil Wars', in *The Memory of Catastrophe*, ed. Gray and Oliver, p. 23.