Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict cont... more Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counter-example. Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in next-door Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable – despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover into Lebanon from the perspective of the country's Sunni Islamists. Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon's conflicting factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting to violenc...
Après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 février 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005),... more Après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 février 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de fédérer un public politique mobilisé contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothèse de l’échec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la durée les différents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne réussirent-ils pas à mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement opposé au régime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Répondant à cette question, la thèse utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus réunis dans l’action politique à travers la perception d'avoir des intérêts communs. La thèse commence en 1967 et s’arrête en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques après 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La première analyse la vague de mobilisation à Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxième partie étudie la déstructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafism...
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Middle East Studies Society (BRISMES), Londo... more Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Middle East Studies Society (BRISMES), London School of Economy (LSE), 26-28 March 2012. This paper analyses the crisis of Sunni leadership in Tripoli (Lebanon) and argues that it reflects a more global crisis of political and religious Sunnism in the entire Levant. Indeed, the city lies at the crossroads of two structural crises currently faced by various regions in the Middle East are: The first one is the weakening and fragmentation of political leadership in the Levant since the 1970s, the second is the problem of authority in Sunni Islam, aggravated by the communications revolution since the 1990s and 2000s. Internet made it easier for local religious leaders to circumvent the official, statist religious institutions and network directly with the transnational Umma. In addition, all the components of the social, cultural and urban crisis identified by different Arab Human Development Reports are also present in Tripoli. Tripo...
This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the ... more This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.
After the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) advent to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy u... more After the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) advent to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy underwent changes which were significant enough to raise question marks with its Western allies' regarding whether Turkey has ceased to be a part of the West and international society. Turkish foreign policy makers started to change the Cold War mentality, which urged Turkey to have a 'faith' in the West without questioning its norms, values, policies and conduct. This change of style and substance in Turkish foreign policy became most evident with the improving of relations with Syria and Iran who had uneasy or hostile relations with the West. However, with the outburst of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Turkey was caught off guard and the mass demonstrations on the Arab streets forced Ankara to reshape its foreign policy calculations in the Arab world. Put differently, the Arab spring became a litmus test for Ankara's policies of playing to the Arab streets as well as its relations with Syria and Iran. While it lent quick support for popular movements in Tunisia and Egypt, where Turkish investments were relatively limited, Ankara's first reaction to the uprising in Syria, where Turkish economic and political investments were both substantial, was more cautious and it prioritised stability and gradual reform. However, Ankara gradually reversed its policy and ended up calling for Asad's overthrow; moreover, as against its early distancing of Turkey from the West, Ankara now sought to enlist the West in dealing with the Syrian regime. Apprehensions of Turkey's ambitions vis-ᾲ-vis Syria's civil war increased significantly because of its policy of activism which lent support to Muslim Brotherhood which dominated the Syrian National Council, the opposition coalition against the Asad regime. Turkey was seen or portrayed as a country following pro Sunni policies especially by the West.
Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – ... more Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – despite the influx of some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and an internal political crisis involving supporters of opposing Syrian factions. Lebanon’s resilience can be explained by the high opportunity cost of state breakdown for domestic, regional and international political actors. Moreover, international economic assistance, diaspora remittances and informal networks established by refugees help to prevent outright economic breakdown. However, stability remains extremely precarious. Primary tipping points include (1) an IS strategy to spread the conflict to Lebanon, with consequent disintegration of the army along sectarian lines, (2) democratic decline and people’s dissatisfaction, (3) Hizbullah’s domestic ambitions and Israeli fears over the group’s growing military powers and (4) the potential that frustration between refugees and host communities may erupt into recurrent violence. T...
Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab governme... more Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab governments have granted a role to religious institutions in this regard in recent years. Yet, the cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences. In Lebanon, the role of Sunni religious institution Dar al-Fatwa is limited. Due to the weakness of state capacity and to the external interference in the country, Dar al-Fatwa is hardly able to coordinate Sunni religious activities there. The corresponding institutions in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia, however, are powerful, and also perform foreign policy roles through religious diplomacy.
Apres l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 fevrier 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005),... more Apres l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 fevrier 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de federer un public politique mobilise contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothese de l’echec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la duree les differents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne reussirent-ils pas a mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement oppose au regime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Repondant a cette question, la these utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus reunis dans l’action politique a travers la perception d'avoir des interets communs. La these commence en 1967 et s’arrete en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques apres 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La premiere analyse la vague de mobilisation a Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxieme partie etudie la destructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafism...
After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, ... more After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, the military defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test case for both Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the region, such as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in Nineveh and Iraq, a new radical group may emerge, with far-reaching consequences.
Gade and Boas examine the question: Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the st... more Gade and Boas examine the question: Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the state and opt for violence, while other groups that may be equally frustrated with the state remain engaged with the existing polity? This question is addressed by analyzing case studies from Lebanon and Mali. Focus is put on the political behaviour of Islamist groups and individuals, and in particular on the factors that determine the acceptance, or not, of engaging in peaceful reconciliation. Revisiting the lessons learned from the divided societies of Lebanon and Mali, the authors assess the conditions under which reconciliation efforts and power-sharing agreements in Syria may become sustainable.
This report looks at the militant salafi-jihadi group Fatah al-Islam (FAI), which was founded in ... more This report looks at the militant salafi-jihadi group Fatah al-Islam (FAI), which was founded in Northern Lebanon in November 2006. It asks four questions: What is the origin of Fatah al-Islam and salafi-jihadi militancy in Lebanon? Why did Fatah al-Islam decide to engage in a full-scale military confrontation with the Lebanese army? How can Fatah al-Islam be distinguished from previous examples of jihadi groups in that country? And, what factors helped its rapid growth? Since the beginning of the 1990s, Islamic militancy amongst Palestinians in Lebanon has evolved significantly. Its traditional nationalist focus on the struggle against Israel to liberate the occupied territories and fulfill the refugees' right to return has gradually been replaced by a struggle over the definition of identity. The Palestinian refugees began identifying with Muslims suffering in other regions of the world, and to a greater extent than before, they began adopting salafi-jihadi discourses, which called for the liberation of the entire Islamic nation (umma), not only Palestine, from occupation, secular rule, and Western influences. The fighting in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army seems to have broken out as a result of a chain of events, rather than being part of a meticulously prepared strategy. It also seems that the FAI leadership had expected far more support from local militant salafis than they actually received. The FAI represents an important historical departure from previous salafi-jihadi groups in Lebanon, in the sense that the FAI demonstrated far more resilience and perseverance in its fight against the Lebanese authorities than witnessed in previous uprisings by such groups. They owe much of their strength to the fact that they have succeeded in mobilizing support from a wide range of global and regional actors. Ideologically, the group adheres to bin Laden and al-Qaida's strain of militant Islam. Yet the group also exploits the rhetoric of Palestinian nationalism in order to maximize the support of the local population. The rise of Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon can also be attributed to the instability of the Lebanese political order, and the efforts by regional actors, Syria in particular, to influence the situation in Lebanon.
A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called “sensitive” zon... more A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called “sensitive” zones where the Syrian war threatens to spread into Lebanon. While the Syrian army withdrew from North Lebanon in April 2005, Tripoli’s destiny remained intrinsically linked to Syria. This was because of the numerous historical, political, family, and economic ties linking the social space of north Lebanon to its Syrian hinterland. The demographic composition of the city resembles Syria. Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9%) and includes, in addition to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (8,9 %, or 28,525 persons) 1 . This paper analyses the consequences of the Syrian intervention and presence in Lebanon on political leadership in Tripoli. It shows how the Syrian presence created alliances, conflicts and divisions still present in Tripoli today. The main argument is that the Syrian presence in Tripoli destructured Sunni leadership in N...
Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict cont... more Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counter-example. Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in next-door Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable – despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover into Lebanon from the perspective of the country's Sunni Islamists. Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon's conflicting factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting to violenc...
Après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 février 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005),... more Après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 février 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de fédérer un public politique mobilisé contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothèse de l’échec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la durée les différents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne réussirent-ils pas à mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement opposé au régime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Répondant à cette question, la thèse utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus réunis dans l’action politique à travers la perception d'avoir des intérêts communs. La thèse commence en 1967 et s’arrête en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques après 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La première analyse la vague de mobilisation à Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxième partie étudie la déstructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafism...
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Middle East Studies Society (BRISMES), Londo... more Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Middle East Studies Society (BRISMES), London School of Economy (LSE), 26-28 March 2012. This paper analyses the crisis of Sunni leadership in Tripoli (Lebanon) and argues that it reflects a more global crisis of political and religious Sunnism in the entire Levant. Indeed, the city lies at the crossroads of two structural crises currently faced by various regions in the Middle East are: The first one is the weakening and fragmentation of political leadership in the Levant since the 1970s, the second is the problem of authority in Sunni Islam, aggravated by the communications revolution since the 1990s and 2000s. Internet made it easier for local religious leaders to circumvent the official, statist religious institutions and network directly with the transnational Umma. In addition, all the components of the social, cultural and urban crisis identified by different Arab Human Development Reports are also present in Tripoli. Tripo...
This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the ... more This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.
After the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) advent to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy u... more After the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) advent to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy underwent changes which were significant enough to raise question marks with its Western allies' regarding whether Turkey has ceased to be a part of the West and international society. Turkish foreign policy makers started to change the Cold War mentality, which urged Turkey to have a 'faith' in the West without questioning its norms, values, policies and conduct. This change of style and substance in Turkish foreign policy became most evident with the improving of relations with Syria and Iran who had uneasy or hostile relations with the West. However, with the outburst of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Turkey was caught off guard and the mass demonstrations on the Arab streets forced Ankara to reshape its foreign policy calculations in the Arab world. Put differently, the Arab spring became a litmus test for Ankara's policies of playing to the Arab streets as well as its relations with Syria and Iran. While it lent quick support for popular movements in Tunisia and Egypt, where Turkish investments were relatively limited, Ankara's first reaction to the uprising in Syria, where Turkish economic and political investments were both substantial, was more cautious and it prioritised stability and gradual reform. However, Ankara gradually reversed its policy and ended up calling for Asad's overthrow; moreover, as against its early distancing of Turkey from the West, Ankara now sought to enlist the West in dealing with the Syrian regime. Apprehensions of Turkey's ambitions vis-ᾲ-vis Syria's civil war increased significantly because of its policy of activism which lent support to Muslim Brotherhood which dominated the Syrian National Council, the opposition coalition against the Asad regime. Turkey was seen or portrayed as a country following pro Sunni policies especially by the West.
Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – ... more Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – despite the influx of some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and an internal political crisis involving supporters of opposing Syrian factions. Lebanon’s resilience can be explained by the high opportunity cost of state breakdown for domestic, regional and international political actors. Moreover, international economic assistance, diaspora remittances and informal networks established by refugees help to prevent outright economic breakdown. However, stability remains extremely precarious. Primary tipping points include (1) an IS strategy to spread the conflict to Lebanon, with consequent disintegration of the army along sectarian lines, (2) democratic decline and people’s dissatisfaction, (3) Hizbullah’s domestic ambitions and Israeli fears over the group’s growing military powers and (4) the potential that frustration between refugees and host communities may erupt into recurrent violence. T...
Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab governme... more Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab governments have granted a role to religious institutions in this regard in recent years. Yet, the cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences. In Lebanon, the role of Sunni religious institution Dar al-Fatwa is limited. Due to the weakness of state capacity and to the external interference in the country, Dar al-Fatwa is hardly able to coordinate Sunni religious activities there. The corresponding institutions in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia, however, are powerful, and also perform foreign policy roles through religious diplomacy.
Apres l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 fevrier 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005),... more Apres l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 fevrier 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de federer un public politique mobilise contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothese de l’echec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la duree les differents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne reussirent-ils pas a mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement oppose au regime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Repondant a cette question, la these utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus reunis dans l’action politique a travers la perception d'avoir des interets communs. La these commence en 1967 et s’arrete en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques apres 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La premiere analyse la vague de mobilisation a Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxieme partie etudie la destructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafism...
After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, ... more After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, the military defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test case for both Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the region, such as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in Nineveh and Iraq, a new radical group may emerge, with far-reaching consequences.
Gade and Boas examine the question: Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the st... more Gade and Boas examine the question: Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the state and opt for violence, while other groups that may be equally frustrated with the state remain engaged with the existing polity? This question is addressed by analyzing case studies from Lebanon and Mali. Focus is put on the political behaviour of Islamist groups and individuals, and in particular on the factors that determine the acceptance, or not, of engaging in peaceful reconciliation. Revisiting the lessons learned from the divided societies of Lebanon and Mali, the authors assess the conditions under which reconciliation efforts and power-sharing agreements in Syria may become sustainable.
This report looks at the militant salafi-jihadi group Fatah al-Islam (FAI), which was founded in ... more This report looks at the militant salafi-jihadi group Fatah al-Islam (FAI), which was founded in Northern Lebanon in November 2006. It asks four questions: What is the origin of Fatah al-Islam and salafi-jihadi militancy in Lebanon? Why did Fatah al-Islam decide to engage in a full-scale military confrontation with the Lebanese army? How can Fatah al-Islam be distinguished from previous examples of jihadi groups in that country? And, what factors helped its rapid growth? Since the beginning of the 1990s, Islamic militancy amongst Palestinians in Lebanon has evolved significantly. Its traditional nationalist focus on the struggle against Israel to liberate the occupied territories and fulfill the refugees' right to return has gradually been replaced by a struggle over the definition of identity. The Palestinian refugees began identifying with Muslims suffering in other regions of the world, and to a greater extent than before, they began adopting salafi-jihadi discourses, which called for the liberation of the entire Islamic nation (umma), not only Palestine, from occupation, secular rule, and Western influences. The fighting in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army seems to have broken out as a result of a chain of events, rather than being part of a meticulously prepared strategy. It also seems that the FAI leadership had expected far more support from local militant salafis than they actually received. The FAI represents an important historical departure from previous salafi-jihadi groups in Lebanon, in the sense that the FAI demonstrated far more resilience and perseverance in its fight against the Lebanese authorities than witnessed in previous uprisings by such groups. They owe much of their strength to the fact that they have succeeded in mobilizing support from a wide range of global and regional actors. Ideologically, the group adheres to bin Laden and al-Qaida's strain of militant Islam. Yet the group also exploits the rhetoric of Palestinian nationalism in order to maximize the support of the local population. The rise of Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon can also be attributed to the instability of the Lebanese political order, and the efforts by regional actors, Syria in particular, to influence the situation in Lebanon.
A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called “sensitive” zon... more A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called “sensitive” zones where the Syrian war threatens to spread into Lebanon. While the Syrian army withdrew from North Lebanon in April 2005, Tripoli’s destiny remained intrinsically linked to Syria. This was because of the numerous historical, political, family, and economic ties linking the social space of north Lebanon to its Syrian hinterland. The demographic composition of the city resembles Syria. Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9%) and includes, in addition to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (8,9 %, or 28,525 persons) 1 . This paper analyses the consequences of the Syrian intervention and presence in Lebanon on political leadership in Tripoli. It shows how the Syrian presence created alliances, conflicts and divisions still present in Tripoli today. The main argument is that the Syrian presence in Tripoli destructured Sunni leadership in N...
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