This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatali... more This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatalism, one must accept that fatalism is true. This argument has a similar structure to the 'knowability paradox', which proves that if every truth can be known by someone, then every truth is known by someone. In this paper, what I mean by 'fatalism' is that whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Existing arguments for fatalism assume that the principle of bivalence holds even for future propositions, that past truths are necessarily true, and/or that possible propositions never change into impossible propositions. However, my argument does not assume such premises. It assumes only the logical possibility of fatalism. Here, what I mean by 'fatalism is logically possible' is that there is at least one possible world where whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Since this assumption is weak (thus is plausible), I believe it to be much stronger than the existing
Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discu... more Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discussed whether time could have begun from an infinite past. This paper clarifies the relationship between the reality of time’s passage and an infinite past. I assert that time cannot have an infinite past if time really passes. This argument is based on a proposition that an infinite series of events cannot be completed if time really passes. A seemingly strong objection to this proposition is that no movement is possible if an infinite series cannot be completed. However, movement is clearly possible; thus, an infinite series can be completed. I argue that although it is sure that an infinite series can be completed in the static view, an infinite series cannot be completed (and thus, time could not have begun from an infinite past) in the dynamic view.
Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discu... more Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discussed whether time could have begun from an infinite past. This paper clarifies the relationship between the reality of time's passage and an infinite past. I assert that time cannot have an infinite past if time really passes. This argument is based on a proposition that an infinite series of events cannot be completed if time really passes. A seemingly strong objection to this proposition is that no movement is possible if an infinite series cannot be completed. However, movement is clearly possible; thus, an infinite series can be completed. I argue that although it is sure that an infinite series can be completed in the static view, an infinite series cannot be completed (and thus, time could not have begun from an infinite past) in the dynamic view.
This study posits that Bohr failed to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical descripti... more This study posits that Bohr failed to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality against Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen's (EPR) paper. Although there are many papers in the literature that focus on Bohr's argument in his reply to the EPR paper, the purpose of the current paper is not to clarify Bohr's argument. Instead, I contend that regardless of which interpretation of Bohr's argument is correct, his defense of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality remained incomplete. For example, a recent trend in studies of Bohr's work is to suggest he considered the wave-function description to be epistemic. However, such an interpretation cannot be used to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical description.
It is investigated, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange approximation, how the shape of the ... more It is investigated, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange approximation, how the shape of the Fermi surface is modified in two-dimensional t − t ′ − U Hubbard model at half filling as strength of the onsite Coulomb interaction U is increased. The antiferromagnetic (AF) correlation length is shown to be enhanced as the Coulomb interaction get closer to the critical value Uc for the onset AF order. At the same time, the shape of the renormalized Fermi surface is deformed showing the tendency of nesting near Uc.
In the famous EPR paper published in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen suggested a thought expe... more In the famous EPR paper published in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen suggested a thought experiment, which later became known as the "EPR experiment". Using the EPR experiment, they posited that quantum mechanics was incomplete. Einstein, however, was dissatisfied with the EPR paper and published a second work on the EPR experiment, in which he discussed the dilemma of choosing whether quantum mechanics was incomplete or nonlocal. Currently, most physicists choose the nonlocality of quantum mechanics over Einstein's choice of the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. However, with an appropriate alternate hypothesis, both of these choices can be rejected. Herein, I demonstrate an approach to overcome the Einstein Dilemma by proposing a new interpretation invoked by a new formalism of quantum mechanics known as two-state vector formalism.
It is discussed on the fluctuation-exchange (FLEX) approximation that the charge susceptibility χ... more It is discussed on the fluctuation-exchange (FLEX) approximation that the charge susceptibility χ c increases divergently in the 2D t – t ' Hubbard model near the half-filling as the strength of th...
We investigate, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange (FLEX) approximation, a hole-number depe... more We investigate, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange (FLEX) approximation, a hole-number dependence of the compressibility in the two-dimensional t-t 0-U Hubbard model. We choose a value of U near the critical Coulomb interaction of the antiferromagnetic transition, where the shape of the renormalized Fermi surface is deformed showing the tendency of nesting. It is found that, near half-filling, the charge susceptibility w c ¼ qn=qm is larger about three times than the value given by the renormalized RPA, w c ¼ P 0 =ð1 þ UP 0 Þ; where P 0 is the polarization function calculated by FLEX approximation.
In this paper, I show that an interpretation of quantum mechanics using two-state vector formalis... more In this paper, I show that an interpretation of quantum mechanics using two-state vector formalism proposed by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, can solve one of the measurement problems formulated by Maudlin. According to this interpretation, we can simultaneously insist that the wave function of a system is complete, that the wave function is determined by the Schrodinger equation, and that the measurement of a physical quantity always has determinate outcomes, although Maudlin in his formulation of the measurement problem states that these three claims are mutually inconsistent. Further, I show that my interpretation does not contradict the uncertainty relation and the no-go theorem.
Since the two-dimensional (2D) Hubbard model is one of the simplest model having features of laye... more Since the two-dimensional (2D) Hubbard model is one of the simplest model having features of layered cuprates which is widely known as high-Tc superconductor, many researchers pay their attention to this model. One of the purposes of this thesis is to discuss, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange (FLEX) approximation which satisfies the conservation law and takes account of the spin fluctuations, how the shape of the Fermi surface (FS) is modified and how the charge susceptibility behaves in the 2D t−t′−U Hubbard model near half filling as strength of the onsite Coulomb interaction U is increased. The antiferromagnetic (AF) correlation length is shown to be enhanced as the Coulomb interaction get closer to the critical value Uc for the critical point to onset AF order. At the same time, the shape of the renormalized FS is deformed showing the tendency of nesting and the charge susceptibility shows a pronounced enhancement near Uc. This result is consistent with experimental obse...
In this study, I argue that the future is not open if quantum mechanics is complete. An open futu... more In this study, I argue that the future is not open if quantum mechanics is complete. An open future means that the value observed when measuring a physical quantity in the future is not determined. At first glance, quantum mechanics seems to support the open future thesis, because it cannot always predict measurement value with certainty. However, many interpretations regard quantum mechanics as deterministic. These interpretations only suggest that the quantum mechanical world can be deterministic. I argue that, although quantum mechanics cannot predict the future with certainty, the quantum mechanical world must be deterministic, and the value observed by the observer is determined. I examine the following two cases: (1) the wave-function completely describes the physical state and (2) the wave-function does not describe the physical state. Then, I argue that the future cannot be open in either case when quantum mechanics is complete.
It is well known that one of the reasons Einstein criticized quantum mechanics is that it abandon... more It is well known that one of the reasons Einstein criticized quantum mechanics is that it abandons strict causality. However, it is also common knowledge that Einstein was strongly influenced by Hume, who rejected the necessity of a causal connection. Thus Einsteins stance seems internally incongruent. This apparent incoherence is resolved if (1) Einstein changed his mind after constructing the relativity theory or (2) Einstein agreed with Hume concerning space and time, but disagreed concerning causality. In this paper, I argue that both (1) and (2) are false. Nevertheless, I argue that Einsteins attitude is not inconsistent by showing that Hume did not reject the use of causality in science (rather, he considered it essential for science), and that, while Einstein admitted the limits of causality as a concept, he nevertheless believed that physics could not function without it.
This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatali... more This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatalism, one must accept that fatalism is true. This argument has a similar structure to the 'knowability paradox', which proves that if every truth can be known by someone, then every truth is known by someone. In this paper, what I mean by 'fatalism' is that whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Existing arguments for fatalism assume that the principle of bivalence holds even for future propositions, that past truths are necessarily true, and/or that possible propositions never change into impossible propositions. However, my argument does not assume such premises. It assumes only the logical possibility of fatalism. Here, what I mean by 'fatalism is logically possible' is that there is at least one possible world where whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Since this assumption is weak (thus is plausible), I believe it to be much stronger than the existing
Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discu... more Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discussed whether time could have begun from an infinite past. This paper clarifies the relationship between the reality of time’s passage and an infinite past. I assert that time cannot have an infinite past if time really passes. This argument is based on a proposition that an infinite series of events cannot be completed if time really passes. A seemingly strong objection to this proposition is that no movement is possible if an infinite series cannot be completed. However, movement is clearly possible; thus, an infinite series can be completed. I argue that although it is sure that an infinite series can be completed in the static view, an infinite series cannot be completed (and thus, time could not have begun from an infinite past) in the dynamic view.
Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discu... more Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discussed whether time could have begun from an infinite past. This paper clarifies the relationship between the reality of time's passage and an infinite past. I assert that time cannot have an infinite past if time really passes. This argument is based on a proposition that an infinite series of events cannot be completed if time really passes. A seemingly strong objection to this proposition is that no movement is possible if an infinite series cannot be completed. However, movement is clearly possible; thus, an infinite series can be completed. I argue that although it is sure that an infinite series can be completed in the static view, an infinite series cannot be completed (and thus, time could not have begun from an infinite past) in the dynamic view.
This study posits that Bohr failed to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical descripti... more This study posits that Bohr failed to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality against Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen's (EPR) paper. Although there are many papers in the literature that focus on Bohr's argument in his reply to the EPR paper, the purpose of the current paper is not to clarify Bohr's argument. Instead, I contend that regardless of which interpretation of Bohr's argument is correct, his defense of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality remained incomplete. For example, a recent trend in studies of Bohr's work is to suggest he considered the wave-function description to be epistemic. However, such an interpretation cannot be used to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical description.
It is investigated, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange approximation, how the shape of the ... more It is investigated, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange approximation, how the shape of the Fermi surface is modified in two-dimensional t − t ′ − U Hubbard model at half filling as strength of the onsite Coulomb interaction U is increased. The antiferromagnetic (AF) correlation length is shown to be enhanced as the Coulomb interaction get closer to the critical value Uc for the onset AF order. At the same time, the shape of the renormalized Fermi surface is deformed showing the tendency of nesting near Uc.
In the famous EPR paper published in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen suggested a thought expe... more In the famous EPR paper published in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen suggested a thought experiment, which later became known as the "EPR experiment". Using the EPR experiment, they posited that quantum mechanics was incomplete. Einstein, however, was dissatisfied with the EPR paper and published a second work on the EPR experiment, in which he discussed the dilemma of choosing whether quantum mechanics was incomplete or nonlocal. Currently, most physicists choose the nonlocality of quantum mechanics over Einstein's choice of the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. However, with an appropriate alternate hypothesis, both of these choices can be rejected. Herein, I demonstrate an approach to overcome the Einstein Dilemma by proposing a new interpretation invoked by a new formalism of quantum mechanics known as two-state vector formalism.
It is discussed on the fluctuation-exchange (FLEX) approximation that the charge susceptibility χ... more It is discussed on the fluctuation-exchange (FLEX) approximation that the charge susceptibility χ c increases divergently in the 2D t – t ' Hubbard model near the half-filling as the strength of th...
We investigate, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange (FLEX) approximation, a hole-number depe... more We investigate, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange (FLEX) approximation, a hole-number dependence of the compressibility in the two-dimensional t-t 0-U Hubbard model. We choose a value of U near the critical Coulomb interaction of the antiferromagnetic transition, where the shape of the renormalized Fermi surface is deformed showing the tendency of nesting. It is found that, near half-filling, the charge susceptibility w c ¼ qn=qm is larger about three times than the value given by the renormalized RPA, w c ¼ P 0 =ð1 þ UP 0 Þ; where P 0 is the polarization function calculated by FLEX approximation.
In this paper, I show that an interpretation of quantum mechanics using two-state vector formalis... more In this paper, I show that an interpretation of quantum mechanics using two-state vector formalism proposed by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, can solve one of the measurement problems formulated by Maudlin. According to this interpretation, we can simultaneously insist that the wave function of a system is complete, that the wave function is determined by the Schrodinger equation, and that the measurement of a physical quantity always has determinate outcomes, although Maudlin in his formulation of the measurement problem states that these three claims are mutually inconsistent. Further, I show that my interpretation does not contradict the uncertainty relation and the no-go theorem.
Since the two-dimensional (2D) Hubbard model is one of the simplest model having features of laye... more Since the two-dimensional (2D) Hubbard model is one of the simplest model having features of layered cuprates which is widely known as high-Tc superconductor, many researchers pay their attention to this model. One of the purposes of this thesis is to discuss, on the basis of the fluctuation exchange (FLEX) approximation which satisfies the conservation law and takes account of the spin fluctuations, how the shape of the Fermi surface (FS) is modified and how the charge susceptibility behaves in the 2D t−t′−U Hubbard model near half filling as strength of the onsite Coulomb interaction U is increased. The antiferromagnetic (AF) correlation length is shown to be enhanced as the Coulomb interaction get closer to the critical value Uc for the critical point to onset AF order. At the same time, the shape of the renormalized FS is deformed showing the tendency of nesting and the charge susceptibility shows a pronounced enhancement near Uc. This result is consistent with experimental obse...
In this study, I argue that the future is not open if quantum mechanics is complete. An open futu... more In this study, I argue that the future is not open if quantum mechanics is complete. An open future means that the value observed when measuring a physical quantity in the future is not determined. At first glance, quantum mechanics seems to support the open future thesis, because it cannot always predict measurement value with certainty. However, many interpretations regard quantum mechanics as deterministic. These interpretations only suggest that the quantum mechanical world can be deterministic. I argue that, although quantum mechanics cannot predict the future with certainty, the quantum mechanical world must be deterministic, and the value observed by the observer is determined. I examine the following two cases: (1) the wave-function completely describes the physical state and (2) the wave-function does not describe the physical state. Then, I argue that the future cannot be open in either case when quantum mechanics is complete.
It is well known that one of the reasons Einstein criticized quantum mechanics is that it abandon... more It is well known that one of the reasons Einstein criticized quantum mechanics is that it abandons strict causality. However, it is also common knowledge that Einstein was strongly influenced by Hume, who rejected the necessity of a causal connection. Thus Einsteins stance seems internally incongruent. This apparent incoherence is resolved if (1) Einstein changed his mind after constructing the relativity theory or (2) Einstein agreed with Hume concerning space and time, but disagreed concerning causality. In this paper, I argue that both (1) and (2) are false. Nevertheless, I argue that Einsteins attitude is not inconsistent by showing that Hume did not reject the use of causality in science (rather, he considered it essential for science), and that, while Einstein admitted the limits of causality as a concept, he nevertheless believed that physics could not function without it.
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Papers by 邦久 森田