JOGOS DE GUERRA PROFISSIONAIS BEM-SUCEDIDOS

MANUAL DO PRATICANTE
 Existem mais de setenta livros atualmente editados ou escritos por John Curry como parte do Projeto
História dos Jogos de Guerra. Aqueles sobre jogos de guerra profissionais usados pelo militar incluem:
Manual de Jogos Matriciais: Aplicações Profissionais desde Educação até Jogos de Guerra
Jogos Matriciais para Jogos de Guerra Modernos: Desenvolvimentos em Jogos de Guerra
Profissionais e Educacionais: Inovações em Jogos de Guerra Volume 2
O Kriegsspiel de Sandhurst: Jogos de Guerra para o Oficial de Infantaria Moderno: Treinamento para
a Guerra: Volume 1
A Arte dos Jogos de Guerra de Peter Perla, Um Guia para Profissionais e Hobbistas
Jogos de Treinamento Dark Guest para Guerra Cibernética Volume 1 Jogos de Guerra de Ataques
Baseados na Internet
Jogos de Guerra de Thomas Allen: Jogos de Guerra Profissionais 1945-1985
Inovações em Jogos de Guerra Vol 1, Desenvolvimentos em Jogos de Guerra Hobby e Profissionais
Jogos de Guerra do Exército: Exercícios da Escola de Estado-Maior 1870-1980
Contact! O Jogo de Guerra Tático Restrito do Exército Canadense (1980)
Dunn Kempf: o Jogo de Guerra Tático do Exército Americano (1977-1997)
Tacspiel, o Jogo de Guerra do Exército Americano da Guerra do Vietnã (1966)
O Jogo de Guerra do Exército Britânico (1956)
O Jogo de Guerra do Deserto do Exército Britânico (1978) Regras de Jogos de Guerra MOD
A Bomba e o Computador de Andrew Wilson: A História dos Jogos de Guerra Profissionais 1780-1968
Veja o Projeto História dos Jogos de Guerra em www.wargaming.co para outras publicações.
SUCCESSFUL PROFESSIONAL WARGAMES
A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK

Graham Longley Brown

Editor: John Curry

The History of Wargaming Project

2019
The rights of Graham Longley Brown and John Curry to be identified as Authors of this Work has been
asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of
authors.
First Printing
The History of Wargaming Project
www.wargaming.co
Índice
Agradecimentos
Prefácios
Peter Perla
Colin Marston
Biografias dos Colaboradores
Prefácio
Introdução
Parte 1: Fundamentos dos Jogos de Guerra
Capítulo 1. Por Que Jogar Wargame? E Quando Não Jogar
Aqueles que levam a guerra a sério, jogam wargame
Razões históricas para jogar wargame
Razões atuais para jogar wargame
Os benefícios de bons wargames
As limitações dos wargames
Quando não jogar wargame
Questões recorrentes
Capítulo 2. O Que é um Wargame?
Por que definir wargaming?
Rumo a um entendimento comum sobre wargaming
‘Wargame’ definido
Aplicações de wargaming
Wargames como forma de arte
Wargames como um ato de comunicação
Capítulo 3. Equívocos e Mal-entendidos sobre Wargaming
‘Simulação’ não é sinônimo de ‘wargame’
Wargames de treinamento ‘ou’ analíticos
‘Wargaming de Curso de Ação’ e ‘wargaming’
Verificação e Validação
Equipe Vermelha versus Time Vermelho
Cenários
Cores das células, especialmente Branco
Capítulo 4. Adjudicação
Escalabilidade
Confundindo ‘kriegsspiel’ com ‘adjudicação’; outro equívoco
Manter-se à frente no ciclo OODA de adjudicação
 Métodos amplos de adjudicação
Métodos de apoio, modelos e ferramentas
Aplicabilidade no mundo real
Níveis de descoberta
Capítulo 5. Formatos de Wargame, Contextos e Variantes
‘Tipo’ ou ‘formato’?
Formatos de wargame
Contextos de wargame
Variantes de wargame
Parte 2: Estabelecendo as Condições para Wargames de Sucesso
Capítulo 6. Características Essenciais de Wargames de Sucesso
Adversarial
Oposicional
Acaso
Incerteza
A primazia das decisões dos jogadores
Liberdade para falhar
Pequeno, barato e frequente
Engajador – até mesmo divertido!
Fatores ‘soft’, não-cinéticos e fatores humanos
Controle
Adjudicação apropriada
Transparência
Análise
Wargaming dentro de um contexto mais amplo
Tecnologia apropriada
Simplicidade
Capítulo 7. A Equipe de Wargame
A Equipe Central de Wargame
Funções e pessoal de apoio
Jogadores
Lidando com o patrocinador
Capítulo 8. Análise
Wargaming como parte de um processo mais amplo
Jogos indutivos, dedutivos e abdutivos
Plano de Coleta e Análise de Dados/Plano de Gestão e Coleta de Dados
Observações, percepções e lições identificadas
 Departamento de Wargaming do Colégio Naval dos EUA – Fazendo Análise
Análise e Tarefas de Wargame
Análise e Design de Wargame
Desenvolvimento de Wargame
Testes de Wargame
Ensaio de Wargame
Execução de Wargame
Relatório de Wargame
Capítulo 9. Tecnologia Apropriada
Combatendo viéses
Terminologia
Os riscos da informatização
Capacitando wargaming através da automação: prós e contras do meio computacional
Capítulo 10. Incorporando Efeitos Não-cinéticos e Jogo Semi-cooperativo no Design de
Wargame
Considerando o não-cinético
Jogando o semi-cooperativo
Parte 3: O Ciclo de Vida do Wargame
Capítulo 11. O Ciclo de Vida do Wargame: Uma Introdução
Definição do Ciclo de Vida do Wargame
Iniciação do Wargame
Aspectos do Ciclo de Vida do Wargame discutidos em outras partes deste livro
Capítulo 12. Design de Wargame
A Reunião de Design de Wargame
Restrições de design
A equipe de design de wargame
Abordagem do Analista, Artista ou Arquiteto de Peter Perla para design de wargame
Saída da fase de design
Capítulo 13. Desenvolvimento de Wargame
Aspectos do wargame a serem desenvolvidos
Reuniões de desenvolvimento e conferências de planejamento
Testes de jogo e o Exercício de Teste
Resultados da fase de desenvolvimento
Capítulo 14. Execução de Wargame
Configuração
Breves iniciais
Ensaios, mini-jogos e ‘Turno 0’
 Os essenciais para uma execução eficaz
Coleta de lições identificadas em wargaming
Capítulo 15. Validação de Wargame
Validação Externa e Interna
Obtenção de feedback e lições identificadas
Formação de atividades subsequentes e mais amplas
Saídas da fase de validação
Capítulo 16. Aperfeiçoamento de Wargame
Governança de wargaming
Introdução ao aperfeiçoamento de wargame
O propósito das melhores práticas
Fontes de melhores práticas
Wargaming é vulnerável a fraudes intelectuais inadvertidas
Práticas recomendadas
Capítulo 17. As 10 Principais Coisas que Fazem um Bom Designer de Wargame
Designers não respeitam autoridade
Designers se preocupam com mapas
Designers sabem muita coisa
Ordens de batalha são irritantes
Designers são curiosos
Designers roubam regras de todos os lugares que conseguem encontrar
Designers são confiantes
Amadores falam sobre design; profissionais falam sobre onde comprar materiais baratos
Designers respeitam seus jogadores
Designers sabem como e por que construir um cenário
Parte 4: Praticando Wargames de Sucesso
Capítulo 18. Jogos de Alto Engajamento
O que é um jogo?
Trabalho e diversão
Conceitos-chave
Felicidade
Um contexto para ação
Vivendo histórias
Suspensão da descrença e o ‘círculo mágico’
Feedback
Capítulo 19. Escrita de Cenários
A importância do cenário
 ‘Comece com o final em mente’
Imerso, não afogado
O que é um cenário e configuração?
Você usa uma configuração e/ou cenário existente ou escreve novos produtos?
Configurações existentes
Escrevendo uma configuração e cenário
Paralelos do mundo real
Capítulo 20. Desenvolvimento de Cenários
Confirmando que um cenário é adequado para o propósito
Oficinas de scripting MEL/MIL usando wargaming
Capítulo 21. Execução de Cenários
Sua tarefa é a de um contador de histórias ou modelador de histórias, mas usando um toque leve
Considerações dramáticas
Técnicas para gerenciar a execução de cenários
Gerenciamento de injetores
Capítulo 22. Controlando Wargames
Uma estrutura genérica de wargame
Funções e papéis principais
Células
Fluxos de informação
Interfaces dos jogadores
Processos de controle
Turnos
Gestão de Consequências
Planejamento e execução de saltos temporais
Capítulo 23. Facilitação
O que é facilitação?
Planejamento
Preparação final
Gerenciando o processo
Gerenciando o debate
Oferecer uma experiência de viver uma história
Outras considerações
Apêndice 1 – Auxílio-memória do facilitador de wargame
Capítulo 24. Gerando Resultados
Duas pessoas são melhores do que uma
Métodos de adjudicação manual, modelos e ferramentas
 A linha de modelagem agregada
Proporções de Força
P [inserir efeito]
Métodos determinísticos e estocásticos
Geradores de números aleatórios e como introduzir e usar dados
Análise Operacional
O método ‘4-caixas’
Decidindo a ordem em que os resultados são determinados durante wargames baseados em turnos
Testes de Comandantes Históricos e Operacionais
Capítulo 25. Apresentando e Afirmado Resultados
Apresentando resultados
Afirmar resultados
Capítulo 26. Wargaming de Curso de Ação
Introdução ao Wargaming de Curso de Ação
Wargaming de Curso de Ação e suas características
Por que fazer Wargaming de Curso de Ação?
Quem participa de um Wargaming de Curso de Ação?
Quando fazer Wargaming de Curso de Ação
Como fazer Wargaming de Curso de Ação
Resultados do Wargaming de Curso de Ação
O que fazer e o que não fazer em Wargaming de Curso de Ação
Apêndice 1. Preparação e configuração de Wargaming de Curso de Ação
Capítulo 27. Conexões: A Conferência para Profissionais de Wargaming
Capítulo 28. Conclusão
Bibliografia
 [11]
Colin Marston
Dstl Wargaming Team
© Crown copyright (2019), Dstl.
Biografias dos Colaboradores
Graham Longley-Brown começou a jogar wargames há 50 anos, aos seis anos de idade. Ao ingressar
no Exército Britânico em 1986, foi informado de que wargaming não era algo 'adequado', e assim
manteve-se discreto. Em 1993, tornou-se Oficial de Inteligência no QG da 7ª Brigada Blindada. O Major
da Brigada, Andrew Sharpe, encorajou o wargaming, então Graham começou a usar wargaming para
fins profissionais com entusiasmo. Ele foi nomeado oficial de Operações G3, cujas responsabilidades
incluíam Wargaming Analítico de Curso de Ação (COA) e organização e execução de wargames
assistidos por computador. Em 2000, agora como Instrutor no Colégio de Comando e Estado-Maior de
Serviços Conjuntos do Reino Unido, Graham assumiu claramente sua posição como Especialista em
Assuntos de Wargaming do Colégio. Nesse papel, ele desenvolveu doutrinas de wargaming de COA do
Exército e de Serviços Conjuntos e expandiu o uso de wargaming educacional em todo o Colégio.
Deixando o exército em 2003, Graham tornou-se um wargamer profissional, no sentido de que isso
passou a ser seu meio de vida. Inicialmente, ele ajudou na entrega de wargames apoiados por
simulações computacionais. Com o tempo, Graham assumiu tarefas em toda a gama de atividades de
wargaming em funções tão diversas como: escrita de cenários (incluindo no Centro de Guerra Conjunta
da OTAN); analista (incluindo como analista líder do Reino Unido nos wargames do Programa das
Forças Armadas Americanas, Britânicas, Canadenses, Australianas e Neozelandesas); consultor em
compartilhamento de melhores práticas (incluindo um projeto de 2 anos para o Comandante Supremo
de Transformação da OTAN); inúmeras posições em organizações de Controle de wargames (incluindo
Chefe de Controle, Chefe da Célula Vermelha, Chefe de Injeções, facilitador, Gerente de Solicitação de
Informações, Controlador Inferior e Superior e Gerente de Informações); e designer, desenvolvedor e
facilitador de wargames. Como oficial da Reserva, Graham continuou a avançar o Wargaming de COA:
[12]
em 2012 ele escreveu a seção sobre o assunto no Manual do Oficial de Estado-Maior do MOD e
ele ensina Wargaming de COA em todos os níveis, desde cursos de oficiais júnior até o Curso de
Comando e Estado-Maior Superior, e com quartéis-generais de unidade e formação do Exército de
Campo.
Dois eventos decisivos em 2012 moldaram a carreira de Graham. Primeiro, Andrew Sharpe (agora
general e Chefe do Centro de Conceitos e Doutrina de Desenvolvimento do Reino Unido), reuniu os
principais wargamers do Reino Unido para discutir um incipiente 'Manual de Wargaming'. Foi aqui que
Graham conheceu outros praticantes de wargaming como Philip Sabin, Tom Mouat e Colin Marston.
Esses quatro iniciaram o Connections UK, a 'franquia' da conferência Connections (EUA) para
profissionais de wargaming. Segundo, um chamado de Jeremy Smith (Chefe de Simulação e Análise na
Universidade Cranfield, Academia de Defesa do Reino Unido) levou a uma colaboração em um sistema
de simulação manual para apoiar a análise rápida de campanhas dentro do MOD. Isso se tornaria o
Conjunto de Ferramentas de Análise de Campanha Rápida (RCAT), que tem sido amplamente utilizado
pela Defesa para experimentação e treinamento desde então.
Graham projetou e entregou wargames apoiados por simulações manuais e assistidas por computador
que variam do sub-tático ao geopolítico, com participantes que vão de poucos a milhares em um
ambiente distribuído. Os contextos cobrem o espectro de educação e treinamento até análise,
experimentação e formulação de políticas. Ele projetou e entregou wargames e cursos de wargame em
todo o mundo, incluindo na Nova Zelândia, Austrália, Brunei, Cingapura, Bangladesh, Catar, Holanda,
Suécia, Reino Unido e Canadá.
Graham possui um diploma em Economia, mas não é economista. Ele administra seu próprio negócio e
é praticante de gestão empresarial: possui um MBA pela Universidade Cranfield e é qualificado em
gestão de projetos, programas e riscos.
John Curry (Editor) é professor sênior de desenvolvimento de jogos na Universidade Bath Spa, Reino
Unido. Ele tem uma reputação internacional em wargaming/simulações de conflitos/jogos sérios e
trabalhou com muitas das principais personalidades atuais no campo. Como parte de seu trabalho
[13]
contínuo para o Projeto História do Wargaming , ele escreveu, coautorou ou editou mais de 80
livros, variando de segundas edições de clássicos de hobbies a obras novas e inovadoras sobre
ciberataques em jogos e planejamento de emergência. Ele trabalha com várias organizações e
atualmente está ativamente envolvido no desenvolvimento de novos modelos de jogos de ciberataque
[14]
para a cidade de Londres e o Reino Unido em geral . Quando perguntado sobre o que ele faz, ele
normalmente diz "Eu jogo jogos estranhos, com pessoas estranhas, em lugares estranhos".
Elizabeth (Ellie) Bartels é doutoranda na Pardee RAND Graduate School. Ela possui um
Mestrado em Ciência Política pelo Massachusetts Institute of Technology e um Bacharelado em
Ciência Política com especialização em Línguas e Civilizações do Oriente Próximo pela
Universidade de Chicago. Antes de ingressar na Pardee RAND, foi associada sênior na Caerus
Associates, onde liderou o desenvolvimento e teste de um quadro analítico para análise e
planejamento de operações urbanas para o Departamento de Defesa dos EUA. Ela também
trabalhou como analista de pesquisa no centro de jogos da Universidade de Defesa Nacional,
onde projetou jogos educacionais e analíticos para escolas militares, iniciativas interagências
dos EUA e militares de nações parceiras. Sua pesquisa se concentra no design de jogos para
questões de segurança emergentes e não tradicionais e análise usando abordagens
multimétodos para pesquisa em ciências sociais. Professor Rex Brynen é Professor de Ciência
Política na Universidade McGill, especializado em política do Oriente Médio e segurança
regional; operações de paz, estabilização e humanitárias; e wargaming político-militar. É autor
ou editor de uma dúzia de livros sobre o Oriente Médio e tópicos relacionados, incluindo
"Beyond the Arab Spring" (2012). Também é editor sênior do site de simulação de conflitos
PAXsims (http://www.paxsims.org), designer da simulação de crise humanitária AFTERSHOCK, e
co-designer do MaGCK: Matrix Game Construction Kit e We Are Coming Nineveh! Prof. Brynen
recebeu o prêmio de Ensino Inovador Deborah Gerner da International Studies Association por
seu trabalho em simulações em sala de aula. Além de seu trabalho acadêmico, ele serviu como
analista de inteligência e como consultor para vários governos, agências das Nações Unidas e o
Banco Mundial. Mr. Matthew B. Caffrey Jr. é atualmente um servidor civil designado para o
Quartel-General do Laboratório de Pesquisa da Força Aérea (AFRL) na Base da Força Aérea
Wright Patterson. Suas funções incluem liderar wargames de Ciência e Tecnologia Analítica
Futura e ensinar o Curso de Wargame do Comando de Material da Força Aérea (AFMC).
Posições anteriores incluem: ajudar a estabelecer o ramo de wargame do HQ AFMC; líder da
Equipe de Análise de Guerra Futura; Professor de Wargaming e Planejamento de Campanha no
Colégio de Comando e Estado-Maior da Força Aérea (ACSC); e Chefe de Desenvolvimento de
Estratégia de Wargaming na Divisão Checkmate do Estado-Maior da Força Aérea. Ele é um
coronel aposentado da Reserva da Força Aérea. Coronel Caffrey é o desenvolvedor do conceito
de "wargame de terceira geração", o Ciclo de Estratégia (às vezes chamado de "Laço Caffrey") e
o Triângulo Caffrey. Em 1993, ajudou a fundar a conferência interdisciplinar de wargame
Connections e em 2013 ajudou a fundar Connections UK. Criou o curso eletivo de wargame do
ACSC, o curso de wargame da AFRL e o curso de wargame da AFMC. Coronel Caffrey é o
designer do Wargame de Ciência e Tecnologia de Suporte de Combate Ágil da AFMC, o
Wargame de Ciência e Tecnologia de Suporte de Combate Ágil da AFRL/Força Aérea Real, o
Wargame do Laboratório de Pesquisa da Força Aérea, o Exercício de Engenheiro/Estrategista, o
Exercício de Alocação de Recursos Conjuntos, o Exercício de Emprego de Implantação Conjunta
e vários outros. Ele é autor de "On Wargaming", coautor (com Frank Chadwick) do "Gulf War
Fact Book" e escreveu vários capítulos e muitos artigos sobre wargaming, poder aéreo e
questões de defesa. Ele falou sobre wargaming internacionalmente na War College alemã, no
Estabelecimento de Pesquisa de Defesa do Reino Unido e nos Estados Unidos, do Pentágono ao
Vale do Silício. Ex-membro da Red Team da Air University, ele participou de equipes Azul,
Vermelha ou Branca em wargames do Título 10 da Força Aérea, da Marinha e do Exército. Seu
livro mais recente, "On Wargaming: como os wargames moldaram o passado e podem moldar o
futuro", foi publicado pela Naval War College Press em 2019. Fred Cameron passou mais de 35
anos conduzindo pesquisas operacionais militares para o Departamento de Defesa Nacional do
Canadá. Nos últimos dez anos, ele ministrou para a Escola de Pós-Graduação Naval dos EUA em
wargaming analítico, tanto no campus em Monterey quanto para clientes no Canadá, Estados
Unidos, Austrália e Nova Zelândia. Dr. Stephen Downes-Martin é um pesquisador associado no
Colégio de Guerra Naval dos EUA e um consultor acadêmico independente. Ele pesquisa e
aplica wargaming e outros métodos de suporte à decisão para problemas nos níveis estratégico,
operacional e tático de guerra e negócios para uma grande variedade de organizações
governamentais, militares, aeroespaciais, acadêmicas e comerciais nos EUA e
internacionalmente. Um foco de pesquisa é como manipular esses métodos para enganar
tomadores de decisão, como os tomadores de decisão usam indevidamente esses métodos para
se enganarem, como detectar tais tentativas e proteger os tomadores de decisão contra elas.
Ele recebeu uma Medalha de Serviço Civil Superior dos EUA pelo seu trabalho no Afeganistão e
uma segunda medalha pelo seu trabalho nos EUA. Stephen possui um doutorado em Teoria
Quântica de Campos pela Universidade de Londres, um Mestrado em Estudos Avançados em
Matemática pela Universidade de Cambridge e um Mestrado em Estudos de Segurança Nacional
e Estratégicos pelo Colégio de Guerra Naval dos EUA. Sua biografia completa está em:
https://sites.google.com/site/stephendownesmartin/. Colin Marston é um Analista Principal
Sênior no Time de Wargaming do Laboratório de Ciência e Tecnologia da Defesa (Dstl). Ele
trabalhou predominantemente no ambiente de Suporte a Operações (S2O), tendo sido
destacado como analista operacional para o Afeganistão e Iraque. No Dstl, ele gerenciou
projetos e forneceu liderança técnica para uma variedade de projetos e participou de numerosas
colaborações de pesquisa internacionais. Ele gerenciou o Programa de Estabilização do Dstl por
cinco anos, que envolveu a entrega de inúmeros wargames usando o Modelo de Operações de
Suporte à Paz (PSOM) para uma variedade de clientes da OTAN e do MOD. Em 2011, ele foi o
Líder de Equipe de Campo responsável por dois grandes destacamentos de analistas (Dstl e
EUA) para entregar wargames para apoiar o planejamento futuro da missão da Força
Internacional de Assistência à Segurança (ISAF) no Afeganistão. Este trabalho recebeu um
Prêmio Científico Chefe. Ele também foi premiado com a Medalha do Presidente da Sociedade
OR em 2012. Ele é o Parceiro Técnico, ao lado da Universidade de Cranfield, para o Conjunto de
Ferramentas de Análise de Campanha Rápida (RCAT), uma ferramenta de simulação manual
usada para suportar / habilitar um wargame. Mais recentemente, ele patrocinou o
desenvolvimento do Kit de Construção de Jogos de Matriz (MaGCK). Ele é um Fellow da
Sociedade OR (FORS), tem um BSc (Hons) em Física com Astrofísica e serviu na Reserva do
Exército (Infantaria). Ele também é cofundador e membro do comitê organizador da conferência
profissional de wargaming Connections UK, além de ser coautor do "Wargaming Handbook" do
MOD do Reino Unido.
Introduction
Good wargames save lives. They also save money. Wargames are compelling and immensely
powerful, helping people to make better decisions and making people better decision-makers.
However, they are not a panacea. Nor are they well understood.
The wargames I refer to are professional, by which I mean they are used for serious purposes.
They are diverse, and can be: used by Defence, business, emergency services, policy think-
tanks, academia or humanitarians; supported by entirely manual or computer-
assisted simulation; and played by one or two people rolling dice over a hobby board wargame
through to thousands of personnel in distributed locations around the globe operating real
communication and information systems. Business executives planning a milk marketing
campaign, politicians plotting an election and humanitarian aid workers training for the delivery
of disaster relief all use the wargaming technique.
This is a textbook to dip in and out of, not a book you pick up and read from start to finish. It is
written from a personal perspective, as one wargaming practitioner to another. I assume that
you are, or want to be, a wargame practitioner; that you have some knowledge of the subject;
and you need little convincing of its merits. I do not, therefore, cover in detail topics such as the
history of wargaming or the utility of hobby wargaming. Rather, I highlight aspects of these with
which you might inform and educate others.
Another important exclusion from this book is detailed discussion on how to structure and run a
wargame department or organisation. I point you to references that do this, and contributions
from expert wargaming practitioners mitigate the risk of gaps in this book. Most of my
experience is in hands-on wargame design and delivery in the UK, which has few organisations
that contain a wargaming department. Other than the NATO Joint Warfare Centre in
[23]
Stavanger , I have not worked in a large wargaming department. I have limited experience of
the largest United States wargames, such as the Title 10 or Global series. However, that does
not mean that the processes and approaches I discuss are not applicable to these events. The
practices and functions I discuss can be scaled to suit the largest of wargames, albeit with
increasing technical challenges. Indeed, most of the topics I examine must be considered,
irrespective of the size of game. Scalability is an important factor that applies throughout this
book.
Having excluded some topics you might think important, what, then, is this book? It is a detailed
guide for the wargame practitioner, based on a lifetime of playing wargames and over twenty
years of successfully designing and delivering them professionally. I use worked examples to
illustrate what I consider to be best practice. I suggest check-lists, guides and step-by-step
processes to turn generic advice into applied practical reality. I focus on wargaming but draw
heavily from general game design, including board (‘Euro’) games, computer and video console
games. My primary target audience is the hands-on wargame practitioner working in a serious
context. This (you) could be a wargame designer, facilitator, analyst, adjudicator, sponsor, user,
scenario writer, experimentation or training designer or simulation expert. The ideas in the book
must be applied flexibly, as you would any doctrine. It is a starting point from which to develop
approaches appropriate to the specific situations you encounter.
There is a gradually increasing body of critical literature concerning professional wargaming,
but this falls well short of that supporting other ‘new’ disciplines such as positive psychology
and even general gaming. By adding one more building block to the literature, I hope to ‘advance
[24]
and preserve the art, science and application of wargaming’ , not least by addressing the
current lack of a shared language, or critical vocabulary – a wargaming ‘lingua franca’ if you will.
I unashamedly stand on the shoulders of giants, and superimpose my experiences – good and
bad – over the wisdom of wargaming greats such as Peter Perla, Philip Sabin, Ed McGrady,
Stephen Downes-Martin, Ellie Bartels, Rex Brynen, Matt Caffrey et al.
Wargaming is a broad church, both in terms of the formats, variants and contexts of the games,
[25]
but also the views of those involved. When the organising committee of Connections UK was
discussing a collective noun for wargamers, I suggested ‘an argument’. While tongue in cheek
(Tom Mouat proffered ‘coven’), ‘an argument of wargamers’ perfectly describes the diversity of
opinions among the community and the vociferousness with which these are expressed; it is in
no way a belittlement. Ask two wargamers the best way to do something and you will get three
answers, probably more. We are, perhaps, starting to move beyond that, and coalesce towards
some sort of consensus. If that is the case, it will be the first time in 200 years of modern
wargaming!
So, I would be amazed, and disappointed, if you agreed with everything in this book. The
differences within the community can lead to issues, but the creative sparks are also a source of
innovation. Like all expressive media, there are few absolute rights and wrongs in wargaming. I
have included alternative approaches in this book, and have invited contributions, comments
and counterpoints from many of the best wargamers in the world. If you do not agree with what I
or they say, please tell everyone! Online forums and other social media offer the opportunity to
respond and debate. We also need more literature describing the theory and practice of
wargaming.
In Part 1 we will chart the length, breadth and depth of wargaming. I will discuss why to do it and
when not to. I’ll examine wargaming issues, some of which appear to be intractable. I’ll confirm
what wargaming is, and is not, and its primary elements. This includes an early discussion of the
central adjudication function. I conclude with a review of the huge variety of wargame formats,
variants and contexts.
In Part 2, we will explore how to establish the conditions to design and deliver a successful
wargame, irrespective of where it sits within the diverse activities we can now confidently call a
wargame; the characteristics of successful wargames are common to all. Others more expert
than I contribute chapters on analysing wargames, using appropriate technology and gaming the
non-kinetic.
Part 3 describes the ‘Wargame Lifecycle’ that takes a game from inception to the final report and
beyond. I examine the issues you might face when initiating, designing, developing, executing,
validating and refining your wargames. Because this is a handbook to dip into, and many themes
re-occur, there are places where I mention the same topic in different sections. That is
unavoidable, and I make no apologies for a certain amount of re-stating key points where they
apply to different areas of the Wargame Lifecycle. Part 3 concludes with a contribution by Ed
McGrady and Peter Perla on ‘The top ten things that make a good wargame designer’.
In Part 4, we dive into the detail of how to put all of this into practise to deliver successful
wargames. I cover player engagement in depth, dwell on creating scenarios and suggest how to
control a wargame during execution. I discuss facilitation, and generating and presenting
outcomes. There is a chapter on Course of Action Wargaming, the most prevalent form of
wargaming in the military. Part 4 culminates with a chapter by Matt Caffrey on the
Connections conference. Much of the success of professional wargaming depends on the
Connections community, so this is a fitting end to the book.
Nothing in all that will be hard to understand. I hope that what you read is no more than common
sense glimpses of the obvious. If they weren’t common sense, you would stop reading! But why,
then, are there so many apparently obvious insights not being practised that they fill a book?
Maybe a misappropriation of Clausewitz’s words offers a clue: the sub-title of this book could
have been,
‘Everything in war(gaming) is simple,
but doing the simplest thing is difficult.’
Finally, and fundamentally, there are gaps in this book. Some I know about, and others will
surely surface. The US Connections team are about to publish a series of papers on 'Wargaming
the future'. I have contributed one of these, but do not cover the topic in this book. Last year's
conference produced a paper on 'In-stride adjudication', which I touch on only in passing. There
is a yawning gap in research into wargaming itself: the influence of group dynamics on a
wargame; the effect of transparent adjudication versus a ‘black box’; the importance of player
engagement; and the efficacy of different methods of adjudication. All these, and far more,
deserve research, experimentation and debate. Every time I deliver a game, watch others do so,
read good articles and posts or listen to speakers I think, “Great point! I must add that to the
book.” This will continue right up to publication – and beyond.
So what? This book is no more than a contribution to the wargaming critical literature. It is
neither comprehensive nor definitive. All of us are obliged to keep ‘pushing the wargaming ball
up hill’, working towards the Connections mission stated just now. Given enough people
pushing that ball, we might just realise Matt Caffrey’s inspirational vision, which he states in the
final few paragraphs of this book: to move beyond wargames to ‘peacegames’.
Part 1: Wargaming Fundamentals
'If my career were ahead instead of behind me, I should endeavor to the extent of my ability, and
at the earliest opportunity, to acquire as thorough a knowledge of the principles of the art of war
as possible, and should neglect no opportunity to train myself in their application by playing
competitive war games.'
Admiral William Sims, USN, 1919
Chapter 1. Why Wargame? And When Not To
‘We wargame because we must. There are certain warfare problems that only gaming will
[26]
illuminate.’
Professor Robert Rubel (2006), Chairman of the
Wargaming Department, US Naval War College
Introduction
In this chapter I hope to substantiate the claim made in the book’s Introduction, that effective
wargames save lives and money. However, I will immediately sound a balancing note of caution:
wargames are not a panacea, are not appropriate to all situations, and need to be approached
carefully. I could have divided the chapter into two ('Why wargame?'; and 'When not to') but
wanted to highlight the juxtaposition of the reasons why you might, and might not, wargame.
I assume that, as a wargaming practitioner, you need little convincing of the merits of
wargaming, so I will not try to persuade you of these. Rather, I suggest how you might convince
others of the utility of wargaming and help them understand its limitations. After a brief wake-up
call as to who is wargaming today, I discuss historical wargaming exemplars. These are followed
by current justifications in the form of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff’s Foreword to the 2017
MOD Wargaming Handbook, and a contribution from General Andrew Sharpe, whose 2012
initiative resulted in that Handbook. This is followed by a bulleted summary of the benefits that
can be delivered by good wargames.
Sadly, wargames are not always well done, and so do not automatically deliver these benefits.
Indeed, bad wargames can be very harmful. Furthermore, wargames are by no means the only
technique available, and are not always the right tool. The limitations of wargames are
important, and you should always qualify the positives with the negatives as appropriate.
Finally, there are many recurring issues that have often frustrated the design and delivery of
good wargames since its modern-day inception in the early 19th century. These must be
addressed.
I’ll elucidate on the applicability of wargaming to both education/training and analysis in Chapter
2 (What is a Wargame). For now, please simply register both broad contexts.
Those who take warfare seriously, wargame
[27]
Russia resurgent

Figure 1-1. The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Force of Russia, which
[28]
features a wargaming centre
In 2017, Russia re-opened their Wargames Centre in the Military Academy of the General Staff of
the Russian Armed Forces. The Commandant of the Academy, Lieutenant-General Sergei
Kuralenko said: '…after refurbishment, in the Military Academy of the General Staff, is the
Centre of Wargames. It is a multi-media complex and… will be able to conduct inter-service
[29]
wargames, as well as [other] measures of an operational training nature.' If you have
recently wargamed across a map featuring the Baltic States, Syria, Ukraine or the Arctic ‘High
North’, rest assured that there will be a startlingly similar map somewhere on a table or
computer screen inside that building.
[30]
Red Dragon Rising
An increasingly assertive China (re-)started wargaming in 2008. Devin Ellis gave an overview of
[31]
wargaming within the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in a talk to Connections UK in 2015.
The PLA use wargames for educational and training purposes. The majority are kinetic,
operational-level wargames, but political-military and cyber games also feature. Although the
learning curve is steep for the Chinese, ‘those parts of the PLA which are interested in
improving [wargaming] are avidly seeking best practices and methodological insights to improve
[32]
and inform [their wargames].’

Figure 1-2. People’s Daily Online 2010 article on wargaming

Israeli wargamers on ‘speed dial’
The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) use wargames continuously, at short notice, and with senior
leaders participating as players. During a visit to Israel in May 2018 by a contributor to this
book, an IDF brigadier general was extracted mid-way through a briefing to hastily prepare and
run a Northern Command wargame the following day. The IDF use the following techniques, with
an emphasis on simplicity.
[33]
Seminar wargaming is used at the operational level at the Dado Centre. Participants are
[34]
presented with a vignette from the situation being examined and asked to develop
alternative options. This is followed by subsequent vignettes based on the derived alternatives
in an iterative manner until the sponsor and participants feel that they sufficiently understand
the situation.
Structured role-play is used at the strategic level at the National Defence College. Participants
[35]
are asked to examine a real-world complex ‘wicked’ problem of their choosing, and define
the actors involved and their objectives and resources. These are then briefed to students to
enable them to role-play these actors in an open, manual simulation over several days.
Two points to note:
All wargames are set in the real world. The fact that other nations use fictitious scenarios is
viewed by the Israelis with polite surprise; the IDF consider education in, and analysis of,
anything other than real-world problems to be a flawed approach and a wasted opportunity.
The IDF do not currently use computer simulations at this level, because these take too long
to configure and set up, and do not reflect the complexity of the problems they want to
wargame.
Historical rationales for wargaming
The Israelis are not new to wargaming. Peter Perla notes in The Art of Wargaming that, ‘the
basic principles of Israeli military gaming include playing with:
· Real people (usually subordinates as close to the primary decision-maker as possible).
· Real data.
· Real time (crucial to avoid teaching wrong lessons).
· Real manuals, orders and procedures.
· Real problems.
· Real psychological environments, putting players into the field to create as many realistic
pressures as possible.
[36]
The Israeli stress on realism is so strong as to be almost obsessive.’
Many of these points chime with discussions later in this book, but I will not dally over the
[37]
history of wargaming. This is comprehensively covered elsewhere. I pick out just two
examples, which demonstrate historical best practice that is applicable to contemporary
wargaming. In a discussion or presentation, it is important that you demonstrate as soon as
possible the benefits that wargaming can deliver. The examples below give you ammunition with
which to discuss how good wargames can save lives (and money) when talking to sponsors and
non-believers. These are highly abbreviated because the detail is easily accessible elsewhere.
The Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU)
A precis of Paul Strong’s article Wargaming the Atlantic War appeared in the Wargaming
[38] [39]
Handbook. The full version is available on the PAXsims website. Paul summarised the
article in a presentation to Connections UK in 2017, and you can hear the audio recording via
[40]
the conference web site. With kind permission, I have reproduced a few short passages
from Paul’s article. WATU is right ‘up there’ with the best examples of historical wargaming. The
saga is full of drama, is a thoroughly human story – and is due be made into a film and a
documentary! Most of the key players were young Women's Royal Naval Service (Wrens).
I precede the extracts with some tabulated comments I sent Paul as part of the review process.
These highlight the correlation between the 1940s WATU wargames characteristics and those in
the ‘Guidelines for good wargaming’ section of the 2017 Wargaming Handbook.
Explicit mention in Implicit mention,
article confirmed by
subsequent research
Adversarial Chance
Primacy of player Transparency of
decisions outcomes
Control Cheap, frequent and small
Safe to fail scale
Senior officer Uncertainty of outcomes
engagement and
participation
Player engagement
Processes
Part of a wider process
Analysis
Appropriate technology
Table 1-1. Correlation of the WATU Wargame characteristics to the Wargaming Handbook
‘Guidelines for good wargaming’
Note two details mentioned in the full article: Roberts was a long-time hobby wargamer; and the
WATU wargames were used for both analytical and training purposes. The significance of these
two points will become clear later in this book.
Wargaming the Atlantic War extract

"The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." Winston Churchill. The
Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU) was a dedicated training and analysis team created in January 1942
and tasked to improve the development and dissemination of new tactics to Royal Navy and Allied vessels
escorting convoys across the Atlantic. Using innovative analytical methods, WATU developed a range of tactics
during the war and disseminated these to over 5,000 officers through lectures and tactical wargames. Many of
these appeared in the Atlantic Convoy Instructions and were used with considerable success by Allied naval
forces during the decisive engagements of the Atlantic War.
In January 1942, Captain Gilbert Roberts was summoned to the Admiralty and tasked to train a small team of
analysts, and identify tactics that could be used to turn the tide of the battle in the Atlantic. The seriousness of
the appointment was made even clearer after a brief face-to-face meeting with the Prime Minister who growled
"find out what is happening in the Atlantic, find ways of getting the convoys through, and sink the U-boats!”
The WATU facility was primitive, with tables, a tactical floor divided into squares, basic ship models, and a
lecture theatre, but Roberts quickly got to work. A basic set of wargame rules were developed, and a set of
processes were designed to represent real-time decision cycles, tactical doctrine, and communications issues.
Then the room was re-arranged so that players representing escort commanders could only see the game play
through a restrictive canvas screen to represent the limited information they would have in a real battle while the
adjudication team moved the model ships according to the orders submitted by the players and their unseen
adversaries… The U-boat track was drawn on the tactical floor in brown chalk line, so it would be invisible to
players looking through their canvas slit but allow the umpires and ‘movers’ to follow its progress.
…It was getting late but [Wrens] Raynor, Laidlaw and Okell stayed behind to test the concept on a convoy
escorted by six vessels. A range of U-boat attack options were tested… As Roberts re-examined Laidlaw's
detailed plots from each game and her meticulous record of the discussions, he realised that a U-boat that
evaded an escort would probably dive and come up again astern of the convoy. The team agreed that he was
onto something and volunteered to continue wargaming… As dawn rose, the exhausted team were sent home
and Roberts arranged a demonstration. A sceptical Sir Percy Noble arrived with his staff the next day and
watched as the team worked through a series of demonstrations…Sir Percy’s demeanour changed dramatically
as the demonstration unfolded. Unlike every other approach, the solution WATU had identified was based upon
the U-boat commander’s most logical course of action and not just a reaction to a stricken merchant vessel. The
[41]
new tactic was immediately sent up to the Admiralty and Roberts was promoted on the spot.
When Roberts accepted his award as Commander of the British Empire at the end of 1943, he took a Wren
officer and rating with him to Buckingham Palace, intentionally sharing the honour with the team of remarkable
young women that helped WATU contribute to winning the Battle of the Atlantic.

US Navy inter-war wargaming

The US Navy conducted a series of comprehensive wargames between 1919 and 1941,
examining potential conflict with various adversaries, primarily Japan. These are detailed
[42]
elsewhere. The Nimitz quote below is ubiquitous in wargaming presentations:
‘The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game room here by so many people and in so
many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise – absolutely
nothing except the Kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war; we had not visualised those’.
[43]

Admiral Chester Nimitz

As well as a general understanding of these wargames, I find it useful to keep in mind some
specific outcomes that were applied to the real-world.
US Navy inter-war wargaming was a part of the training cycle that instilled a flexible,
resilient mindset in the commanders who would fight the Pacific and Atlantic Wars. Peter
Perla says, ‘Wargames frequently help us to identify where and how we can make
improvements to what we plan or do, and one of the most important of those improvements
lies in learning how to adapt to change. We can see this highlighted in the use of
wargaming in the inter-war period. An important – if not perhaps the most important –
outcome of that long series of games was that students and future leaders of the wartime
[44]
Navy learned adaptive techniques.’ (My italics)
 A group of dedicated staff officers was established, whose task was to trawl the Naval War
College wargame repositories and extract lessons identified applicable to the Pacific
[45]
Theatre. The fact that there was an effective repository, and the necessary governance
to support it, is noteworthy.
Many pivotal strategies, tactics and capabilities were examined that affected the outcome of
World War II. Innovations were subjected to further study, analysis and live trials prior to
introduction, but their genesis was US Navy inter-war wargaming. Significant examples
include:
The strategic ‘art of the possible’ was examined iteratively from every angle. The
‘thruster strategy’ was shown to be infeasible and the ‘cautionary strategy’ evolved,
[46]
which was used to cross the Pacific.
The decline in US amphibious capability and doctrine was reversed. Detailed tactics,
techniques and procedures were developed, including against a defended beachhead
[47]
with the necessary coordination of land and sea fires.
Naval aviation and carrier-based operations were developed from nascent to advanced.
A specific example of an innovation is aircraft carrier arrestor wires, which dramatically
increased sortie rates.
Submarine and anti-submarine operations evolved. Originally employed only as a
screening force for the fleet, submarine tasks such as long-range interdiction and
commerce raiding were developed.
o The requirement to deliver logistics at reach was identified and innovative solutions
found, such as floating dry-docks, repair underway, fast oilers and forward basing.
Novel tactics were introduced. John Lillard notes, 'The development of the circular
formation is... a useful example of how even junior students could introduce tactical
innovations in the wargaming venue [and have them] tested on the War College
[48]
maneuver board.'
· US Navy inter-war wargaming is an excellent example of Peter Perla’s ‘cycle of research’,
which features throughout this book. The current practice of an Integrated Analysis and
Experimentation Campaign Plan (IAECP) is another expression of the same approach. Both
are explained in Chapter 8 (Analysis).
Lillard’s conclusion is noteworthy: ‘The interwar period ended with the U.S. Navy on the
precipice of war, a war that naval leaders attempted to predict and practice for twenty-two years
in Fleet Problems and wargames. However, to say that the Navy practiced the Pacific War is not
to say that they predicted it with complete accuracy nor were totally prepared for it when it
came, as the Admiral Nimitz statement would seem to imply. Taken at face value, the
Nimitz quote is an over-simplification or at least a distracter. Behind the words, though, is a
claim that the trained officers the War College fed into war-planning positions played a
significant role in transforming the U.S. Navy, with its post-World War I physical state and
[49]
mindset, into a military force that was much better prepared to fight a real war with Japan.’
Current rationales for wargaming
The MOD Wargaming Handbook
[50]
Most chapters in this book contain extracts from the Wargaming Handbook . I explained the
shared genesis of that doctrinal guide and this book in the Preface and Introduction. It is
apposite that the first of these extracts is the Vice Chief of Defence Staff’s Foreword.
Wargaming is a powerful tool. I am convinced that it can deliver better understanding and critical thinking,
foresight, genuinely informed decision-making and innovation. Sir John Chilcot’s report highlighted these very
themes. I have also been struck by how important wargaming is becoming among many of our allies and partners.
It allows those involved to experiment and learn from their experiences in a ‘safe-to-fail’ environment.
I wish to reinvigorate wargaming in Defence to restore it as part of our DNA. Historically the UK military was
accomplished at wargaming, but this culture has largely been lost. Where it exists, it is ad hoc and uncoordinated,
with demand outstripping existing expertise. We must seek to regenerate this culture and the associated skills
among our people – military and civilian alike – at all levels and in all areas of our business. This effort requires
everyone’s participation and encouragement, but particularly at senior levels.
The Wargaming Handbook is the first publication of its type in Defence. It is an important element of this initiative
and a key resource for us all. I commend it to you.
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

The utility of wargaming is recognised by significant actors far beyond Defence. Wargaming
does not pertain just to war. Condoleezza Rice, writing in the Harvard Business Review in May
2018, said, ‘Reducing blind spots requires imagination. As one major investor told us, “The
biggest mistake is believing the future will look like the present. It almost never does.” His firm
trains all its associates to ask a simple question, over and over again: What if we are wrong?
Scenario planning, wargaming exercises, and other methods can also help firms identify hidden
[51]
risks.’
Business, government departments, emergency services, crisis management organisations,
humanitarian organisations and academia increasingly use wargaming. Many of my ‘lightbulb
moments’ can be laid at the feet of business wargamers. This because current Defence
wargamers tend to apply wargaming to theoretical contexts, whereas business practitioners use
the technique for real. Their quest for market share, profit, stress-tested strategies and so forth
is conducted in the harsh reality of the business world. Humanitarians and the emergency
services even more so; real lives depend on the effectiveness of their wargames.
General Andrew Sharpe
General Andrew Sharpe sums up the rationale for wargaming as follows:
Modern armies pour a lot of effort into a mixture of practicing tactics and procedures as a
repetitive drill, or into the planning process. Constraints on time, resources and commitments
often mean that they spend very little time, however, in practicing the execution of their plans,
or in dealing with the consequences (expected or unexpected) of the execution of their plans.
Opportunities for ‘free play live exercises’, in which teams, units or formations can practice
executing their plans against an active, thinking, disruptive and belligerent opponent are rare.
And, because they are rare, such training opportunities tend to be carefully constrained to
practice the executors in pre-arranged aspects of warfare with ‘goals’ and 'training aims’.
Exercises are rarely allowed to flow like wars - unpredictable, frictional, frustrating: the
military mind simply isn’t like that. Despite the need to be comfortable with and in chaos,
military trainers tend to use their precious time in a very controlled way, in a controlling
environment, for controlled outcomes. But war simply isn’t like that. Planning is a vital military
skill, but dealing with what happens after, inevitably, ‘no plan survives contact with the enemy’
is an even more vital skill. And, like so many such skills that rely as much upon intuitive
reasoning as on a rigid adherence to process, expertise can only be found in those who
practice that skill regularly.
This is where wargaming is such an essential tool for professional warfighters. When time
and material resources are short, and where career sensitivities mean that there is a fear of
‘failing’ during rare live training opportunities, wargaming offers professional soldiers a
vehicle in which they can train, safely and effectively, in the execution of their plans; in which
they can take the risks that they identify as the key opportunities with no fear of failure. The
‘fitness programme for the brain’ that is alluded to below, like any other fitness programme,
only works if it is conducted regularly and systematically. Wargames are competitive, like war;
 outcomes are uncontrolled, like war; luck plays its part, like war; and those who tend to
succeed are those who habitually use a mixture of procedural understanding and intuitive
reasoning as events, unexpectedly, unfold (like in war). Simple manual wargames offer a cost-
effective, easy-to-conduct, safe-to-fail, and, if one dares to say it, enjoyable way of practicing
(for professionals) the simulated realities of decision-making in war. (Which is interesting, for
if one substituted: ‘sport offers a cost effective, easy-to-conduct, safe-to-fail and enjoyable
way of keeping soldiers fit to fight' no military person would question one’s logic.) And, as
every doctrinal pamphlet will tell you, the successful military leader, in war, is the person who
can seize and hold the initiative inside the decision-cycle of his opponent. So, a soldier’s
brain, like a soldier’s body, needs to be fit for purpose, and wargaming provides a very
portable mental gym in which genuinely professional officers can conduct their mental fitness
training.
Of course, completely aside from the routine training benefits described above, wargaming
also offers two other great benefits: informed force development and mission rehearsal. On
the former, those charged with developing future forces, whether in terms of equipment
capabilities, tactical developments or organisational changes, can try out ideas as they
develop. Wargaming has become an established and accepted tool for both military and
scientific force developers. On the latter, planners are afforded the opportunity to test and re-
test their actual operational plans. Before the chaos of execution, plans can be played through
(if time permits, repeatedly played through). This has two immediate benefits. First, plans tend
to become better and better as they are honed through the experience of success and failure
as they are played out. Second, teams that have played out the execution of their plans
against a genuinely belligerent opponent will be more comfortable in the inevitable confusion
of execution that will start the moment that the plan rolls into action, and thus be better pre-
prepared to succeed in that uniquely competitive environment.
[52]
Matt Caffrey’s On Wargaming
Matt’s book was published as mine was in its final draft. Unsurprisingly, there are close parallels
between the two. Rather than incorporate Matt’s wisdom into this chapter, you should read his
[53]
Chapter 8 (The Utility of Wargaming) for a slightly different perspective.
The benefits of good wargames
‘Games are intensely stimulating; people are very active; ideas and conjectures get tossed
around and analysed by a highly motivated group of people; a great deal of expertise is
collected in a single room, expertise that is not often collected together; and people discover
facts, ideas possibilities, capabilities and arguments that do not in any way depend on the game
[54]
but nevertheless emerge from it.’
Thomas Schelling (1964)
I show the benefits of good wargames on a single slide at the start of a presentation (Figure 1-
3). I leave this up for a good two minutes with no commentary beyond having posed the
question, “How else might you achieve these?”
Each of the bullets deserves discussion, but here are just two comments:
A ‘fitness programme for military thinking’. Talking to Connections UK in 2013, General Andrew
Sharpe pointed out that the officer class is the conceptual component of fighting power, and so
needs to hone the brain as much as the brawn: “It’s about minds, not stuff [equipment].”
‘Build confidence and trust in a team and pre-position relationships.’ Plato said, ‘You can
[55]
discover more about a person in an hour of play than in a year of conversation.’
 Figure 1-3. The benefits of wargaming
This bullet was introduced at Connections UK 2013 by David Hockaday, a humanitarian. I am
amazed at the richness of discussion between members of what should be one team during the
simplest of wargames. It often seems as though the G3 (operations) and G4 (logistics) staff, or
the Business Development and Operations personnel, never talk, and relish the opportunity to
establish a mutual understanding in a wargame.
However, there is a risk that moving beyond 'getting to know someone' into explicit assessment
can prevent one of the key characteristics of successful wargames discussed in chapter 6:
freedom to fail. Knowing that they are being assessed can significantly dampen someone’s
willingness to innovate and experiment with no fear of failure.
When talking to businesspeople, I usually follow slide above with one directly relevant to the
business environment (although business folk relate well to military ideas):
· A greater understanding of competitors, frictions and market forces.
· Proactively managing, and reacting to, emerging risks and opportunities.
· Becoming comfortable with operating in dynamic and chaotic situations.
· An opportunity to practise or test:
o Risk Management.
o Business Continuity.
o Resilience.
o ‘What if’ questions.
o Collaborative ventures.
The limitations of wargaming
The references below address wargaming challenges and recommendations:
Pettijohn and Shlapak (18 February 2016) War on the Rocks article, ‘Gaming the system:
[56]
obstacles to reinvigorating defense wargaming’.
Downes-Martin (2014) ‘Your Boss, Players, and Sponsor - The Three Witches of War
[57]
Gaming’.
Downes-Martin, Rubel and Weuve (2004) ‘Pathologies of war gaming and what to do about
[58]
it.
 [59]
Downes-Martin (2016) ‘Wargaming to Deceive the Sponsor’: How and Why?
Perla and McGrady (2011), ‘Why Wargaming Works’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No.
[60]
3 (specifically the ‘Cautions’ section pp.123-125).
The Wargaming Handbook introduces the main limitations of wargaming, but I include
supplementary comments after the extract.
Wargaming Handbook extract

Wargames are not a panacea and should only be applied when appropriate. Wargames are not reproducible.
Wargames are driven by player decisions, and players will make different choices even when presented with the
same situation. Add the element of chance inherent in wargaming, and no game will ever be the same, even when
the starting situation is replicated. Of course, it is this very unpredictability, coupled with the creativity of
participants, which enables wargames to generate new ideas.
Wargames are qualitative. If the output required is numerical, a wargame is unlikely to be an appropriate tool.
While most wargames include mathematical systems that produce numerical results, precise outcomes will vary.
Wargames can complement, but are not a substitute for, more rigorous or detailed forms of analysis. Wargames
are best used to inform decisions by raising questions and insights, not to provide a definitive answer.
Wargames are only as good as the participants. An uninformed, unqualified or overconfident wargame team is
unlikely to add value. Furthermore, the product of a successful wargame will be of benefit only if it is considered by
the sponsor. Greater diversity among participants is likely to generate richer collective insight. In some cases,
having military officers as the only participants, or having military officers with common experiences and
perspectives, may limit the quality of the game.
Wargames are not predictive. Wargames illustrate possible outcomes, so there is a risk of false lessons being
identified from a single run of a wargame. Wargames can illustrate that something is plausible, but will not be able
[61]
to definitively predict that it is probable.

Wargames are not predictive

'Wargaming is far more the dim candle that lights the path, than the night vision goggles it is
[62]
often advertised as.'
Wilf Owen
Some people seek certainty. It is a wargamer’s responsibility not to offer it. Do not claim that a
wargame is predictive, even though there are examples where, in hindsight, it can be shown
that something that happened in a wargame came to pass. That said, we use wargames to scry
a hazy future, so there is clearly a relationship of some sort with prediction – but approach this
with caution.
[63]
Let’s consider two more ‘p’s: plausible and probable. Definitions of plausible include
[64]
‘seemingly or apparently valid, likely, or acceptable; credible’ and ‘seeming likely to be true,
[65]
or able to be believed’ . ‘Seeming’ is a key word, because it implies that wargame outcomes
must be further investigated, usually by means other than wargaming. Because wargames focus
on people, and human decision-making, it is questionable whether they can show that
[66]
something is probable. Probable means ‘likely to be true or likely to happen’ or ‘supported
[67]
by evidence strong enough to establish presumption but not proof.’ To be that certain, you
must be confident of fully understanding the psychology of all protagonists and the significance
of the factors influencing their decision-making. The key take-away is that wargames
demonstrate plausibility, and might indicate that subsequent investigation by other means is, or
is not, warranted. In 2014 and 2015 the RAND Corporation conducted a series of wargames
[68]
examining a Russian invasion of the Baltic States. One insight arising was that it took no
longer than 60 hours for Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga. Does this
show that it is plausible that Russia could seize the Baltic States? Yes. Does it make it
probable? No. Is the situation worthy of further study? Absolutely. The consequence of the
[69]
wargames was to spark debate and subsequent consideration by other means of Russian
aggression; that is precisely what wargaming should do.
When not to wargame
Wargaming is but one technique in the decision-making ‘tool bag’. This needs to be made clear
to any sponsor demanding a gaming solution. Furthermore, the time and resources needed to
develop and execute a wargame incur an opportunity cost: resources might be better used, for
example in a well-facilitated discussion. Specific reasons why wargaming should not be used, or
should be used with caution, are listed below. I advocate what Professor Rex Brynen calls
‘responsible evangelism’: advertise the power of wargames, but also explain its limitations.
Quantitative analysis and hard answers are required
This is per the Wargaming Handbook extract, above, but warrants repetition because it can be
sufficient reason in itself why wargaming in isolation might not be appropriate. Wargaming is a
qualitative technique that is generally inappropriate for quantitative analysis. Wargaming is best
used to raise questions and elicit insights; it is not good at providing hard, or definitive
answers.
Wargaming to reinforce stakeholder preconceptions
Beware the sponsor who wants a wargame to reinforce a preconceived ‘solution.’ Stephen
Downes-Martin writes, 'Stakeholders with influence and motive to deceive include the sponsor,
the organisation producing the wargame and players (including their respective chains of
command). [We must] build processes explicitly designed to detect deception (inadvertent and
[70]
deliberate) and defend against it...’
Gamewashing
[71]
‘Gamewashing’ (as in ‘whitewashing’ or ‘greenwashing’ ) is the use of gaming to ‘prove’ a
concept or policy, or increase the chances of it being adopted. The ‘game’ (which is often no
more than a mislabelled discussion) is designed to substantiate the sponsor’s claims. Not only
are false lessons ‘identified’, but gaming can be brought into disrepute due to the fallacious
nature of the findings.
False lessons and ‘cognitive lock’
Wargames are compelling. Their story-living nature can lead to powerful, even visceral, shared
experiences. This is one of wargaming’s strengths, because it leads to a greater collective
understanding of emerging insights. The danger is that if these insights are unsound, they can
lead to ‘cognitive lock’ and be internalised as erroneous lessons. This is an issue identified by
Robert Levine in 1964: ‘Games are seductive. Their excitement and the logical structure they
present seduce those who intend to use them economically into using them elaborately and
frequently; their surface plausibility seduces those who enter them "sceptically", merely looking
[72]
for hypotheses, into leaving them with conclusions.’
Recurring issues
The issues below have re-occurred since the inception of modern wargaming. Two hundred
years is a long time to fail to resolve them.
A general lack of understanding of wargaming, exacerbated by vexed disagreement within the
community
Modern wargaming suffers from a chronic lack of common understanding, both within and
outside the community. Ask six people in the street what they think a wargame is, and you will
get six different answers, none of which are likely to be near the truth. Ask six wargame
practitioners, and you will get at least seven different answers.
Lack of a common language
An associated point, there is little formal critical wargaming language, or even an informal
[73]
‘lingua franca.’ Systems engineers, military officers, analysts, software coders, hobby
gamers, game designers, academics et al, all hail from diverse backgrounds. Video game
designers are forging ahead and developing their own common language. We are not. Confusion
over terminology is such that wargamers often fail to communicate, even on a basic level.
Chapter 3 addresses these ‘Misnomers and Misunderstandings.’
Jargon
How many lay people would understand ‘a classic double-blind kriegsspiel using stochastic,
rigid adjudication’? We must guard against jargon. It risks turning professional wargaming
practitioners into a priesthood, speaking an arcane language understood only by them and
preventing new comers from joining.
A paucity of academic literature on wargaming
I rate no more than six key textbooks and a dozen or so articles on professional wargaming.
[74]
These books and articles are ably supplemented by web sites such as: PAXsims ; War on the
[75] [76]
Rocks ; The US Naval Postgraduate School ; and the Connections UK web site, but we do
not yet have the necessary body of academic literature.
Too few accessible wargaming repositories and a resulting lack of shared best practice and continuity
The US Navy inter-war wargaming could not have delivered the results it did had it not been for
detailed and painstaking reporting and an effective repository, maintained and exploited by the
Naval War College Research Department. Whereas the Naval War College had the necessary
governance to enable this, the current paucity of repositories outside the US is symptomatic of
a lack of governance. One consequence is an endemic lack of continuity among serving military
wargame users. The system of rotating people through posts every year or two results in
wargaming continuity being provided by – expensive – contractors. I have seen enough wheels
reinvented to supply Uber. Lessons are repeatedly identified but not learned (implemented), and
there is significant duplication of effort. This situation might be changing in the US, with the
establishment of the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group (DWAG), discussed in Chapter 16
(Wargame Refinement).
Inappropriate and inexpert stakeholder interference
Stephen Downes-Martin says, ‘Stakeholders frequently attempt to influence the design of the
wargame, even during play itself. For two reasons, such attempts amount to inappropriate
interference. First, these stakeholders are not (usually) expert in wargame research, design,
development, or production. Second, it is a conflict of interest for them to influence the game’s
[77]
design; such interference puts the credibility of the results into justifiable doubt.’
Pretender wargames and wargamers
RAND’s Stacie Pettijohn and David Shlapak sum up the situation thus: ‘A failure to appreciate
the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of wargames and wargamers could lead to a situation
in which “bad games drive out good ones.” This is not a new concern. As wargaming expert
Peter Perla has observed, wargames have often been “oversold” and “abused”, and wargaming
as a method has suffered as a result… the present enthusiasm for wargames is encouraging
individuals and organisations with minimal wargaming experience to enter the field. Although
this could bring new ideas and approaches into the fold, it also heightens the risk that
inexperienced designers will produce games that are not as well-designed or executed, or that
wargames might be used when they are not the most appropriate analytic tool for a given
[78]
question.’
As well as poor wargamers, ‘pretender’ wargames proliferate. When in vogue, the term
‘wargaming’ can quickly be devalued into a meaningless buzz-word; everything must be
‘wargamed.’ I sometimes find myself having to explain that ‘wargame’ is not synonymous with
‘talk about.’
Superficial analysis, and a failure to learn lessons
Too many wargames suffer from a lack of rigorous analysis, reporting and integration into a
wider programme. It is difficult to quantify this, but anecdotal evidence suggests that most
wargames deliver inadequate reports, and those that are produced are seldom effectively
catalogued and stored. Rex Brynen asked one of his students to conduct a Freedom of
Information request on unclassified US Title 10 wargame reports; little could be found. This is an
issue I encounter frequently; reports I have written myself cannot be found in the sponsor’s files
when I return to run iterative wargames just a few months after the previous game.
Lack of governance
One of the most important recurring issues, I have left it until now to highlight the lack of
governance because every issue above could be ameliorated by effective governance. Periodic
efforts in the US (detailed in Chapter 16) appear to be gaining traction – but this is the global
exception and might yet prove temporary. Wargaming in the MOD received a boost in 2017 with
a welcome intervention by the UK’s Vice Chief of Defence Staff; whether this translates into
effective governance remains to be seen.
Failing to design to a purpose, and poor facilitation
I group these two together because, along with analysis, they constitute the ‘Three Pillars’ that
Rex Brynen suggests are necessary to support good wargames. Design to a purpose and
analysis are represented on the cover of this book as golden threads that run throughout the
entire ‘Wargame Lifecycle’, while facilitation is specific to the wargame execution phase. I have
included them under ‘recurring issues’ because they feature throughout the book and I wanted
to introduce them early. I address each in detail in later chapters.
Excessive complexity
Wargames have a habit of ‘growing bells and whistles’. For example, there is an almost
irresistible urge to add more and more factors to make the game increasingly realistic. This is
usually counter-productive. It is exemplified in the development of von Reisswitz’s 1824 game,
which was subverted by those striving for realism until it became almost unplayable. People
stopped playing it because the processes added to ‘enhance’ it were too protracted and
tortuous. So it was then, so it is now. One of the key topics that Professor Philip
[79]
Sabin addresses in Simulating War is the balance between simplicity and playability. I
discuss simplicity in Chapter 6 (The Essential Characteristics of Successful Wargames). The
lesson that does not seem to have stuck down the decades is, ‘Keep it simple, Stupid.’
Excessive pre-scripting
By the time you reach my reservations on excessive pre-scripting in Chapter 19 (Scenario
Writing), it will be clear why ‘wargames’ with a pre-determined narrative that ‘railroad’
players through a series of inviolable events are not wargames at all. Pre-scripted, inflexible
scenarios are likely to preclude almost all the characteristics of successful wargames that I
discuss in Part 2.
Emotional involvement, and ‘gaming the game’
The power of a dynamic and persuasive narrative can compel players to become personally
invested. Particularly in an analytical game, it is important that players remain objective and
professional. I frequently see players become emotionally involved, ‘gaming the game’ by
seeking gaps in the rules, and even cheating so they can win. In a survey conducted by Ellie
[80]
Bartels in 2017 , she found that 'a somewhat alarming number of folk felt that emotional
conflict was the primary sign of a good game.' This is (usually) inappropriate, and a
phenomenon that you should watch for and treat with caution.
Art and science
Wargaming – like war – is as much art as science. I contend more so. Talk of art or science is
irrelevant, because wargaming has elements of both: it is an art form overlaid on rational
science. The problem is that art is hard. Creating an effective wargame requires craft and
intuition. Rex Brynen highlighted this in an October 2018 e-mail. I had asked him to address the
‘how to’ of wargaming in a contribution to this book. His reply was that this was ‘…a challenge,
since I’m rarely sure “how to” myself until I’m presented with a particular issue to game!’ That
is a wargaming truism: no amount of rational planning will obviate the requirement for the artist
designer/facilitator to rely, at some (probably frequent) point, on instinct. The issue is that the
number of first-rate wargame ‘artist’ practitioners is severely limited. I remain to be convinced
that good wargaming can be taught to the point where it can be practised as an art form, not
just a series of procedures. Teaching painting by numbers does not create a Monet. Designers
and facilitators can be taught a process, but it takes an inveterate wargamer with multiple skill-
sets plus something indefinable to design and deliver a true story-living experience while
resolving the inevitable glitches along the way. Nor is the ability to do this based solely on
experience. The choices and suggestions of a true master craftsman will likely have been the
same during his or her professional wargame #1 as #1001.
Reputational and connotative issues centred on the name
This should be the least important recurring issue. It should also be dismissed. That is why I
have left it until last, give it short shrift and make suggestions that I hope will lay the issue to
rest. The professional wargaming community has been sailing around this buoy since the days
of von Reisswitz the younger. Writing in 1966, Francis McHugh said, ‘[in 1824]…it appeared
obvious to the originator, Lieutenant von Reisswitz of the Prussian Guard Artillery, that the term
‘wargame’ was not an appropriate title for his invention. It has been applied to the military type
chess games and implied a pleasant pastime rather than a serious endeavour. However, he did
use the name ‘wargame’ only because he could not at that time find one more suitable. Since
then there have been other attempts to find what might be considered a more appropriate name
for the simulation of military conflicts… Despite these proposals, the name ‘wargame’ has never
been uprooted, either by edict or suggestion. This may be because the title is too deeply
embedded in the history and literature on the subject, or perhaps it is due to the more basic
[81]
reason that was discovered by von Reisswitz: one cannot find a more suitable title.’ (My
italics)
My overwhelming experience is that people quickly accept the term ‘wargame’ when it is used
with confidence and in a professional context. The universal military familiarity with Course of
Action (COA) Wargaming is a sound foundation upon which to build. I find that preconceptions
and doubts dissipate as soon as a wargame starts and people register the utility of the
technique. I’m with Francis McHugh on this: my answer to anyone who wants to replace
‘wargame’ with a euphemism is ‘get over it, get on with it, and let the wargaming technique
speak for itself.’
That said, do not fight too hard over this if a customer has a valid reason not to use ‘war’ or
‘game.’ When Dstl deployed their Peace Support Operations Model (POSM) to support
wargames in Afghanistan in 2011, ISAF changed the name of those games to ‘Synchronisation
of Effort Conferences’ because of the preponderance of International Organisation and Non-
Governmental Organisation personnel. Some businesses do not like the term ‘game’ (but are
usually happy with ‘war’, which connotes a competitive environment), so you might use
‘business simulation’, ‘serious game’ or some such. However, only do this if you must, and try
to promote ‘wargame’ as the name of the technique. Certainly, using ‘simulation’ as a
euphemism for ‘wargame’ causes more problems than it solves.
'It is only necessary to have courage, for strength without self-confidence is useless.'
Casanova (1725-1798)
So, we have work to do. Having established that the technique has merit, and that we should
stand tall and call a wargame a wargame, in Chapter 2 we will explore what that word actually
means.
Chapter 2. What is a Wargame?
‘Wargames enable smart people to be smart.’
Peter Williams,
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Australian Defence Science and Technology Group
Introduction
Foremost among the recurring issues discussed in the previous chapter are the lack of an
agreed understanding of wargaming and the absence of a common language. Hence, the
purpose of this chapter is to explain what I mean by ‘wargame’, while noting others’
interpretations.
The first term I would like to clarify is the titular ‘professional’ wargaming. I am a professional
wargamer, in the same way that a professional golfer makes a living from golfing. But that is not
what I mean by ‘professional’ in the context of this book. Rather, I mean ‘used in a professional
manner for serious purposes’.
Why define wargaming?
Defining ‘wargaming’, and confirming its relationship with associated techniques, is important
because:
· Agreed precise language enables effective communication between wargame
practitioners, sponsors and participants.
· We need to know when something is, and is not, a wargame. Designing and delivering a
wargame requires specialist skills, so it is necessary to recognise when such expertise is
required.
During initial discussions about a prospective wargame, it is essential to spend time with the
sponsor to fully understand the requirement and confirm if and how a wargame might satisfy
that. After discussion, if both the sponsor and I are content that a wargame is an appropriate
technique, we can proceed. But there are occasions when it becomes apparent that a wargame
will not do what the sponsor thought it would, or only in conjunction with other tools. Reaching
that understanding is crucial, and can only be achieved when the discussion centres around
mutually understood terminology. Hence, I will:
· Build an understanding of what makes a wargame: the term itself; the essence of a
wargame; key characteristics; and the constituent elements.
· Address the actual definition, explaining how others define a wargame and then
proposing my own.
· Discuss where wargaming can be applied.
The final introductory point is that, per Peter Williams’ quote, wargames are about people. All
other wargame elements and activities exist to enable a discussion between people. The
wargame provides the framework (‘instructional scaffolding’) and context for this discussion,
nothing more. The outputs of the discussion are analysed decisions and insights, while
everything else is an input. I elucidate on this below, but please note it now because it is central
to, and frames, the discussion of what a wargame is.
Towards a common understanding of wargaming
Wargaming Handbook extract

There is no single, commonly accepted, definition of ‘wargaming’. NATO defines a wargame as: ‘a simulation of a
[83]
military operation, by whatever means, using specific rules, data, methods and procedures.’ The importance
placed on the decisions of the wargame players, not contained in the NATO definition, means this handbook uses
the working definition of wargaming contained in the Red Teaming Guide:
‘A scenario-based warfare model in which the outcome and sequence of events affect, and are affected by, the
[84]
decisions made by the players.’
Wargaming is a decision-making technique that provides structured but intellectually liberating safe-to-fail
environments to help explore what works (winning/succeeding) and what does not (losing/failing), typically at
relatively low cost. A wargame is a process of adversarial challenge and creativity, delivered in a structured format
and usually umpired or adjudicated. Wargames are dynamic events driven by player decision-making. As well as
hostile actors, they should include ‘oppositional’ factors that resist a plan. At the core of wargames are:
the players;
the decisions they take;
the narrative they create;
their shared experiences; and
the lessons they take away.
Wargames immerse participants in an environment with the required level of realism to improve their decision-
[85]
making skills and/or the real decisions they make.

The grammar of wargaming

‘Wargame’ is a noun and a verb: the noun names a technique (that need not pertain to war); and
the verb is the application of that technique. The key point is that ‘wargaming’ creates a new
word, as with ‘brainstorming’. Maintaining ‘war’ and ‘game’ as separate nouns elicits unhelpful
connotations and reinforces prejudiced preconceptions. Wargaming has moved beyond that.
Use the word ‘wargame’ with confidence, as a noun or a verb, and without hyphens or gaps.
The essence of a wargame
One of my more important ‘light bulb moments’ happened at Connections UK 2014, when Hans
[86]
Steensma flicked this particular switch. Hans was introducing a business wargame. He
wrote the letters ‘P, D, S’ on a chart, said these were easy to remember using ‘Perla,
Dunnigan and Sabin’, and then told us that they stood for the essence of a wargame.
What did they stand for?
· People.
· Decisions.
· Story-Living.
That’s it! Simple. Some prefer ‘narrative’ over ‘story-living’ due to concerns over the latter
sounding frivolous, but story-living is fine with me. Some say the ‘P’ should be ‘players’, but I
am content to use ‘people’ and ‘players’ interchangeably (and do so henceforth). Ed
[87]
McGrady made the point in his 2015 Connections UK keynote address that ‘play’ itself –
being a combination of players/people and their decisions – is, along with ‘narrative’ the
essence of a wargame.
During a Wargaming Handbook editorial meeting, I asked Professor Phil Sabin to draw the
simplest possible representation of a wargame. He drew Figure 2-1.
 Figure 2-1. The simplest representation of a wargame
The ‘Players’ sphere might be divided into competing or cooperating teams, or cells.
[88]
‘Adjudication’ is ‘the act of determining the outcomes of player decisions’ (and the subject
of Chapter 4). The ‘Outcomes’ and ‘Decisions’ arrows indicate the passage of time, during
which players make decisions and face the consequences of those in a dynamic story-living
process. There are elements to be added (analysis, for example), but Phil’s diagram captures
the essence of a wargame: people making decisions that drive a story-living experience over
time.
Previewing three characteristics of wargaming
I devote Chapter 6 to the essential characteristics of successful wargames. In advance of that
discussion, I need to highlight three of those that help build towards a definition of wargaming.
· Adversarial. In the late 1990s, 3 UK Division produced a guide to Course of Action (COA)
[89]
Wargaming. Their definition of that started with ‘Adversarial by nature…’. Spot on. All
wargaming – not just COA Wargaming – is adversarial (which can be couched in terms of
‘competitive’ in a business context). I discuss an important adjunct to this next, which is
‘oppositional’, and Rex Brynen would berate me if I didn’t mention semi-cooperative games
– but let’s stick to ‘adversarial’ for the time being. ‘Adversarial’ describes the fundamental
wargaming approach, or ethos. It must feature in a definition, and I see no problem
prefacing such with ‘Adversarial by nature…’ But be open-minded: as well as business
competitors, the ‘adversary’ might be, or include, media (if there is a reputational risk) or a
force of nature. Hence…
· Oppositional. The OED defines ‘oppositional’ as, ‘The act of opposing or resisting;
something that acts as an obstacle to some course or progress.’ This encompasses
Clausewitzian ‘friction’, and any ‘spanner in the works’ you care to think of. The
‘adversary’ in an emergency services or humanitarian game will almost certainly be an
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accident, mischance, or act of nature. Barney Rubel says that, ‘…life in general and war
in particular are influenced by thousands of little happenstances that are beyond the
[91]
control of any single decision maker (a true definition of Clausewitz’s “friction”).’ These
frictions are rife in war, so must feature in wargames. William Lind says, ‘Friction is the
inherent condition of war. It is caused by the enemy, by terrain and weather, and by the
foul-ups that occur in your own force. The only way to learn how to deal with it is to train
[92]
with it.’ Being inherent in warfare, oppositional friction must feature in a definition of
wargaming.
· The passage of time. ‘Story-living’ alludes to the temporal aspect of wargaming: people
make decisions that drive a story over time. This differentiates a wargame from a static
 planning exercise. It also highlights the necessity for players to react to events and face
the consequences of their actions. These must feature in the definition.
The elements of a wargame
Wargaming Handbook extract
A wargame consists of various elements, all of which must be present to some degree. No single element
constitutes a wargame. The elements of a wargame are:
1. Aim and objectives.
[93]
2. Setting and scenario .
3. Data and sources.
4. Simulation(s).
5. Rules, procedures and adjudication.
6. Players (and their decisions).
7. Supporting personnel and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).
8. Analysis.

Space, and the fact that it is introductory doctrine, precluded a full explanation of these
elements in the Wargaming Handbook. I explore them in detail in this book, often devoting a
chapter or more to each. For the purpose of defining a wargame, please note the following.
A professional wargame includes all the elements above: they are part of a holistic whole that is
the game. The role of the first five is to enable the successful addition of the vital ingredient:
players. The decisions made by the players will be better, and be better understood, when SMEs
and analysis are integrated.
The first five elements provide a framework and a context for discussion; the last three
generate and make sense of that discussion.
The outputs from a wargame are analysed player decisions and the associated insights.
Everything else is an input to prompt and capture this discussion between players, SMEs and
analysts. For example, adjudicated in-game outcomes are an input that prompts further
decisions and discussion; they are not an output.
Elements 2 through 5 can be entirely manual, computer-assisted, or a combination thereof. I
discuss these later, but want to make the fundamental point now that manual and digital
approaches are complementary and synergistic, not preclusive or exclusive. This is discussed
in Chapter 9 (Appropriate Technology), and the theme recurs throughout the book.
Supporting and associated techniques
I introduce supporting techniques now to establish their relationship with wargaming, but
discuss them in detail later.
Wargaming Handbook extract

Several associated techniques can support, or be supported by, wargaming. These overlap to some extent and,
along with wargaming, add to the ‘tool kit’ of decision-making techniques. Their relationship with wargaming is
important.
· Operational Analysis (OA) or Operational Research (OR) is ‘the application of research and analysis
methods to the systematic investigation of operational problems to assist executive decision makers. In Defence,
it largely involves the application of OA/OR to complex socio-technical problems within the MOD and in
[94]
military/security operations’. Most wargame outcomes are based at some level on OA. OA can directly support
wargaming, while wargaming is often used to integrate OA into planning.
· Modelling and Simulation (M&S) is ‘using models (a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process) as a basis for simulations (methods for implementing
[95]
a model statistically or over time) to develop data as a basis for decision making.’
· Red Teaming is ‘the independent application of a range of structured, creative and critical thinking
[96]
techniques to assist the end user make a better-informed decision or produce a more robust product.’
[97]
Wargaming is a recognised red teaming tool, while red teams often support wargames. However, neither is a
‘parent’ technique to the other; ‘sister’ is a better term.

I discuss M&S elsewhere, making the crucial differentiation between ‘simulation’ and ‘wargame’.
For now, please note what I consider to be the simplest and most useful definitions of each:
· A model is ‘a representation of something’; and
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· A simulation is ‘the exercising of a model over time.’
Matt Caffrey concurs: ‘Many people in today’s military use the terms “modelling”, “simulation”,
and “wargaming” as if they were interchangeable. They aren’t. Models are proportional
representations of the real world [and] are static. When a model is examined over time, it
becomes a simulation. Place an aircraft model in a wind tunnel and observe how it behaves at
[99]
different airspeeds at different moments, and you have a simulation.’

Figure 2-2. MOD Wargaming Handbook diagram showing the strengths, weaknesses and
overlaps between wargaming, modelling and synthetic environments
‘Red Teaming’ remains an extant term but is gradually being replaced by ‘Critical Thinking’.
More on this in Chapter 3 (Misnomers and Misunderstandings). ‘Oppositional’ is the wargaming
characteristic that highlights the requirement for Red Teaming/Critical Thinking, which
challenges assumptions and mitigates cognitive biases such as group think and optimism bias.
‘Wargame’ defined
Previous definitions
I will shortly draw on the above discussion to arrive at a precise definition, but let’s first
highlight the key elements from historical and extant wargame definitions. The phrases and
terms I consider important – either to discard or to carry forward – are in bold. You will quickly
identify a pattern of common terms. I then suggest my own definition. Francis McHugh’s 1966
version is omitted from this survey; I’m saving that for a discussion on training ‘versus’
analysis wargames, and it is included in others’ definitions here. You may wish to review Peter
[100] [101]
Perla’s Art of Wargaming and Matt Caffrey’s On Wargaming before continuing, as my
proposals build on theirs.
US Naval War College, 1824. ‘Exercises in the art of war, either land or sea, worked out upon
maps or tables with apparatus and constructed to simulate, as nearly as possible, real
conditions.’
New International Encyclopaedia, 1916. ‘An imaginary military operation, usually conducted on a
map and employing various moveable devices intended to represent the opposing forces, which
are moved according to rules reflecting conditions of actual warfare.’
The Dictionary of United States Terms for Joint Usage, 1964. ‘A simulation, by whatever means,
of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, conducted using rules, data and
procedures to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.’ This is the genesis of most
[102]
modern definitions, and remains extant in US doctrine.
[103]
Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming. A warfare model or simulation that does not involve the
operations of actual forces, in which the flow of events affects and is affected by decisions
made during the course of those events by players representing the opposing sides.’
Peter recently updated this to 'A warfare model or simulation in which the flow of events
shapes, and is shaped by, decisions made by a human player or players during the course of
[104]
those events.’ I discuss the deletion of ‘that does not involve the operations of actual
forces’ in Chapter 3.
[105]
NATO definition. 'A simulation of a military operation, by whatever means, using specific
rules, data, methods and procedures.'
Draft Wargaming Handbook working definition (replaced by the extant Red Teaming
Guide definition by editorial diktat). ‘A wargame is a structured representation of adversarial
situations, in which outcomes are shaped by the decisions of the players. Effective wargames
generate an immersive narrative which can be used for training, education, planning and
executive decision-making.’
Let’s unpack the key terms from this array.
· ‘Simulation.’ A simulation is the exercising of a model over time. It can be manual,
computer-assisted or computerised. Accepting this removes the necessity to include ‘by
whatever means’ in a wargame definition.
· ‘…opposing sides…’ introduces the adversarial nature of wargames, and can be
subsumed into ‘adversarial.’
· ‘…does not involve the operations of actual forces…’. This means no formed bodies of
troops are deployed. HQs yes, but no actual force elements. This is important because it
excludes field exercises and manoeuvres. The clause should be retained because
exercises etc require different skill sets and design approach than wargames.
· ‘…in which the flow of events affects and is affected by decisions made during the
course of those events…’. This is story-living. It is critical, but the clause might be
shortened – as long as the story-living characteristic is not lost. Phil Sabin suggested: ‘…
in which events and outcomes are shaped…’ It is important to note that events affect
player decisions as well as vice-versa.
· ‘Immersive.’ As you will see in Part 4 (Practising Successful Wargames), immersing
players in the ‘possibility space’ where decisions are made and players face the
consequences of these is key to successful wargames. It should be retained.
· ‘Rules, procedures & data’ are included in the constituent elements of a wargame, so
need not take up words in the definition. They encompass ‘structured’.
To the above, add: the previewed wargame characteristics (adversarial by nature, oppositional,
and the temporal course of events); and the essence of a wargame (players, decisions and
story-living), and you have the ingredients for a definition that synthesises the key terms from
historical and current definitions.
Suggested definition
Adversarial and oppositional by nature, a wargame is an immersive simulation, not involving the
operations of actual forces, in which the course of events shapes, and is shaped by, decisions
made by the players.
After all that, it’s noteworthy that mine is similar to the 1964 (and extant) DOD definition, and
Peter Perla’s from 1990.
Wargaming applications
So, that’s what a wargame is. Where might the technique be applied? I discuss the many
formats, contexts and variants of wargames in Chapter 5. In advance of that, I want to briefly
introduce the general domains to which wargaming can be applied.
Wargaming Handbook extract

Wargames immerse participants in an environment with the required level of realism to improve their decision-
making skills and/or the real decisions they make. Analytical (‘discovery’) wargames can be used to explore
national-strategic, strategic, operational and tactical issues across the full spectrum of military activity. Training
(‘learning’) wargames are a ‘fitness programme for thinking’, enabling practise in the conceptual elements of
command and control. Wargames are widely used by business, the emergency services, academia and
[106]
humanitarians, as well as defence organisations. Historically, wargaming has proved its utility to UK
Defence and remains relevant to today’s problems. In particular, it can be applied to the following areas:
Education and training wargames focus on training personnel, using safe-to-fail environments to allow
participants to practise, experiment and innovate. Wargames are well suited to this because they create
experiential learning opportunities, helping to develop a shared narrative about situations and tasks that
personnel might face in the real world.
Planning wargames are analytical wargames used to develop and test plans for dealing with particular events
or circumstances. Applications span policy, strategic, operational and tactical situations. Their aim is to expose
plans to rigorous examination to identify risks, issues and previously unconsidered factors.
Executive decision-making wargames are analytical wargames that inform real-world decisions. The dynamic
and unpredictable nature of wargames enables players to consider future events, and supports related
decision-making. The intent is to generate insights and data that will increase understanding of, for example,
how:
Situations might develop.
Force structures and concepts might adapt to new challenges.
Science and technology might deliver a competitive advantage.
The distinction between education and training wargames and analytical wargames is not rigid. A wargame
designed for one purpose is also likely to have benefits in the other. However, in 1966, Francis McHugh wrote,
with regard to wargames designed for training or analytical purposes, ‘In practice, it has been found that it is
better to point the game towards but one of those objectives, that is, to select as the primary objective one of
the following: (a) provide military commanders with decision-making experience, or (b) provide military
commanders with decision-making information.’ This is illustrated in Figure [2-3]. Note the final sentence in the
figure: a wargame must be applicable to real-world situations to make it relevant. [107]

[108]
Figure 2-3. The general purposes of wargames
Two fundamental points illustrated in Figure 2-3 need emphasising:
1. Analytical wargames help inform people so they make better decisions, while
education/training wargames help people become better decision-makers.
2. Professional wargame outputs should be applicable to the real world. This can likewise
be manifested in enhancing someone’s decision-making abilities or informing actual
 decisions.
Wargames as an art form
Art and science
I raised this as an issue in Chapter 1. However, the fact that wargaming is an art form is what
makes it so powerful, so I need to explain this apparent dichotomy. It is not a case of art versus
science, but of art and science. Wargames must include rational scientific elements: the
representations of physics (such as missile ranges or movement rates) must be sufficiently
accurate to be credible. Overlaying the people-centric nature of wargames introduces the
irrational human factors that win and lose wars and business campaigns. These emotional
aspects of wargaming demand an approach that is more art than science. Furthermore, it is the
‘play’ aspects of gaming that sets it apart from scientific techniques. Ed McGrady noted in his
2015 Connections UK keynote speech that ‘Games are not simply a linear extension of other
forms of analysis, models and simulations, because you have multiple people
[109]
participating.’
However, reconciling the tension between art and science presents an issue. Ed pointed out
that if you claim your wargame incorporates really accurate models, and that your adjudication
process gives it the exactitude of a computerised simulation, you will lose the argument. It is
the people playing wargames that differentiates the game from rational scientific constructs and
computerised simulations. Play is powerful. It causes players to: change their views; become
emotionally involved; introduce irrationality; and even change the paradigm (“Hey, we’re
examining the wrong problem!”). But many sponsors and users subscribe to the rational
approach, even to the point of viewing humans as agent-based systems that we don’t quite
understand yet. The issue, therefore, is persuading people to adopt an approach that requires
art not just to be overlaid on top of science, but to be accepted as being of equal or greater
importance.
Wargames as an act of communication
[110]
Raph Koster tells us that ‘Pinning art down is tricky.’ He further observes that: all games
are a form of communication; they are media that provide information; games that are
‘entertainment’ provide comforting and simplistic information that is easy to assimilate; games
that are ‘art’ deliver information that is intellectually and emotionally challenging. ‘Mere
entertainment becomes art when the communication element in the work is either novel or
exceptionally well done. It really is that simple. The work has the power to alter how people
[111]
perceive the world around them.’
[112]
Peter Perla addresses wargames as acts of communications in The Art of Wargaming and
Zones of Control: ‘Professor Stephen Downes-Martin at the US Naval War College has argued
that using game decisions as the key information source for wargaming insights is an unreliable
[113]
one. Pursuing this line of thought, Naval War College professor Hank Brightman and
student Melissa Dewey proposed that the true source of useful information and insight available
in a game derives from the conversation among the players as they communicate by both word
[114]
and action. Indeed, wargaming is an act of communication.’
In 1964, William Jones wrote, ‘In my opinion, the two most salient features of crisis games (or
any other sort of team game) are: (1) The rapidity with which the bits of information on the
problem area, known at the outset to individual participants, enter the common information
base of the whole group; (2) The rapidity and accuracy with which individual members of a
game team achieve an understanding of (although, not necessarily in agreement with) the
feelings of their team mates about the situation/problem being simulated. These two features
are, I believe, the main bases for the phenomena remarked on by Tom [Schelling]: the
noticeable post-game improvement in the ability of participants to communicate meaningfully.'
[115]
(Emphasis in original).
Communication occurs on many levels and is multi-directional between (for example): sponsor
and players; multiple players; and players and analysts. Some of these are quite esoteric
relationships, but I want to focus on practicalities that arise if you think of a wargame as a
[116]
‘focussed conversation.’
The implications of wargames as an act of communication are that analysts and training
mentors need to pay at least as much attention to the discussion in player cells as they do to
the decisions themselves and the resultant actions and outcomes. In a large, distributed
wargame, the technical and procedural challenges this presents are significant. As well as
decisions, analysts should capture the factors considered, options rejected and the rationale
for all this. Once a decision is taken, consequences can be examined fully cognisant of the
precursor discussion. This is a significant insight that can shape the entire analysis plan for a
game, be it in an educational or analytical context.
Data capture and initial analysis should focus on the anatomy of a decision; subsequent
analysis on its unflinching autopsy.
Chapter 3. Wargaming Misnomers and Misunderstandings
“When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose
it to mean — neither more nor less."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
Introduction
The pervasive mis- and non-communication I allude to in Chapters 1 and 2 warrants a chapter to
clarify terminology issues. The standard caveats apply: wargaming is a broad church; what
follows are my own views; others will likely raise valid objections; and sparking debate is
desirable. If the latter occurs, the fact that we cannot agree highlights the issue.
‘Simulation’ is not synonymous with ‘wargame’
'The game is in the mind of the players, and the instrumentality of the game is simply a tool to
help get the game into the mind of the players.'
[117]
Peter Perla, Connections UK (2013)
Differentiating ‘simulation’ from ‘wargame’
Conflating ‘simulation’ with ‘wargame’ lies at the heart of many pernicious issues (hence the
inclusion of Figure 2-2 in the Wargaming Handbook). Let’s tease those terms apart. We know
from the previous chapter that simulation is but one element of a wargame. That immediately
differentiates them: an engine is one element of a car, but it is not the car. We also know that, to
have a wargame, you must have players and the decisions they make. Simply stated,
simulation + people = wargame
and not just simulation = wargame. I can understand the confusion, because many peoples’
experience of a wargame involves a computerised simulation, into which many of the other
elements have been subsumed.
As well as players, you also need rules, procedures and adjudication to bind everything
together. The next step, of course, is to add the other elements of a wargame to the equation
above. This combination of all elements is a wargame system, to which the vital ingredient of
players is added. Two examples and two manifestations illustrate the ‘wargame equals
simulation’ misunderstanding.
Example 1: Mistaking a simulation for a wargame
An organisation asked me to assess the cost savings and potential improvements to a wargame
from replacing a computerised with a manual simulation. While that is almost a valid question,
what was not valid was their preferred approach to answering it. I was to: set up the manual
simulation in an empty room isolated from the controlling staff; ‘execute’ my simulation during
the wargame; emerge after two weeks and compare the outcomes and situation to those
generated by the computerised simulation; then, from that experience, evaluate the feasibility of
replacing the computerised with the manual simulation.
I eventually persuaded them that a manual simulation divorced from players is just a map that
would achieve nothing on its own, and was allowed to work in the Control Room. The
fundamental failure to recognise that you need to add people to a simulation to have a
wargame, plus a host of nuances around that, persisted. One such was a primary ‘finding’ (that
we already knew): it is not a case of ‘either/or’ computerised or manual simulations; they each
have strengths and weaknesses and, when used in a complementary fashion, deliver synergistic
benefits. Another (that we also knew) was that the most significant improvements to the
wargame could be achieved by refining the wargame’s processes and rationalising extraneous
resources. These ‘findings’ would have been apparent to an organisation that understood the
basics of wargaming: that wargames are supported by appropriate simulation and enabled by
robust processes.
Example 2: Serendipitous wargames
While demonstrating a wargame to a group of international visitors, one of them admitted to me
that she was not a fan of the technique. She had seen too many ‘serendipitous wargames’ at
which the organiser had booked a room, booked a computer ‘wargame’, arranged for the
players to turn up – and then expected magic to spontaneously occur. Sometimes it did,
because the ‘can-do’ attitude of the military will wring any potential benefits out of an event. But
not, she explained, as many benefits as there should be, and not enough to justify the
expenditure of time, effort and money.
The primary issue, she said, was that the organisers assumed that the computer simulation was
the wargame, and all that was needed to make the event work once you added players. There
was no recognition that you also needed the enabling wargame processes. Her observations
were accurate and her objections to serendipitous wargaming valid: just booking a room, hiring
computers and co-opting some players is unlikely to deliver a good wargame.
If ‘serendipitous wargaming’ is a little prosaic, here are two common and down-to-earth
manifestations of the conflation of simulation and wargame.
Manifestation 1. I am regularly asked if I can shorten the length of time it takes to conduct a
wargame turn. The assumption is that there is a ‘x 2 speed’ button that can be pressed. In fact,
there is a formula that determines the length of a turn: number of participants x complexity of
the situation = time required for the necessary discussion. The turn length can only be
shortened by reducing participant numbers and/or complexity, or by curtailing discussion.
Doing any of these risks factors being insufficiently discussed or missed altogether; or
participants disengaging because their opinion is not being heeded.
Manifestation 2.
'No-one, however smart, however well-educated, however experienced, is the suppository (sic)
of all wisdom.'
Tony Abbott, former Australian Prime Minister (2013)
Despite explaining that a wargame is simply a framework for informed expert discussion, I am
frequently approached at the end of introductory briefings by well-meaning people who want to
send me volumes on non-state actors in the Ukraine, the capabilities of the S-400, counter-
cyber technology etc. Their intention is to pour information into the wargame data base (which
they perceive to be me) so that, brimming with all available information, the simulation will
produce the right outcome when the ‘execute’ button is pressed.
Ellie Bartels comments that, 'One source of the simulation versus gaming conflation is that
"simulation” is the preferred term within the political science community involved in activities
we would think of as games (see for example, the title of the "Simulation & Gaming” journal). As
a result, it is used by a fair number of American think tanks and academics to describe their
[118]
activities. In my experience, these tend to fall in the direction of BOGSATs.'
So, what is simulation?
'More and more we are into communications; and less and less into communication.'
Louis 'Studs' Terkel (1912 – 2008), chronicler of oral histories
Respective examples of manual, computer-assisted and computerised simulations are: map and
counters; spreadsheet-based combat calculators; and constructive computer simulations such
as the US Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). As Studs Terkel alluded to, there is a
widespread pro-technology bias and, in the case of simulations to support wargaming, a
presumption that ‘electrons are best.’ I address this in Chapter 9 (Appropriate Technology).
What is Modelling and Simulation (M&S), and how does it relate to wargaming? As discussed in
[119]
Chapter 2, my preferred definition of ‘simulation’ is ‘the exercising of a model over time.’
‘Model’ is a useful term, but it is cranking that model over time, powered by player decisions,
that drives a wargame.
The M&S industry agrees that a simulation can be live, virtual or constructive.
· Live: real people using real equipment. Think lasers and direct fire weapons effects
simulators.
· Virtual: real people using simulated equipment. Examples include the UK’s Combiner
Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) or first-person shooters such as Virtual Battlespace (VBS).
· Constructive: simulated people using simulated equipment. Computerised examples
include JTLS and the Advanced Battlefield Computer Simulation (ABACUS), which supports
Command and Staff Trainer events.
Those examples are computerised. But most manual simulations also qualify as constructive:
counters or miniature figures represent individuals or aggregated groups of personnel and their
equipment. Figure 3-1 shows the counter ‘fields’ used in the Rapid Campaign Analysis
Toolset (RCAT). Such a manual simulation is effectively a deconstructed constructive computer
simulation. The combat and ‘find’ factors enable algorithms and procedures that are essentially
the same as those in a constructive computerised simulation.

[120]
Figure 3-1. Counter ‘fields’ used in RCAT
‘Wargame’ and ‘exercise’ are not synonymous
The definitional clause ‘…that does not involve the operations of actual forces…’ is important
because it tends to preclude live and virtual simulations from wargames. The British Army (my
background) ‘trains the trainer’: commissioned and non-commissioned officers are taught to
train their subordinates. They are qualified to design and run live-fire ranges, conduct field
exercises, and so forth. If you transpose a section of infantry from a live-firing range into a live
simulation exercise or a virtual trainer, there is little substantive difference in the delivery of live
firing, and live or virtual simulation exercises. Personnel are placed directly alongside, or into,
the simulation, or use adapted real equipment. All British Army officers can design and execute
such exercises; there is no specialist skill required.
That is not the case when designing and delivering a wargame supported by a
constructive simulation. Equipment and headquarters are simulated (usually, although real
communications and IT systems are often used). Integrating people with the simulation to
create the wargame requires bespoke processes, and synthesising all elements requires
specialist skills – those of the wargame designer. If we do not exclude the operations of actual
forces from our wargames, we succumb to the presumption that ‘it’s just another exercise, and
anyone can design that.’ That is incorrect.
Hence, while a wargame is often given an exercise name, it should be considered something
apart. Although this is not one of the more serious misnomers, it is worth bearing in mind.
Terms such as Start- and End-of-exercise (Startex and Endex) and Exercise Control (Excon), are
widespread (I use them liberally throughout the book), and I see no harm in applying them to
wargames – but remain alert to the risk of conflating ‘wargame’ and ‘exercise.’
Training ‘or’ analytical wargames
Should a wargame be one or the other?
Francis McHugh said in 1966, 'The ideal of every wargame is to provide military commanders
with both decision-making experience and decision-making information that will be useful in
real-world situations. In practice, however, it has been found that it is better to point the game
towards but one of those objectives, that is, to select as the primary objective one of the
following:
(a) provide military commanders with decision-making experience, or
[121]
(b) provide military commanders with decision-making information.'
It is now apposite to introduce McHugh’s definition of a wargame (which I withheld in Chapter
2): ‘A simulation of selected aspects of a military operation in accordance with predetermined
rules, data and procedures to provide decision making experience, or decision-making
[122]
information that is applicable to real world situations.’ In Figure 2-3, McHugh considers the
distinction between providing decision-making experience and decision-making information
sufficiently important to fundamentally shape his diagram.
Some reinforce the distinction. In a 2012 PAXsims post, Brant says, ‘On the Joint Staff we are
[123]
using PSOM for planning and analysis. To me, that almost shoots it down as a solution to
[124]
CGSC's [training requirement] right there. Training tools should be focused on training, not
predictive analysis or decision support. Conflating the two because they have similar interfaces
(to people who don't know any better) will result in huge problems with outcomes, and poor
[125]
results on all fronts.’
However, Rex Brynen makes the point that you often don’t have the luxury of deciding whether
a wargame is educational or analytical. Game sponsors demand insights, but also want
participants to learn from the experience, form social or team bonds etc. This reality check is
substantiated by an extract from a 2011 US Naval War College Fleet Arctic Operations Game
(FAOG): ‘In addition to serving as a highly analytic event, the FAOG was designed to enhance
participants’ understanding of potential challenges and cooperative strategies for conducting
[126]
sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.’ Rex notes that, ‘While that differentiation
[training vs analysis] is useful because it points to important differences in purpose and hence
design, I’ve been increasingly interested in the extent to which we might be able to develop
hybrid games – that is, wargames that serve an education/training function, but in which
participants are also generating data that is of analytical value too. My own Brynania civil
war/peacebuilding game at McGill, for example, is designed for educational purposes but has
now been used to generate data for two PhD theses (one on terrorist violence, the other on
educational gaming). While there’s a risk of compromising analytical rigour or educational
effectiveness in doing this, it could also provide a useful way of stretching limited
[127]
resources.’
Does it matter?
It is inevitable that dual benefit will be derived from training and analytical wargames. However,
it remains important to bear the distinction in mind. This is McHugh’s ‘pointing’ to one or the
other, because each needs a different design approach. I explain this in detail in Chapter 12
(Wargame Design), but the essential difference is that the design of a training wargame
focusses on the effect to be enacted on the players, while the design of an analytical game
centres on the examination of a research question.
The distinction should be borne in mind throughout the ‘Wargame Lifecycle’ (see Chapters 11 -
16). For example, higher levels of verification and validation will be required of simulations that
support an analytical wargame, compared to those demanded of a training game (where
outcomes only need be ‘good enough’ to support the training objectives, ensure immersion and
prevent false lessons being learned). However, remain open to the dual benefits that will arise;
approached carefully, these are a desirable spin-off benefit, not a distraction.
‘Course of Action Wargaming’ and ‘wargaming’
Many military personnel erroneously use ‘Course of Action (COA) Wargaming’ and ‘wargaming’
synonymously. This is important because COA Wargaming is probably the most widespread
application of wargaming in the military; it is mandated in doctrine and practised in planning
activities from battlegroup upwards. Failing to recognise that COA Wargaming is just one sub-
set of wargaming risks assuming that everything can be approached as an analytical COA
Wargame. I repeatedly need to make the distinction to prevent people reverting to the COA
Wargame schema as the sole answer to all wargaming problems. Ellie Bartels, researching for
her doctoral thesis, says that, ‘the only place US doctrine discusses wargaming is in the
context of COA analysis. As a result, a shocking number of military officers will tell you that no
other purpose or structure is valid.’ (Ellie’s italics.) I use the diagram at Figure 5-5 to illustrate
this, with a red arrow showing that COA Wargaming belongs in the ‘operational planning’ box,
but that there are many other applications of wargaming. COA Wargaming is explained in
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Chapter 26.
Verification and Validation
This section will be contentious.
The wargaming and M&S communities have reversed the common English meanings of ‘verify’
and ‘validate.’ Unsurprisingly, this switched meaning confuses most users. Wikipedia says of
verification and validation (V&V), ‘In practice, the usage of these terms varies. Sometimes they
are even used interchangeably.’ (My italics.) That is a significant issue, because the terms have
different meanings and are fundamental to wargame design and the supporting simulations.
The accepted meaning of the terms within the systems engineering and wargaming communities
is:
· Verification: ‘The process of determining that a model or simulation implementation
[129]
accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description and specification.’ In
short, is something fit for the purpose for which it was designed?
· Validation: ‘The process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation is an
accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the
model or simulation.’ [130] In short, is something true to reality?
[131]
The above definitions are stated in Zones of Control, showing that they also pervade
hobby wargaming. Now to show that those two terms have been reversed from the common
English usage.
Verify
The root word is the Latin veritas, which means ‘truth’. Veritas was the Roman goddess of truth.
The OED definition is ‘To establish the truth, accuracy, or reality of; to prove to be true;
confirm; substantiate, establish the truth.’ That is the common English meaning: something is
true to reality.
Consider these examples:
· Complete, verifiable and irreversible de-nuclearisation.
 · He attempted to verify the account of the Battle of Hastings.
These every day uses relate to ‘true to reality’. They have nothing to do with ‘accurately
representing the developer’s conceptual description and specification.’
Valid
‘Valid’ originates from the Latin validus, which means ‘strong’, ‘worthy’ or ‘with force’. The OED
definition is ‘To establish the soundness, or legitimacy of; having a sound basis in logic or
cogent; reasonable or defensible.’ Wikipedia says that validation is ‘the assurance that a
product, service, or system meets the needs of the customer.’ That is the common English
meaning: something is fit for purpose.
Consider these examples:
· The plan was proven to be valid.
· To be valid the referendum needs a turnout of over 50%.
These every day uses pertain to ‘strong’, ‘worthy’ and ‘fit for purpose.’ They have nothing to do
with ‘an accurate representation of the real world.’
The Defence Systems Approach to Training
The UK Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) uses the standard English meaning of
validation: an evaluation of training, plans and materials to determine the extent to which
training achieves its intended purpose.
The DSAT meaning of validation, to evaluate fitness against the intended purpose, is the one
used in the Wargame Lifecycle described in the Wargaming Handbook. I adopt the same
meaning in this book.
Implications
In the context of M&S, it clearly matters which word is used, and that people understand what it
means. The questions ‘is the simulation an accurate representation of the real world?’ and ‘is
the simulation fit for the purpose for which it was designed for?’ are very different and very
significant. However, I have no illusions that the terms will revert to the common English usage.
Hence…
The take-away is that you must: be aware of the confusion between the terms; explain what you
mean when you use them; and confirm what is meant by whoever you are speaking to.
Red Cell versus Red Team
People inevitably refer to adversary players as the ‘Red Team’. Of course they do: the Blue
Team are a team, as is the Umpire team. The issue pertains to confusion over the Red Cell and
Red Team, as discussed on p.49. The Red Cell is the enemy; the Red Team are the Critical
Thinkers. A colleague employed at a UK Force Development wargame as a Red Teamer, was told
on arrival that he was commanding an armoured division in the Red Cell. The misnomer is
common, and results in misused expertise and a failure to deliver Red Teaming. Thankfully, the
term Red Team/Teamer is gradually being replaced by Critical Thinking/Thinker.
Scenarios
Scenario writing, development and execution are so important that I devote three chapters to
them in Part 4. I will define those terms fully there; the purpose of this section is to highlight the
fact that a wargaming lingua franca is required. Conversations about scenarios provide
numerous instances of experts in their own field failing to communicate, often without even
realising it.
I attended a presentation on ‘Scenario design’ at an M&S conference. The speaker had been
talking for a few minutes about the ‘scenario’ for a first-person shooter simulation, and I was
confused because she was describing the techniques used for configuring the digital data for
individual vehicles. Whispers around the table confirmed that I was not the only one expecting
the talk to be on something different. At the end, I asked the question, “What do you mean by
‘scenario’?” Her reply was the digital information that constitutes entities within the model; how
the 0s and 1s make a tank look and act like a tank. But she hadn’t thought to clarify that at the
start or, more useful, before the talk, so that we could have decided whether to attend. It hadn’t
crossed her mind that there could even be a different definition of ‘scenario’ other than the one
she used. Most of the delegates were expecting a talk about the background story, or the
‘outline of the plot of a dramatic work, giving particulars as to the scenes, characters,
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situations, etc.’
This should be another misnomer that is easy to address: a definition exists for ‘scenario’ and
‘setting.’ The ones in Part 4 are from the NATO Bi-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive
(CT&ED) 75-3. Suffice to say here that the setting is the geo-political framework within which
the scenario is developed, and the scenario is the crisis-specific story that leads to the situation
being wargamed. I prefer both terms to the historical ‘General Idea’ and ‘Special Idea’, which
sound simplistic.
Cell colours, especially White
I discuss cell colours in Chapter 22 (Controlling Wargames) but include ‘White Cell’ here as
another example of an easy-to-fix misnomer.
The Wargaming Handbook defines the White Cell as ‘National and supranational political
organisations and diplomats; humanitarians; International Organisations and Non-Governmental
[133]
Organisations.’ I use that definition, but some countries, including the US, use ‘White Cell’
to describe Control/Excon. This implies that the White Cell is a game player, or at least playing
in the same way as other cells. That might be the case: Control can sometimes be an active
[134]
player. However, it is usually not, so calling it the White Cell can cause confusion.
Two take-aways
First, we need to sort out these misunderstandings and misnomers. This might require the
governance that I said is lacking in Chapter 1, and this at a cross-community, international level.
Absent that, it’s down to us – the wargaming community – to discuss and agree the necessary
lingua franca. We must do this.
Second, whatever terminology you decide on, or are told to use, ensure that your team
understand it, and that it is briefed to all game participants from the outset.
Chapter 4. Adjudication
‘Good adjudication is the key to successful wargames, whether by a single “umpire” or a large
organisation.’
[135]
MOD Wargaming Handbook
Introduction
[136]
Adjudication is ‘the act of determining the outcome of player decisions.’ It is at the heart of
every wargame. Although a wargame Control organisation (or mechanism) is also responsible
for other activities, the Wargaming Handbook singles out the adjudication of players’ decisions
as its primary function. While other aspects of controlling wargames are important, I find it
helps to classify these as determination, not adjudication. The centrality of adjudication is
illustrated in Phil Sabin’s ‘simplest possible representation of a wargame’ in Figure 2-1. It is so
important that I have placed this chapter in Part 1 (Wargaming Fundamentals), rather than in
Part 4 (Practising Successful Wargames), where some might have expected it.
Figure 2-1 shows players making decisions, responding to outcomes, making more decisions
and facing the consequences of those. A parallel process takes place within the ‘adjudication’
area of the diagram. Unlike most hobby wargames, where adjudication tends to be subsumed
into rigid rules, professional wargames almost always involve human-in-the-loop (HITL)
adjudication, to steer the wargame to achieve the objectives. Some think of adjudication as
umpiring, but it is more than that. It is crucial that those in the adjudication process get, and
[137]
stay, ahead of game play in a variant of the OODA loop. That is a key focus of this chapter.
Adjudication in professional games can also serve to separate, or shield, players from the
detailed wargame systems. This mitigates the risk of players 'gaming the game' and exploiting
rules and mechanics to gain an unrealistic advantage. It is easy to imagine an experienced and
capable military commander struggling against an adversary for no other reason than the other
player better understands how to manipulate the game system. A good adjudication process
should prevent this.
The Wargaming Handbook introduces the technical aspects of adjudication. I will overlay my
experience on those and explain the various methods, models and tools (MMT) that can support
adjudication. These MMT enable adjudication, they are not ‘ends in themselves’. The ‘master’
diagram Figure 4-1 informs this discussion, but contains one element that is not strictly
necessary to discuss adjudication: the level of enquiry being conducted. I offer a brief
discussion of this important adjunct at the end of this chapter because it is closely related to
adjudication.

[138]
Figure 4-1. Broad adjudication approaches and associated factors
Before we go on, I’d like to explain my convention of using ‘control’ with a lower and upper case
‘c’. The upper case ‘Control’ is a noun that refers to the organisation that contains the
wargame’s directing staff; the lower case ‘control’ is a verb. All wargames are controlled; some
feature a Control. I differentiate ‘control’ from ‘adjudication’ to focus the latter on the act of
determining the outcomes of player decisions without being distracted by the myriad control
functions required of a professional wargame (and are discussed in Chapter 22).
Scalability
The scaling of functions and MMT to make them appropriate to the size and scope of any
wargame is easier than it might appear. Irrespective of a whether a wargame consists of one
person playing solitaire or a massive multi-player, multi-national exercise with distributed
players and Control organisation, the functions, factors and MMT I discuss still apply – they are
all scalable. Scalability can dramatically increase the complexity and technical challenges
involved in a wargame, but the principles remain the same.
Conflating ‘kriegsspiel’ with ‘adjudication’; another misnomer
Some of you will have noted the absence of the term ‘kriegsspiel’ from the adjudication labels in
Figure 4-1. ‘Free kriegsspiel’, ‘semi-rigid kriegsspiel’ etc have been commonly used terms for
nearly two hundred years, so why do I marginalise them?
The literal translation of ‘kriegsspiel' is 'wargame' – they are truly synonymous. But ‘kriegsspiel’
(perhaps, more fully, ‘classic kriegsspiel’) has specific and commonly-held connotations within
[139]
the wargaming community: a three-table, manual, 'double blind' wargame format . There is
much right with this type of wargame, but it is not the only form of wargame. Conflating the
same term, 'kriegsspiel', with adjudication causes further confusion. I recently heard a leading
expert, while educating new wargamers, say, “The difference between free- and rigid-kriegsspiel
is critical” and then, moments later, “Adjudicating a kriegsspiel is hard work, with all that
running between tables.” The first sentence pertains to adjudication, the second to the wargame
format. Experienced wargamers would have followed this conversation, but the risk of confusing
newcomers and non-wargamers is significant – and easily avoided.
Wargaming Handbook extract

While adjudication is just one of the variants that produce different wargames, it is common to all wargames and is
of primary importance. Ranking adjudication as the principal variant does not imply that the others are
unimportant. Quite the opposite: the other variants generally take the majority of wargame design and
[140]
development effort. However, adjudication requires the most careful consideration and so is placed foremost.
[141]
Adjudication is the act of determining the outcome of player decisions. It enables consequences to be
[142]
highlighted and discussed, and options to be explored. The methods of adjudication are as follows.
[143]
Free adjudication. The results of interactions are determined by the adjudicators in accordance with their
professional judgment and experience.
Rigid adjudication. The results of interactions are determined according to predetermined rules, data and
procedures.
Semi-rigid adjudication. Interactions are adjudicated by the rigid method, but the outcomes can be modified or
overruled by the adjudicator.
Minimal/consensual. Adjudication is by the collective opinion of players and the adjudicators.
Several tools and techniques can be used to support adjudication.
Operational Analysis. Operational analysis informs the adjudicator(s), typically by presenting a spread of outcomes
such as the best, worst and most likely cases. Using this to inform the decision influences adjudication in the
direction of a rigid outcome.
Computers. Computer assistance in the form of a ‘plug-in’ model or spreadsheet ‘combat calculator’ likewise
informs the adjudicator’s pending decision. Like Operational Analysis, the influence is towards a rigid outcome.
Computerised simulations exert an even stronger influence in the direction of rigid adjudication. Commonly used,
computerised simulations can provide the entirety of the adjudication function.
Moderation. To moderate is defined as: cause to be less extreme; to move towards the medium or average
[144]
quantity. Moderation is used to steer a wargame to achieve specific training objectives, or to lessen extremes
in an analytical event. Moderation is generally used during semi-rigid adjudication, and can influence the decision
in either direction (towards an average expected outcome). However, moderation has perils, since shifting towards
average outcomes can all too easily side-line important conclusions about the vulnerability of plans to chance and
bad luck.
Role-play. Defence wargames sometimes include an element of role-play, but are rarely only role-play. Role-play
can exert a strong influence towards free, or consensual/minimal, adjudication. Constraining role-playing actors’
interactions can reduce this influence, but that risks lessening the benefits of role-play (free thinking creativity).
The ultimate expression of role-play is completely open-ended games featuring consensual adjudication. There is
[145]
some evidence, when considering human conflict situations, that role-play is a better predictor of outcomes
than either a single ‘expert’, or game theory, or simulated interaction and unaided judgement for forecasting
[146]
decisions in conflicts.

Staying ahead in the adjudication OODA loop

Before we discuss adjudication methods in detail, I’d like to say some more about the
‘adjudication OODA loop’ in professional wargames where HITL determination is part of the
adjudication process. Those involved in this process need to be sufficiently ahead of the game
play (and, hence, players’ decisions) to enable well-considered adjudication decisions.
‘Observe’ relates to the players’ planning process, be this one- two- or multi-sided. ‘Orient’
could be replaced by ‘Premeditate.’ The possibilities considered during this premeditation are
determined during ‘Decide’, once the players’ decisions are known. The results are then
presented to the players during ‘Act.’ OODA could be OPDA (Observe – Premeditate – Decide –
Act), but everyone understands OODA, so I’ll explain the process in those terms.
This adjudication OODA cycle requires significant effort by Control staff. But premeditation is
perfectly possible if the processes exist to support it, because professional wargames involve
player planning before decisions are enacted. What the wargame controllers need to do is get
inside the player planning cycle.
An example of an opportunity lost
Sadly, the best example to illustrate this is a negative one. It involved a missed opportunity at a
wargame at which, as an observer, I was unable to intervene. A situation arose in an operational-
level educational wargame in which the Blue Cell decided to disembark an amphibious brigade to
threaten the adversary’s rear; then withdraw all supporting shipping due to a maritime threat,
leaving the lightly-equipped marines ashore for several days facing a potential armoured
counter-attack. This was a player HQ decision, which was over 24 hours in the making. The
wargame was one-sided: the Red Cell (enemy) was part of Control. As the situation developed,
and the understanding grew within Control of the players’ plan to land, then abandon, the
marines, I thought, “What a wonderful opportunity for the players to face the consequences of
their own decision.” The unsupported marine brigade could become a target of a counter-attack.
For the Blue players, planning and fighting that battle would have become a joint effort involving
land, air, maritime and logistics components simultaneously, and would have required
synchronisation between current operations and future operations. This was precisely the
learning outcome desired, and it would been arisen entirely from the players’ decision.
Unfortunately, the Control processes were insufficiently mature to premeditate a response to the
potential situation. Part of the reason was a ‘battle rhythm’ that was slaved to servicing the
computerised simulation and scenario management tools. Despite the situation evolving slowly,
and being apparent to Control, a hasty last-minute decision was taken to conduct an ineffectual
‘drive-by shooting’ by a Red armoured brigade. This definitive adjudication decision was taken
by the Game Controller, under pressure to attend an imminent review meeting of the
computerised simulation outcomes. The ‘drive-by’ took place, the marines suffered minimal
casualties and logistics expenditure, and withdrew to the beaches for evacuation some days
later – and a wonderful learning opportunity went begging. This was because: there were
insufficient processes in place to premeditate emerging potential situations; and the HITL
adjudication process was subordinate to the requirement to service the needs of the computer
simulation.
Broad methods of adjudication
The MMT in Figure 4-1 are explained in detail in Chapter 24 (Generating Outcomes) but
introduced in the Wargaming Handbook extract above because they feature throughout the
book. The Wargaming Handbook’s basic descriptions of ‘free-‘, ‘rigid-‘ etc adjudication are clear,
but I want to overlay some examples and practicalities.
· Rigid adjudication. Results and outcomes are applied exactly as dictated by the MMT
(such as look-up tables or computer outcomes). Examples include nearly all
hobby wargames, where Combat Results Tables (CRT), computer algorithms etc generate
outcomes. Both stochastic (involving an element of randomness) and deterministic (no
randomness) methods can be applied to rigid adjudication.
· Semi-rigid adjudication. This uses a rigid adjudication MMT outcome as a starting point,
but includes a HITL element to modify (moderate) that to decide the final result. This allows
the direction the wargame takes to be controlled. An example is a Course of Action
Wargame, in which the Chief Controller is typically briefed by the Operational Analysis team
on the ‘worst case’, ‘best case’ and ‘most likely’ outcomes, and then selects, or moderates,
whichever of these best suits the game’s purpose.
· Deliberative. I didn’t include ‘deliberative’ as a discrete method of adjudication in Figure
4-1 because it is more a style of, or approach to, semi-rigid adjudication. RAND introduced
me to the term, [147] which means ‘relating to or intended for consideration or
[148]
discussion.’ Using a deliberative approach, a prospective result is proposed to experts
and/or players, factors are introduced and weighed, and an outcome agreed. This forces a
discussion (as opposed to ‘open’ adjudication which is simply a transparent presentation of
outcomes). As well as involving everyone in the adjudication process, the forced
conversation: enhances player recall; assists scribing; and reinforces the nature of the
wargame as an act of communication. Time allowing, semi-rigid deliberative adjudication is
my preferred method, because it provides a rational start point that is then subjected to
inclusive expert scrutiny.
· Free adjudication. This is typified by a person, or a small team, deciding outcomes based
on their own experience and expertise. There are usually no, or few, MMT used to inform
decisions. The obvious risk is that outcomes depend entirely on the judgement of the
adjudicator. Further considerations are that free adjudication: places great responsibility on
the judgement maker; is unremitting and can be exhausting; and relies on a strong
personality to avoid argument.
· Minimal/consensual adjudication. An outcome is discussed in a committee of several, or
all, Control staff, experts and/or players and a decision reached, ideally by consensus. It
often features in seminar-style games where deciding and agreeing outcomes is difficult
due to the complexity (‘messiness’) of the problem.
As a counterpoint to the above, at an educational seminar given by Rex Brynen and Tom
[149]
Mouat to Dstl in June 2018, Rex discussed adjudication under three headings: types, turns
and transparency. ‘Types’ pertained to the bullets above; ‘turns’ centred on the different
approaches required for continuous versus time-stepped games; and ‘transparency’ involved
maximising open adjudication unless inappropriate.
Ellie Bartels adds, ‘One additional style of adjudication that I’ve used but not seen written up
[150]
(though I describe it superficially in my ZOC essay) is “peer adjudication” where a blue cell
builds a plan and the other team responds to it as a red cell which is then passed back to blue
directly with minimal umpire injects. This approach has aspects of both free and consensual
adjudication but feels a little different than both as described here.’
Supporting methods, models and tools
MMTs support adjudication, which remains the central function. It is easy to forget that they are
not ends in themselves, especially when complex and expensive computer applications are
used. It too often becomes the case that the computer becomes both master (outcomes are
treated as inviolable) and beast (the demands to feed it data overwhelm the wargame process,
as in the example just cited). The same risk can apply to the other influencers on Figure 4-1.
These can, if not controlled, become more important than the adjudication. This phenomenon
can be caused by forceful personalities, rank or seniority, and unclear objectives.
Human-in-the-loop determination
HITL determination means that someone makes the adjudication decision, even if this is simply
‘rubber stamping’ an outcome produced by another MMT. HITL determination does not apply
when using a rigid or minimal method, which is why the line does not extend into these areas.
Note that it is a line, not an arrow. That is because HITL adjudication does not exert an influence
in one direction or another: someone simply confirms, or decides, the outcome.
Moderation
Moderation is a common adjunct to HITL determination, usually (but not always) moving
outcomes towards the average, or expected, result. Like HITL adjudication, it enables Control
staff to steer a wargame towards achieving the desired objectives. Heed the final sentence in the
Wargaming Handbook bullet point ('…moderation has perils, since shifting towards 'average' outcomes all
too easily side-lines important conclusions about the vulnerability of plans to chance and bad luck.'). 'Smoothing
out' results is not always desirable – but is something that the military tend to do. There is a fine
balance to strike. Allowing outcomes from either end of the results bell curve risks having
players blame luck or the adjudicator. They might disengage from the wargame because they
think the result unfair or unrealistic. But moderating adverse results precludes examination of
‘outlier’ results, and prevents players becoming comfortable with uncertainty and adverse
outcomes.
Operational Analysis
OA is discussed in Chapter 24 (Generating Outcomes). Suffice to say that, while no OA
practitioner will claim it is an exact science, OA assists adjudication by adding rational science.
The arrow points towards the more rigorous end of the adjudication spectrum because of this
application of science. But remember that, ‘The more precise you want the answer, the more
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precisely wrong it will be.’
Computer-assisted tools
Computer assistance ranges from using a laptop to capture data through to using computer
simulations to derive outcomes; hence the line stretches the entire length of the diagram. Dr
Karl Selke discusses the pros and cons of computer and manual simulation in Chapter 9
(Appropriate Technology). The pertinent point now is that automating manual MMT such as
look-up tables should not result in hiding them in a ‘black box’; inputs and outputs must remain
transparent.
Computerised tools
I discuss the various types of computer simulation elsewhere. The key points that pertain to
adjudication are:
· A completely computerised tool is one with no player input, such as a Monte Carlo
simulation. Hence, most computer simulations used to support wargames are computer-
assisted: they still rely on human operators to make decisions.
· It is difficult to adjudicate real-time computer simulations. It is possible (I explain how
later) but requires robust and well-considered processes.
Real-world applicability
The green cones on Figure 4-1 relate the applicability of adjudication to the level of complexity
of the wargame context (the problem). Dstl label these cones 'wicked' (messy) through to
bounded (clear). 'Wicked' problems feature multiple soft factors and population-centric
situations, and so adjudication methods towards the left side of the diagram are more
appropriate. Bounded problems tend to be more kinetic and sterile, are easier to model
according to the laws of physics, and so more computerisation is appropriate in adjudicating
such outcomes. Tom Mouat uses the labels ‘creativity and original thought’ through to ‘rigour
and analytical precision’. The correlation with the adjudication approach is clear. However,
consensual, free and semi-rigid adjudication can deliver amazing insights into tactical, kinetic
subjects of analysis, so be flexible.
Levels of discovery
Similarly, some methods of adjudication tend to be more appropriate to wargames at particular
levels of discovery. However, apply this broad principle flexibly. While the distinction between
these categories is important, the yellow arrow is a continuum: wargames rarely fall neatly into
one category. All the adjudication approaches can deliver useful outcomes under any of the
three ‘level of discovery’ categories.
· Understanding. Participants’ basic understanding of the context and scenario will be
enhanced. Physical- and human-geography will be assimilated. Tom Mouat tells a story of a
wargame at a senior HQ that examined the threat posed by Russia to the Baltic states. A
high-ranking participant asked, “What is that area, and why does it matter?” The answer:
“Kaliningrad…” That is the point of ‘understand’ wargames.
· Insights. Participants will comprehend which factors and interactions are at play, and
which are significant. During wargaming to support experimentation into a new UK Army
capability, it quickly became apparent that a lack of integral gap-crossing equipment would
severely constrain its proposed use. Similar insights arose concerning logistics, medical
support and other essential capabilities. The surprising thing was that these apparently
obvious factors only arose during game play, and came as a shock to participants. The
gap-crossing issue reminded me of the Punch cartoon at Figure 4-2. I am constantly
amazed at the number of fundamental insights thrown up by game play.

Figure 4-2. 1981 Punch cartoon

· Evaluation. We are now firmly into the analytical space. Analysts and players scrutinise
and test specific capabilities, equipments, courses of action, doctrine and/or force
structures against an agreed set of criteria and variables. Advantages and disadvantages
become clear, and the detailed examination of factors such as logistic and cognitive burden
are possible. To achieve this, increasing rigour is required of the MMTs that support
adjudication, and of the adjudication process itself. However, do not expect – or claim –
‘answers’ from such wargames. Outcomes might indicate subsequent research is
warranted, and/or add weight to findings from other activities, so it is crucial that the
outputs of a wargame form part of a wider experimentation campaign.
Chapter 5. Wargame Formats, Contexts and Variants
‘Space is big. Really big. You just won't believe how vastly, hugely, mind-bogglingly big it is. I
mean, you may think it's a long way down the road to the chemist, but that's just peanuts to
space.’
Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy
Introduction
There is no commonly accepted taxonomy of wargame ‘types’, and loose language and deep-
[152]
rooted preconceptions abound (not least in my own mind, I am sure). Long-time grognards
tend to have strong views about what wargame format works best. Users of professional
wargames often persist with the form of wargaming they were first introduced to, or are most
familiar with, attempting to apply that format to any problem, irrespective of how appropriate it
is. Course of Action Wargames are a case in point, as discussed in Chapter 3. There is no such
thing as a one-size-fits-all wargame solution. The wargame practitioner needs a toolbox of
methods to apply as applicable, probably combining several approaches to meet a specific
requirement.
This chapter proposes a wargaming taxonomy to stimulate debate; and enable informed
communication when determining the correct wargame format and variant to meet the
requirement of a specific context and purpose.
‘Type’ or ‘format’?
In the Wargaming Handbook, we used ‘type’, ‘context’ and ‘variant’ to classify the permutations
and combinations of wargame approaches. The most problematic of these terms is ‘type’, which
can connote all things to all people. Fred Cameron, one of the contributors to this book, uses
the term ‘formats’ and I now prefer that: it talks to wargames being a medium, and alludes to
different methods of delivering what can be the same underlying game. Phil Sabin’s Fire and
[153] [154]
Movement can be played using an entirely manual or a computer-assisted format . The
[155]
Euro game 7 Wonders is undisputedly a board game, but you can play it as an app on a
tablet. Does that make it a computer game? No: the medium is different, but the games are
exactly the same. ‘Type’ does not tease out this crucial distinction; ‘format’ does.
The Wargaming Handbook extract below introduces the subject, but the table at Table 5-1
develops this and summarises my proposed classification. There is no relationship between the
table rows: they are simply listings. You can imagine a three-dimensional space with the axes
being ‘format’, ‘variant’ and ‘context’. Within this, there are a huge number of intersections.
[156]
I then turn to some leading experts of wargaming formats and contexts to introduce these,
and I make some points of clarification myself.
Wargaming Handbook extract

Wargame types, contexts and variants

Wargames are many and varied. There are many approaches and techniques which produce numerous wargame
types. Wargames therefore take many forms and they can be almost unrecognisable from each other. There are
many different tools and techniques that can be applied to a wargame. The interaction of these many axes can
produce a wide number of wargame variants. Because there are so many types and variations, it is not sensible to
precisely classify wargames.
There are many contexts to which a wargame can be applied. These reflect the span of human competition and
imagination and are not limited to the levels of warfare, domain or environment.
The many combinations of wargame type, variant and context is the reason why the size, scope and technical and
procedural complexity of wargames can be so different. [157]

Wargame formats
Common game and wargame formats are introduced below, except for computer-assisted,
because that is discussed in detail in Chapter 9 (Appropriate Technology). For now, be mindful
of the distinction between ‘wargame’ and ‘simulation’ discussed previously, especially with
regard to computerisation. Almost all professional wargames are computer-assisted to some
degree. Hence, I find it more useful to consider the degree of computerisation as a variant.
However, it is almost inevitable that people will refer to ‘computer wargames’ (although there is
no such thing as a computerised wargame because you cannot computerise the vital ingredient
of players), so I retain computer-assisted in the table, even though this will probably be in
support of, or subsumed into, one of the other wargame formats.
 Format Context Variant
Educational or
Board Number of sides
training
Number of
Seminar Analytical
players
Map/chart & Number of force
Defence
counter elements
Representation
Course of
Business of force
Action
elements
Emergency Size of play
Matrix
Services space
Distributed or
Role-play Academia
co-located
Degree of
Kriegsspiel Humanitarian intelligence
provided
Megagame Hobby Narrative driver
Historical, through Method of
Sand table/
contemporary to generating
miniatures
future outcomes
Command
Post Level of discovery Size of Control
[158]
Exercise

Computer- All Degree of

assisted [159] control
environments

[160] Degree of
PMESII PT computerisation
Method of
Grand strategic to sharing
micro-tactical situational
awareness
Complex through
well-bounded
Original creative
thought through to
rigorous analysis

Table 5-1 Wargame formats, contexts and variants

Another ‘format’ missing from my list is Table Top Exercise (TTX). Official UK definitions are so
vague the term could mean almost anything. For example, ‘Table top exercises are based on
simulation, not necessarily literally around a table top. Usually, they involve a realistic scenario
and a timeline, which may be real time or may speed time up. Usually, table tops are run in a
single room, or in a series of linked rooms which simulate the divisions between responders who
[161]
need to communicate and be co-ordinated.’ The US Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation
Program defines a TTX as: 'A tabletop exercise involves key personnel discussing simulated
[162]
scenarios in an informal setting.' If someone uses the term, make sure they define it; you
might find one of the formats listed below is what they actually mean.
Board (‘Euro’) games
Think traditional family board games – but much better. Many still cite Monopoly and Risk as
examples, but the art and science of board games has advanced far beyond these. Since the
mid-1990s, increasingly sophisticated games, designed primarily in Germany and France (hence
‘Euro’ games), have significantly raised the standards and level of cerebral challenge. Games
such as 7 Wonders, Settlers of Catan and Terraforming Mars are beautifully produced, involve
entrancing game mechanisms and often emphasise strategy over luck. The vast majority of
board games are formal systems, using fixed rules and rigid adjudication.

Figure 5-1. AFTERSHOCK (2015), a humanitarian board game that teaches some realities of
dealing with humanitarian disasters
Board wargames - Volko Ruhnke
Board wargames model military conflict on a tabletop. They often feature unit pieces on a
geographic map, but can use just cards or other displays. Most hobby board wargames
portray specific historical conflicts, from soldier-on-soldier tactics (Sniper! 1973), through
military operations (Wilderness War, 2001) and regional politico-military affairs (Here I Stand,
2006), up to global grand strategy (Twilight Struggle, 2005). Some concern very recent,
present-day, or future conflicts (Labyrinth: The War on Terror 2001 -?, 2010, or the Next War
series, from 2012). Professional wargaming has built upon that hobby tradition for Defense
training and research. Most importantly, board wargames include a rulebook to govern play
and resolve all situations that the players and chance might create.
Figure 5-2 GMT Games Fire in the Lake. Photo courtesy of the US Army War College
Seminar wargames - Fred Cameron
Seminar wargames exhibit the elements found in other formats, but with some changes in
emphasis. The players generally sit around a table and conduct a structured discussion
concerning what has happened or might happen in coming moves. They may have a map, and
counters to represent resources, or cartographic products rendered by a computer. More
stress is placed on discussing what is happening and why, and less on specific moves of
resources, detections, engagements, and the like. Seminar wargames have a reduced focus
on systems – e.g. platforms, weapons, sensors – than other wargames. In other formats the
performance characteristics of such systems are represented with considerable fidelity. In
seminar wargaming, there is more discussion of decisions and their consequences, and
subsequent decisions and further consequences. Adjudication tends to be consensual or free.
Seminar games are good at generating discussion and identifying group consensus. Their
weakness is that they tend to gloss over the details of operational reality.
Map/chart & counter wargames
A map/chart & counter wargame is played on actual maps/charts, or a simplified version of
these. Counters can be replaced by 3D blocks or models to ensure they can be seen.
Colloquially called 'heavy cardboard' games by recreational wargamers, map/chart & counter
games are flexible, cheap, and can be applied to almost any context, and so are a prevalent
wargame format.

Figure 5-3. RCAT ‘High North’ wargame

Sand table and miniatures wargames
These wargame formats respectively use physical 3D terrain and miniature models (‘minis’),
often combined. The use of miniature models is most common in hobby wargaming, but has a
place in serious games. Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) miniature vehicles and figures – and
[163]
the associated wargame rules – are commonly used for training purposes . Single models
representing individual soldiers can be used to examine micro-tactics using ‘skirmish’ wargame
[164]
rules. Literal sand tables or other forms of 3D terrain can also serve a serious purpose, for
example when examining combat in a high-rise environment. They are but a short step from the
soldier’s ‘model making kit’ used to brief patrol orders and the like.
Matrix games – Tom Mouat
Matrix games are different to standard wargames. In a matrix game, there are few pre-set rules
limiting what players can do. Instead, each is free to undertake any plausible action during
their turn. The chances of success or failure, as well as the effects of the action, are
determined through structured argument and discussion. This process enables imaginative
game dynamics that are lively and open-ended, and yet grounded in reality. The game system
crowdsources ideas and insight from participants, thereby fostering greater analytical
understanding. Players use words to describe why something should happen, then the
facilitator and the players decide how likely it is. You might roll dice to see if it happens (but
equally, in the face of a compelling argument, you might not need to). If you can say, “This
happens, for the following reasons...” you can play a matrix game.
Scenario Planning
Scenario planning is related to business wargaming (see below). It has a particular structure,
which is why I include it in ‘formats’. However, it is not wargaming, because it tends to lack one
vital characteristic: players immediately facing the consequences of their decisions. As
[165]
described in Scenarios: The art of strategic communication, scenario-based planning as
commonly practised tends to be a more static affair than a wargame. Participants are faced with
a scenario, and their views and responses are elicited. But these responses are then
[166]
analysed and presented back to participants after the event, not immediately adjudicated
and reinserted into an ongoing decision – outcome – decision cycle. Scenario planning can be
turned into a wargame by incorporating a rapid adjudication function appropriate to a business
context.
Role-play games
Role-playing games (RPG) use immersion to generate empathy, with players assuming an
alternate identity, becoming an alter ego and shaping and experiencing the story in and as that
persona. Manual RPG are like a ‘special form of collaborative acting, but the computerized
versions tend to put a much heavier emphasis on increasing the statistical definition of your
character. A game with role-playing elements is typically one where the character you play can
[167]
become more powerful over time.’ The best-known example is Dungeons & Dragons (D&D),
but the range of RPG is large, extending, for example, to examinations of aspects of the
[168]
holocaust. RPG are important because: 'Games Mastering’ RPG is excellent training for
[169]
wargame facilitators, and of great benefit in developing game design skills ; role-play
enhances the realism of wargames by enhancing player immersion and engagement; and RPG
are an excellent way to explore human factors.
Kriegsspiel - General Andrew Sharpe
Kriegsspiel is an adversarial, free-play, umpired wargame, originally developed in the
Nineteenth Century by Prussian army officers to contribute to the rejuvenation of their military
capability after the defeats of the Napoleonic Wars. Two or more opposing teams are given
orders, make an appreciation and deploy their forces on the map. The umpire tells them what
they can see, and the players give orders to their forces. The umpire then arbitrates combat,
using their own judgement or rules, or a combination of both. Kriegsspiel came of age in the
lead-up to the Franco-Prussian war and has been used extensively by various armies as a
 training, mission rehearsal and force development tool ever since. Umpiring can be based
simply upon expert opinion, or upon carefully drawn-up rules. As an example, the Camberley
Kriegsspiel was developed by the British Army’s Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict
Research in 2017. Participants plan and conduct operations against live opposition using
standard maps to allow for force-on-force free play. The system allows for the simulation of
several hours of realistic but simple combat operations. The focus is on intelligence,
manoeuvre and combat, with uncertainty and the fog of war being essential elements. The
sequence of play generates realistic, active and continual decision-making cycles. Both sides
plan and play over their own map without being sighted to their opponents’ maps. Once the
planning phase is complete and umpires have updated the master map, the execution phase
commences in a sequence of overlapping player turns. Umpires coordinate intelligence and
update players on what they know of the enemy based on the actions carried out by both
sides. The game requires a minimum of two players and an umpire, but is best played as
competing teams with a primary umpire and Red and Blue Cell umpires.
Megagames – Jim Wallman
A megagame is characterised by its size and structure. Megagames often involve fifty or more
participants. They have many similarities with academic political - military games. The key
elements are:
· Multiple teams. The megagame is generally used where there are multiple actors involved
in, or with perspectives on, the scenario. It is rare for a megagame to be simply 'Blue vs Red'.
· A hierarchy of teams or a hierarchy within teams. This is a natural consequence of the
multiplicity of teams, but also often an important part of the megagame dynamics.
· Open possibilities. A megagame is open-ended, allowing a wide range of possibilities
through emerging game play and the player-determined narrative. A general principle is that
the game should accommodate anything that could be done in real life, regardless of pre-set
rules or procedures.
· Meaningfulness. A megagame is most effective where there are relevant and meaningful
interactions both between, and within, teams. Complete player engagement in a
megagame generates the best learning outcomes or insights.
· Sense of urgency. There must be time pressure and a sense of urgency. Players are
given limited time to make decisions, and the game moves at a pace that is not primarily
determined by the players. In terms of understanding the decision-making process, time
pressure can generate important insights.
Course of Action Wargaming
A Course of Action (COA) Wargame is a systematic method of analysing a plan in a conscious
attempt to visualise the ebb and flow of an operation or campaign. Adversarial by nature, a COA
Wargame superimposes friendly and hostile plans, and oppositional and neutral elements in time
and space to generate insights and identify risks, areas of weakness and necessary
coordination in a forming plan. It provides a structured discussion among experts, often using
judgement-based adjudication (and so is akin to a seminar wargame). In common with other
forms of analytical wargame, a COA Wargame will raise questions for subsequent examination
rather than provide immediate answers.
COA Wargaming is an essential part of the military decision-making process, and is mandated in
the doctrine of most Western militaries. Hence, COA Wargaming: is probably the most
commonly used type of wargaming across Defence; is accepted by military personnel, providing
effective repudiation of anyone who stigmatises wargaming; presents a familiar schema to the
military, which increases the likelihood that they will understand other types of wargame; and
the turn mechanism provides a familiar start-point for other wargaming constructs.
Figure 5-4. HQ 12 Brigade COA Wargaming. Photo courtesy of HQ 12 Brigade.
Command Post Exercises
A Command Post Exercise (CPX) is, in many ways, the quintessential expression of a wargame,
involving players making decisions and facing the consequences of those in an immersive story-
living experience. The ‘command post’ might be military or emergency services and will usually
be set up to replicate an actual operational headquarters. The audience could be individual
commanders or their staffs. A Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) is a form of CPX, usually
involving a natural disaster or emergency.
Wargame contexts
The purpose of a wargame
The first two entries in the ‘context’ column at Table 5-1 equate to the broad purpose of a
wargame, as expressed in Figure 2-3, where McHugh divides wargames into those that ‘point’ at
either education/training or analysis. Figure 5-5 is a diagram I find useful when framing, or
prompting, discussion on the purpose and potential applications of wargaming in a Defence
context. Reflecting McHugh’s diagram, I use it as an introduction to a discussion of formats,
contexts and variants.

Figure 5-5. The broad contexts of Defence wargaming

Academic and educational wargames – Philip Sabin
Education is striving to improve all aspects of delivery and to maximise student
engagement and depth of learning. As part of that trend, school and university teachers
increasingly use wargames of various kinds as active learning to help their students grasp
conflict dynamics in an engaging and informative way. Much the most common form of
educational wargaming is role-playing, in which individual students adopt the roles of leaders
or organisation heads and negotiate with others to develop strategies to achieve their
objectives in a simulated international crisis. ‘Model UN’ games are an example where
students themselves often take the lead in organising the activity. However, some teachers
 also use simple board or computer games which have been published commercially or which
they have designed or tweaked themselves to simulate conflicts in a more structured and
rules-based way. There are even a few teachers such as myself who get their students to
design wargames, forcing them to research and understand their chosen conflict in great
depth and to engage with all the challenges of creating an accurate yet playable game model.
Wargames are also starting to be used as a methodology for academic research, going
beyond the game theoretical calculations which became popular in economics and strategic
studies two generations ago to include carefully documented crisis role-playing by experts
and retired officials, as in the Carnegie-funded wargames at King’s College London in 2017-18
to study the strategic impact of missile defence.

Figure 5-6. Phil’s MA 2018 class students playtesting their wargame designs
Historical wargames - Philip Sabin
The great majority of hobby wargames model conflicts which have already occurred, from
ancient times to the most recent wars. Around half of hobby wargames model battles or
campaigns from World War Two. Historical wargames aim to capture the observed
characteristics of their chosen conflict, while allowing players to refight the conflict for
themselves and to explore how events might have gone differently. They range from tactical
games such as the Call of Duty series (2003) to grand strategic games such as Hearts of
Iron (2002). Professional wargames are more likely to have contemporary or future settings,
but historical scenarios are also used for a variety of purposes.
Professionals use historical wargame scenarios to educate players about the dynamics of the
past conflict or crisis, or to develop general command and leadership skills (complementing
activities such as battlefield study tours), or to test the validity of generic wargame systems
by seeing whether they can capture the dynamics of known past conflicts.

Figure 5-7. The RCAT system being validated in Phil’s office in 2015, in an unclassified historical
scenario based on the 1982 Falklands War and with the participation of two veteran
commanders from that conflict, General Julian Thompson and Commodore Michael Clapp
Business Wargames - Hans Steensma
Business Wargames (BWG) are the application of wargaming to a business context. They can
utilise COA Wargaming, board wargaming, seminar wargaming, matrix gaming, or a
combination of wargaming formats. BWG engage and inspire people to think and act
differently from a more traditional training or meeting environment. They give meaning to
business ‘battles’ in various situations, ranging from engaging competitors, exploring the
future business battlefield to countering a hostile take-over. Encouraging staff to consider
 their ‘gut feeling’, assembled work experience and their network/creativity, results in a gaming
format that can be played at short notice. A BWG is a relatively low-cost intervention, which
might have a huge impact on the future track of a business. Co-providing insightful
information during a game-process is not only rewarding for the elected players, but can bring
together diverse minds in a challenging game setting.
Hobby Wargames - John Curry
The hobby market for wargaming is vast, sprawling, and dwarfs professional wargaming. For
example, the largest company, Games Workshop, had a revenue of £158 million in 2017. The
company behind the online game World of Tanks, was valued at £1.14 billion in 2016. The
wargaming hobby includes board games, miniatures, computer games and conceptual games
such as matrix games. The games cover practically all eras of history, including current and
future confrontations. It should be noted that although English is the dominant language of
wargaming, other nations have their own traditions. The issue with using hobby wargames for
professional purposes is assessing the accuracy of the game when not an expert in that topic.
A wargame is a visualisation and generalisation of a particular confrontation, and it takes time
to establish the validity of the designer’s model. Some hobby games companies and some
designers are better than others for professional purposes. Wargaming innovation is
continuous, with a recent example being matrix gaming. Every year, new ways of gaming are
proposed, for example to model cyber or hybrid warfare. Routinely, these developments come
from the hobby market due to the commercial pressure to innovate, the absence of security
restrictions preventing the free exchange of ideas, the scale of the wargaming development in
the hobby and the rapid testing of the new at an almost continuous series of hobby
conventions.
Miniatures wargames, where the units involved are represented by miniature figures/ vehicles/
ship/ aircraft etc need a mention. Although using miniatures is not currently popular, it should
be noted that they were widely established and accepted during the development of
wargaming. An early example is RUSI’s Polemos (1888), which used figures on Ordinance
Survey maps, but other examples include the Fred Jane Naval Wargame (1898-1918), the
United States Naval War College, Dunn Kempf (1977-1997), Blockbuster (1984) and Contact!
(1980). There are two key reasons for using miniatures in tactical professional wargaming.
Using scale models teaches recognition as part of the hidden curriculum. Secondly, miniatures
allow flexibility to game any scenario with a minimal set up time. For example, the games of
Dunn Kempf and Contact! were played on tabletop representations of training areas and likely
battlefields on the central front in Europe. It is likely that, as professional wargamers grows in
confidence, miniatures will again dominate tactical level wargames.
Complex/well-bounded, creative thought/rigorous analysis and level of discovery
These contexts were discussed in Chapter 4 and feature on Figure 4-1. They determine the
necessary level of complexity of the wargame.
Wargame variants
Most of the variants that follow can be applied to most wargame formats and contexts. Largely
self-explanatory, I present examples from each end of the spectrum to illustrate the diversity of
approach that different variants demand. Again, note the distinction between ‘wargame’ and
‘simulation’; the latter is often the variant in question.
Number of sides: one through many-sided
The number of sides refers to the number of actors and factions being actively played. A one-
sided wargame has just one side (usually Blue), with all other actors and factions represented
by Control. A wargame in which Blue contains multiple cells (branches, departments, staff
functions or levels of command) remains a one-sided wargame. Most CPX-style wargames,
irrespective of size, fall into this category.
ISIS Crisis is an example of a multi-sided matrix game: the US, Iran, ISIS, the Iraqi Prime Minister
Haider al-Abidi, Sunni Opposition and the Kurdish Regional Government. Sides might be sub-
divided into discrete cells, for example if there are divisions within a group.

Figure 5-8. ISIS Crisis matrix game

The US Naval War College War Gamers’ Handbook lists a 1½ -sided wargame as well as a 1-
sided game: ‘A 1½-sided game also includes one player cell, with the opposition furnished by a
control group, but with scenario injects developed during game execution.’ [170] This alludes to
Control being a player, something that Stephen Downes-Martin talks to in his Adjudication: The
[171]
Diabolus in Machina of War Gaming paper. Stephen makes a compelling case that
Control will inevitably act as a player – even the dominant player: ‘If the game objective is to
explore novel situations for which we do not have sufficient history or case studies to construct
credible outcome results tables then we have an inductive game in which the adjudicators are
equally as inexpert as the players. Or, if we have an inductive game with credible outcomes
tables dealing with well understood situations, then the adjudicators are by definition players.
There is no mitigation of this. The real danger is for games (inductive or deductive) in which
members of the adjudication team deliberately attempt to manipulate the outcomes to support
some stakeholder desire that conflicts with the sponsor’s objectives for the game. The size of
the wargame does not address this issue. Since it is inevitable, I treat it as an opportunity –
recognise the adjudicators’ unavoidable role as a player and collect more and better data by not
ignoring adjudicator decisions and discussions.’
I have not found this situation to be inevitable. If you do encounter it, either accept the
inevitability as Stephen does and exploit it to collect more and better wargame data, or work
with the sponsor to mitigate it.
Number of players: solitaire through massive multiplayer
John Butterfield’s D-Day at Omaha Beach (2009) is an example of a manual solitaire
hobby game: you can play solo or as a pair, playing against the simulation, which controls the
Germans.
The US Warrior Preparation Centre (WPC) events and the CPX elements of NATO’s TRIDENT
exercise series are examples of massive multiplayer wargames. Participants number thousands,
from many nations and all Services. Spread across the globe, these wargames are still
controlled by one Control organisation, albeit with remote sub-organisations.
Number of force elements: a few through many each side
One of Phil Sabin’s design principles is to limit the number of force elements (FEs) to forty or
less. His 1914 Kriegsspiel represents FEs at the corps level, of which there are twelve on each
side.
 Figure 5-9. Phil Sabin’s 1914 Kriegsspiel
At the other end of the spectrum, large-scale professional wargames, such as those run by
NATO and the WPC, can feature thousands of FEs, as well as local populations, armed non-state
actor groups etc.
Level of modelling of force elements: entity/platform-level through highly aggregated
I discuss an ‘aggregated modelling line’ in Chapter 24 (Generating, Outcomes). This line applies
equally to manual and computer simulations. Below it, modelling is conducted at the platform
level, using Line of Sight (LOS) checks, and probabilities to hit, kill and so forth: p (hit), p
(kill) etc. Above the line, forces are aggregated, and use force ratios or other game mechanisms
to determine outcomes.
Figure 5-10 shows manual simulation FEs at the entity/platform level and aggregated.

Figure 5-10. Examples of counters used to model a single entity/platform (left) and an
aggregated unit (right)
Representation of ‘soft’ factors: none (entirely kinetic) through social science modelling of actors’ and
populations’ perspectives at all levels
Many simulations do not feature soft factors; they are entirely kinetic, and poorer for that. Rex
Brynen addresses the modelling of soft effects in Chapter 10 (Incorporating Non-kinetic Effects
and Semi-cooperative Play into Wargame Design). Any wargame that does not feature soft
effects and human terrain ignores the fact that war is a human affair and fought among the
population. Ellie Bartels comments that, 'Even if we are unsure about how to represent soft
factors, choosing to exclude them or rely on players to represent the mental and moral spheres
of conflict represents either a systematic bias or a completely opaque approach to modelling. In
both cases we are undermining our representation of conflict.' If soft factors do not feature in
the game, they will not be considered and played, either by Control or by the players. A simple
example is shown in Figure 5-11. This represents soft factors, which prompts expert discussion
and human adjudication rather than attempt to model them.
Figure 5-11. A simple representation of soft effects and human terrain using RCAT ‘sticky’
[172]
Marker Tracks and Intelicons™
Size of play space: small (sub-tactical) through global (geo-strategic)
A valid approach to investigating individual soldiers’ equipment enhancements is to use 1/32nd
scale figures (54mm tall) and ‘skirmish’ rules. ‘Micro-tactics’ and capabilities such as mini
unmanned aerial systems, remote sighting systems and programmable-distance grenade
launchers can be examined. Computer or console first-person shooters such as Virtual
Battlespace (VBS) could also be used.
At the other end of the spectrum, the US Global series of wargames and the board game
Labyrinth: The War on Terror 2001 –? (2010) use most of the planet as their play space.
Amount of intelligence provided: closed through open disclosure
An open game is one in which everyone knows everything, with all forces displayed. In a semi-
open game, one or more sides’ dispositions and movements are known only to Control and,
maybe, to one or other side, with FEs being revealed as appropriate by Control. Enemy play in a
COA Wargame is usually semi-open. A closed game is one in which information and intelligence
is only revealed to players as they would ascertain it in reality; a so-called ‘intelligence view’.
Degree of computerisation: manual through computer-assisted to computerised simulation
The spectrum of potential computerisation is enormous, and discussed in Chapter 9
(Appropriate Technology). The – usual! – point to note is that none can be considered an
exclusive solution to all wargaming requirements: they are complementary and must be used as
appropriate.
Method of generating outcomes
I cover this in Chapter 24 (Generating Outcomes). For now, note that many of the methods,
models and tools (MMT) used to generate outcomes blur, overlap and are used in combination.
These include, but are not limited to: human determination, stochastic and
deterministic methods, various random number generators (including dice), argument-based,
cards, fixed rules, computer simulations, and look-up tables.
‘Turn’ length: real-time through turn-based cycles of months or even years
I discuss the derivation and execution of time-stepped turns in detail in Chapter 22 (Controlling
Wargames). These can cover virtually any length of turn in time-stepped games. The Wargaming
Handbook points out that many ‘real-time’ simulations still work in steps, generally of no smaller
than 30 seconds. Role-play should be considered a real-time simulation. It is an example of the
challenge facing the adjudication team working with a real-time simulation: how do you get
ahead of the evolving narrative to exercise a degree of control over the outcomes? Once the
role-players start talking, there is little that Control can do to credibly moderate whatever
[173]
happens.
Narrative driver: open-ended through pre-determined, pre-scripted events
Excessively pre-scripted events that significantly constrain player decisions are arguably not
wargames. However, some games demand strict control to ensure they meet their objectives.
Attaining the nirvana of correctly balancing the primacy of player decisions with the necessity of
controlling the game is best achieved by using the lightest of Control touches. I discuss this in
Part 4.
Method of sharing situational awareness, and the number and type of table/display: single table or
screen through many – including distributed – computer displays
The range of this variant is enormous. While some wargames use just one table, or display,
most professional wargames feature a combination of manual and digitised approaches,
especially when situational awareness has to be shared. As soon as you broach a distributed
requirement, you almost certainly need computers.
Size and composition of Control: none through large, distributed, Control organisations
Most hobby wargames are controlled by the rules, procedures and rigid adjudication, and so
have no Control organisation. Conversely, almost all professional wargames have a Control,
ranging from one person to hundreds in distributed locations. However, the functions of Control
remain the same, irrespective of its size, as I discuss in Chapter 22. This is an example of
scalability.
Conclusion
There is no one-size-fits-all wargaming solution. The permutations of wargame formats,
contexts and variants is enormous. Almost every professional wargame will require a bespoke
combination of these. As well as resisting the tendency to apply a previously used wargaming
solution to a new problem without due thought, wargame practitioners must be able to classify
and communicate to everyone the multitudinous options available to a wargame project. I hope
this chapter will spark the debate necessary to advance this process.
Space is big. Wargaming likewise. Discuss.
Part 2: Establishing the Conditions for Successful Wargames
‘Wargaming is a powerful tool. I am convinced that it can deliver better understanding and
critical thinking, foresight, genuinely informed decision-making and innovation.’
[174]
General Gordon Messenger, UK Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Chapter 6. Essential Characteristics of Successful Wargames
‘One thing a person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his analysis or heroic his imagination, is
to draw up a list of things that would never occur to him.’
Thomas Schelling
Introduction
I begin Part 2 with a review of the characteristics found in successful wargames. These are
different from the elements of a wargame explained in Chapter 2. Characteristics are less
obvious and, in some cases, intangible: a game of rugby needs a ball, pitch, players, rules and a
referee (elements), but might only be considered ‘good’ if it is played in a competitive but
sporting spirit, is exciting and – from the coaches’ perspective – the reasons for success or
failure are apparent and actionable (characteristics).
Note the addition of ‘appropriate adjudication’, ‘soft factors’ and ‘simplicity’ to the
characteristics listed in the Wargaming Handbook, and the expansion of ‘oppositional’. There
might be good reasons why your wargames do not feature all the characteristics listed but, if
any are missing, you should ask yourself why in every case. The essential characteristics that
your wargames should feature are:
· Adversarial.
· Oppositional ‘friction’.
· Chance.
· Uncertainty.
· Primacy of player decisions.
· Freedom to fail.
· Engagement (and fun).
· Cheap, frequent and played in small groups.
· ‘Soft’, non-kinetic factors.
· Control.
· Appropriate adjudication.
· Transparency.
· Analysis.
· Wargaming within a wider context.
· Appropriate technology.
· Simplicity.
Adversarial
‘[The power of wargames] ...lies in the existence of the enemy, a live, vigorous enemy in the next
room waiting feverishly to take advantage of any of our mistakes, ever ready to puncture any
visionary scheme, to haul us down to earth.’
William McCarty Little, US Navy (1912)

‘Adversarial’ is a key – perhaps the key – characteristic of wargaming. Wargaming is a competitive intellectual
activity, and the primary challenge is usually provided by a combination of:
· Opposing players representing active, thinking and adaptive adversaries and competitors; and
[175]
· Wargame controllers using the level of threat as a variable.
According to my definitional discussion, if a wargame is not to some extent adversarial it is not a
wargame. A planning exercise might be a challenging intellectual activity – but it is not a
wargame. The adversarial characteristic of wargaming ensures experiential learning, demands
innovation and adaptive thinking, and introduces the prospect of failure. The McCarty Little
quote highlights the critical requirement for players to face suitably qualified, thinking people.
Unfortunately, playing the intentions and capabilities of Red (enemy), Orange (armed non-state
actors), Black (organised crime) etc into a wargame is too often insufficiently considered, both
in training and analytical wargames. I will return to this in more detail in Chapter 7 (The Wargame
Team).
How does a one-sided wargame deliver this adversarial characteristic? This is a function of
Control. Determining the level of adversarial challenge, and how this vital control lever is
managed is a critical consideration that I discuss in Chapter 22 (Controlling Wargames).
The adversarial characteristic of wargames is crucial, but there are nuances you need to be
aware of. Be careful that emotionally engaged players do not become confrontational. It is a
small step from adversarial to confrontational, and the change can occur quickly. Be alert for
indicators and take immediate action; a wargame that becomes confrontational can quickly
become counter-productive (as well as unpleasant). Note, also, the concept of ‘semi-
cooperative’ wargames, set in contexts such as inter-agency operations or coalition activities.
[176]
These are discussed by Rex Brynen in Chapter 10.
Oppositional

Operations rarely unfold as we wish, even in the absence of adversaries or competitors, so ‘oppositional’ friction,
[177]
in the Clausewitzian meaning, should also feature. This can be introduced by a red team [Critical Thinkers] or
wargame controllers. The red team challenges assumptions and, in conjunction with the wargame controllers, can
introduce friction.

[178]
Oppositional factors, and the means of introducing them to your wargames, should be
considered during the wargame design and development phases. Mechanisms to do this
include:
· Critical Thinking/Red Teaming. A primary method of injecting friction, be aware that
Critical Thinkers/Red Teamers can become unpopular, and so need support.
· Scenario injects and random events (typical of hobby wargames). Chapters 19-21 cover
injects in detail. These are a Control function that requires meticulous planning and
rigorous execution.
· Asking ‘What if?’ questions during analytical wargames. You will note a specific ‘What if’
serial in the Course of Action Wargaming process in Chapter 26. Note the distinction from
‘So what?’ questions.
Chance
‘War is the province of chance. In no other sphere of human activity must such a margin be left
for this intruder. It increases the uncertainty of every circumstance and deranges the course of
events.’
[179]
Carl von Clausewitz

Chance is an ever-present characteristic of warfare, and so must feature in wargames. It is an expression of risk,
which is a fundamental concept that all military personnel should be experienced in calculating and managing;
wargaming allows this in a safe-to-fail environment. Chance plays a key role in handling the extensive middle
ground between inevitable failure and confident success. The element of chance is most easily generated in a
[180]
wargame by using random number generators.

Space precluded a fuller discussion of chance in the Wargaming Handbook. I hope you do not
need persuading of its importance – but others might. I explain the spiel I use to introduce the
role of chance in Chapter 24 (Generating Outcomes), but paraphrase that briefly here. Military
folk venerate Clausewitz, as do many business people. Clausewitz's 'Paradoxical Trinity' is ‘…
composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural
force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and
of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason
[181]
alone.’ My simplification of that is that Clausewitz’s Paradoxical Trinity comprises passion,
logic and chance. Chance is the ‘intruder’ in Clausewitz’s quote; it is certain to play a part in war
and so must feature in wargames.
Uncertainty

Uncertainty and the fog of war are fundamental characteristics of warfare, and should be considered in a
wargame. Experiencing uncertainty fosters a robust mental capacity among players, better allowing them to deal
with adverse outcomes. It often leads to new, and unexpected, situations and insights. Active, thinking
opponents and the element of chance are the primary means of introducing uncertainty into a wargame, but
other methods include:
· Hidden movement, until forces or intentions are revealed by intelligence;
· Unclear or unspecified aims and intentions, including those of allies, actors and factions other than the
adversary;
· Random events appropriate to the scenario such as bad weather, political interference, media scrutiny or
mechanical breakdown affecting operations; and
· Altering the sequence of play, which can allow one side to ‘steal a march’ or get inside the decision-making
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cycle of the other.

Adversarial, oppositional, chance, friction and uncertainty are clearly interrelated. However,
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when designing and delivering wargames, each deserves discrete consideration.
The primacy of player decisions

The players are the protagonists. Their combined behaviour should determine the course of a wargame.
Maximising story-living, with all its benefits, takes place when the narrative is driven by player decisions and when
players face the consequences. During execution, this requires wargame controllers to allow a dynamic, open-
ended narrative to evolve. Care should be taken to avoid:
· Presumptive answers influencing analytical wargame design and execution so that outcomes inevitably
reinforce these preconceptions; and
· Excessively predetermined events in a training wargame that constrain player decisions and constrict a
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dynamically evolving narrative.

The second bullet reinforces the necessity to address the recurring issue of excessive pre-
scripting that I introduced in Chapter 1 and discuss in Chapters 19-21 (Scenario Writing,
Development and Execution).
Freedom to fail
‘If you're willing to fail interestingly, you tend to succeed interestingly.’
Edward Albee (Reader’s Digest, 2012)
and, more down to earth (figuratively),
‘Failure, the greatest teacher is.’
Yoda, The Force Awakens
Safe-to-fail. Wargames can provide a safe-to-fail environment, where mission command is practised and ‘thought
experiments’ undertaken with no fear of failure. Commander Field Army said in January 2017: ‘Delegate and foster
mission command in barracks as much as in training. Be bold and reward boldness. Release the genie from the
junior commander bottle. I don’t want failsafe (except in security, money, Service complaints and law). I want safe-
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to-fail – providing the reason is positive.’ Wargames that involve undue assessment of participants,
consciously or subconsciously, stifle innovation, risk-taking and the opportunity to learn. The Israeli Defence
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Force perspective is that, to learn, the trainee has to fail, be surprised and be mentally challenged.

These are fine words – which I rarely see put into practice. The ‘genie will only be released from
the bottle’ when all senior officers engage with wargames by actually playing them, accepting
the risk of their own failure in front of their peers and subordinates, and encourage their
subordinates to do likewise with no fear for their careers. William Lind says, ‘Wargaming should
play a much larger role in courses of instruction. The purpose of gaming should not be to see
who wins or loses, nor to attempt to “prove” certain specific approaches. There should be no
“school solutions”. Rather, it should be to teach students to make quick decisions through a
coherent, logical, thought process, while under pressure. General F.W. von Mellenthin, a 1937
graduate of the German War College, has told of the frequency and importance of wargaming at
that school. He stressed that there were no “right answers”. A student was never told his
decision was wrong. He was criticized for only two things: failure to make a timely decision, and
inability to give a logical, coherent explanation for his decision. But if he made either of these
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errors, he was criticized severely.’
‘Freedom to fail’ particularly applies to business contexts. Business wargames offer a safe-to-
fail environment where strategies can be implemented that carry too much risk to attempt for
real. In the actual world, any suggestion of falling profit margins or share prices can lead to
instant dismissal and loss of livelihood, so it is often too risky to attempt bold plans. These can
be trialled in the safe-to-fail environment of a wargame.
‘You win, or you learn’
I don’t know who coined the phrase ‘you win, or you learn’, but I first heard it from Professor
Phil Sabin at Connections UK in 2013. It perfectly sums up one of the key reasons to wargame: it
is far better to make mistakes in a safe environment where no-one will die or lose their job than
to wait to make them on live operations.
Small, cheap and frequent

Recent United States experience shows that the majority of wargames should be cheap, frequent and played in
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small groups. While some wargames are necessarily large, a ‘cheap and frequent’ approach maximises
learning opportunities and allows innovations to develop in subsequent games. Single wargames conducted as a
‘box ticking’ exercise generally fail to build on the educational process or analytical findings.

Pareto’s Law applies to wargames. Also known as the 80/20 Rule, the Law states that you derive
80% of total effect, or benefits, from the first 20% of resources applied; to then strive for the
final 20% of realised benefits requires 80% of the effort. Small, cheap and frequent wargames,
played iteratively, will deliver 80% of insights and innovations, while a large, comprehensive
game that might deliver the final 20% of benefits will be expensive and time consuming.
This turns on its head the current tendency for wargames to be large affairs that are so
expensive that they happen infrequently. It is a characteristic of successful wargames that I find
is bubbling up to the top of that list in importance, and I increasingly advocate the approach.
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) or Modified Off The Shelf (MOTS) games provide an easy
option for playing games frequently and cheaply. Small groups of players executing iterative
wargames with an opportunity to learn between these will elicit more insights than a single large
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event. This is the case in an analytical or training context. Larry Bond’s Persian Incursion is
a good example of a COTS game used by small groups of Pentagon planners. It is a game about
Israeli air strikes to disrupt the Iranian nuclear programme, but the mechanisms can be applied
elsewhere. Bond’s introductory quote is instructive:
‘What an [analytical] wargame can do is show which interactions are important. Simple study will
not reveal them – there are just too many. “Banging the rocks together” gives all the factors full
play. One game will be instructive. A second game may reveal a pattern. By the third play, both
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sides will know what drives the situation.’ (My italics.)

Figure 6-1. Persian Incursion

An article in The Economist in 2014 reported the following about Persian Incursion: ‘...playing a
wargame is like receiving an intelligence briefing. It forces players to grapple with myriad
cascading events, revealing causal chains they might not imagine... During official gaming
sessions, analysts peer over players’ shoulders and challenge their reasoning. Afterwards, they
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incorporate the insights gleaned into briefings for superiors.’
Engaging – even fun!
Following official advice, we shied away from using the word ‘fun’ as the Wargaming Handbook
section title – but that is what I meant! The quote below was also removed during editing.
‘I think there’s a good case to be made that having fun is a key evolutionary advantage right next
to opposable thumbs in terms of importance. Without that little chemical twist in our brains that
makes us enjoy learning new things, we might be more like the sharks and ants of the
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world.’
Raph Koster
We rarely conduct professional wargames for fun, but they can be fun. And hard work, and
challenging. Wargames are art, and good art is challenging; expect to come away from a quality
wargame having been intellectually and emotionally stretched, with your perspective on the real
world altered. Raph Koster classifies this as fun. I agree.
Engagement is critical to successful wargames. Chapter 18 (High-Engagement Games) is at the
centre of this book in every sense. I won’t pre-empt that discussion, but please register now the
importance of player engagement.

Engagement. Challenge and professional satisfaction should be inherent in all games, but wargames should also,
where appropriate, be fun. This in no way undermines the serious nature of wargames. ‘Fun’ is an acceptable
term; it is a primary factor in ensuring that players engage. Engagement, through active learning, leads to better
internalisation of training lessons and greater analytical insight. This effect extends to wargame designers, support
staff and observers.

Senior officer engagement

Another aspect of engagement is that by senior leadership. Wargames are seldom successful if
unsupported by the chain of command. Despite your best efforts in designing and delivering a
good wargame, players will follow the lead of their boss: if he or she is disinterested, they will
be, too. It is noteworthy that, in his 1824 demonstration to the Chief of the Prussian General
Staff, von Reisswitz asked General von Muffling to provide the scenario General Idea and
Special Idea. The General was immediately engaged, and the subordinate players, following his
lead, fascinated.
It is not enough for a senior officer to decree a wargame be held, then step away and leave that
delegated decision to a subordinate to enact; they must stay engaged and demonstrate their
commitment to the game. Do your utmost to ensure senior leader engagement and support.
‘Soft’, non-kinetic factors and human factors
The validity of any wargame that does not consider soft factors, non-kinetic capabilities and
human terrain must be questioned. Rex Brynen addresses this in Chapter 10 (Incorporating Non-
kinetic Effects and Semi-cooperative Play into Wargame Design).
A broader context for action
‘Human terrain’ should encompass actors and factions at the level at which the wargame is set,
but also above and below this. In many wargames, the ‘higher’ human terrain extends into the
geo-political space, and will include many and diverse organisations, none of which are likely to
be military. If you do not consider the representation of the human terrain at all appropriate
levels, your players will operate in a vacuum. This is a wasted opportunity to practise interacting
with the relevant human strata, and can lead to false lessons being learned.
Control

Control is the minute-by-minute activity that ensures the wargame proceeds as required to address the problem. It
most often takes the form of a wargame control team, which can range from one person to hundreds sharing
[193]
distributed systems in many geographical locations.

I’ve discussed control and Control previously, and devote Chapter 22 to these essential topics.
Appropriate adjudication
Note the broad adjudication approaches and associated factors at Figure 4-1. You need to
ensure that the adjudication approach you select, and the supporting methods, models and
tools are appropriate to the real-world applicability and level of discovery of your wargame.
Transparency

Simulation outcomes, and the reasons for these, should be clear and open to scrutiny. This allow participants to
understand the dynamics of a situation. When adjudication is based on transparent calculations there is a clear
understanding of how the outcomes have been derived. Transparency is equally important in training and
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analytical games.

I discuss transparency in Chapters 24 (Generating Outcomes) and 25 (Affirming and Presenting

Outcomes). It is another crucial factor.
Analysis
Analysis can range from an informal discussion after a hobby wargame to a large After Action Review (AAR). The
wargame design and development process should determine the analysis plan, which will include the size and
frequency of AARs, along with the staff and processes required to enable analysis. In-game and immediate post-
game analysis are part of execution. Post-game analysis can only take place if sufficient data has been captured in-
game. Constant reference should be made to aspects related to analysis.
a. Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP). The DCMP is fundamental to analytical wargames. Pre-game, it
will dictate aspects of the scenario and the activities to be wargamed. In-game, it must be checked to ensure
enough relevant data is being collected.
b. The AAR process. Some AARs occur daily or more frequently; some wargames only feature them at the end. In
all cases, the systems and sub-processes required to enable AARs and feedback must be borne in mind
throughout wargame design and execution.
c. Lessons identified. A lessons identified log should be readily available to all wargame participants throughout
execution. This is used to collect and collate lessons identified and issues arising as the wargame progresses; it is
too late to ask for these at the end, when they are long forgotten.

Analysis is one of Rex Brynen’s ‘Three Pillars’ of good wargames. It permeates all activity from
conception through design, execution and refinement. I devote Chapter 8 to it, primarily written
by Margaret Polski and John Scott Logel from the US Naval War College. Also note the
contribution by Stephen Downes-Martin in Chapter 16 (Wargame Refinement), which discusses
AARs and other forms of in- and post-game analysis.

Wargaming within a wider context

Wargames provide greatest utility when used iteratively within a wider decision-making process. For example,
Defence experimentation recognises the necessity to combine different techniques in a series of inter-connected
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events. The Integrated Analysis and Experimentation Campaign Plan (IAECP) is accepted best practise. A
multi-technique, integrated approach enables a ‘cycle of research’, which is: ‘an iterative application of the
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principal tools the military uses to explore, understand, and prepare for future conflict.’ Wargames are one
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potential component. The principle applies to all wargaming, whether analytical or training.

This wider context, including the cycle of research and IAECP, is covered in Chapter 8
(Analysis).
Appropriate technology

Appropriate supporting simulation. All wargames require simulation. There are many instances where this can be
manual, rather than computerised; even role-playing is a form of simulation. Computer and manual simulations
each have strengths and weaknesses and are usually complementary. All types of simulation should be
considered, and an appropriate solution determined. Whatever supporting simulation is selected, there is generally
a requirement to incorporate a human-in-the-loop, usually as part of the adjudication process.

Appropriate technology is the subject of Chapter 9. Technology supports your wargames: ‘the
instrumentality is not the game’; and ‘wargame’ is not synonymous with ‘simulation.’ In his
keynote address to Connections UK in 2013, Peter Perla commented that when von
Muffling saw his first kriegsspiel in 1824, he didn’t see maps, counters and rules (the
instrumentality); he saw the wargame happening in the minds of the players, with the same
thought processes engaged as on staff rides and live operations. The instrumentality – the
supporting technology – is only there to inform, or affect, the players.
Simplicity
'It is very difficult to keep a game-design project simple. Once you get going, there are
tremendous temptations to add this and that. A game design is a very dynamic activity. It soon
acquires a life of its own, asking questions and providing parts of answers. The game
designer is sorely tempted to go deeper and deeper. Without some years of experience and a
high degree of professional discipline, it is extremely difficult to do an unsimple game that is not
a truly incomprehensible one. For a game is, in addition to being a source of information, also a
form of communication. If the information cannot be communicated, the game does not work.
You’ve got to keep it simple.'
[198]
Jim Dunnigan
You must fight to keep your wargame simple. Too many people offer WAGIIs (‘What A Good Idea
If…’) or CORGIs (‘Commanding Officer’s Really Good Idea’) with little understanding of the
implications. As Jim Dunnigan warns, wargames are also prone to ‘mission creep’, with the
areas being examined spiralling out of control. There is always pressure to add more detail,
examine more subjects of analysis and so forth. I have lost count of the times I’ve heard the
phrase, “We do not have time to ‘boil the ocean’, so will concentrate on x…” – and then we
press on and try to boil said ocean, adding to the scope and complexity of the wargame.
Ironically, a well-designed and well-run wargame looks simple – but isn’t. This is the same as
watching any expert at work, and belies the hard design and development work that has
delivered an apparently effortless wargame. It leads to people erroneously thinking, “That’s easy
– I can do that.” The following quotes are self-explanatory soundbites you can use to introduce
or shape a discussion on the necessity to keep wargames simple.
‘Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.’
Einstein
‘Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. It takes a lot of hard work to make something simple, to
truly understand the underlying challenges and come up with elegant solutions.’
Steve Jobs (the first sentence was Leonardo da Vinci)
‘Everything in war(gaming) is simple, but doing the simplest thing is difficult.’
Clausewitz-ish
Accuracy versus playability (simplicity)
‘Simplicity in manual games is achieved by abstracting ancillary elements through game
mechanics.’
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Robert Hossal
The tension between accuracy and playability is at the heart of most wargame design dilemmas.
Brian Train said during Connections UK 2013 that, ‘Games should be simple, and teach basic
principles and dynamics quickly; everything else is an add-on that can distract from this
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fundamental requirement.’ Phil Sabin devotes a chapter of Simulating War to this, entitled
‘Accuracy vs Simplicity’. I can express it no better than Phil, so here’s a short quote to end the
chapter. You should also read the rest of Phil’s chapter, pp.19 – 30, and p.68, too.
‘Perhaps the most pervasive trade-off affecting all human attempts to understand the world in
which we live is that between accurately capturing the almost infinite complexities of reality and
keeping our models simple enough to be grasped by ordinary minds and used as a practical
guide for action… Above all, it is crucial to remember that a simple wargame that is played will
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be more instructive than a detailed wargame that is not’.
Chapter 7. The Wargame Team
‘It is important to make one thing clear at the very start; designing and delivering a wargame is
an art, not a science. Experienced military officers, practised operations research analysts, and
accomplished computer programmers are not necessarily capable of designing useful
wargames. Although some or all of the knowledge and skills of such people are important tools
for a wargame designer to possess, the nature of game design requires a unique blending of
talents.’
[202]
Peter Perla
Introduction
This chapter introduces the wargame team; who it consists of and their roles. The ideas are
developed in Parts 3 and 4, where the synergistic efforts of the team, and the part they play in
the wargame processes, are detailed. Some of the terminology presented here and in the
Wargaming Handbook has been queried by US commentators on this book, so be mindful that it
is not a universally accepted template.
Peter’s quote is fundamental to good wargame design and delivery. However, one aspect of the
wargame team not mentioned is the customer, or sponsor (I use the terms interchangeably). I
defer to the wisdom of Stephen Downes-Martin, who has written extensively on the relationship
between the wargame designer and sponsor. Stephen’s experience informs the ‘Dealing with the
sponsor’ section, below.
Everything in this chapter is subject to scalability: the concepts and functions are applicable to
all wargame sizes and contexts.
Wargaming Handbook extract
Roles and Responsibilities
The credibility of a wargame depends on the skills and experience of the wargame design and delivery team, with
senior sponsorship and support. The key personnel involved, and their roles and responsibilities, are outlined
below. The NATO Bi-Strategic Collective Training and Exercise Directive 075-3 details the roles required in large-
scale events. The following list is shorter, acknowledging that wargames can be small. Indeed, some of the roles
below might be combined.
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Game sponsor. The sponsor is the senior officer or official under whose authority the game is conducted.
Defence wargames are usually initiated by a sponsor. As well as starting the process, their understanding,
continuing commitment and open-mindedness will contribute to successful wargames. The sponsor needs to:
· Inculcate a common and widespread culture of wargaming at all levels, characterised by senior sponsorship
and active participation.
· Define the problem to be wargamed and approve aims and objectives.
· Remain open-minded to wargame insights; cognitive bias and Service or individual interests must be avoided.
Game director. The game director represents the sponsor, and is responsible for delivering a wargame that
satisfies the problem. Once a wargame’s aims and objectives have been approved by the sponsor, the game
director is responsible for achieving them. The game director is responsible for the following:
· Ensuring that the wargame team consists of suitably qualified and experienced personnel.
· Being actively involved in the design and development of the wargame.
· Ensuring that planning is done at the appropriate time. It is too often assumed that a wargame can be ‘pulled
off the shelf’ at the last minute. Sufficient time to design and develop all elements of the wargame must be
allowed.
· Empowering the wargame team. The game director should be open to external ideas but protect the team from
unwarranted criticism and ensure that design and development outcomes are acted upon by other decision-
makers.
· Ensuring the wargame is correctly staffed.
· Providing direction and guidance as required during wargame execution to ensure objectives are met.
· Ensuring that lessons are identified throughout the wargame process, analysed and promulgated.
· Validating the wargame and promulgating findings.
The wargame team. An empowered wargame design and delivery team must be established at the outset of a
wargame project. The size of the team will vary considerably with the scale of the wargame. The wargame team
should comprise the following:
a. Sponsor representative. One or more representatives of the sponsor should form part of the design team. They
are the custodian of the aim, objectives and scope of the wargame, and should be available throughout for
direction and clarification.
b. Designer. An experienced wargame designer should orchestrate the programme of wargame design and
development.
c. Analysts. Analysts are usually required to design and/or validate:
o Simulation models, to ensure these are sufficiently realistic; and
o Data collection and management plans.
d. Simulation experts. Experts are required to ensure that the simulation(s) selected are appropriate and will
enable delivery of the wargame objectives.
Game Controller. The game controller (GameCon) is the critical role during wargame execution. They steer the
wargame minute by minute to achieve the objectives, following direction and guidance from the game director as
required. The role includes, but goes beyond, ‘umpire’: the GameCon should be the final arbiter of all key
decisions, which might relate to adjudication, scenario evolution, or any aspect of the wargame. The GameCon can
be likened to the conductor of an orchestra, controlling all sections of the ensemble to produce a harmonious and
coherent whole. As well as being the key wargame controller, the GameCon is responsible for the following (but
does not necessarily personally undertake them):
a. Adjudication. Whether a person, in the form of an adjudicator, or a multi-person, multi-tool function, the
adjudication process is key to the success of the wargame.
b. Facilitation. The complexity of the wargame might necessitate a facilitator, or facilitation organisation. The
facilitator/organisation could assist both players and wargame support staff.
Players. Wargame players can number from one to thousands. They are usually organised into cells, the size and
shape of which can vary considerably.

The Core Wargame Team

If your organisation is planning to run a wargame, then a Core Wargame Team (CWT) should be
established during the initiation (conception) phase. If you are engaged individually, establish
the team as soon as possible. Peter Perla recommends the CWT should include:
· A lead wargame designer;
· A lead analyst;
· A lead simulation expert; and
· Military officers (or business, humanitarian etc personnel). These will typically be from
the sponsor organisation or a supporting authority to whom the wargame has been
outsourced or delegated.
Supporting functions and personnel
The CWT will normally start small but expand during wargame development. I discuss all roles
(CWT and additional) in Chapter 22 (Controlling Wargames), but highlight key functions below.
Some might be fulfilled by one person, some by many people.
· Control. Within the control function, or organisation, the Game Controller is the key role.
They are the person responsible for the minute-to-minute control of a wargame to steer it
to achieving its objectives.
· Adjudication. This central function was explained in Chapter 4.
· Facilitation. The role of the facilitator is to manage the group – which might include
players and/or Control staff – through the wargame process. This to leave people free to
concentrate on decision-making and/or control. Chapter 23 is devoted to facilitation.
· Analysts and recorders. Whether a training or analytical wargame, the number of
analysts, observer/mentors, scribes and recorders et al can be large. The effective
integration of analysis and analysts into the wargame team throughout the Wargame
Lifecycle is critical.
· Floorwalkers. I use this term as a catch-all to include everyone else who is involved with,
or visits, the wargame. There can be many! I discuss dealing with floorwalkers in Chapter
23.
· Administrative support. This function is typically delivered by a Game Manager. It tends
to be a full-time role, so the Game Manager should not have any other responsibilities,
except in the smallest of wargames.
The US Naval War College War Gamers’ Handbook goes further than the list above, but the
parallels are clear: ‘War game project team major roles include game director, game designer,
game analyst, game adjudicator, game developer, game logistician, game knowledge manager,
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and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) representative.’ This reflects the generally larger
scale of the War College’s games. There is no Game Controller in this list, with those duties
subsumed into the Game Director’s. I recommend differentiating them.
Players
Players are part of the wargame team. You should look at everything through the prism of the
players’ perspectives, aware of the potential tension between the primacy of player decisions
and the customer’s purpose and requirements.
You must carefully consider all player cells and the roles within these. Rex Brynen made this
point in his 2016 keynote address at Connections UK. For example, in a political-military game of
Iraq, should the government be one player, one Sunni and one Shia, or more to represent the
potpourri of vying factions? Are the Kurds a player cell? How do you play multiple and disparate
IOs and NGOs? How does a single player cell represent the diversity inherent within groups of
refugees? And so forth. [205]
Assigning individuals to player roles is also important. Do you put the most suitably qualified
and experienced personnel in each role, or do you take the opportunity to let others rise to the
challenge within the safe environment of a game? Do you select personality types for particular
roles or allow others to play a character or role they may not naturally gravitate to? Whatever
you decide, diversity is important in an analytical wargame to counter group-think and introduce
different perspectives. Rex Brynen says, ‘there is wisdom in crowds’ and ‘the combination of
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players in a room tends to generate ideas that none would have thought of individually.’
The Red Cell
The composition and functioning of the Red Cell is critical. I have seen too many wargames in
support of experimentation where the Red Cell is staffed by people unqualified for the role. This
can skew the entire game and risks the validity of the resulting analysis. In one example, the
Red player in a tactical Army experimentation wargame was persuaded by a vociferous Blue cell
that, because Blue was attacking at 0300 hours, Red would be in their sleeping bags and taken
unawares. The Red player rolled over (pun intended) and Blue stormed the position unopposed,
achieving surprise despite having approached in armoured vehicles. The Blue tactics and
capabilities went untested, so what was the point of the wargame?
The US Marine Corps have created a ‘Deep Red’ pool of experts who specialise in playing
adversaries. I was taken aback at a recent British Army force development wargame After Action
Review when someone bemoaned the lack of Red knowledge and suggested that battalion and
formation Intelligence Officers might learn enough about any adversary to play Red. I was
surprised because I thought this was standard practice; it certainly used to be. I agree with the
concept of a Deep Red pool to play Red in larger wargames (UK Defence Intelligence personnel
provided an excellent Red Cell in a large-scale 2017 RAF High Command wargame), but small,
cheap and frequent wargames should revert to Red being played by internal G2/J2 Intelligence
Officers. These require educating and training – not just in whatever adversary they may face,
but also how to play Red in a wargame. As a battalion then brigade HQ Intelligence Officer, I
attended numerous courses on Soviet then Russian tactics and doctrine for precisely these
reasons. The G2/J2 should not become the wargame process expert; that should remain a
G3/J3 Operations function (that also demands education in how to run wargames). I was also a
brigade HQ G3 Operations Officer, and am convinced that wargaming process expertise should
reside with the G3 branch and Chief of Staff. The reason is that, in a Course of Action (COA)
Wargame, these two are respectively the Blue player and Game Controller, but often share or
oversee the facilitation function. That should remain the case, leaving the Intelligence Officer or
branch free to concentrate on playing Red.
Finally, in a small, open, wargame around one table, consider the relative seating positions of
the Blue and Red Cells. Moving the Blue Cell lead from the end of a row to the centre, where he
was now sitting directly opposite the Red Cell’s lead – staring directly into his eyes – completely
changed the dynamic of the RAF wargame just cited.
Dealing with the sponsor
Stephen Downes-Martin addresses this issue in Wargaming to deceive the sponsor; how and
[207] [208]
why? and Three Witches.’ Some might consider this an ‘inconvenient truth’, but the
sponsor is fundamentally part of the wargame team. It is important to understand the sponsor’s
intentions and work to deliver what you have been asked, despite the valid cautions that
Stephen raises. It is worth re-stating his ‘3+1’ questions to put to the sponsor when you are first
engaged to design and run a wargame:
What do you want?
Why do you want it?
Why don't you have it?
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When are you rotating out of here?
Managing the customer’s expectations is one thing. Ensuring that the customer, or a
representative, is sufficiently engaged, is another. This is not to say that the customer must be
involved in day to day business, but they must be available at certain points and take an active
interest. Read Stephen’s articles, know your sponsor, and design to a mutually understood
purpose. But remain conscious of the issues.
Chapter 8. Analysis
‘Proper assessment of the results in relation to the objectives is the most important product of
any wargame. If the analysis is not appropriate to the nature of the wargame, then it becomes
data collection without purpose. It is not the wargame, maneuver, exercise, or experiment that is
itself important, but the analysis that results from it; the analysis is the most important part of
the undertaking.’
[210]
Albert Nofi
Introduction
Analysis is one of Rex Brynen’s ‘Three Pillars’ that support professional wargames (along with
design to a purpose and facilitation). It is all-pervasive, and so must be considered from the
moment the wargame is first conceived through to the final full stop placed on the post-
wargame report. This is just as much the case for a training wargame as an analytical game.
The bulk of this chapter was written by Margaret Polski and Jon Scott Logel from the U.S. Naval
War College Wargaming Department in 2018. Before that, I need to explain some of the
terminology and concepts used.
Wargaming as part of a wider process
The Wargaming Handbook extract on p.136 concerning 'Wargaming within a wider context'
stated that professional wargames are usually one part of a series of linked activities. That is
particularly important with analytical wargames.
The cycle of research
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Peter Perla, introduced the concept of the ‘cycle of research’ in The Art of Wargaming.

Figure 8-1. The cycle of research

‘Alone, wargames, exercises, and analysis are useful but limited tools for exploring specific
elements of warfare. Woven together in a continuous cycle of research, wargames, exercises
and analysis each contribute what they do best to the complex and evolving task of
understanding reality… Rather than use each of the tools in isolation, a great deal more can be
accomplished by employing wargames, exercises and analysis to address the individual pieces
of a problem for which they are best suited, and then integrating and interpreting their separate
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results into a combined picture.’
Consider the US Navy inter-war wargaming example in Chapter 1. ‘The cycle of research
approach is one that has worked in the past. During the 1920s and 1930s, the US Navy
integrated an extensive program of analysis and wargaming… with an equally extensive
programme of large-scale fleet exercises [Fleet Problems]… The results of this tightly spun
cycle of research included most of the operational concepts, tactics, and systems employed by
the US Navy so successfully during the war against Japan. Perhaps even more importantly, the
process helped produce the mind-sets and habits used by the men who led and fought during
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that conflict.’
However, as of 2019, I have seen little evidence of the cycle of research being systematically
applied in UK Defence.
Integrated Analysis and Experimentation Campaign Plan
The concept of an Integrated Analysis and Experimentation Campaign Plan (IAECP) was
introduced in the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’
Programme (ABCA) Guide for Understanding and Implementing Defense
Experimentation (GUIDEx). It has close parallels with the cycle of research. Both demand that
wargaming effort is interleaved with wider analysis, using techniques other than wargaming.
'Experimentation is a necessary tool in addressing large capability development problems, but
this should be embedded in an integrated campaign of experiments, studies and analytical
activities. Such Integrated Analysis and Experimentation Campaigns would typically also have an
integrated analytical and management process, and use a variety of techniques to ensure that
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weaknesses in one technique can be mitigated by others.'
In UK doctrine, the IAECP is most clearly explained in the Army's Land Handbook: Force
Development Analysis and Experimentation: 'If it is clear that a single study will not be
sufficient, then an Analysis & Experimentation campaign must be created, and an associated
IAECP will need to be created [which] details how multiple studies/activities will be combined to
meet a campaign's objectives... Whatever the magnitude of the question(s) being asked, it is
critical that the combination of analytical activities to be used is carefully selected in order to
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produce the required level of evidence in a robust and efficient manner.' Examples of other
analytical activities include: previous work; Historical Analysis; seminar wargames; analytical
wargames; modelling; live, virtual and constructive simulation; and training exploitation.
Inductive, deductive and abductive games
Inductive games. Inductive games begin without a pre-game concept. With inductive games, the
concept is discerned after analysing game data for potential patterns. This type of gaming is
used early in the concept development process, and makes use of open-ended brainstorming
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styles during the event.
Deductive games. In contrast, deductive games begin with general game ideas to be tested,
followed by observations collected during the game to support or refute the initial hypothesis.
This type of gaming is used later in the concept development process, after the concept is more
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fully developed. This is used during COA analysis or to test a plan prior to execution.
Abductive games. Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference which starts with an
observation or set of observations then seeks to find the simplest and most likely explanation.
This process, unlike deductive reasoning, yields a plausible conclusion but does not positively
validate it. Abductive conclusions are thus qualified as having a remnant of uncertainty or
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doubt, which is expressed in retreat terms such as ‘best available’ or ‘most likely’.
The Data Collection and Analysis Plan/Data Collection and Management Plan
The Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP) is also known as the Data Collection and
Management Plan (DCMP). I prefer the latter because of the explicit requirement to manage the
data. The DCAP/DCMP is a crucial document in any analytical wargame, and drives all activity
from project start to finish. The starting point is the research question, and then, ‘A DCMP is
developed with issues decomposed into sub-issues, and further into questions. The
decomposition may continue through subjects of analysis (SOA) and/or essential elements of
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analysis (EEA) and the measures of merit (MOM) that might be used to assess them.’
Figure 8-2

Measure, Method,
and Model
Research Sub- Observable collection and Tool Scenario Scheduling
Question Issue issue SoA EEA attributes methods required requirements requirements

Figure 8-2. Example DCMP column headings

shows some example headings (although these differ between organisations). Figure 8-3 is an
explanatory diagram from the US Naval Postgraduate School Operational Analytics web site.

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Figure 8-3. DCMP aide-memoire
Observations, insights and lessons identified
Many people find it useful to sub-divide insights arising from a wargame into observations,
insights and lessons identified (OILS). The definitions below are paraphrased from a knowledge
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management web site .
1. Observations. Observations are captured from sources, whether they be people or things.
Observations are the basic building blocks for insights and lessons identified, but they often
offer limited or subjective perspective on their own.
2. Insights. Insights are objective conclusions drawn from patterns or groups of
observations.
3. Lessons identified. Lessons are insights that have specific potential and actual authorised
actions attached. Lessons identified are those that substantiate requests for recommended
actions to be authorised. Lessons learned are those that have been accepted into doctrine,
operating procedures etc. A wargame will elicit lessons identified.
The remainder of this chapter is a contribution from Margaret Polski and Jon Scott Logel. It is
based on U.S. Naval War College Wargaming Department course materials and working papers
that describe the Department’s approach to analysis.
U.S. Naval War College Wargaming Department – Doing Analysis
The Wargaming Department (WGD) at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) has been wargaming as
a means to explore military decision challenges since 1887. Today, the WGD principally executes
analytical wargames to address Navy senior leaders’ most difficult questions about war fighting.
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In our view, analytical wargaming is a flexible method for analysing and experiencing strategic
and operational decision-making and interaction. It is a tried and tested approach to rapidly
advancing knowledge about warfighting challenges. In a joint and combined arms environment,
wargaming also provides the opportunity to build and sustain essential working relationships
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across services, partners, domains, and theatres.
From an analytical perspective, wargames, like real war fights, are unique events. The results
that emerge from a single analytical wargame are specific to the problem, purpose, objectives,
and research questions that provide a framework for design and execution, the participants, and
the event. In order to produce insights that are useful for command decision making, analysts
must use a disciplined method, adhere as closely as possible to the principles of scientific
inquiry, and identify the strengths and limitations of their work.
In the sections that follow we elaborate on how we think about analysis. The first section
provides background on the development of analytical war gaming at the NWC, our
terminology, and our research design process. The second section explains how we approach
analysis in each phase of our war gaming process. The final section summarizes and provides
advice.
Background
Analytical wargaming at the NWC is based on the work of Captain William McCarty Little,
Captain Wilbur Van Auken, and Francis McHugh. These early military operations researchers
developed wargaming at the college over a period that spanned the founding of the College,
the Inter-War period, and the Cold War era. McCarty Little is credited with introducing
wargaming to the Navy, and he wrote a number of papers on the topic in his time at the NWC.
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Van Auken established a research department in wargames at the College in 1932, and
was one of the first to systematically analyse the BLUE-ORANGE games of the interwar period.
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However, it is McHugh who is most closely associated with developing and documenting
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the methodological approach that the WGD uses today. His definition of analytical
wargaming, which incorporates the definition McCarty Little articulates in a lecture at the NWC
in 1912, is: ‘A war game is a simulation, in accordance with predetermined rules, data, and
procedures, of selected aspects of a conflict situation. It is an artificial – or more strictly – a
theoretical-conflict … to afford a practice field for the acquirement of skill and experience in
the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and trial ground for the testing of
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strategic and tactical plans’.
The WGD is an integral part of the U.S. Navy’s (USN) research enterprise and supports national
defense strategy and operational design. The USN uses wargaming to research military
operations, provide experience in decision making, educate personnel, and shape critical
decisions and investments. The WGD is responsible for designing and executing wargames to
help leadership and their staff better understand their most vexing dilemmas. WGD wargames
are designed to challenge the assumptions underpinning joint and naval operating concepts and
plans, identify critical issues for further analysis, and produce a ‘punch list’ for action. Every
analytical wargame has educational and experiential as well as research components: typically, a
fleet commander’s objectives for a wargame include not only gaining insights, but also providing
an opportunity for senior staff to experience decisions when executing a concept or planning
against an aggressive adversary.
In our experience, a successful analytical wargame addresses the research questions and
generates questions that inform further analysis, exercises, experiments, and planning. At the
end of a wargame, the sponsors and participants should have a better understanding of what
they know, what they need to learn more about, and where they need to focus refinements. A
well-designed wargame properly analysed can also have implications for national security policy,
strategy, and naval enterprise management.

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Figure 8-4. The U.S. Navy’s Approach to Analysing and Researching War-Fighting
Today the WGD uses a team research method that includes steps that are typical in professional
research design modified to accommodate the USN’s applied research requirements. Most of
our wargames investigate questions related to executing maritime concepts of operations and
plans in a joint, multi-domain, coalition environment. While we regularly design and execute
wargames for joint military operations planning courses, our primary responsibility is to
investigate challenges identified by the Navy’s CNO and fleet commanders. Hence most of our
wargames are classified and as analysts, we are required to work with our wargame teams to
ensure that we can draw implications from play that inform strategy, operational design, and
organizing, manning, training, and equipping the force.
Approach
Each fiscal year the CNO’s staff asks fleet commanders to submit wargame proposals. The WGD
reviews these proposals and makes recommendations to the CNO’s staff about which proposals
are best suited to war gaming and will contribute to the USN’s analytic agenda. Once the CNO
decides on a wargame plan, the WGD develops a schedule for the fiscal year and assigns a team
to execute each of the wargames in the schedule.
A WGD wargame core team includes a director, analyst, designer, developer, knowledge
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manager, and logistician. As the wargaming process unfolds, a lead adjudicator is
integrated into the core team. The analyst provides the framework for designing and developing
a wargame, builds a Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP), and a team to execute the plan
(DCAT). The analyst leads the team in collecting data on players’ decisions and decision-making
processes during play, analyses these data, and drafts wargame reports for peer review. Peer
reviewers typically include wargame team members, members of the WGD including the
Chairman of the WGD and his deputy, and command staff.
The WGD’s analytical wargame research process, which is depicted in Figure 8-5, includes
seven phases: tasking, design, development, testing, rehearsal, execution, and reporting. All
WGD wargames begin with analysis and integrate analysis into each phase of the wargaming
process. However, as the following sections describe in more detail, analytic goals and tasks
differ across the phases.
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Figure 8-5: U.S. Naval War College Wargame Department Research Design Process
The WGD’s disciplined approach to analysis makes it possible for other wargamers to replicate
or repeat a wargame, to iterate on some aspect of a wargame in subsequent research, and to
understand how war gaming and wargame findings fit in a broader military operations research
agenda that includes other research methods such as modelling and simulation, experiments,
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and exercises.
Wargame Analysis and Tasking
The overall team goal in the tasking phase is to reach agreement with the fleet commander
about the problem, purpose, and objectives for the wargame. At the end of the phase, which
includes an initial planning conference (IPC) with the commander and relevant staff, the WGD
executes a final proposal and schedule for the wargame.
Working from the preliminary wargame proposal and prior knowledge, the analyst begins
building a ‘literature review.’ The literature review, which often continues through the
development phase of the wargaming process and even in post-game analysis, involves
identifying and reviewing the results of other relevant studies, exercises, experiments, and
wargames to inform the problem, purpose, and objectives for the new wargame. The analyst
asks the following questions when conducting this review:
1. What are the current policy, strategy, and operational design challenges in the
commander’s area of responsibility (AOR)?
2. What does the USN know now about warfighting challenges in the AOR based on
previous research, what is the extent of the available evidence, and what is the quality of
the evidence? What don’t we know or what haven’t we previously studied?
3. What doctrine, concepts, plans, instructions, and assumptions address operational
challenges in the AOR and how well are they supported by evidence?
Based on the literature review, the analyst helps the wargame team draft an initial statement of
problem, purpose, and objectives for the wargame, which is then discussed and refined in the
IPC. WGD analysts typically participate in planning conferences with the wargame director,
designer, commander, and staff. The text box offers an example of a wargame framing
statement:
Problem: We need to refine our maritime planning products in light of changes in the
adversary’s capabilities.
Purpose: Challenge existing planning framework assumptions in order to identify warfighting
strengths and weaknesses.
Objectives: 1) Specify ways of employing capabilities to execute the planning framework; 2)
Identify the scale and scope of risk to force and mission; 3) Develop a deeper understanding of
the nature of the fight if the planning framework is executed.

Wargame Analysis and Design

The team goal for the design phase for an analytical wargame is to develop a design document,
which serves as a framework for how the wargame will be developed and executed.
As the WGD team moves into the wargame design phase, the analyst continues to build the
literature review, develops research questions or hypotheses to guide wargame design, selects
a primary analytic approach, and begins to draft the DCAP.
Immediately following the IPC, the analyst works with the team to develop a set of research
questions or hypotheses (or both), and maps them to the wargame problem, purpose, and
objectives. This mapping provides the blueprint for wargame design, development, execution,
data collection, analysis, and reporting. We use classic war-fighting factors (time, space, and
force) and functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, protection, maneuver,
sustainment, and cyber) to systematically identify warfighting challenges potentially associated
with the problem, purpose, and objectives for the wargame. Figure 8-6 provides an example of a
research logic map.
The process of developing a research logic map includes selecting a primary analytic approach.
WGD analysts use one of two primary approaches depending upon the nature of the research
challenge: inductive or deductive. An inductive approach is well-suited to problems that have
well specified assumptions, such as a concept or plan. A deductive approach is well-suited to
problems that require investigating unexplored territory such as how to fight using a particular
capability or identifying critical issues associated with particular warfighting functions.
Using an inductive approach, an analyst identifies critical warfighting questions or assumptions,
(re)states them as hypotheses, collects data on wargame play, and then determines whether
these data support, do not support, or provide ambiguous support for the hypotheses. For
example, Figure 8-6 illustrates the research logic for investigating a joint planning framework
and identifying considerations for a maritime support plan. Using an inductive approach,
research question number one could be restated in the form of a hypothesis: H1: The plan does
not enable delivery of adequate fires.
Using a deductive approach to understanding maritime support planning considerations, an
analyst could formulate research questions such as those illustrated in Figure 8-6, collect data
on wargame play, and then look for patterns in the data that logically shed light on the research
questions. A deductive approach allows the analyst to mine the data to discover interesting
insights that go beyond the research questions. By contrast, an inductive approach requires the
analyst to focus data analysis rather single-mindedly on the research hypotheses.
In our experience, both inductive and deductive approaches to wargame data analysis are useful
and the best approach includes elements of both. For example, an inductive analysis can
address the hypotheses but it can also include interesting insights from wargame play that were
not contemplated in the research design. Similarly, a deductive analysis can be very focused in
the way it addresses the research questions.

Figure 8-6. Research Logic Map

After developing a research logic map, the analyst begins drafting the DCAP, which incorporates
other research findings related to the wargame and describes how the DCAT will collect,
analyse, and report on data generated from wargame play. The DCAP, which we discuss in more
detail in the next section, includes the following elements:
· Background or context for the wargame including prior research findings.
· Problem.
· Purpose.
· Objectives.
· Research questions or hypotheses.
· Player and data collector requirements.
· Analytic strategy.
· Type and structure of data to be collected.
· Data collection and analysis processes and tools.
· Bias mitigation strategies and caveats.
In addition to guiding design, development, adjudication, and reporting activities, the research
logic map helps define requirements for player expertise. For example, the research logic map
depicted in Figure 8-6 requires a wargame design that encourages the players to think critically
and specify in detail how they would coordinate across task forces, coalition partners, and other
entities to achieve the end states envisioned by the planning framework. In addition to the
commander, command staff, and coalition partners, the wargame research logic requires players
with experience and expertise in how the adversary fights; strategy; planning; joint, coalition,
and maritime warfighting in all domains; maritime law enforcement; national policy and law;
international law; public affairs; and strategic communication.
Wargame Analysis and Development
The WGD team goal for the development phase of an analytical wargame is to create an
engaging, playable wargame that will rigorously address the problem, purpose, objectives, and
research questions. All the wargame products, processes, and technology are conceptualized
and prototyped in this phase.
In the development phase the analyst continues to build the literature review and DCAP. This
requires close consultation with the designer and the developer to specify the type of data
wargame play will generate, how it will be generated, and by whom (or what). The analyst must
take a keen interest in information flows, inputs provided to players, formats and templates for
player submissions, the organisation of the sequence of player activities, the adjudication
process, and the structure of after action review sessions.
A key role of the analyst in the development phase is to ensure that the team collects and
analyses data on wargame play that can address the research questions or hypotheses as
unambiguously as possible. A WGD analyst’s primary concern in the development phase is rigor.
Measures of rigor include validity, or the extent to which the way the wargame is designed and
executed generates findings that actually measure what the team intends to measure; reliability,
which refers to whether the team’s measuring procedures used in the same way will produce the
same measure; and replicability, or the extent to which another analyst could duplicate the
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analysis using the same data and reach the same conclusions. Achieving rigor in
wargaming includes taking steps to minimize bias and error in wargame procedures, and
ensuring that procedures are as simple as possible.
In the development phase, the analyst is principally focused on two components of the DCAP: 1)
the type and structure of data that will be collected in the wargame; and 2) data collection and
analysis processes and tools.
Data
From an analytical perspective, the usefulness of a wargame to a commander ultimately
depends upon the quality and structure of the data generated in play. If play does not generate
the data an analyst needs to provide rigorous insights that can inform command decisions
including those associated with doing further analyses, it is a dreadful waste of time and
resources.
Figure 8-7 illustrates the way we think about wargaming, data collection, and analysis. The
commander is responsible for making decisions about how to address threats in a particular
part of the world. These threats, and the trade-offs associated with alternative courses of action
give rise to any number of dilemmas. As wargamers, we help the commander focus on and
critically investigate one of these dilemmas. In the example we have been using thus far, our
commander is presented with a planning framework for a joint warfighting plan and they must
provide guidance to staff who are tasked with developing a maritime component plan that will
support the joint plan objectives.
Continuing with our example, as analysts we help the wargame team and command staff identify
some of the most critical assumptions of the joint planning framework from a maritime
perspective in terms of warfighting factors and functions. Then we raise questions about these
assumptions based on what we know about operating in the area. Once there is consensus
about the research focus, we work with the wargame team to design a wargame that will
generate the data we need to address our questions as rigorously as we can. Wargaming
generates a great deal of data but not all are needed for analysis. Crawling through vast
amounts of data is not only inefficient, it can send the unwitting analyst down rabbit holes that
lead to incoherent reporting. Our rule of thumb is to collect the minimally inclusive sufficiently
exhaustive (MISE) amount of data required to rigorously address our research questions and
hypotheses.

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Figure 8-7. Conceptualizing Data Collection and Analysis Planning
In the development phase the analyst and the wargame team are thinking through the type and
structure of the data we will collect from players and how we will collect these data (collect raw
data), how we will analyse them once collected, and how we will clean and organize the data so
that we can identify patterns (visualize) and communicate findings (report). The value of our
data and our ability to use modelling, simulation, or Artificial Intelligence (algorithms) to help us
visualize or use our data (build data products) is linked to the type of data we collect, the
structure of the data, and the tactics we use to ‘interrogate’ and archive our data. This brings us
to a discussion of tools and technologies.
Using tools and technologies
WGD analysts have access to several computer-based tools and technologies that help us
collect, analyse, clean, visualize, and build data products. For example, when we wargame in our
own facilities at the NWC, we use a custom-designed wargaming platform that automates
collection of data generated by player moves, requests for information, survey responses,
player communications, adjudication, and situation updates.
Automating data collection helps to reduce the potential for bias related to errors, omissions,
and misinterpretations. It also improves the efficiency of data collection and analysis processes.
In other words, properly done, automated data collection generates cleaner data, which reduces
the need for additional cleaning processes.
WGD analysts also have access to several analytic tools that help us crawl through and
interrogate our data more efficiently and with less human bias. For example, we use Atlas.ti,
Analysts’ Notebook, and custom-developed forms of artificial intelligence to visualize and
identify patterns in our data. Similarly, we use commercial and custom-developed software tools
to build data products and archive our data for future use.
In order to use our tools properly and to begin the process of developing new tools, WGD
analysts use the development phase of a wargame to specify data collection requirements. Table
8-1 provides an example of this type of specification.
Wargame Analysis and Testing
The WGD team goal for the testing phase of an analytical wargame is to integrate all of the
individual pieces of the wargame that were created in the development phase and make sure
that they 1) effectively and efficiently achieve the wargame purpose and objectives, and 2)
generate data that will allow us to address the wargame research questions.
DATA SET TYPE OF STRUCTURE SOURCE
DATA
Briefings Text and Structured & Players
Images Unstructured
Commander’s Intent Text Structured Operational
Cell Leads
HHQ Guidance Text Structured HHQ Cells
Operations Directives Text, Structured Operational
Numbers, Cells
& Images
Survey Responses Text Structured Operational
Cells
Situation Updates Text & Structured Control Cell
Images
Open Session Comments Text Structured & Players
Unstructured
Data Collector & Analyst Notes Text & Structured & Players &
Images Unstructured Control Cell

Table 8-1. Data Collection

In the testing phase the analyst continues to build the literature review and DCAP and begins to
test and refine analytic tools using sample data sets. A key role of the analyst in this phase is to
identify potential sources of bias in the war gaming process and develop strategies to mitigate
and control. By bias, we mean those things that can distort or contaminate wargame play, data,
or analysis such that the design is not fully executed, and the validity and reliability of the
findings of the wargame are significantly compromised.
Potential sources of bias in wargaming include:
· Independence. Some or all of the wargame team were involved in creating the products
the wargame is designed to investigate.
· Recruiting players. Someone deliberately recruits specific players and instructs them to
shape or direct wargame play.
· Sample. Numbers are small, or the type of players selected and assigned to play in
particular billets do not have the knowledge, skill, or experience to play in a plausible way.
· Materials, presentations, and facilitation. Wargame materials, presentations, facilitator, or
observer behaviour provides clues about what players could or should do.
· Participants. Participants do not have to respond to the actions of an aggressive
adversary, they do not consistently follow the rules for play, or senior leaders or observers
interject in ways that skew play.
· Adjudicators. Adjudicators fail to adjudicate a player move, or interact with players as
they are making decisions about their move.
· Data collectors. Data collectors analyse, interpret, misunderstand, or change what
players actually do or say.
· Analysts. Analysts ‘mine’ data to confirm a particular perspective and fail to seek
contradictory evidence.
· Errors, omissions, and events. There are estimation or calculation errors in data, data are
lost or omitted, or events occur that distort play.
Every operations research method encounters bias; wargaming is no exception. Bias cannot be
completely eliminated, but analysts are obliged to do what they can to identify sources of bias,
mitigate, and acknowledge the impact on findings when it cannot be mitigated. One of the
principal values of wargaming is the ability to identify and confront warfighting assumptions and
biases. The analyst’s objective is to make sure that we are in fact identifying what we aim to
identify and dispassionately reflecting upon the implication of these assumptions. Table 8-2
provides an example of how one might think through bias issues.
Wargame Analysis and Rehearsal
In the rehearsal phase the WGD team puts a group together to practice or rehearse the
wargame. The goal is to discover and make critical refinements before execution. The analyst
participates in the rehearsal with a focus on testing surveys and other data collection tools,
running analysis tools on sample data, and identifying player issues that could interfere with or
bias data collection or analysis.
In the rehearsal phase the analyst finalizes the DCAP, the DCAT, and briefing materials for the
DCAT. As a part of this process, the analyst confirms the schedule for data collector training and
cell assignments. Data collector orientation is usually scheduled either the day before the
wargame begins, or during the first morning of the wargame.
Data collectors are critical members of a WGD wargame team. The WGD recruits and assigns a
minimum of one data collector for each wargame cell, depending upon the number of people in
the cell. Data collectors observe and take notes on player activities, behaviors, and events in an
unbiased way, focusing on collecting facts about the context of wargame play rather than
analyzing or interpreting player perspectives or behavior. Data collectors’ products are used to
analyse wargame play and develop insights that may inform readiness, operational design,
strategy, policy, or organizing, manning, training, and equipping the force.
 Table 8-2. Sources of bias and mitigation strategies
WGD data collector orientation includes the following elements:
· Role, responsibilities, and products.
· Job description and expectations.
· Procedures, tips, examples, templates.
· Background on the wargame including the research logic map and wargame guides.
Wargame Analysis and Execution
During the wargame, the analyst, who is part of the Control cell, is monitoring data collection,
adjudication, and Control activities to ensure that they will have the data needed to address the
wargame research questions.
WGD analysts have two different preferences with respect to analysis and execution. Some
prefer to do ‘dynamic’ in-game analysis, which involves doing preliminary, high level analysis
during wargame play and detailed technical analysis after the game is executed. Others prefer to
do ‘ex-post’ or post-game analysis, deferring most analysis until after the wargame is
completed.
Regardless of our preferences, our reporting requirements, which we discuss in the next
section, require that we must all do some in-game analysis. In our analysis we hone closely to
the scientific method using primarily qualitative techniques to identify all the data relevant to
addressing our research questions or hypotheses, categorizing data, interpreting data, and
deriving interesting implications for senior leadership.
Wargame Analysis and Reporting
In the final phase of our wargames, the analyst pilots the ship. This phase is focused on a final
technical analysis of wargame data, reporting on analytic findings, and archiving wargame
outputs.
WGD analysts support three reporting requirements:
1) A brief ‘sounding’ email from the commander to the CNO;
2) A ‘quick look’ report; and
3) A final research report. As the wargame concludes, we provide the command staff with
preliminary analysis that helps them support their commander in sending a sounding email to
the CNO immediately following the conclusion of the wargame. This email reports that the
wargame has taken place, describes the purpose of the wargame, and provides a summary of
execution, warfighting insights, and insights related to the commander’s analytic agenda.
Following the sounding, the analyst drafts a brief 5-10 page report on the wargame for the
commander and staff based on a ‘quick look’ at the data. This report, which is due ten calendar
days from the conclusion of the wargame, includes principal findings and preliminary
observations with respect to the research questions. It describes the commander’s intent for the
wargame, the design, and who participated. The report briefly summarizes wargame play, lists
issues that require further analysis, the way forward, and caveats.
The analyst has sixty days from the conclusion of the wargame to release a final research
report, which the commander receives and endorses either with or without comment. Working
with the team knowledge manager, the analyst organizes and archives all the wargame
documents, data products, analyses, and reports on a department share drive using a standard
file structure. This convention helps the WGD build and sustain its stock of war gaming
knowledge and practice.
Unlike the sounding and the quick look reports, the final wargame report is primarily written for
a research audience. It includes an abstract and executive summary, which are condensed
summaries of insights for immediate action by Navy leaders, a detailed technical analysis of the
wargame, and a technical appendix that contains key data products. Following is a typical
outline for the final report:
Abstract
Executive Summary
Overview of the Wargame
Research Plan and Wargame Design
· Research Questions and Hypotheses
· Wargame Design
· Data Collection and Analysis
Analysis
· Background of the Wargame
· Wargame Play Overview – A Summary of What Happened
· Wargame Play – Move by Move Analysis
· Flag Officer After Action Review
· Participant Survey Results
· Caveats and Biases
Conclusions
Technical Appendix Index

Summary
As analysts in the U.S. Naval War College War Gaming Department we have the good fortune
and privilege to build on over 130 years of analytical wargaming practice. We stand on the
shoulders of some truly great strategic thinkers who developed a capability that has helped the
U.S. Navy prepare to fight and win when called to do so.
This chapter provides a brief overview of how we approach analysis when we wargame, which
is summarized in Figure 8-8. From this overview, three key points emerge:
(1) By definition, an analytical wargame requires that analytic activities are integrated into all
phases of wargaming. An analyst’s work begins before the tasking phase and continues
 after the wargame executes until a report is produced, disseminated, and archived.
(2) Most analytic activities are not confined to a single phase and are not performed
sequentially: they continue to evolve and are performed in parallel fashion across
wargaming phases
(3) War-fighting is a complex challenge that is very difficult to investigate. Hence, the best
analysts are humble sceptics who are willing to acknowledge the limits of their work.

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Figure 8-8. Nesting analysis in wargaming
Operations research communities are rife with - and often thrive upon - controversy and
competition. Every wargamer we know has been called upon to explain or defend their methods
in comparison to other, more formal methods of investigating warfighting problems such as
modelling, virtual simulations, exercises, and experiments. However, our most interesting war-
fighting challenges, such as jointly fighting peer and near peer adversaries in a global political
and economic system with five domains, are messy and difficult to investigate. No method,
including wargaming, can generate perfect analytical rigor: these are ideal standards, not
minimum thresholds.
While WGD analysts work hard to ensure that our wargames produce findings that senior
leaders can rely on along with other analyses to ensure warfighting readiness, we know that our
analyses have strengths and limitations for decision-making. We believe that all military
operations researchers including wargamers ought to acknowledge the limits of their analyses
and provide estimates of rigor in their briefings and reports. If there is nothing else that you take
from this chapter, we urge you to consistently estimate the rigor of your analyses. The text box
below and associated table provide an example of how we handle this in our wargaming reports.
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 Factor Estimate
External Medium: We based our analysis
Validity on input from a selected sample
of the types of individuals who
are likely to make assessments
or decisions in a similar situation
and not a random sample of the
entire population.
Reliability High: We based our analysis on
players’ assessments and
decisions as expressed in their
directives, observations of player
behavior and comments by
multiple individuals in three
different fora, or comments
directly contributed by
participants.
Replicability High: We believe that if another
equally capable analyst analyzed
these data using the same
procedures they would arrive at
similar conclusions.
Reasonable High: There is a high degree of
Person consistency in the observations
and statements we collected,
which a reasonable person could
use to inform decision making
and action.
Chapter 9. Appropriate Technology
‘Tech can be your friend or your foe – usually both.’
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Dr Karl Selke
Introduction
This chapter consists primarily of a contribution from Dr Karl Selke. Before that, there are some
fundamental points that I need to introduce.
Combating biases
In Chapter 3, I prefaced the discussion of the conflation of ‘simulation’ and ‘wargame’ with a
2013 Peter Perla quote. Peter expanded on that subsequently:
'Real wargaming is not about the unverifiable quantification of computer models. Real
wargaming is about the conflict of human wills confronting each other in a dynamic decision-
making and story-living environment. There is a place for technology in supporting that clash of
wills, but electrons are not always the most useful technology to apply.
The instrumentality is not the game.
The game takes place in the minds of the players. Human players, intensely seeking ways to
beat the brains out of the guys across the table or in the other room. It is that dynamic – and the
competition, conversation and contemplation it creates – which is our most powerful and
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promising source of inspiration and innovation.' (My italics)
This chapter addresses the role of technology – the instrumentality – in supporting wargames.
You may think that you can detect an anti-technology bias running through this book. You
would be wrong, and I want to quash any such notion. However, I regularly find it necessary to
counter pro-technology and innovation biases, so understand why some might think I have a
pro-manual bias when, in fact, I am merely ensuring that all sides of the argument are heard.
Those with a pro-technology bias assume any and all new technology or innovation will be an
improvement and must be used. I am no Luddite (but accept that there are wargaming
practitioners who have a pro-manual bias), but echo Peter’s caution that electrons are not
always best. The pro-technology bias is so widespread that it is addressed as early as the
foreword to Zones of Control, where the editors discuss the cursory consideration of wargames
by the military and academia ‘before they arrive at the presumptive finality of a digital
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present.’
Terminology
I need to define automation, autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI), manual, computer-assisted
and computerised.
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In a presentation to a NATO Working Group , Colin Marston (Dstl) and Patrick
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Ruestchmann (Serious Games Network-France ) defined automation and autonomy as
follows, and explained how they are related to wargaming. I am grateful for this information and
follow up conservations with the authors to compile this chapter.
Automation is principally defined as the act of performing repeated tasks. There is little
variation in the input, besides pre-determined categories, and such variations are accounted for
by simple measures (e.g. re-calibration, normalisation). Typical examples are found in robotic
assembly on the factory floor: the piece of machinery provided to the robot is known within
precise tolerance, the positioning can be adjusted to a high degree of accuracy, and the action
performed is pre-programmed. Note that automation is not limited to a single set or sequence of
actions; 'decision-making' can be performed, based on the input or result of actions, via a
decision-tree ('if' statements).
Automation in wargaming
The role of automation concerns tasks which are: 1) precisely identifiable; 2) uniform
throughout multiple wargames (of the same format); and 3) providing measurable quantities of
interest. Automation could be performed by humans, but is truly beneficial if conducted by
computerised systems (leveraging speed, uniformity, data size, accuracy and longevity). Areas
within wargaming that can benefit from automation (in part or full) are: data collection,
processing, visualisation, and adjudication.
Autonomy is defined as the ability to perform tasks according to the input data, state of the
agent, and environment, without strict observance to a pre-determined decision tree. By
contrast with automation, an autonomous agent can handle significant variations and
uncertainty in the input ('fuzzy' data). A key difference is that an autonomous agent learns from
experience. This makes the decision-making process non-uniform (not all agents have the same
experiences), and approximate (there is no exact answer). All autonomous agents are given a
general set of objectives, and learn through an optimisation principle, minimising the
discrepancy between achieved and desired objectives (this is generally valid for supervised,
unsupervised and reinforcement learning). For example, an autonomous program is given the
objective of achieving the highest score in a game (the objective must have a measurable
quantity associated to it); it can play against human agents, other AI agents, or itself. If an
additional objective is provided (e.g. minimum time to success), the solution will be a
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combination of those (e.g. Pareto front ).
Autonomy in wargaming
Autonomy allows a flexible approach to the analytical support of wargames. Autonomous
enhancements can potentially be applied to a wider class of wargames (or parts thereof) and
are dynamically adaptable to geographical and temporal variations (updates in policies,
scenarios, technologies etc) due to their 'learning' ability. Factors to consider include:
· Which processes, currently performed by human agents, could be replaced by trained
autonomous systems (computerised 'agents').
· Which processes, currently not performed by human agents, could be added as
autonomous agents to the execution of the wargame to improve it.
The Dstl Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM) was built around a semi agent-based model;
the population faction (which was actually multiple factions/players depending on the
associated social-ethnic considerations within the scenario) was played by the ‘computer’. The
best way to represent influence activities is to use a simple agent-based model to support
human-in-the-loop (HITL) adjudication.
Artificial Intelligence is the ability of a machine or a computer programme to think and learn. The
concept of AI is based on the idea of building machines capable of thinking, acting, and learning
like humans so they can deal with tasks in a way we would call intelligent or smart. AI involves
many different fields, such as computer science, mathematics, linguistics, psychology,
neuroscience, and philosophy. For a machine or a computer programme to be considered AI, it
should be able to mimic the human thought process and human behaviour, and it should act in
a human-like way e.g. intelligent, rational, and ethical.
Artificial Intelligence in wargaming
AI can be used to augment automation and autonomy and can feature in a number of areas
within the wargaming process, as Figure 9-1 shows. For example, the use of personal
assistants such as Alexa or Siri has already become the new normal within everyday life. These
intelligent gadgets can recognise our speech, analyse the information they have access to, and
provide an answer or solution. They continuously learn about their users until the point at
which they can accurately anticipate users’ needs. Asking a personal assistant open-ended
questions to understand and inform a decision in a wargame can be seen as using AI in
wargaming.

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Figure 9-1. Potential insertions of AI in the wargaming process
Manual, computer-assisted and computerised
I categorise the technology that supports wargames into 'manual', 'computer-assisted' and
'computerised'. According to the definitions in Chapter 2, there can be no such thing as a
‘computerised wargame’ that subsumes all the elements listed in that chapter. The essence of a
wargame is people making decisions, so it is impossible to have a wargame without people. You
can have a computerised simulation, and it is possible to computerise the adjudication function
(although that carries risk, as discussed below), where everything takes place inside the
computer with no human interference – but you cannot have a computerised wargame. The
people using a computer simulation, such as the UK’s Advanced Battlefield Computer
Simulation (ABACUS), are still making the decisions and, hence, engaged in or supporting a
computer-assisted wargame. Hence, a computer-assisted approach is one in which some
degree of digitisation is used. This is the case in most professional wargames. Examples
include operator-controlled computer simulations, spread-sheet look-up tables, situational
awareness and visualisation tools, data capture tools and the distribution of any of these.
However, even when supported by significant technology, people predominate. Players are the
vital ingredient, but ‘people’ includes control staff and analysts. You can clearly also have a
manual wargame, in which all components are physical, and all adjudication is conducted by a
human(s).
The risks of computerisation
Computerising the crucial adjudication function carries risk. One of the essential characteristics
of wargaming is transparency. The biggest risk with computerised adjudication is that the
outcomes of players' decisions are determined inside an opaque 'black box'. This might be
appropriate in hobby games, where the player(s) accept outcomes to move the game forward,
but it cannot be the case in professional wargames, where transparency and control (to meet
objectives) are key and the HITL element is essential. This is particularly the case in analytical
wargames, where analysts strive to understand player decisions and the factors considered.
The case is less clear in educational and training wargames, but it is still important that Control
understands why outcomes occur. It is also frustrating for players when 'black-box'-produced
outcomes cannot be explained.
The computerisation of other wargame elements should also be approached carefully. Read Phil
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Sabin’s ‘The benefits and limitations of computerisation in conflict simulation’. Phil makes
the point that manual and computer simulations have strengths and weaknesses. He then
[244]
explains why he prefers ‘a more balanced mix of old and new technology’:
· Computerised simulations are ‘expert-led’, and their algorithms impenetrable to the average
wargame user (‘black boxes’).
· Computerised simulations tend to be designed from the ‘bottom-up’, maximising aspects
such as technical equipment data and graphics. This contrasts with the simpler ‘top-down’
approach standard in manual simulations, which concentrate on the overall effects and less
quantifiable ‘soft effects’ and human dimension.
· Despite 3D technology, augmented reality and so forth, computer displays do not
automatically deliver benefits over analogue solutions.
Those bullets are paraphrased from Simulating War, but I want to quote Phil verbatim to
substantiate that final point: ‘When the object is to portray units positioned on a map, computer
monitors and data projectors are actually less effective than physical maps and counters on
one or more large tables, since their fixed resolution and limited field of view frustrates
employment of the human eye's wonderful combination of central acuity and breadth of
[245]
vision.'
Permit me a short anecdote to illustrate that quote.
Supporting a corps-level wargame at the US Warrior Preparation Centre, I was part of a small
UK Lower Control ‘response cell’. We represented a brigade HQ, working to the US Task Force
(TF) Tiger divisional-level HQ. We had a small room, about 100m from the TF HQ. In the TF HQ,
rows of staff officers sat at terminals facing a bank of perhaps thirty monitors suspended on
frames. We had a table, a monitor and a printer. On asking for a map, we were told there were
none available; everything was electronic. So, we printed about forty A4 screen shots of the
operational area, taped them onto the table and used page tab markers to show units. A few
days into the exercise, one of the TF HQ staff officers visited us to receive a back-brief. We
conducted this around the map, and he commented how clear it was. A little later, the same
officer appeared and asked if he could brief his team using our map. Those briefs became
regular, and others started using the facility. Presently, the primary TF Tiger G3 staff officer
brought in his team to brief around our map. After that, he set one up in the main HQ. This for
precisely the reasons stated in Phil’s quote: a physical map can enable more effective shared
situational awareness than tens of computer monitors (but only if there is no requirement to
distribute it).
Technology must support people, not the other way around
There is no question that technology has a role to play in wargaming, but it must be in support
of people; to make their tasks easier and to free up their capacity to think – to make decisions,
to control and to analyse. The question is, ‘What technology is appropriate?’ We know from
Chapter 5 that there is no 'one size fits all' wargame – and that applies to technology, too. There
is no tool that is better than all others in all circumstances. Indeed, it is usually the case that
different models, methods and tools are complementary, not preclusive. Figure 9-2 illustrates
such a complementary approach.

[246]
Figure 9-2. Complementary approach to wargaming. Photo courtesy of NSC
Computerised calculations can be appropriate in well-bounded situations where the physics is
understood. Examples include kinetics such as missile effects, time and space calculations,
logistics consumption and sensor calculations. However, computerised outcomes become
questionable as soon as soft and intangible factors are involved. Despite advances in agent-
based modelling (ABM), AI, machine learning (ML) etc, I am not convinced that computerised
tools can model human factors and the plethora of human-related variables to deliver valid
outcomes. However, these technologies can be used to assist wargames, providing an input
into HITL adjudication that is transparent, well-understood and able to be documented. It is a
mistake to think that technology can provide an output from a wargame.
To summarise this introduction:
 · Many people suffer from a pro-technology and innovation bias, which leads to a
presumption of a digital solution.
· Computerising the crucial adjudication function carries risk, but computerised
simulations, AI, ML etc have a role to play as an input to a HITL process.
· Technology has a place in professional wargames, but it must support the people
involved, making their tasks easier and increasing their capacity to think.
· Manual, computer-assisted and computerised approaches are usually complementary;
there is no one-size-fits-all. Hence…
· The technology you select must be appropriate.
The remainder of this chapter is a contribution from Dr Karl Selke.
Empowering wargaming through automation: the pros and cons of the computer
medium
Introduction
Simulation, whether man-only, machine-only, or a combination of the two, is a purposeful
undertaking whereby abstraction is leveraged to provide learning useful in the real world. The
bottom line is that experience suggests that fuzzy learning objectives lead to fuzzy insights
from the simulation. The ‘design to a purpose’ theme highlighted in this book is just as central
to the discussion of computer automation within a wargame. As computer automation is often
on display in front of the players, the lack of purposeful design will lead to unwanted and often
embarrassing results as the computer automation derails or distracts from the game objectives.
Types of computer automation and simulation
Computer automation can be categorized by the role of the computer and human players within
a wargame. Figure 9-3 presents a framework for considering automation support within a
wargame.

Figure 9-3. Automation within wargame design

Arguably, the simplest form of computer automation is visualization. This is often a digital
gameboard with pieces that have long been available with play by email (PBE) technology (e.g.
Aide de Camp, Cyberboard, and Vassal). Within the domain of computer visualization, there are
two key measures of sophistication: multidimensionality and distributivity. Multidimensionality
provides a more nuanced view of the gameboard or operational environment by enabling game
counters and spatial regions to be shown, and even have filterable or hidden attributes to allow
players or game controls to manage players’ information processing. Distributivity is the means
to share the visualization to distributed players. If the game design calls for simple unit
counters and players to focus around the same gameboard, computer visualization is likely not
required.
That is, unless there is a requirement for recordation. Recording player actions is often the
analytic thorn in the side of wargame designers as it can significantly impede game progress.
Recordation has two measures of degree as well. The first is the ability for the system to
capture game play as it is played either directly from player input (where the computer is the
primary game medium) or indirectly (shadowed by an analyst observing game play). The second
is the ability of the computer system to capture indirect or side bar conversations and link them
to the more structured game inputs. The holy grail is the system that records, time stamps,
coverts voice to text by player, and tags the text to the appropriate point in the more structured
game play. If anyone has this, please email the solution to the authors! If the results of the game
are intended to reside primarily in the mind of the players, the use of computers for recording
game play is largely an academic exercise.
Another area where computer automation can be applied is adjudication, from rolling dice to
performing complex algorithms and then updating the effects such as removing dead units from
the game board. This often builds upon visualization and recordation because inputs to
adjudication require both multidimensional data (e.g. an armour unit in rough terrain) and the
capturing of player moves (the armour unit is moving two hexes to the east) to automate the
evaluation of action feasibility and ultimately determine the result. Adjudication has two key
measures of sophistication: speed and defensibility. One of the reasons to automate
adjudication is to increase the speed of game play by handling move restrictions and
adjudications seamlessly. The intent is to reduce the necessity for players to refer to a large set
of game rules. Speed is often in opposition with defensibility. Defensibility in adjudication is akin
to the quest for realism where the game designer moves from simpler representations to more
complex game mechanics and player functions. Computers may support complicated
calculations in a few seconds; however, the additional data and execution time required by the
participants may have an adverse impact on the overall speed of game play. If the adjudication
is simple to execute by players, and defensibility is not a significant concern, the use of the
computer is not essential.
Visualization, recordation, and adjudication are all aspects of computer-assisted wargaming
where human players are paramount. Constructive, or machine-only simulation, is at the
opposite end of the spectrum where the human analyst provides the starting conditions,
initializes the simulation, and waits to evaluate the results. The expert logic within the computer
model generates a response (deterministic) or responses (stochastic) that can be evaluated by
the analyst. The Synthetic Theater Operations Model (STORM), one of the United States
Department of Defense’s main military campaign tools, falls into this category. There is no
interactive mode where players can participate in the simulation run. In pre-wargame analysis, a
good practice is to dock a constructive simulation to the wargame. This means that the
wargame and the computer model will have the same scenario – just different means to explore
the space. By exploring the space in advance, wargame designers have a strong baseline from
which to consider game play and guide subsequent analytical work and research.
Two key measures of the sophistication of constructive simulations are credibility and
applicability. Credibility can be thought of as the underlying arguments for trusting the results.
Applicability is the degree to which the simulation models the key elements of the useful
scenario. Only a few existing constructive simulations will have any relevance for a given
wargame, and most will not be specifically designed to be complementary. The bottom line is
that constructive simulation can be useful in supporting wargaming if it is both applicable and
credible; otherwise, it is not worth the effort.
The last major type of computer automation is participatory or man-machine simulation which
combines human and computer decision-making. Examples include Command Ops 2 and the
Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). Participatory simulations are interactive and immersive
as the computer usually solicits real time feedback from players. Others may be more analytic in
nature as constructive simulations with an interactive mode. Two key measures of
sophistication are verisimilitude and playability. Verisimilitude pertains to the appearance of
being true. For simulation-oriented disciplines, the concept is retained to distinguish balance in
the quest for both simplicity and realism. A simple model is analytical, meaning the relationship
between input and output is readily discernible. Regression testing on parametric analysis of
the model is quite effective. As the model increases in realism, which almost always leads to a
more complicated representation, the greater the verisimilitude. While models are all assumed
to be pale representations of reality, the concept of verisimilitude suggests that simple models
are paler than their more complicated cousins. Participatory simulations are usually
computationally demanding, and they are physically demanding as well. Playability is related to
the ease with which a player can learn and execute the wargame. Participatory games can easily
become too difficult for players to manage. By immersing them in intense details, players may
be forced to give far more detailed responses while simultaneously not being able to contribute
out-of-the-box considerations.
Pros and cons of the computer medium
In general, professional wargaming provides three main benefits. First, computer-assisted
wargame tools enable the organic data collection of game actions, events, and outcomes. This
allows the wargame facilitators or analysts to worry less about enforcing rigid game rules or
capturing game play, and focus more on capturing side bar conversations and unstructured
‘table talk’.
A second benefit is the clarity of thought conveyed when designing in a computer environment.
Computer-assisted wargame designers are inherently forced to grapple with player functions
and visualization requirements.
This leads to the third benefit regarding the depth and breadth of mechanics. A sophisticated
computer-assisted wargaming platform allows designers to explore the boundaries of realism
and playability. It also enables rapid incorporation of feedback from players that push the state-
of-the-art. Players appreciate the evolution of their experience as the system advances to the
human-machine process that works best for them during the wargame and across iterative
games. Designers are limited only by their own creativity, time, and capability to fuse the art of
wargaming with the field of computer science. From a player perspective, the computer medium
reifies, or makes more concrete, the wargame’s operational environment, or game space,
shifting the burden from the players having to hold the game state in their minds, to a commonly
accessible and multidimensional environment.
The computer has long been the bane of traditional (1990 era) wargamers as they challenged the
existential value of computer wargaming. This is not without good cause. Technology is often
both a friend and foe. Computer wargames are heavily constrained by the available information
technology infrastructure. Participants are often given an insufficient viewport into the digital
system when the socio-technical design was not thought through well in advance. Playtesting is
important because uncertainty is introduced to even the smallest of items (e.g. moving a piece
on the map). Unexpected actions by players can potentially kill the game. Recall the errors of
the 1990s: “Oops! You have done something we haven’t expected. The game will now quit.”
In the modern era, Defense computer wargame designers must face commercial expectations of
performance and visualization. Commercial gaming is a multi-billion dollar industry that devotes
teams of expert game developers. Defense game designers must think carefully about what to
automate. Visualization-focused computer games can be setup in minutes-to hours; however,
there is tendency to demand that the computer execute more and more of the players’
functions, which can add significant cost and time. Shrink-wrapping a software release of a
computer wargame is not a small endeavour, and is not usually necessary to support
professional wargaming.
The following are some pros and cons of the computer medium.
Pros:
· Data capture and structuring. Computers can track and correlate player data seamlessly.
· Playback. There is nothing quite like an immersive, edited video to communicate a
wargame’s actions and reactions.
 · Repeatability. The ability to support iterative wargames of the same scenario and method
without further development is a key selling point of computer wargaming.
· Computationally constrained adjudication. Computers can handle far more tasks without
negatively affecting playability than manual processes.
· Distributed play. The operational environment can be piped across the world to facilitate
more sophisticated game designs.
· Transferability. Given an instantiated wargame methodology, the ability to change the
scenario (forces, geography, etc.) is relatively easy.
· Information hiding. Participant-based visualization is a capability that is difficult to match
in an analogue system.
· Computer opponent. Computer players are always available and are becoming
increasingly more dynamic as computing power, agent logic, and AI become more
sophisticated.
Cons:
· Expensive. A programmer is almost always required to customize the software for unique
game requirements. Sometimes a team of software developers is needed.
· Long development cycle. Traditional forms of software engineering create individual
software platforms that are neither flexible nor useful beyond the purpose of their initial
creation.
· Design inaccessibility. Any software solution must allow the designers to be an author of
the wargame as opposed to a slave to the computer wargaming system. Design
accessibility is a key requirement for any automation solution.
· Rigid opaque rules. By automating the rules, participants may either blindly accept the
wargaming mechanics, or dismiss the entire approach as a ‘black box.’
· Visibility is poor (pixels). There is something about a physical board that a computer
cannot achieve.
· Tendency to overcomplicate design. Because something is possible doesn’t mean it is
beneficial. Computer solutions often include unnecessary details.
· Supporting infrastructure requirements. Poor infrastructure will result in a poor wargame.
· Poor human interface. The transition from the graphical human interfaces to natural user
interfaces has been sporadic within professional wargaming and still do not create the
same feeling in players as physical maps and counters.
Conclusion
The object of automation within wargaming is the coalescence of human ingenuity and
computing power in the discovery of possibilities. Automation can add value in visualization,
recordation, adjudication, and exploration. The human-only mechanism may be the best way to
wargame, but it is cost prohibitive and time limited. Machine-only simulation can be a
complementary solution to the wargame when sufficiently docked to the scenario being
explored.
Chapter 10. Incorporating Non-kinetic Effects and Semi-cooperative Play into
Wargame Design
This chapter is a contribution from Professor Rex Brynen.
Introduction
Most wargames focus on the kinetic aspects of military operations: mobility, protection,
firepower, lethality, and so forth. Elements such as intelligence or command and control figure
too, largely in their role as enablers of the application of military force.
However, it is rare that contemporary military operations occur in environments where the
application of force is the sole – or even, in many cases, primary – determinant of success or
failure. Arguably, this has always been the case. More than two millennia ago, Chinese military
philosopher Sun Tzu wrote extensively about the fundamental importance of such non-kinetic
intangibles as morale, discipline, command and control, and psychological warfare. In the 19th
century, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz made the essential point that war is the
conduct of policy by other means. The inevitable implication of this is that victory is not solely a
function of battlefield outcomes. World War Two – often thought of as the most conventional
and kinetic of all modern wars – was decided not only by the combat arts, but through
diplomacy, coalition-building, research and development, electronic warfare and cryptography (a
forerunner in many ways of current cyber challenges), terror and repression, resistance
movements and asymmetric warfare, propaganda, industrial planning, economic warfare, and
national will to fight.
Many wargames model such non-kinetic and non-military aspects rather poorly. For all the
attention to tactics, organisation, equipment, and capabilities, there is rarely an equally
sophisticated treatment of the political and diplomatic pressures on national decision-makers or
host countries, the economics of conflict, or the complex political sociology of how various
segments of the population might respond to various aspects of military campaigns.
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I have written elsewhere about how wargames might address non-kinetic elements, as well
as how game design can be used to recreate some of the ‘fog and friction’ of war-fighting,
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public-policy, and other complex tasks. Most of those observations will not be repeated
here. Instead, this chapter will offer more practical guidance for wargame designers and other
practitioners. Thus, the first section will suggest several key considerations in integrating
political, psychological, social, economic, and other non-kinetic effects in wargame design and
implementation. The second part will explore more fully a holy grail of wargame design,
especially with regard to complex and coalition actions: semi-cooperative game design.
Considering the non-kinetic
As with all wargame design, the cardinal rule of incorporating non-kinetic dynamics is to know
what your objectives are, and to build your game design around these. As obvious as this is, it
often falls by the wayside. Some of the trendier non-kinetic elements, such as social media
effects or cyber operations – while undeniably important in many contexts – are sometimes
thrown into a game just to make it seem cutting-edge. Before even starting on a game design,
therefore, it is essential to ask whether non-kinetic effects are important to the real-world
situation that is being explored, to the problem that is being examined, or to the training
objective that is being addressed. In some cases, this may require that such effects dynamics
are front-and-centre in the game design. At other times they may simply be ancillary effects,
modifying combat outcomes or creating additional complications. It may turn out that, when fully
considered, they are not that important given the purpose of the game.
Closely related to this, it is equally important as a designer or facilitator to ask whether you
know what you don’t know about non-kinetic effects. Just as specialists in humanitarian
assistance, local politics, or cyber operations may not be fully conversant with infantry tactics
or the capabilities of modern armoured fighting vehicles, a wargamer whose career experience
has been wielding the sharp end of the stick in combat operations may not be fully cognisant of
complex social dynamics or cyber operations. The more one is designing out of one’s traditional
lane the greater the utility in consulting widely, seeking input, and playtesting with diverse
audiences. This is especially important in games intended to explore the frontiers of emerging
technologies, politics, and information environments, and where there is inevitable uncertainty
about how it would all work out in practice. Robust evidence from research on forecasting
highlights that diverse teams outperform individuals or groups of like-minded experts with
[249]
similar professional experiences.
Validating wargames that include indirect and non-kinetic effects as a major aspect of game
dynamics is difficult. While one might know the p (hit) and p (kill) of a weapons system based on
field trials and experimentation, it is much more of a challenge to know how populations would
react to actions and events, or how the complex interplay of multiple actors would work itself
out. Try to imagine, for example, designing a Brexit game on the eve of the 2016 European Union
membership referendum that would anticipated the twists and turns that have followed. If the
game is intended to encourage participants to develop innovative tactics and strategies, the
challenge is even more substantial: how can the designer anticipate, and build into the rules,
actions that have not yet occurred to them? How can a game provide for unintended
consequences and second and third order effects that are themselves discovered by
participants during, and not prior to, game play? The challenge here is akin to that of a ‘messy
[250]
problem,’ where prior historical experience may be an inadequate foundation for judgment.
In contexts where it is important that opportunities for innovation be maximised, it is often
valuable to use less rigid wargaming approaches. Free adjudication and techniques such as
argument-based matrix games are inherently more open to accommodating emergent play,
although much depends on the open-mindedness of facilitators and adjudicators. One detailed
study of ISIS Crisis, a matrix game exploring the campaign against Daesh in Iraq, found that
when players were given a free choice across a range of possible actions, only 54% of the
actions taken were kinetic/military ones. Most participants also reported that the game had
[251]
increased their understanding of non-military aspects of the (real-world) scenario.
It is also possible to build options for in-stream modification of pre-existing rules during play,
allowing players to mount a challenge to presumptions—and, thereby, offer some game-
generated insight into how conventional military wisdoms may be inappropriate for complex
social, political, and information environments.
An example of this was provided by a demonstration game of the Rapid Campaign Analysis
Toolset (RCAT), undertaken for Defence Research and Development Canada. This was based on
[252]
one of the then-current Department of National Defence Force Development scenarios. The
original RCAT game design assumed that patrolling by international forces would increase
security and reassure the local population. The Red player objected, arguing that the nationalist
inclinations of the local population meant that they would likely object to the sight of armed
foreign soldiers on their streets. A quick matrix game-style discussion was held, which resulted
in a modification of the existing rules. Similar flexible in-stride adjudication (and a willingness to
modify or develop rules on the fly to respond to innovative tactics) meant that the game was
able to accommodate the challenges of asymmetric kinetic and non-kinetic warfare, and that it
also revealed some of the weaknesses of the existing Force Development scenarios which
tended to overemphasize the utility of traditional military activities. A subsequent DRDC report
on the event noted the adaptability of RCAT and its ability to challenge linear assumptions and
simplistic solutions, although credit for this was given not only to the game design itself but also
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to ‘a small creative team of game designers and one or more game facilitators.’
When wargaming non-kinetic effects, it is important to move beyond simple models of group
behaviour that treat all effects as linear and all populations as undifferentiated masses. Many
social phenomena are curvilinear, so that increasing applications of effort might produce
diminishing (or even negative) returns. As anyone who has been involved in advertising or
political marketing would attest, different demographic groups may also respond differently to
messages, and different modes of communication may have more effect on one than another.
The extent to which the game design needs to address this, of course, is a function of game
objectives. In some cases, knowing that there are hostile locals providing intelligence to the
enemy might be enough to add a non-kinetic element to a wargame predominately about
conventional infantry tactics. On the other hand, a game about intelligence collection in support
of counterinsurgency operations might delve deeply into social structures and patterns of local
[254]
life, in order to allow players to discern the suspicious behaviour of the local milkman.
With some non-kinetic dynamics, the game designer faces a choice of ‘hard-wiring’ these into
game rules or more subtly and indirectly embedding them in the human software of the game
experience: player selection, role assignment, role differentiation, and scenario briefings. To the
extent that the wargame controller has any prior knowledge of the expertise and personalities of
the players assigned to the game, it may be possible to assign especially inventive or devious
players to roles that would benefit from unconventional military thinking.
[255]
Research suggests that player behaviour can vary dramatically on how a game is framed,
and that narrative engagement and dramaturgical effects are important components of
[256]
successful wargames. As a consequence, scenario and briefing notes should be carefully
written to nudge players towards desired behaviours. In the context of games depicting
contentious social and political environments, aggrieved players – that is, those who genuinely
feel that their rivals are taking advantage or harbour normatively objectionable goals – will
portray such tensions far more realistically than those are simply told what their grievances and
objectives are, but then pursue them in an excessively dispassionate and technocratic fashion.
In thinking about how to represent non-kinetic effects in a wargame, a designer should seek
cautious inspiration from other professional and hobby designs, on both serious and not-so-
serious topics. With regard to information and political effects, for example, several counter-
insurgency (hobby) wargames offer some quite useful models, from the way in which political
platforms and social constituencies are treated in SPI’s Nicaragua (1988) to the representation
informational cascades in the science fiction game Freedom in the Galaxy (1979). Despite being
a cheap mobile (iOS) game, Rebel Inc (2018) offers an extraordinarily rich look at the way in
which military and developmental initiatives interact, and how these in turn might shape the
dynamics of peace negotiations. There is a reason, after all that wargame designer Jim
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Dunnigan stressed the value of ‘plagiarism’ in his second golden rule of wargame design.
By the same token, one should be wary about importing game mechanisms from elsewhere
without adequate thought as to how well they can be repurposed. On occasion, wargamers who
are also hobbyists may be inclined to incorporate a game system they like to play without
considering how well it represents reality and how fit it is for its intended professional purpose.
Finally, be alert to the challenges of analysis. In analytical wargames in particular it is not
enough that the game designer, game, and game players are all sensitive to the importance of
non-kinetic factors – those responsible for post-game reporting and analysis must be equally
sensitive too, or lessons may be missed or misunderstood. An experiment conducted at the
Connections UK 2017 professional wargame conference highlighted the potential magnitude of
this problem. When three separate teams were each asked to separately report on the
methodology and findings of a large game, they each produced quite different assessments
despite having similar access to the game, players, and written materials. Analytical teams need
to be diverse and multidisciplinary if they are to be attuned to non-traditional elements and
findings, and efforts should be made to prevent more senior analysts from imposing their well-
[258]
established prior views on more junior analysts.
Gaming the semi-cooperative
The conduct of military operations, and most especially coalition military operations in complex
political environments, is often neither fully adversarial or fully cooperative. Examples include
peacekeeping missions, counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations, humanitarian
assistance and disaster response, or even much more conventional military campaigns in
coalition or alliance settings, such as NATO. In such settings, many interests are overlapping,
yet not fully aligned. Actors share many similar goals, but also have divergent ones.
The recent (and in many ways, still ongoing) campaign against Daesh in Iraq is a case in point.
The Iraqi government, Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), United States, Iran, and other
regional partners all shared the goal of defeating a brutal and implacable foe. However, Baghdad
sought to do so in a way that strengthened national unity and territorial integrity, while the KRG
hoped to use the threat of Daesh as a way of advancing its goal of Kurdish independence. Iran
wished to strengthen the Iraqi central government and defeat Daesh, but also build lasting
influence in Baghdad and diminish US influence in the region. The US sought the defeat of
Daesh too, but in a way that furthered its influence and weakened that of Iran. Other regional
actors had their own goals too. The interplay of actors who were (sort of) on the same side but
(sometimes) rivals was central to the way the campaign unfolded.
Even within a single national actor, collective decision-making is often semi-cooperative in
nature. Inter-service rivalries and difference in perspective may complicate military planning,
diplomats need to remain sensitive to the international context when national decisions are
made, and political leaders must act with an eye to political pressures and their own political
fortunes.

Figure 10-1: Adversarial, cooperative and semi-cooperative games

As Figure 10-1 suggests, a great deal of security policy, foreign policy, conflict, and life in
general involve semi-cooperative interaction. Yet despite its ubiquity in war and peace alike, the
vast majority of wargames are adversarial and zero-sum in nature. Blue’s victory is Red’s defeat.
While host nations and coalition partners might also be included, all too often everyone on one
side seems to march to the rhythm of a single drummer. Frankly, designing fully cooperative or
fully adversarial games is much easier. This is why designing for semi-cooperation can be
considered the holy grail of wargame design.
One way of eliciting semi-cooperative behaviours from players might be termed a game-theoretic
approach. Here, certain types of player behaviour are incentivised through explicit objectives,
payoffs, or game mechanics. In AFTERSHOCK: A Humanitarian Crisis Game, for example, each
of the four sets of actors involved (the disaster-affected country of Carana, foreign militaries,
United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organisations) are assessed using both a
collective score indicating how many lives have been lost or saved, and an individual score
indicating how well that organisation has done in addressing its own objectives and priorities.
Players need to achieve a positive collective score, or otherwise everyone loses. However, each
player also needs to attain a positive individual score to win. The existence of a second separate
scoring system for each actor means that they sometimes squabble about priorities, and on
occasion one will prioritize individual over collective goals.
A potential problem with a game-theoretic approach is that it can encourage ‘gamey’ behaviour,
especially if it creates strong incentives to play the system by minimising losses and maximising
gains. This sort of strategic behaviour is known as ‘minimax’ in formal game theory, but the
term is also used more descriptively by RPG (role-playing game) gamers to refer to player
choices that are less focused on character or plot development than they are the desire to
squeeze maximum advantage out of a game system. If players feel they are being forced to
cooperate or compete by imposed and artificial rule structures, the narrative coherence (and
hence effectiveness) of the game is undermined.
Two-level games, whereby players are simultaneously enmeshed in two separate processes of
strategic interaction, regarding other actors and their own internal constituents, can be very
effective at creating the sorts of disconnects that bedevil perfect cooperation. While the intra-
organisational game can be quite complex, a similar effect might be achieved by simple
mechanisms, such as a weighted internal voting system for internal decision making. [259]
As noted in the previous section, limited and asymmetric information can be used in a way that
subtly influences their perspective of the problem to be addressed. Not all Blue briefings need to
be identical, or even consistent. Some players can be provided with key information, and not
others. ‘Facts’ can reflect the perceptions of differing actors, rather than some objective ground
truth. In ISIS Crisis, for example, different briefings give very different estimates of the Sunni
proportion of the Iraqi population, ranging from 20% (the government’s view) to 40% (the view of
Sunni leaders). Players rarely compare notes, and the discrepancy often contributes to Sunni
[260]
feelings of alienation when the central government fails to take their concerns into account.
In games where bureaucratic process (and rivalries) are an important part of decision-making,
organisational ‘stove-piping’ can be designed into the information content and flows of the
game.
Manipulating information availability can also form part of what might be termed a psychological
approach to encouraging semi-cooperative play. As noted earlier, the framing of a game can
have powerful effects on how players play it. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the research
literature on game play that player behaviour is more than simply an automatic response to
incentives and disincentives offered by game rules. This highlights the importance of using
briefing materials, game dynamics, and even such ‘fluff’ as national flags and other elements to
encourage players to immerse themselves in the mindset and perspective of the actor they
represent. To the extent that less-than-cooperative behaviour is unconscious, it is often
rendered all the more powerful in the game environment.
Physical placement of players in the game space and the use of time and work pressures can be
useful in augmenting this, providing simple mechanisms for breaking down unrealistically
smooth and frictionless cooperation. In a 2008 Chatham House negotiation simulation exploring
aspects of the Middle East peace process, players representing refugees (who were themselves,
in real life, refugees) were not provided a dedicated break-out room like other teams were, but
instead forced to find meeting space where they could. This created a sense of grievance, made
consultation more difficult, and inhibited fully cooperative approaches.
In a 2016 Atlantic Council crisis simulation, the US and Saudi teams were placed in adjacent
rooms, thus rendering their mutual interaction relatively easy. The Iranians, on the other hand,
were placed in a meeting room on another floor, creating a physical obstacle and delay to any
meetings. As a result, cooperation (and even mutual understanding) was made more
[261]
challenging. In AFTERSHOCK, initial playtests found players beset by a certain amount of
‘analysis paralysis’ as they laboriously sought to decide on the move that would yield optimum
payoffs and discussed the various options at length with all of the other players. In this case,
the problem was resolved by having the game usually played to a two-hour clock. This increased
the sense of urgency, recreated some of the time pressures of a crisis, heightened the
importance of effective communication (and created much opportunity for miscommunication),
and generated a great deal of peer pressure on players to act quickly. The consequent tensions
more accurately reflected the less-than-perfect (semi)cooperation of actual emergency
response. In the Brynania peace operations simulation, players are often bombarded with so
much information that coordination and consultation tends to fall by the wayside. The result
once again is less-than-perfect cooperation, and the frequent tensions when one party fails to
[262]
consult about its course of action.
Final Thoughts
This chapter has not sought to provide specific rules or mechanics for incorporating non-kinetic
effects into wargame design. To do so simply is not feasible, given both the broad range of what
might be considered a ‘non-kinetic effect’ and the variety of purposes for which a game might
be designed and run. In addition, resource constraints are an ever-present reality in game
design and facilitation: a game design must necessarily work within the budget, time,
personnel/participants, and space available.
Instead, this chapter has sought to highlight key considerations in the design of games with
substantial non-kinetic components. It has also offered suggestions on how game design can
move beyond simple, zero-sum adversarial games to more complex ones characterised by both
cooperation and conflict—a situation, it has been suggested, that is actually a more accurate
reflection of modern military operations than many conventional Red vs Blue wargames.
Part 3: The Wargame Lifecycle
‘It’s the process, stupid’
[263]
Bill Clinton misquote
Chapter 11. The Wargame Lifecycle: An Introduction
‘The successful conduct of a Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) depends more on the correct
composition of exercise components (exercise control, exercise support and Training Audience)
[264]
than on the efficient tackling of technical issues.’
Erdal Çayirci,
Head of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre CAX Branch (2009)
Introduction
Wargaming Handbook extract

In common with all systems and projects, a wargame is best considered in terms of a holistic life cycle, as shown
in Figure [11-1]. Wargames are iterative, and follow a circular life cycle: the refine step leads directly back into
(re-)design, even if changes are minor. Even one-off wargames should follow all steps, including validation and
refinement. Lessons identified should be captured and promulgated to inform other wargames as applied lessons
learned. All wargame proceedings, findings, suggested refinements and best practise should be collected centrally
[265]
for future use.

Wargame Lifecycle defined

By ‘Wargame Lifecycle’, I mean the entirety of the wargame process from conception, design,
through development and execution, and then validating the wargame post-execution and
writing a final report that includes lessons identified (LI) and suggested refinements. Think
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project management or through-life management, as espoused by Defence. The Lifecycle
includes an important precursor phase: project initiation, or ‘conception’ that, for reasons
explained momentarily, does not feature in the Wargaming Handbook. The process might be
linear for a single-iteration wargame, but is often circular, with LI shaping subsequent events.
Even a one-off wargame will throw up LI, either as outputs that shape wider training or analysis
and/or pertaining to generic wargaming procedures of potential benefit to the wargaming
community. All LI, from all wargames, should be captured and – classification permitting – made
publicly available.
The Lifecycle is based on Peter Perla’s The Art of Wargaming. It is worth re-reading Chapters 5
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– 8 of this so that you understand the foundation upon which I build. Peter’s process, per
his chapter titles, encompasses: design, development, play and analyse. I have developed this
into the five steps shown in Figure 11-1: design, develop, execute, validate and refine. Rex
Brynen’s ‘Three Pillars’ of successful wargames (design to a purpose, analysis and facilitation)
are incorporated, but I see the first two of these as ‘golden threads’ because they are all-
pervasive and run through the entire Lifecycle.
 [268]
Figure 11-1. The Wargame Lifecycle
Wargame initiation
All project management processes include an initiation phase. This should be integral to the
Wargame Lifecycle. It is ideal if the wargame designer can be involved during the initiation
phase, to help shape the aim, objectives, research question etc. However, my experience is that
this is usually done by the sponsor organisation in isolation, with the Core Wargame
Team (CWT) invited to join the project only when the aim and objectives have been determined –
at which point it is likely that you will need to review and refine these. This can be avoided if the
CWT is part of the sponsor organisation, as is often the case in the US, where full engagement
from the outset is the norm (as discussed in Chapter 8). The US Naval Postgraduate
School include an Initiation Phase in their wargaming course teaching, as shown at Figure 11-2.

[269]
Figure 11-2. A 5-phase wargame project
The US Naval War College War Gamers’ Handbook describes the necessary early discussions
with the sponsor: ‘The importance of properly defining the sponsor’s problem cannot be
overstated. The game purpose, objectives, and all subsequent game actions should be mapped
back to this problem. Defining and working toward the wrong problem neither fulfils the
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sponsor’s needs nor effectively utilizes the collective time and talents of the department.’
The War Gamers’ Handbook contains a useful diagram that includes this ‘Tasking’ phase, and
provides another view of the overall game project process. This is at Figure 11-3. It sub-divides
‘Development’ into ‘Testing’ and ‘Rehearsal’, reflecting the larger scale and complexity of many
of the College’s wargames compared to UK and European games.

[271]
Figure 11-3. US Naval War College game project management process
[272]
Stephen Downes-Martin offers detailed guidance how you might approach the sponsor
during project initiation (‘Tasking’). It builds on his ‘3+1’ approach introduced in Chapter 7 (The
Wargame Team):
‘Engage sponsors by using their own mission planning process and language and make clear
the sponsor is a required participant in the wargame planning process (as is the wargame
director, designer and analyst) in just the same way that the commander's presence is
necessary during phases of the operational planning process (as is the commander’s staff). The
likelihood of an operation being well-planned and thus well-executed if the commander or staff
are absent from the planning process is as low as the likelihood of a wargame being well-
designed and executed to meet the sponsor's needs if the sponsor (or wargame staff) is absent.
The action officers cannot do it all: the sponsor must engage with the wargame planning
process. You demonstrate respect for the sponsor's and action officers' time and expertise by
using their own process.
For military sponsors, treat the request for a wargame as a mission to which you bring (a
suitably adapted) mission planning process using military language. A military officer serious
about sponsoring a game should respond well. Literature from the project management world is
useful when dealing with civilian sponsors from civilian organisations. For military sponsors I
strongly recommend you explicitly use your nation's operational planning manuals/doctrine
documents to build credibility and put pressure on your sponsor to perform.
What you are after is a “Mission Statement” consisting of objective, guidance, commander's
intent, intelligence (about the problem) etc. Using this language makes clear to the military
officer that this is a serious endeavour, requiring the commander's (sponsor's) attention if the
mission (the game) is to be successful. You will learn much about whether your organisation
should accept the request for a game from the sponsor's attitude towards engaging with you
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(under your guidance of course - the 3+1 questions laid out in the Three Witches paper
helps with this) as you undertake “Mission Analysis”.
The “Restatement of the Mission” part of the planning process is handled by the follow up
“Initial Planning Conference”, at which you obtain a signature for the objectives, Commander's
Intent, guidance, desired timings, etc – or start negotiating. But get a signature before
proceeding with the game. Also make clear that the game will not happen without the sponsor's
signature on a mutually agreed “restated mission”, and that late changes to this document will
probably result in delays to the timetable due to the need to redesign the game.
“Sponsor's Objective.” You will decide whether a wargame or some other type of activity best
addresses that objective, and you will be in charge of the wargame design if a wargame is the
best way forward. Objectives are contractual, i.e. how well you achieve the objectives
determines how successful was the game.
Use a drill down on “What do you want?”
“Commander's Intent.” This, with the Objective, will allow you to craft subsidiary objectives and
Research Questions. Research questions are aspirational; which ones the game provides
relevant data for will depend on the players and the game's trajectory, so not all of them will be
addressed or addressed to the same depth.
Use a drill down on “Why do you want it?”'
“Intelligence Preparation of the Environment.” The equivalent information desired here are the
resources the sponsor brings to the game, when the sponsor needs the final report (after
analysis, after the game), who is the sponsor's audience for the report and for the game, what
bureaucratic purpose does the sponsor have for sponsoring a game, analysis and report, what
has gone wrong with previous attempts to address the problem, who are the bureaucratic
enemies of the sponsor and what are their objectives, and so on.
Also drill down on “Why don't you have it?” and ask the sponsor and the action officers “When
are you rotating out of here?”
I find an initial meeting of 30 minutes discussion with the sponsor to explain the planning
process you use and obtain the initial Sponsor's Objective and Intent, followed by several hours
(a half day) with the action officers to drill down on the planning products for the game is
sufficient. The final action of this meeting is to schedule with the sponsor and action officers
the “restated mission” meeting with the requirement that the sponsor (not the action officers)
signs off on the wargame plan and design.’
Aspects of the Wargame Lifecycle discussed elsewhere in this book
Many important aspects of the Wargame Lifecycle demand their own chapters. Analysis,
scenario writing, scenario development, scenario execution, facilitation, the control function
and generating outcomes are introduced in Part 3 to highlight where these crucial and pervasive
topics relate to the Lifecycle, but are fully detailed elsewhere. Hence, there is a lot of cross-
referencing and sign-posting to other chapters of the book.
Chapter 12. Wargame Design
‘In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.’
Carl von Clausewitz, On War
Introduction
I have refined the wargame design steps in the Wargaming Handbook. Those in Table 12-1 are
better standardised between training and analytical wargames.
Wargaming Handbook extract

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As McHugh advised, wargames should ‘point to’ either a training or analytical purpose, but a dual benefit will
ensue. Typical design steps are shown in Figure [12-1] for training and analysis wargames. While similar, the key
difference lies in:
· The effects to be enacted on the players (training); and
· Subjects of analysis and metrics (analysis).
The design phase often includes an initial wargame design meeting. This should be held as early as possible in the
overall planning of the activity that the wargame will support. Wargame design ‘by committee’ can be counter-
productive, so attendance should be restricted to the minimum number required. In very small wargames, one
person may perform the last three roles below. Attendees should include:
· Sponsor, or an authorised representative.
· Game director (who could be the sponsor’s representative).
· Wargame designer.
· Lead simulation expert.
· Lead operational analyst.
Training wargame Analysis wargame
design steps design steps
1. Specify the aim and 1. Specify the aim (usually
training objectives related to the research
question) and analytical
objectives
2. Identify how the 2. Identify how the outputs
outputs will be used and will be used and integrated
integrated
3. Identify the people to 3. Identify the subjects of
be trained, their roles analysis, the critical
and the decisions they elements within these and
will be expected to make key variables
4. Determine the desired 4. Determine how the
effects on the players, subjects of analysis will be
and the wargame examined
activities required to
create these
5. Determine the setting, 5. Identify the data and
scenario and types, level metrics to be gathered to
and sources of enable the examination,
information the players and how this data capture
will need to make their will be done
decisions and to enable
the training objectives to
be achieved
6. Identify, or design, the 6. Determine the setting,
structures and processes scenario, vignettes and
required to achieve types, level and sources of
Steps 3 and 4 information required to
enable the examination
7. Identify or design the 7. Identify the people and
methods, models, processes required to
techniques and subject ensure the validity of the
matter experts needed to examination findings
populate and enable
these structures and
processes, including
adjudication
8. Create an audit trail by 8. Identify, or design, the
documenting all structures and processes
assumptions, decisions required to achieve the
taken and the reasons for examination, including
them adjudication of outcomes
9. Identify or design the
methods, models,
techniques and subject
matter experts required to
make these processes
work
10. Create an audit trail by
documenting all
assumptions, decisions
taken and the reasons for
them

Table 12-1. Wargame design steps (refined)

The wargame design meeting agenda typically follows the steps at [Table 12-1]. While the wargame designer
should lead, the sponsor is responsible for providing clear aims, objectives and scope for the wargame. These
frame the problem and are an essential start point for all wargame design. The outcome of the design meeting
should be an agreed and documented set of actions and their rationale. This becomes the schedule for all
development activity and provides a constant reference point for all queries arising. Wargame design is an iterative
process and outcomes should be revisited as necessary.
Scoping previous wargames. The wargame team should identify and speak to organisations that have conducted
wargames like the one they are considering. This relates directly to the ‘validate’ and ‘refine’ steps from previous
games, which should identify wargaming lessons identified for future wargame teams to use. This engagement can
[275]
occur before the design step starts in earnest.

The Wargame Design Meeting

Experience has demonstrated that the initial wargame design meeting is essential for the project’s
success.
Prerequisites for a successful wargame design meeting
The design meeting might be a relatively short affair lasting a couple of hours, or a workshop
lasting several days. It is a critical event: all subsequent design and development work is
derived from the decisions made, and assumptions agreed, at the design meeting. Therefore:
· Attendees must include the sponsor (or an empowered representative who can make
decisions and confirm assumptions) and the Game Controller who will actually run the
game.
· Design to a purpose. One of Rex Brynen’s ‘Three Pillars’ (and as Stephen Downes-
Martin described in the previous chapter), this is akin to following a mission statement.
The sponsor must bring well-considered aims and objectives to the design meeting,
because these are the start point for all discussion and a point of constant reference
throughout the Wargame Lifecycle.
If you do not meet either of these two conditions, adjourn the meeting. To proceed risks game
design decisions being overturned or, at worst, working to faulty assumptions and decisions
that might cause the wargame to fail.
The 3-column format: a methodology for analysis and recording
The design meeting outcomes provide the actions for subsequent design and development
work. Factors discussed must be analysed methodically and meticulously recorded. One of the
more practical things I learned at Staff College was the ‘3-column format’, a structured
approach for considering complex problems. The basic format is shown in Figure 12-1. The first
column is a simple statement of fact, for example an objective. Column two is where the
thinking takes place, including any ‘So what’ deductions. Column three is where actions and
outcomes are recorded. Note the categories of the column 3 actions.
Fact(or) Deduction/ Action/
Consideration Outcome
xx xx xx
Actions in column 3:
A – Real-world action T – Wargame task TS –Tool
set-related
MIL – Include in injects list P – Process-related
outcome
B – Requires briefing RFI – Request for info
S – Scenario requirement RFC – Request for
clarification

Figure 12-1. 3-column format: column headings and actions key

Figure 12-2 is an extract from a worked example that illustrates the process. I take notes during
a design meeting, writing directly into each column, and then type up my scrawl afterwards to
produce the record of the meeting.

Figure 12-2. Example extract from an analytical wargame design meeting 3-column write-up
Column 3 provides a comprehensive set of actions and outcomes. With the rationale for these
captured in the centre column, the document usually suffices as the required audit trail. I
haven’t done so in this example, but you might also capture who made the decisions and
assumptions. As well as providing an audit trail, the document serves as a prompt for agenda
items during development phase meetings to ensure that actions are complete or being
progressed.
Design constraints
Determination of the scenario and simulation
Scenario writing and development is covered in detail in Chapters 19 and 20. Factors affecting
the choice of appropriate simulation were covered in Chapter 9 (Appropriate Technology). I
touch on these now because they must feature during the design meeting.
The scenario and simulation(s) are often pre-determined by the game sponsor, so will likely be
constraints on your wargame design. However, you must still address them during the
design phase, and assess their suitability thoroughly during the development phase, suggesting
amendments and work-arounds as required. Do not immediately accept the imposition of such
constraints as absolute and irrevocable, because they might have been made by people who do
not fully understand how a wargame will meet the requirement.
In an ideal world, determination of the setting, scenario and any detailed vignettes would occur
at steps 5 (training) or 6 (analysis) of the wargame design process. That is necessarily a long
way into the process. You should fight for the flexibility to adapt these givens to best meet the
requirement emerging from previous steps. At the very least, you should make the point that
the scenario will probably need to be adapted or developed to ensure that the training or
analytical objectives are met. Required refinements might arise during the design meeting itself;
they will probably surface during subsequent design work; and they will almost certainly
emerge during development and playtesting.
The simulation can be more problematical, because the option of replacing one that has already
been selected rarely exists, even if it is inappropriate. Ideally, the choice of supporting
simulation(s) is the penultimate step in both the training and analytical wargame design
processes. Again, never assume that a pre-determined simulation is fit for purpose until you
have worked through the design steps, confirmed the requirement and then assessed the
tool(s) during the development phase. This might necessitate hands-on use or, as a minimum, a
demonstration of the simulation to assess it against the now-confirmed requirement. The likely
outcome is that areas of weakness will be exposed, and you will have to work with the
simulation experts to devise ‘work-arounds’.
Game venue
The real-world space allocated is important to the success of the game. Each team, or cell,
needs sufficient space with tables, maps, computers etc. The relative position of the players,
Control staff and analysts is important. You should visit the actual game venue during the
design phase if possible, and the game should be play-tested there during development. Do not
take it for granted that the sponsor, or the executive officer, understands the wargame’s real
estate requirements. These need to be explained and agreed, and then confirmed during site
visits. It is too late when you arrive at the venue for execution to realise that player or Control
ergonomics will not work. While player HQs are usually set up by experienced teams (often
replicating reality), unless the Control set-up has been carefully considered and tested, key
cells can find themselves isolated or with insufficient space or facilities to function properly.
The wargame design team
The Core Wargame Team (CWT) was discussed in Chapter 7. The following points should be
considered during wargame design.
Involve the CWT as early as possible
The CWT should be created, and fully involved, during the wargame initiation phase; otherwise
the CWT should certainly be fully formed and present at the design meeting.
Minimise the size of the design team
The number of people involved in wargame design should be minimised; otherwise meetings
degenerate into talking shops and ‘design by committee.’ Successful wargame designers,
whether professional or hobby, report that games should be designed by one or perhaps two
people initially. Once the outline game design is ready, it can then be handed over to a larger
development team. This minimalist approach contrasts with NATO’s. The sequence of Initial,
Main and Final planning conferences suggested in Bi-SC 75-3 is accompanied by a long list of
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responsible officers and attendees. What Bi-SC 75-3 does not specify is an initial wargame
design meeting. Given the size and scope of many NATO wargames, I understand the need to
involve numerous attendees at the three principal planning conferences – but try to keep the
wargame design team small, if you can.
Peter Perla’s Analyst, Artist or Architect? approach to wargame design
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The 2010 edition of The Art of Wargaming explains three different design approaches.
Being aware of these is a good start; consciously picking the optimum blend to meet the
requirement is an ideal to strive for – and is often the necessary reality of most wargame
design. Each has pros and cons.
The Analyst focuses on modelling the real world. ‘The Analyst uses data and theory to model
the real world, including the players as elements of the model… You may often hear this
approach described as human-in-the-loop modelling or wargaming. The model is the main point
of emphasis in design and interest in play. For this reason, it tends to dominate the view of
most defense professionals when we talk about wargaming. But it is not the most useful
approach to most of the problems we face under current conditions. Our models, at best,
predict the past; Analyst wargames tend to imprison their players too tightly in that past for
them to lift their eyes high enough to see the circling Black Swans.’
The Artist focuses on immersing players in a story that they become part of, engaging them
intellectually and emotionally. ‘Like the Analyst, the Artist bases his game on real data, and lots
of it. But instead of using that data to build a clock-work model – as an Analyst does – the Artist
uses data to build an immersive storytelling environment. The Artist is the storyteller, and he
crafts the game’s story to engage and affect the players both intellectually and emotionally, by
communicating his own creative point of view on the subject matter… At its best, the Artist
approach allows the players freedom to surprise themselves, but it can sometimes be difficult
for them to surprise the Artist himself. Indeed, the Artist-designer has more to say to the
players of the game than the players have to say to the Artist.’
The Architect focuses on distilling a simplified decision-making environment to challenge
players with key decisions. ‘The Architect-designer is also trying to produce a story, but it is not
a story of the Architect’s own creation. Instead, it is a story the players tell each other as they
live through the game. The Architect uses data, as all designers do, but he uses that data to
create a representation of the game universe in which the players will live and work, but only to
the level of detail and completeness necessary to allow the players to focus their attention on
what the designer (and other stakeholders in the game) deem to be most critical. The Architect
distils the data of the real world into a form that is more readily accessible to the players for
making decisions in that universe. The decisions they make may be restricted somewhat to
those the Architect’s research indicates are the most critical… It presents the players a
somewhat more restricted range of decisions that might be available in the Artist’s approach,
but in the context of allowing the players more freedom to develop their own story line.’
Design phase output
The output from the design phase should be a blueprint for all subsequent development work.
This should also fulfil the audit trail requirement, although some additional documentation might
be required. This blueprint is a living document. It will be adapted and should form an agenda
item for subsequent meetings.
The US Naval War College War Gamers’ Handbook says, ‘The design phase, led by the game
designer, provides the backbone of the wargame. The primary focus driving the design phase is
creation of a game design document. All games are required to produce a game document,
which serves as a guide for the intended game and as a reference for future game
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designers.'
Chapter 13. Wargame Development
‘Playtest, playtest, playtest!’
Every game designer, ever
Introduction
If there is one take-away from this chapter, it is a single word: playtest, playtest, playtest! There
is more to it than that, but ask any wargame designer – serious or hobby – what the most
important aspect of wargame development is and you will get that answer.
In the sections on development meetings and playtests, I offer example agendas from two
wargames on different points on the spectrum of scale of event: one of limited scope, and one
complex. These are not blueprints: every meeting and playtest will be unique.
Although unlikely to feature in a standard development phase for a specific wargame, note the
Operational Commanders Test discussed in Chapter 24 (Generating Outcomes), in which
veterans of a conflict help develop a wargaming system.
Wargaming Handbook extract

The wargame team, with appropriate assistance, individually or collectively complete the actions arising from the
design step. Examples of development taskings include the following:
a. Setting and scenario. The effort required to develop a scenario (including mapping, whether physical or digital)
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can be considerable. The six modules detailed in the NATO directive provide a good guideline, including for
smaller wargames. While the use of main events lists and master incidents lists is common, take care to avoid
pre-scripting the wargame narrative.
b. Adjudication methods. These will ideally be drawn from existing and proven methods, but new tools or
techniques might be needed.
c. Wargame processes. The success and failure of most wargames depends on using correct and robust
processes, irrespective of the technologies used.
d. Analysis plan, plus any supporting processes. An analysis plan should exist for both training and analytical
wargames.
e. Data capture plan. This is derived from, and supports, the analysis plan.
f. Simulation. The simulation(s) might be original, or a modification of an existing one. Considerable effort may be
required to configure, populate and physically set up the simulation(s).
g. Players and supporting personnel. Undermanned player cells or absent subject matter expert functions can
invalidate the entire wargame.
h. Venue and layout. The physical space within which the wargame will take place can vary from a single table to
distributed multinational locations. While this should be dictated by the wargame design and development
process, it is often the case that venues will be predetermined and can act as a constraint on wargame design.
Several development meetings, workshops and conferences are typically required. These can be large, such as the
series of initial, main and final planning conferences used by NATO, but need not be for smaller wargames. The
outcomes of the design step should form the agenda for development meetings, or at least be reviewed as an
important agenda item.
‘Play testing’ is critical to deliver all wargames successfully. A series of events, interleaved with ongoing
development work, is commonplace, and could include the following:
· Internal Play Test. The internal play test is usually attended by just the wargame team. The purpose is to test
the progress of key development items such as adjudication methods, processes, the scenario, data collections
and analysis plans.
· Integrated Systems Test. The purpose of the integrated systems test is to assess whether the wargame
systems integrate to the required degree of rapidity and simplicity. It is a good opportunity to involve the
sponsor and game director to confirm that the wargame is on target to achieve the objectives.
· Test Exercise. The purpose of the test exercise (TESTEX) is to robustly test all aspects of the wargame to
ensure they are fit for purpose. While all wargame elements (including briefings, technology and processes)
should be evaluated, the TESTEX should not be mistaken for a rehearsal. A representative of the sponsor and
the game director should be present.
Rehearsal. Differentiated from the TESTEX, a rehearsal is required just before the actual wargame, with sufficient
supporting staff and player representatives. No new issues should arise; the rehearsal is primarily to confirm that
the technology and processes supporting the wargame will work.
Outcome. The desired outcome from the development step, and the series of play tests in particular, should be
that the sponsor, game director and all members of the wargame team are confident that the wargame can be set
up, executed with a full player contingent, deliver the required outputs and meet the overall aim.

Aspects of the wargame to be developed

The Wargaming Handbook lists the major elements of the wargame to be developed. Let’s
unpack that further.
Scenario
It is rare to be given a blank piece of paper on which to write a scenario. Irrespective of whether
you write the scenario, or use an existing one, it must be thoroughly tested to ensure it is fit for
the purpose of supporting the wargame aim and objectives. This is a primary activity during
wargame development, and discussed in Chapters 19 – 20 (Scenario Writing and Development).
It should include the Red plans, irrespective of whether Red is part of Control or free-play; in
either case, you must ensure that the opposing forces and game play will support the
objectives.
Wargame processes
Robust and effective wargame processes and sub-processes are essential to the success of any
wargame. Dealt with in Chapter 22 (Controlling Wargames), note now that wargame processes
evolve during development, and should be tested to destruction during playtesting.
Analysis and data capture
Pertaining to both analytical and training wargames, analysis and data capture is particularly
important in the former. Providing the framework for all analysis, the Data Capture and Analysis
Plan (DCAP)/Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP) is fundamental to the development
and execution of the wargame. As described previously, analysis planning should have started
at the outset of the wargame design phase, but the DCAP/DCMP is a living plan that will evolve
during development. This partly through rigorous testing, but also because real findings will
arise: new factors and subjects of analysis can manifest themselves, and many of these will
warrant incorporation into the DCAP/DCMP. Changes to the scenario and other elements of the
wargame will need to be made to support analysis of these emergent insights even before any
‘real’ analysis has occurred.
Data will feature strongly during wargame development. The development phase is the time to
acquire, sift, sort and validate data. Data capture before and during execution must also be fully
considered and tested. During the Test Exercise (Testex) all data capture methods (and, ideally,
personnel) should be present and operating to ensure they are fit for purpose.
Information management
Planning Information Management (IM) is crucial, but seldom well done. From a simple check of
the filing system through to devising bespoke sub-processes, you need to confirm that all
information (not just data capture) will be effectively managed and exploited. Post execution, the
aspiration is that information can be placed into a wargame repository and understood by others
years after your event.
Adjudication
Discussed previously, adjudication is a central focus of wargame development.
Simulation
The design, thorough testing, and modification of the simulation(s) that will support your
wargame is a critical part of development. The development phase is the first opportunity to
leverage the complementary nature of the various types of simulation: a quick manual wargame
conducted early in the development phase can help shape the requirement for computer-
assisted or computerised simulations to be employed later. This is quick, easy and saves
considerable time and money – but is seldom done.
Supporting personnel
Supporting personnel should have been largely identified during wargame design, but it is likely
that the final requirement will crystallise during development, especially during playtesting. For
example, it might become clear that some player or Control cells are more important than first
envisaged and need reinforcing; or aspects of game play that emerge as important during
playtesting need specialist expertise to fully examine or play. The key point is not just to expect
new requirements to arise, but to actively seek them out.
Communications equipment and IT, and user training
Many of the above headings will be predicated on effective communications and IT systems. Not
only does the hardware requirement have to be determined and met, but user training must be
planned. Most users will see the equipment for the first time when they arrive for wargame
execution, so that is when user training usually occurs. During development, you should trial as
many aspects of this as possible, and determine the training requirement. It is likely that user
training cannot be built into a playtest and will require a separate event or workstrand once
personnel assemble. Simulation and communications experts will lead on all matters testing, set-
up and training, but work with them to ensure their plans are robust.
Briefs
One of the ‘actions arising’ in the 3-column format was ‘B – Requires briefing’. Capturing
briefing requirements is an important part of wargame design and development. Points to be
briefed will arise during the design phase, and more will be identified during development. The
series of playtests and the Testex is your opportunity to build and practise these briefs. By the
Testex, you should have a 90% complete set of briefs. These should be delivered in full at the
Testex, and critiqued to ensure they are fit for purpose.
Identification of aspects not suitable for wargaming
Throughout the design and development phases, consciously note aspects of the event that are
not suitable for wargaming, or that another technique can better address. Per Chapter 1,
wargaming is not a panacea and you should be honest about its limitations; shortcomings will
become apparent at some point.
Development meetings and planning conferences
The various development meetings, conferences, playtests and Testex will probably be
interleaved. However, while they might overlap in time and space, they should be conceptually
compartmentalised because they serve different purposes and, if conflated, you risk overlooking
the vital playtesting function.
NATO planning conferences
The risk just alluded to is not addressed in NATO doctrine. This mandates a series of planning
conferences for exercises but does not advocate playtests or a Testex. The NATO Joint Warfare
Centre has a department dedicated to modelling and simulation, The Computer Assisted
Exercise (CAX) Branch. This sub-organisation is generally left to develop, test and implement
the required simulations. Hence NATO’s Bi-SC 75-3 tends to consider modelling and simulation
as an outsourced activity. This is what you should guard against. Bi-SC 75-3 also ignores the
Testex; the words ‘playtest’ and ‘Test Exercise’ do not feature. There is one tangential
reference, which illustrates the outsourcing mind-set, and states that ‘M&S [Modelling and
Simulation] SMEs will develop and test required M&S data and information exchange between
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M&S tools and operational C2IS [Command, Control and Information Systems].’
I am not disparaging Bi-SC 75-3 or suggesting you disregard it, simply pointing out that it is
written for exercises, not wargames. Bi-SC 75-3 is used as the basis to plan and execute
wargames by many people and organisations, so you need to be familiar with it, and its
shortcomings.
The conferences it specifies are the Initial, Main and Final Planning Conference (IPC, MPC and
FPC). You can find details of these at Chapter 4 and Annex C to Bi-SC 75-3, including purposes,
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agendas, attendance etc. These are useful references, but use them flexibly (as they were
designed to be used). For example, Bi-SC 75-3 says that the IPC 'ideally aims at assessing
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requirements... [and so] the audience must be as large as possible.' As discussed,
wargame design should be a small-group activity.
Development meetings
While your wargame development will probably include planning conferences, you will also need
smaller, working-level, meetings or workshops. There is no fixed template for these as the scope
of each will vary considerably. However, I offer development meeting agendas from two
wargames of differing scopes (and will carry these forward to provide examples of playtest and
Testex agendas). The first was a small-scale British Army tactical level wargame to support
experimentation into new capabilities to assist the ‘find’ function. The actual wargame lasted
two days and featured one map, eight players and six Control staff and analysts. The second
example was a major Force Development event run by the RAF High Command. This event
lasted two weeks and featured six separate – and often simultaneous – wargames, two hundred
players, supporting experts, Control staff and an analyst team of about twenty.
The ‘find’ experimentation wargame development phase included a series of tasks, some
conducted individually, some collaboratively. Two meetings were held to assess progress on the
following bullets, which therefore formed a common agenda for both meetings.
‘Find’ experiment development meeting agenda:
· Scenario.
· Red Cell plan, including detailed vignettes.
· Mapping. (Mapping and geo-data, physical or electronic, is always problematic and so
should feature as a priority in all development meetings.)
· Wargame-specific DCMP, and how this would be integrated with that of the overall
experiment and the Integrated Analysis and Experiment Campaign Plan.
· Players and required supporting personnel.
· Wargame turns.
· Wargame processes.
· Command and Control (C2) model.
· Combat results and supporting data tables.
The RAF High Command wargame development phase featured several workshops and a
Planning Week. Two agendas from that process follow: an initial development meeting; then a
development meeting held just prior to the Planning Week.
Initial development meeting:
· Aim. To identify potential methods, models and tools (MMT) that might support the
wargame.
· Programme:
 o Re-assess the outcomes of the wargame design meeting.
o Analysis plan update.
o Conduct a matrix game to: familiarise everyone with the scenario; identify potential
Command Group topics, Red Cell and Critical Thinking Team options and ‘What if?’
questions; and assess matrix gaming as a gaming option.
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o Conduct an RCAT ‘baseline’ to: familiarise everyone with its processes and
mechanics; assess its suitability against the various campaign phases; identify gaps
to be filled by other MMT; identify potential Command Group topics, Red Cell and
Critical Thinking Team options and ‘What if?’ questions; identify possible ‘spin-off’
subjects for deeper examination; and identify scenario development requirements.
o Assess selected Commercial Off The Shelf recreational games for their suitability to
support the wargame.
Pre-Planning Week development meeting:
· Aim. To ensure we arrive at the Planning Week adequately prepared.
· Objectives:
o Develop RCAT and continue skills transfer to the Wargame Team.
o Ensure that all MMT will be sufficiently progressed to survive scrutiny by RAF officers
during the Planning Week.
o Inform the DCMP and data capture opportunities.
o Review previous design assumptions and development phase actions.
o Confirm the desired Planning Week outputs.
 · Programme:
o Continue RCAT skills transfer.
o Review technology demonstrators for: matrix game; Tac Air Game; Homeland Security
Game; and C2 Game.
o Review ongoing actions.
o Confirm the Planning Week wargaming plan.
Your starting point for determining the content of development meetings should be the record of
outputs from the wargame design workshop.
The separate elements being developed need, at an appropriate time, to be integrated.
Combining the various elements takes place at the Integrated Systems Test (IST). I discuss that,
and the other playtest events, momentarily.
Site visits and administrative support
The RAF Planning Week offered a perfect opportunity for a site reconnaissance, as we were in
situ for a full week. Failing such an opportunity, you must ensure that the development phase
includes one or more site visits. Administrative support must be organised during development.
Playtesting and the Test Exercise
The term ‘playtest’ (one word, like ‘wargame’) is used in recreational game design and
development. Like ‘wargame’, you should use the term without reservation or apology. There are
a series of playtest events, which culminate in a Test Exercise, variously abbreviated to Testex,
TestEx or TESTEX, but a capitalised noun to show that it is a singular event.
Playtesting on its own will not suffice to successfully develop a wargame, but no wargame
development can be completed without effective playtesting. The progression through a series
of playtests and the Testex is critical in ensuring the successful delivery of any wargame. A
series of playtests is explained below, illustrated with examples drawn from the two wargames
above.
Internal Playtest
The Internal Playtest (IPT) is unashamedly the ‘inside of the sausage factory’ and can be
disconcerting to anyone new to the process. Hence, ‘internal’: attendance is best restricted to
the Core Wargame Team (CWT) plus – possibly, and only if they are properly briefed and you
consider them 'friendly forces' – a project officer or technical lead from the sponsor
organisation. Critical Thinking of the developing wargame could be carried out by a project
officer/technical lead at this stage. If not, assign an external expert if possible or dedicate a
member of the CWT to conduct impartial Critical Thinking.
The agenda should fall out of the ongoing development work. As an example, during the IPT for
the Army ‘find’ wargame we covered the following:
· Scenario. Sufficient detail was required to confirm the scenario was fit for purpose, and
to enable some loose wargame activity during the IPT. Red and Blue Cell plans and actions
were sufficient only to trigger interactions for developmental purposes.
· Mapping. A first look at the physical mapping was required, sufficient only to step
through the proposed wargame turns.
· Wargame turns and vignettes. A primary output of the IPT was to ensure that the
wargame turns derived at the wargame design meeting would support the required
analysis. Detailed vignettes within the turns were then identified that would enable
examination of specific subjects of analysis.
 · Wargame processes. These were derived from COA Wargaming techniques that had been
proven at multiple previous events, but adapted to integrate flexible-duration micro turn
‘impulses’.
· Data tables. An update only was required, with a full version required for the subsequent
IST.
· C2 Model. This was a flip-chart showing early ideas, which was to progress to a digital
version for the IST.
· Analysis plan. The DCMP was reviewed throughout the IPT to ensure the effective
examination of all subjects of analysis.
The outcome of the IPT should be any necessary refinements across all development areas.
New requirements will probably arise. For example, in the tactical ‘find’ wargame, it became
apparent that we needed simple traces to show the guided weapon overmatch of Red over Blue.
These were subsequently produced then tested in the IST; see Figure 13-1.

Figure 13-1. Guided weapon overmatch traces

Integrated Systems Test
As the name suggests, the purpose of the IST is to test all elements of the wargame as a holistic
whole. The sponsor should be present; if you are not comfortable with this, you are not ready to
hold the IST. But you will still find faults; that is the purpose of these events, and why they all
include the word ‘test.' Warn people of this fact and manage expectations; there will be
inevitable debate. However, you should now be beyond the ‘inside of the sausage factory’ stage,
and the IST should reflect what will happen during wargame execution. My rule of thumb is that
all wargame processes, products, briefs – i.e. everything – should be about 80% complete at the
IST.
There are still no players present, but you need enough people to represent them to test the
wargame processes. Include an objective (ideally external) Critical Thinker to apply further
scrutiny to the wargame processes.
The agenda for the IST again flows from previous playtesting. The wargame elements listed in
‘Aspects of the wargame to be developed’ provide a steer, but you will add many specifics. I
won’t go through the entire agenda of the ‘find’ experiment wargame IST; a summary of the
points made in the IST report suffices:
· Purpose. To confirm that all wargame systems would integrate to the required degree of
rapidity and simplicity.
· Agenda. This was per the IPT, but testing all wargame elements to ensure they were fit
for purpose.
· Outcomes. Final refinements to all wargame elements and components were identified, to
be ready for Testex. That said, it is not unusual for significant requirements to arise. One
example from the ‘find’ IST was that the central C2 Model was assessed as too slow to use
 during the wargame. The decision was taken to use it in the margins of the wargame and
produce C2 outputs after wargame turns, rather than use it to drive the primary discussion.
This significant change, which worked well come the day, is a good example of the
necessity for thorough testing.
Test Exercise
The development phase culminates with a singular Testex. It must be differentiated from the
preceding playtest events to ensure that it is given sufficient importance.
Per the Wargaming Handbook extract, the Testex purpose is to ‘robustly test all aspects of the
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wargame to ensure they are fit for purpose’. By ‘robustly’, I mean ‘try to break’. Everyone
present, but the lead wargame designer in particular, should actively seek out issues and test
the entirety of the wargame to destruction. It is far better to stress the processes and equipment
to breaking point now, when you have time to fix faults, than to have it happen on the day.
The Testex is the critical development activity. All development work should be 90-95%
complete. Refinements will still arise, but they should be minor.
Key supporting personnel should attend the Testex and fill their actual roles. The Game
Controller must be present and conduct their wargame role. The Testex affords the sponsor and
Game Director the best opportunity to understand what will be delivered in the wargame, and is
far better than a dry briefing. Robust Critical Thinking should be conducted by dedicated
external personnel and all attendees.
Physical products and equipment should be used as if for real to ensure that the actual systems
will work on the day. This includes IT, communications and recording equipment. All introductory
briefs should be delivered in full, ideally to a newcomer to assess how easy they are to
assimilate. Game play must take place, with players represented by wargame and project team
members, augmented by trusted agents as required.
The Testex is not a rehearsal. It is development work because you are actively seeking faults
and making refinements, whereas a rehearsal entails familiarising participants with a finished
product. Rehearsals take place at the start of execution, as part of that phase (see next
chapter).
While the Testex contents flows from previous development work, the guidance for the Testexes
from the ‘find’ experiment wargame and RAF wargame are shown below by way of example.
The ‘find’ wargame Testex guidance was:
· Purpose. The Testex purpose was to robustly test all aspects of the wargame to ensure
they were fit for purpose.
· Agenda. The agenda was that of the actual wargame, with every serial enacted to the
degree necessary to ensure it would work. Every element of the wargame, including
briefings, components and equipment is to be set up and executed at 95% completeness.
The programme for the wargame, and hence the Testex, is:
o Review briefs: introduction; wargame mechanics; and scenario.
o Execute wargame turns. Enough of every turn will be executed to ensure it will meet
the analytical requirement. At the core of each turn are the vignettes developed by the
Red Cell, which will be played out.
o Conduct immediate post-turn then final analysis and voting. A test of immediate voting
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and analytical techniques will be conducted to ensure these are valid.
· Outcomes. The Testex outcome should be that the sponsor and all members of the
project and wargame teams are confident that the wargame is fit for purpose; that it can be
set up, executed with a full player contingent, and deliver the required outputs.
The RAF High Command Testex guidance was:
· Purpose. The purpose of the Testex is to ensure that RAF High Command are satisfied
that the wargame team and supporting games are fit for purpose.
· Agenda:
o Scenario review.
o Playtest games:
§ Tac Air.
§ Command Group matrix game.
§ Homeland Resilience game.
§ C2 game.
§ RCAT turn, to include ‘Concept Card’ serials.
o Concept Cards review.
o Analysis plan review.
o Event schedule, task allocation and room allocation review.
o Key participant review.
Playtest and Testex outputs
Each playtest event requires a consolidated list of decisions taken and actions arising. Many of
these will be noted by individuals, but you should record them formally. An example from one of
the ‘find’ experiment wargame playtests is shown below at Figure 13-2.

Figure 13-2. Example record of actions arising from a development meeting

Development phase outcomes
The outcome of the development phase is a wargame that: has been tested to destruction in all
respects; is considered fit for purpose by the sponsor, Game Director, Game Controller and
CWT; and can be set up and executed seamlessly. The next time the wargame will be used will
be during execution. This should include a rehearsal, but that is part of execution, and it will be
too late to rectify faults arising.
Audit trail
The records of each of the development meetings, playtests and Testex should suffice as an
audit trail. Figure 13-2 is an example. However, you should review the audit trail at the end of the
development phase; ‘covering your back’ and doing your job properly amount to the same thing.
In this way do we avoid the serendipitous wargaming of Chapter 3.
Chapter 14. Wargame Execution
‘What wargames can do for those who play them (at least when they are designed by insightful,
knowledgeable and skilful designers) is give them that dull grey shadow of what a black future
might look like and feel like. And getting as much practice as possible at making decisions in
those sorts of environments can be very helpful to some of those decision makers (the best
ones, I contend), especially if knowledgeable, talented, and skilful mentors and analysts help
them understand and profit from those experiences.’
Peter Perla, 2011 e-mail exchange
Introduction
You might find this chapter surprisingly thin, considering that execution is what it’s all about.
That is because many of the topics are fundamental to successful wargaming and warrant a
separate and full discussion. I place these into context here but then point to the chapter where
they are considered in detail.
A second reason is that there are so many wargame formats, variants and contexts that it is
impossible to detail how to execute all of them. The doctrinal adage offered in the Introduction,
that this book is a starting point for consideration, is especially applicable to this chapter. Most
headings are common to most wargames, but the detail will differ.
Finally, and fundamentally, execution is the extrapolation of all your hard development work. It is
‘just another day in the office’ – assuming that your design and development has been sound.
Wargaming Handbook extract

The diversity of wargames that results from the combination of variants and contexts precludes a detailed
explanation here of how to execute them. Execution is a bespoke activity that will vary considerably from wargame
to wargame; it must be entrusted to a suitably staffed, qualified and experienced wargame team, supported as
required by subject matter experts. However, common activities (which will vary considerably in complexity) are
below:
· Conduct simulation and systems set-up. This can range from a map on a table to federated and distributed
computer systems.
· Conduct simulation user training as required.
· Conduct pre-wargame and start-of-wargame briefs for control staff and all participants.
· Conduct the wargame.
· Capture data and analyse the wargame. Some analysis will occur during execution, some afterwards. Data
capture during execution will be required in both cases.
· Conduct the after action review. These are not limited to a single end-of-wargame event, so can occur during
execution.
· Collect and collate lessons identified throughout for use during the ‘validate’ and ‘refine’ steps.

Set-up
Allow more time than you think to set up. Within the bounds of common sense, you cannot set
up too soon. If everything is set up early and you have spare time, consider using this for
rehearsals and ‘test turns’ (see below). Even if you have ‘smashed’ the development phase,
there will be participants for whom the wargame is entirely new. Any opportunity to familiarise
them with the wargame processes and scenario through game play should be seized.
Given the variety of wargames it is not possible to produce a single set-up aide-memoire.
However, I have included some points below that I frequently encounter. You should develop
your own check-list throughout the design and development phases, and have this to hand on
arrival at set-up.
Real-estate
Despite site recces, in-situ playtests and submitting detailed lists of your requirements, do not
assume that the right equipment or facilities will be waiting for you. The person, or people, you
have been dealing with might not be at the wargame venue, having delegated set-up to an
administrative branch or department. Even if the organiser is present, they will be inundated
with people making demands. Arrive early, claim your real-estate and set up. Then get people to
come over and start them playing.
Simulation and systems user training
Whether using manual, computer simulation or both, you must allow time for, and plan, user
training. Ideally, this can dovetail into rehearsals and a ‘Turn 0’ (see below), helping people get
into the scenario and become familiar with game mechanisms.
If you can harness user training to enable people to make decisions that will actually affect
game play, it helps to engage them, as you will see in Chapter 18 (High-Engagement Wargames).
For example, making amendments to orders of battle and dispositions or enhancing personality
profiles allows people to take ownership of the actors, factions and force elements they will
control during the game. Clearly, all of this must be done within the scenario parameters – the
wargame has not started yet! Even so, build in opportunities during user training for people
(players and Control staff alike) to start taking control.
Conduct training on IT, communications equipment and any scenario management software,
according to plans you devised during development. This is often interleaved with simulation
user training, with different groups (players, Control cells, observers, analysts and so on)
needing bespoke training, probably at different times. Hence, user training across all systems
can take several days if you are using complex computer simulations, real Communication
Information Systems and/or scenario management tools.
Initial briefings
Initial briefs should have been produced during the wargame design and development phases,
and delivered in full at least once, at the Testex. Introductory briefs tend to be structured
broadly as below. Different versions of each might be required for different participants, for
example players and Control staff.
· Administration.
· Introduction. Aim, objectives etc.
· Wargame mechanics. This will probably require variants for: analysts,
Observer/Mentors (O/M) and other support staff; and players (who probably need to know
less about the processes and sub-processes).
· Scenario. The scenario brief might also have two versions: one for support staff, and
one for players.
These briefs are important, and usually contain a lot of information, so keep them as short is
sensible or consider breaking them up. After 30 minutes of health and safety and
administration, a 10-minute pep talk from the sponsor, then a detailed brief on the scenario, the
audience’s ability to assimilate the detail of the wargame mechanics will be limited.
Exacerbating this, due to pressure of work or other priorities, assume that no-one has read any
of the instructions, scenario or pre-reading sent out prior to the wargame. Briefs should be
prepared and delivered based on this assumption.
Scenario brief
The scenario brief deserves particular attention. You will read in Chapter 18 about the ‘Invitation
to Play.’ This is the point at which players – and support staff to a degree – move from the real
world to being immersed in the play space known as the ‘magic circle’. The point at which
people step into the magic circle, and how this is done, is important. One way is to deliver all
except the scenario brief, and then have a break. The break could be a protracted period when
participants set up cells, find their accommodation or whatever. When everything else has been
done, deliver the scenario brief. The brief should end with a high-impact, ideally multi-media,
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climax that precipitates participants into the scenario. That ‘Invitation to Play’ is Startex :
players and support staff are transported into the magic circle, not to emerge until the end of
the wargame.
Rehearsals, mini-games and ‘Turn 0’
At some point prior to Startex you should hold one or more rehearsals. All participants – or as
many as you can get – should take part, and all simulations, IT, communications equipment,
recording systems, scenario management tools and so forth should be used for real. This is not
the Testex: it is a genuine rehearsal, with the focus on familiarising people with the scenario,
equipment and roles they will play during the wargame.
The mini-game
An excellent way to do this is to run a mini-game. Simply putting people into their physical
locations achieves little by way of rehearsal, even with equipment live. You need to do more
than that – so why not run a mini-game? Pick a slice of the anticipated wargame play (identified
during the development phase) and run one or more turns or, if using real-time simulation, run
the game for a fixed time, including data capture. It is best to choose a relatively calm period in
the anticipated scenario, rather than pitch people straight into frenetic activity. Having run the
mini-game, re-set everything back to the Startex point.
‘Turn 0’
A variation on this if you are executing a turn-based wargame is to hold a ‘test turn’, or ‘Turn 0’.
Choose a turn that involves as many aspects of the game-play as possible, and include
recording. Run the turn as if for real, but ensure that everyone knows it is a practice and take
the opportunity to explain the game mechanisms. At the end of the turn, assume that you will
re-set everything back to the Startex situation, and then execute it again as the real Turn 1.
Hence your wargame schedule should include time for a Turn 0 and a Turn 1. However, having
played the Turn 0, if you, the Game Director, Game Controller and Lead Analyst are content,
then this can become the actual Turn 1 and be used for real. But take this decision carefully,
and do not assume that outcome. In a training event, the Turn 0 is best conducted before
Startex with just key members of Control. Typically, it takes place while Control is being set up.
Once all staff are available, the situation is replayed as the real Turn 1 with the full Control
contingent.
The output of a well-run rehearsal, mini-game or Turn 0 should be: all participants familiarised
with the scenario, wargame processes and enabling equipment; and players who have had an
opportunity to figure out how to enact their plans without these being skewed by unanticipated
aspects of the wargame mechanics.
The essentials of effective execution
So, this is it. Startex. The rubber hits the road and you’re off. While there are many important
aspects of the Wargame Lifecycle that continue beyond Endex, execution is where everything
comes together – or doesn’t. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the essentials of execution reflect the
essential characteristics of successful wargames discussed in Chapter 6.
Effective facilitation
Good facilitation is essential to successful execution. It is the third of Rex Brynen’s ‘Three
Pillars’, and covered in Chapter 23. I will highlight just one point here: the relationship between
the facilitator and Game Controller is key to success.
Transparent adjudication
Transparency is discussed in detail in Chapter 24 (Generating Outcomes). Some results might
have to be presented as a fait accompli, with no explanation, for example for training purposes
or, a less-good reason, to achieve rapid game play. However, players and Control staff make
better decisions if they understand the factors leading to an outcome, so make these as
transparent as possible.
Effective data capture and ongoing analysis
Data capture is a critical activity, and must be accorded a high priority in terms of ergonomics
and effort. While this is slightly less the case in a training wargame, it remains important, with
O/M needing to capture material for After Action Reviews (AARs). Hence data capture methods
must be effective (including capturing the vital communicative aspects of the game), with
recorders and analysts front and centre of all discussions.
Preliminary analysis is likely to occur during execution in both analytical and training wargames.
AARs (and Scientific AARs) often take place daily, or more often on an ad hoc ‘as required’
basis. When conducted immediately after wargame play, these are often called ‘hot wash-ups’
(‘hot washes’). Conducting hot washes carries risk, due to the tempo with which they are
prepared and conducted; each needs sufficient time to make it effective, and a staffed sub-
process that has been planned and tested during development.
Execute to the same purpose you designed for
An obvious point, too often forgotten: the wargame you are executing must stay true to the
purpose for which it was designed. It is easy for ‘mission creep’ to occur, with the wargame’s
scope and even aim and objectives being subjected to ‘improvements.’ If this is because of a
design or development flaw, then something must be done. Take remedial action and note
everything for the lessons identified (LI) log. Should this occur, the most likely error was
insufficient engagement from the sponsor and Game Director during the design and
development phases. Deviations or suggested amendments should have been discussed then,
not during execution.
Conversely, changes in scope can result from the wargame being too successful, when people
naturally want to exploit it and achieve more. Accepting that such pressures are the result of
positive factors, and that it is difficult to disappoint, you should still objectively consider the
impact of any proposed change. A lot of apparently good ideas originate from well-meaning
participants who do not understand the consequences of implementing what might appear to be
an innocuous and positive ‘improvement.’ Suggested changes are often the result of senior
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officer WAGIIs or ‘CORGIs’ . Coming from senior officers, these tend to be accepted
with insufficient scrutiny. Be judicious in accepting any idea that affects the wargame objectives
or scope, or that over-complicates something that should remain as simple as possible.
Effective, but light, control
The control function is critical and is discussed in detail in Chapter 22 (Controlling Wargames).
The point to note here is that while control must be effective, it should be implemented with as
light a touch as possible. This talks to characteristics of successful wargames such as the
primacy of player decisions and engagement.
High-engagement wargaming
Chapter 18 presents a myriad of methods by which you can ensure participant engagement. I
will highlight just two of these now. The first is the level of pressure on players. Key to players
staying in ‘the flow’, maintaining the correct level of pressure is central to continuing
improvement and engagement. I begin every Control meeting with an assessment of the level of
pressure on the players; it is the starting point for all discussion. Secondly, feedback is crucial
for player engagement. Feedback should, ideally, be constant, and amounts to far more than a
daily or weekly AAR. It should occur during execution, when it can be acted upon; it is too late
at the end.
A dynamic scenario that is primarily shaped by player decisions but remains coherent
Given that a wargame is a shared story-living experience, the scenario must be at its heart;
executing the wargame is executing the scenario. This is discussed in Chapter 21 (Scenario
Execution). And the scenario shapes, and is shaped by player decisions, per the wargame
definition. This necessitates a light Control touch to ensure that players retain enough
ownership of the scenario’s direction of travel to remain empowered and engaged.
Yet there is a tension here: the wargame has been designed, and is now being executed, to a
purpose that must be met. So, player decisions cannot completely dictate how the scenario
unfolds. The primacy of player decisions versus controlling the wargame to meet its objectives
is a crucial balancing act.
Achieving that balance is the primary challenge facing the wargame team during execution. To
make this even harder, it must be achieved while ensuring that the scenario remains coherent.
To violently adjust the play space to accommodate both player decisions and game objectives is
to invite inconsistency and aggravate players, who will soon disengage. It is a central balancing
act that Control must achieve.
Adversarial game play
The adversaries’ freedom of action is part of this balance. In a one-sided wargame, adversary
plans and actions are part of the scenario and, while usually enacted by a Red Cell [289], are
sanctioned or ultimately determined by Control. In a multi-sided, fully adversarial, wargame, the
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adversary(ies) will be freer to act, although potentially still steered by Control.
Whatever variant of wargame you are executing, try to give the adversary as much freedom of
action as possible. The players or Control cell playing the adversary should be encouraged –
ideally able – to win. If this is not the case, you will lose one of the most powerful drivers of
innovation and challenge. This talks to the same tension between player primacy and control.
Even in a two- or multi-sided wargame, it is likely that a compromise must be reached. For
example, in an educational staff college wargame, one side pre-emptively destroyed the other’s
air force on the ground (1973-like). Because the learning objectives included the command and
control of joint air operations, that outcome had to be moderated, with forces resurrected to
allow both sides’ continued air play. Avoiding such clumsy interventions while allowing
adversary freedom of action is the challenge you face.
Collection of wargaming lessons identified
No wargame is perfect: issues will arise during execution. Clearly, you address these as they
occur. Beyond that, though, you should seek these out and the actions taken to resolve them,
and record this during execution for subsequent examination in the wargame validation and
refinement phases.
The lessons identified data base
To achieve this collection, consider using a LI data base. This can be a simple spreadsheet or
part of a bespoke exercise management system. Seemingly easy, the collection of LI happens
during execution, when more exciting things are going on. Some suggestions to ensure the
effective collection and collation of LI are:
· Exhort (force) everyone to complete, or review, LI at the end of every day. The tempo
and excitement of wargames can result in people forgetting everything that happened
more than a few hours (sometimes minutes!) before. If you wait until the end of the
wargame (which might be days or weeks), they will have forgotten their LI.
· Ensure the spreadsheet, or data base, has multi-access permissions, so that people can
work on it simultaneously.
· Make sure it is easy to access (i.e. have terminals to hand) and use. Over-complicating
the data base will discourage people from using it.
· Organise it into simple and obvious areas or work sheets. One huge bucket of entries is
difficult to examine subsequently.
Different grades of OIL
As an important aside, there are two different uses of the acronym OIL. You might find that you
have two ‘OILs’ data bases:
· Observations, Insights and LI. This pertains to data capture and analysis, as previously
discussed.
· Open Issues Log. This is a technical issues list that pertains to computer systems. It
ranges from user training to new code required.
Both are useful; just ensure there is no confusion.
Chapter 15. Wargame Validation
‘This is not a game! This is training for war! I must recommend it to the whole Army.’
General von Muffling,
Chief of the Prussian General Staff, 1824
Introduction
[291]
I use the common English meaning of ‘valid’ and apply the Defence Systems Approach to
Training (DSAT) definition of validation: an evaluation of training, plans and materials to assess
its fitness for purpose. Although DSAT specifies ‘training’, its methodologies are applicable to
any wargame, training or analytical.
Clearly, there will be ‘real’ findings from your wargame that pertain to the research question or
learning objectives. This chapter, however, focusses on validating the wargame to elicit lessons
identified (LI) that can become lessons learned (LL) when applied to future wargames. The
processes of validating and refining wargames are inseparable: the one enables the other.
Hence, there is considerable overlap between this chapter and the next (Wargame Refinement).
Wargaming Handbook extract

Validation should involve the whole wargame team. All LI, observations and feedback should be collated and
examined for internal and external validation. The customer will lead on external validation (were the event
objectives correct?); the remainder of the wargame team will lead on internal validation (did the event meet the
given objectives?).
A Post Exercise Report (PXR) should be produced. This might solely concern the wargame, or wargaming aspects
of a wider event might be included as a PXR annex. The following sections should be considered:
· Suggested refinements. Suggestions can relate to any aspect of the wargame. Promulgation should be
widespread, including to a central repository of wargaming LI.
· Wargame findings. If not extracted for promulgation elsewhere, the observations and insights arising from the
wargame should be noted. These, too, should be distributed to a central repository.
· Shaping factors for subsequent events. If not extracted for promulgation elsewhere, factors arising from the
wargame that will shape future iterations in a series of games, or other aspects of an experiment, should be
noted. The distribution of these in a timely manner is particularly important in an ongoing cycle of research.

External and Internal Validation

These useful DSAT terms can be applied to training and analytical wargames – but note that
social scientists have a different meaning for them so, as ever, make sure you explain your
terms.
External Validation
External Validation (ExVal) is ‘validation to ensure that the training objectives of an internally
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valid course are based on current requirements of the job.’ Colloquially, are we doing the
right thing? Pertaining directly to the aims and objectives of an event, this question should be
addressed by the sponsor, but is worth considering yourself.
Internal Validation
Internal Validation (InVal) is ‘validation to ensure training has achieved the given training
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objectives’ . Colloquially, are we doing the thing right? While the ExVal is probably above
your pay grade, the InVal is within your remit. The data capture that informs the InVal should be
ongoing throughout execution as part of the LI process. If you cannot persuade the sponsor to
devote effort to collecting wargame-specific LI (the worst case), you should capture them
yourself and produce your own report. The following sections outline what should happen. I
have retained sections of overlap between this chapter and the next (written primarily by
Stephen Downes-Martin) to offer you two perspectives.
Garnering feedback and lessons identified
There are several ways to gather participants’ feedback, for example: LI data bases, After Action
Reviews (AARs), hot wash-ups, surveys, questionnaires and interviews. Their purpose is to
collect respondents’ views on the three bullets in the Wargaming Handbook extract on the
previous page.
Lessons identified data base
To reiterate the key points from Chapter 14: use a spreadsheet or bespoke data base; ensure
this is easily accessible, is simple and user-friendly; and, most important, exhort people to fill it
in every day, not just at the wargame’s end.
After Action Reviews
Stephen Downes-Martin covers these in detail in the next chapter. The only point I’ll draw
forward is that a proper AAR takes time (4 – 6 hours) and should be based on a tailored
combination of analytical techniques such as, for example, language processing, silent
clustering, and formal debate rules.
Sponsor’s hot wash-up
Until the UK catches up with US best practice (see the next chapter), you could be faced with
the prospect of holding only a quick hot wash-up with the sponsor, rather than a properly
resourced AAR. This is better than nothing so, in lieu of a full AAR, you should make time with
the sponsor and Core Wargame Team (CWT) at the end of the wargame to discuss the wargame
processes. You should lead this, using notes you have made throughout the wargame. Quickly
scan the LI data base to pull out recurring or important issues. There is no fixed format for this
hot wash-up, but try to shake points into a prioritised list.
The PXR should then include a full discussion of these points and make specific
recommendations. This so that the designers of future iterations of the same – or similar –
wargame can refer to the PXR, understand the LI recommendations’ context and, hopefully,
implement them as lessons learned.
Questionnaires and surveys
Producing a good survey questionnaire is not simple, and analysing the results takes time. It is a
science, and you should seek advice. As opposed to daily entries into the LI data base,
questionnaires and surveys are best done at the end of the event – but before people depart
back to their day-jobs. If your resources do not extend to a survey expert, two questions will still
elicit considerable insights that, when combined with your own thoughts, will suffice to produce
recommendations for your PXR:
· What three things went well?
· What three things would you improve?
Shaping subsequent and wider activities
If your wargame is part of a wider activity, such as an Integrated Analysis and Experimentation
Campaign Plan (IAECP) or progressive training, you will elicit findings that shape subsequent
activities. It is likely that these findings need to be produced rapidly, to allow them to be
integrated into the planning of other elements of the IAECP. However, their validity must first be
confirmed; hence why they feature here. They should be included in the final PXR.
A series of manual tactical Army wargames to support experimentation into a new UK capability
illustrates this process. Outputs included insights and LI in their own right, but many of these
also informed the design of a major three-week Virtual Event (VE). Figures 15-1 and 15-2 show
extracts from the PXR that: summarise LI pertaining to the wargaming; and suggested subjects
of analysis to take forward into the virtual environment.

Figure 15-1. Example of wargaming-specific LI

Validation phase outputs
The outputs from the validation phase should include:
· A PXR. The bullets below could be included in that, and/or promulgated separately.
· LI specific to the wargaming process, including recommendations.
· Observations, insights and LI specific to the aim and objectives of the event supported
by the wargame.

Figure 15-2. Suggested subjects of analysis to further examine in a virtual environment and/or
live trials
 · Suggestions to exploit findings and shape subsequent activity.
Classification allowing, all of these should be deposited in a central repository, with meta data,
key word tagging and so forth. Repositories and governance – or the lack of – is covered in the
next chapter.
Chapter 16. Wargame Refinement
'It is critical that we police ourselves and act as professionals. The mark of a professional
community is one that conducts a critical assessment and records what occurred, reporting
insights gained and advances its best practices.'
[294]
Cdr Philip Pournelle
Introduction
This chapter is a contribution by Stephen Downes-Martin. It discusses best practise in the USA,
where a wargame model is continually improved during its lifetime.
Wargaming Handbook extract

Lessons Identified only become Lessons Learned when applied. Many wargames are iterative, particularly in
educational and training contexts. In these instances, the incorporation of LI into subsequent events is routine.
More effort is required when a wargame is a one-off, which is often the case in analytical events, even an IAECP.
In the Wargame Lifecycle diagram, the ‘Refine’ arrow should flow back into the Design Phase. For even highly
iterative wargames, time is well spent re-confirming that the existing design remains valid. Exceptionally,
refinements might be made directly into the Development Phase, but it is wise to consider a (re-) Design Phase
first, using the design steps to check that nothing has changed.
Finally, and in common with all phases of the Wargame Lifecycle, an audit trail should be generated and maintained
by documenting suggestions made, by whom, decisions taken and the reasons why. A key output from the Validate
and Refine Phases are documents that enhance wargaming corporate memory.

Wargaming governance
There are two types of effective professional wargaming governance depending on who
manages it: the government’s defense department; or the profession itself. These two can and
should be complementary (with overlaps preferable to gaps). In the US, centralized DoD
wargaming governance exists due to the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, whose
2015 initiatives established the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group (DWAG), Wargaming
[295]
Repository (WGR) and Wargaming Incentive Fund (WIF). Although resources have reduced
after the change of US governments in 2016, this governance remains effective. Critically,
defense department-managed wargaming governance handles classified information. On both
sides of the Atlantic professional wargaming governance is also handled, albeit in a more
distributed fashion, by initiatives such as the various Connections wargaming conferences and
websites such as PAXsims and Milgames. In addition, a large amount of professional gaming
best practice and lessons learned is available from a wide variety of non-defense related gaming
conferences and university programs.
US wargaming governance
Phil Pournelle explains the remits of the DWAG, WGR and WIF in his 2018 Connections
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UK presentation. These are supporting organisations only and, although we should be
grateful for their existence, we cannot rely on them for continuity or quality. We must rely on
ourselves and create a governance that is based in the activity, not on the sponsor. For
example, while patient groups do exist, and the government passes laws concerning medical
treatments, true medical governance by organisations such as the British Medical Association or
the American Medical Association are set up and run by medical professionals (setting up codes
of ethics, best practices, and a knowledge base for example) and not by customers or sponsors
(Defense Department sponsors for wargamers, patients for doctors). We are responsible for the
lack of, or presence of, wargaming governance and only have ourselves to blame if a
bureaucratic governance is imposed on the activity by frustrated sponsors.
Introduction to wargame refinement
Wargame refinement is an expanded version of the best business practice of Reflection, in
which an organisation or individual explicitly schedules time (and therefore funds) to examine
the performance of a just-completed individual project to improve future organisational and
individual performance (see for example Stafano et al 2014 and Bravenboer 2017) through
learning and knowledge development. This is an episodic process mainly focused on identifying
and correcting performance errors in recent projects and is a necessary activity for sponsors
and providers of wargames. Wargame refinement adds to this a continuous reflection process
designed to:
1. Improve the organisation’s performance at wargaming and delivering wargames;
2. Identify and deal with hidden flaws in designing, playing and delivering wargames;
3. Deepen and extend the state of art and science of wargaming; and
4. Capture the best practices in a useful form.
How much effort an organisation or individual puts into wargame refinement depends on the
trade-off between the current and opportunity cost of the time spent on the process against the
potential increase in profitability (for a commercial activity), personal development (for an
individual) or in national security objectives (for government agencies). This chapter explores
wargame refinement and recommends some techniques based on logic and experience to obtain
its benefits while reducing its immediate and opportunity costs.
The purpose of best practice
A best practice is an activity which, if not carried out, or if carried out improperly, will result in
poor performance of individual wargames or in long term poor performance of the organisation
providing the wargame. The key point here is not just that the best practice must be carried out
properly to be effective: it is often the case that a poorly executed process is more damaging
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than the absence of the properly executed process. Furthermore, experience shows that
the temptation to execute a process poorly in order to check the ‘we did it’ box is often
irresistible. Therefore:
The most important best practice of all is to take best practices seriously!
There are three kinds of wargame refinement best practice, each of which provides a level of
desired outcome. The first two levels are to:
1. Improve and maintain the best possible performance of the organisation delivering the
wargame; and to
2. Provide the best possible design, delivery, execution and analysis of individual
wargames.
These are not the same. No amount of brilliant performance by the wargame team on a specific
wargame can compensate for a poorly performing organisation to which the wargame team
belongs or for poorly performing managers and leaders of that organisation. Nevertheless, the
two levels are linked, in that poor organisational performance will lead to high-performing staff
leaving. The third level is to:
3. Extend the state of art and science of wargaming through the discovery and
development of new wargaming techniques in order to wargame better than our
adversaries.
There are two levels of poor performance that your wargaming best practices need to be
tailored to refine, not only your wargaming performance but also your best practices processes:
 · First, the obvious poor performances that are easily perceived by professional
wargamers and managers. These produce results from individual wargames that we can
ignore or caveat. They indicate organisational problems that can be fixed assuming a good
cost-effectiveness trade-off and management’s will to do so.
· Second, those that are hidden. These are dangerous and hard to deal with. After all, how
can we develop best practices to avoid problems we can’t see and don’t know about?
This distinction between obvious and hidden flaws is important. Performance which is obviously
poor is the least dangerous, in that they do not lead to perverse results unless the sponsor
chooses to accept them for political or hidden agenda reasons. For example, a wargame that is
obviously flawed but supports the sponsor’s pre-conceived beliefs and wishes may result in the
sponsor ignoring the flaws in order to claim the wargame validates these wishes (Downes-
Martin 2014).
Hidden poor performance creates the risk of erroneous lessons at best being believed by well-
meaning wargaming or sponsor’s organisations, or at worst exploited by dishonest leaders. The
hidden results of failing to implement a best practice will result not only in wrong lessons
learned, but also in failing to discover the existence of the best practice or wrongfully ignoring it
by claiming it is ‘an unnecessary complication’. At best ‘the world has deceived you’, and at
worst ‘you have conspired to deceive yourself’. We need a way of identifying hidden problems
and therefore best practices are required that have a high probability of exposing and dealing
with previously hidden problems.
An organisation that is either so imbued with arrogance or so lacking in imagination that it
believes it has achieved and understands all that is possible to know about wargaming or cannot
imagine the possibility of others developing novel and competitive advances in technique is
already in trouble – but doesn’t yet know it. It might be addressing the easily perceived first level
of poor performance but is failing at the hidden deeper and more dangerous level.
Sources of best practice
Benign and malign games
The normal sources for best practices are well-run games that provide ‘what we did well’ and
‘what went wrong’ in the just-completed game, which in turn should then provide ‘how to do
things right’ and ‘what mistakes to avoid’ lessons learned for future games. They provide
characteristics to seek and behaviours that interfere with those characteristics to avoid, i.e. best
practices and lessons learned from benign games. This is routine episodic business practice but
does not go far enough.
Consider the thought experiment of deriving lessons learned and mistakes to avoid if you were
to deliberately design a malign wargame with the objective of deceiving the sponsor (Downes-
Martin 2016, Downes-Martin et al 2017). Deception here means the well-meaning and intelligent
sponsor believes in the validity of the game and, based on the game, is motivated to act in a way
that does not best support national security. Such thought experiments allow you to detect new
best practices and wargame design principles in a two-stage process: first, best practices for
how to best deceive the sponsor and what mistakes to avoid if you are to successfully deceive
the sponsor and avoid detection; and then, based on these best practices, for how sponsors and
wargame organisations might avoid being deceived and avoid deceiving themselves. This type
of thought experiment extends the state of art and science of wargaming with additional best
practices to those that surface from benign games.
We have no innate distaste for the idea of a Red Cell expending every intellectual effort in a
wargame into defeating our Blue Cells in order to explore how best to avoid a Blue defeat. We
can only credibly explore how best to achieve a Blue victory and avoid a Blue defeat if we
explore how best to defeat Blue. It’s called wargaming for a reason! If wargames inform the
national security decision process, it is therefore inappropriate squeamishness to object to the
idea of a thought experiment into creating a wargame deliberately designed to deceive those
national security decision makers, i.e. the wargame sponsors, in order to explore how best to
ensure they are not deliberately or inadvertently deceived, and to discover new wargame best
practices and principles. I.e. to apply wargaming principles to the very act of designing a
wargame to inform decision makers and to apply wargaming to the decision making process that
wargames inform, in which games ‘Red’ (now the wargame refinement researcher) is attempting
to pervert traditional wargame design for malign purposes and ‘Blue’ (now the national security
decision maker) is attempting to sponsor a benign game that correctly and best informs national
security.
By looking at wargames that are deliberately designed to be malign (deceptive) we identify
additional characteristics to explicitly avoid in wargame design that are not obvious from looking
at a list of characteristics to seek provided by benign games.
Final plenary
The final plenary is the wargame session after the final move(s) have been made. The cells are
brought together for a facilitated discussion led by the leader of the wargame’s facilitation team
and a sponsor representative. This session is part of the game in that it is focused on the
sponsor’s objectives for the game and is obviously an episodic process. As the US Naval War
Game Department’s handbook states:
‘Facilitated plenary gatherings include select questions created by the analysts to gather player
responses needed to answer game research questions and further explore unexpected insights
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observed during game play.’
For example, during a deterrence game the Blue Cell lead might be asked ‘How well did you
deter your adversary?’ and then the Red Cell lead asked to comment. Although not explicitly
designed to be a source of best practice for wargame refinement, discussion during the final
plenary often does surface wargame design problems that can then be passed onto the
wargame refinement process. Players, when asked about their ability to achieve their military
objectives within the game, may complain about game design issues in addition to discussing
the capabilities they were given to play with and the cunning innovations of their adversaries.
During final plenaries I have frequently heard senior officers complain that the wargame
technology support failed to pass along an order they had given during a move or failed to
provide them with information they would have had in the real world. If true, this indicates a
technical problem that must be solved. If not true, this indicates a problem with the process by
which players kept track of what they did or did not do or know about during the game. The
latter might be a best practices issue if the game is not meant to deal with exploring unreliable
C3 or stressing people with too much information. Players should be allowed to vent about game
design during the plenary sessions since this is useful for wargame refinement purposes both
intra and inter games, but not to the extent that it interferes with the analytic purpose of the
plenary.
After Action Reviews
The After Action Review (AAR) is the primary mechanism for assessing your own wargame and
wargame organisation to identify ignored or poorly implemented best practices, and to identify
previously unknown and therefore missing best practices specific to your own organisation. It
can be episodic (following each game) or continuous (regularly scheduled independent of games
and addressing broader issues of wargame knowledge and quality within the organisation).
You identify the best practices by looking at the poor performances (problems) and asking why
the performance was poor and what best practice was known about but ignored by your
organisation, it’s leaders, or the wargame team. This is quite separate from the game’s final
plenary. Participants are primarily the game team from the organisation that designed and
delivered the game but should if possible include those sponsor representatives who
participated in the game and senior players who led game cells. It should not include anyone, no
matter how senior, who was not an active participant in the game.
An AAR is a disciplined procedure that digs deep into the weakness-based question:
What interfered with us providing the best possible wargame?
The answers to this provide a starting point for developing best practices and refining the
wargame process. The question is weakness-based since the purpose is not to pat yourself on
the back about how good you are, but to examine what went wrong. Its wording avoids
assuming from the beginning that the game was a failure and avoids any blame being a priori
assumed. The going-in assumption is that the game was successful, but that improvement is
possible.
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A proper AAR following the wargame is not just a hot-wash, BOGSAT or brainstorm of
participants and practitioners. Hot-washes and BOGSATs are easy, fast, and produce lists of
what people emotionally liked or did not like. They produce responses, not answers.
Brainstorms are a form of problem solving rarely done properly and long since debunked as an
effective process (Lehrer 2012) in favour of a three-stage normative process.
The full AAR process takes four to six hours (depending on the level of participant familiarity
with the process) to do properly, which means it must be scheduled on the wargame agenda. If it
is not scheduled, but merely shoehorned into the final plenary, then that is a warning sign that
the organisation is either uninterested in improvement (wargame refinement), too busy to do it,
or arrogant enough to believe they do not need to do it. Obviously for small and short games a
four hour or longer AAR might be considered excessive and you might instead do a single full
AAR after a series of many similar short games – unless a short game is critically important and
involved very senior leadership as participants. For a several-day to one week or longer
wargame the full AAR process should be mandatory for a serious organisation. Tailoring the
AAR is a trade-off analysis between cost and benefit.
The AAR process is designed to identify the real underlying problems, from which you may then
identify what best practices were ignored, not properly adhered to, or perhaps new ones that
need to be introduced. Details of the process successfully used by the author on many
occasions for business, military and government sponsors are contained in and adapted from
the Language ProcessingTM Manual (GOAL/QPC 1995).
An AAR is a problem identification process, after which you schedule a separate session to
propose actions specifically aimed at addressing each of the weaknesses identified in the AAR
by asking the following questions:
1. What smallest collection of actions covers all the weaknesses with the best likelihood of
dealing with them?
2. What weaknesses are worth dealing with and which ones should we live with?
3. Which critical weaknesses have we seen before, i.e. which weaknesses are
systematically present in our organisation?
4. Why are these weaknesses present? What is it about our organisation that interferes
with past attempts to deal with them?
Outside organisations
A key source of best practices for refining your own wargames and wargaming knowledge are
the community of professional wargaming colleagues (both inside your organisation and, more
importantly, outside your organisation), outside organisations and their wargames, government
wargaming repositories, and academic and professional organisations and their databases.
Engaging with these sources should be a continuous process with embedded episodic events.
Your wargame staff should engage with other organisations by supporting their games, playing
in them, and inviting them to play in and support your own game development and delivery. For
government organisations the only obstacle to this might be the lack of political and financial
willpower of the leadership to do so. Different government departments or military services have
their own internal wargaming efforts; these should be talking with each other to refine their
wargames and knowledge by sharing best practice. For commercial organisations ‘outside’
means other departments or profit centres, while for academic departments ‘outside’ includes
other departments within the university and other universities. Review the documentation in
wargaming repositories for lessons learned that might apply to you.
Professional development
A critical source of best practice, especially for best practices that deal with performance
problems hidden from your organisation and to extend and deepen the state of art and science
of wargaming, is the professional development of your own wargame staff. This must be by both
formal (internal and external courses) and informal (conferences, time set aside for self-study)
learning. A good rule of thumb for keeping on the leading edge is to allow staff 20% of their time
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for self-directed study or self-chosen formal courses.
Wargaming is vulnerable to inadvertent intellectual fraud
In nearly all cases of scientific fraud, three risk factors have been identified as present. The
perpetrators: ‘knew, or thought they knew, what the answer to the problem they were
considering would turn out to be if they went to all the trouble of doing the work properly; were
under career pressure; and were working in a field where individual experiments are not
expected to be precisely reproducible.’
A major risk to wargame refinement is a similar and inadvertent intellectual fraud driven by self-
confidence, career pressure (on sponsors, players and wargame designers and analysts), and
the strategic indeterminacy (Hanley 1991 pp 8-19, Hanley 2017 p 81) inherent in wargaming and
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therefore in wargame refinement. Wargaming professionals and their sponsors are not
usually uncertain or humble about their areas of expertise, national security is a vital field where
careers depend on making good decisions, and the indeterminacy of warfare and wargaming
means that repeatability is unlikely. All three risk factors are present and thus wargaming is
vulnerable to inadvertent self-deception. The wargaming refinement process must therefore
explicitly deal with this vulnerability at the individual and the institutional levels.
A major way this vulnerability manifests itself is when an organisation acts as though following
procedures is the end rather than a means to an end. The end being the best possible design
and delivery of wargames based on extending the art and science of wargaming. A cautionary
example of how this might happen at the institutional level is provided by a recent examination
of a number of high-profile studies originally published in prestigious journals which failed to
find significant evidence for the original findings and found weaker effects than those originally
claimed (Camerer et al 2018, ScienceDaily 2018). At best poor and at worst incorrect results
were reported despite all concerned (the original experimenters, the Journal editors and their
peer reviewers) scrupulously and honestly following best practices.
If this kind of failure can happen for repeatable events, the possibility this can occur for hard-to-
repeat events such as wargames must be seriously considered despite the difficulty of proving
similar failures have occurred. National security is too important to blithely assume that
wargaming, unlike every other human endeavour, is somehow immune to systematic error, self-
deception, deliberate deception or fraud. How can wargaming deal with this vulnerability?
We start with the observation that wargaming is a social group process, and therefore so are
the best practices used to refine wargames and the wargaming process. There exist several
group dynamic effects that subtly subvert the benefits of group processes and which are rarely
considered when constructing, running, analysing or refining wargames. These must be taken
into account by advanced wargaming organisation, and so a discussion of the failure modes of
group processes and how to avoid them is required.
Before proceeding further, ask yourself these questions about the wargame or wargame
refinement process:
· Do we believe we know the answer to the question or problem and, if so, how is this
influencing our design and our attitude?
· Who among the stakeholders are under career pressure, where is that pressure coming
from and how intense is it?
· How easy is it to inflate or hide results?
Then respond to the answers by explicitly naming the problems and their sources and adapting
your normal institutional processes to deal with them. For example, if you face problems from
the second question, consider replacing the relevant people, and if that is not possible identify
the pressure on that person to behave in a certain way and explicitly adapt your Data Collection
and Analysis Plan (DCAP) accordingly. Of the recommended best practices at the end of this
chapter the one concerning an external independent peer review board is extraordinarily
effective at keeping an organisation honest.
The Three Witches of Wargaming
We must face the deliberate but well-meaning interference by the ‘Three Witches of Wargaming’:
the wargame sponsor, the wargamer’s own boss, and the senior officers leading game cells
during play (Downes-Martin 2014). Each of these will attempt to interfere in the design and
execution of the wargame and the wargame refinement activities due to the erroneous belief that
they are more expert at wargame design and refinement than the expert they have hired to do
the wargame and the wargame refinement. The wargame or wargame refinement process lead
must be truly an expert, obtain sign-off by the sponsor and his own boss for the design, recruit
(not invite) senior players to play the game or execute the process as designed, and have the
intestinal fortitude to politely but uncompromisingly push back against improper interference. In
the face of improper interference, if support from your own chain of command is not
forthcoming, then document the interference and the assessed damage it will do to the quality
of the product and analysis that will be delivered to the sponsor.
Wisdom of crowds, or madness of mobs?
The work of Philip Tetlock, Dan Gardner and James Surowiecki (’Superforecasting’, ‘Wisdom of
Crowds’) and their colleagues is too often grossly oversimplified into the claim that ‘aggregate
group forecasts and decisions are much better than individual ones’. This is clearly nonsense: a
group of idiots is unlikely to make a better forecast or decision than a single expert; and a single
expert is more than likely to make a better decision about their area of expertise than a group of
experts in another field. No patient in their right mind would ask a group of expert sanitation
engineers about their cancer treatment instead of the single expert oncologist. The wisdom of
crowds and superforecasting research is much more nuanced, with interesting areas to
manipulate, than the popular understanding of them.
A more accurate summary of the research might be ‘A group of experts satisfying four
requirements who make a decision or forecast about their area of expertise is more likely to
make a better decision or forecast than a randomly selected individual from that group’.
Furthermore, research indicates that a group brought together and using BOGSATs and
brainstorming consistently underperforms the same group using normative methods in which
individuals first work independently, then in a group, then review and refine as individuals
(Nijstad et al 2006; Lehrer 2012; Mullen et al 1991). The four requirements for a group to exhibit
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the ‘wisdom of crowds’ rather than the ‘madness of mobs’ are (Surowiecki 2004, p. 10):
· ‘Diversity of opinion: Each person should have private information even if it's just an
eccentric interpretation of the known facts.
 · Independence: People's opinions aren't determined by the opinions of those around
them.
· Decentralization: People are able to specialize and draw on local knowledge.
· Aggregation: Some mechanism exists for turning private judgments into a collective
decision.'
While the DoD groups I have observed often do satisfy the decentralization requirement, they
mostly fail on the other three for wisdom of crowds. They frequently consist of subject matter
experts from the same communities of practice or Service with peer pressure to conform to
doctrine. Opinions, in the form of statements or votes, are often collected sequentially and
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publicly. Aggregation is often based on flawed voting schemes using junk arithmetic.
Brainstorming and BOGSATs
Immediately following its introduction in the 1950s, brainstorming has routinely been debunked
as an effective mechanism, so much so that the demonstration of its inferiority compared to
easily implemented normative processes is a routine experiment carried out by first-year
undergraduate social science students (for a popular description of the problem see Lehrer
2012). This is quite separate from observation that most brainstorms do not even follow the
primary rule that brainstorming claims must be followed for the process to be effective, which is
‘no analysis during the process’. A common problem is that shortly after the start of a
brainstorm a senior officer has grunted approval or disapproval of some junior officer’s idea –
and the brainstorm is over. It has long been proven that a disciplined normative approach using
Language Processing, Silent Clustering and Formal Debate give superior results than those
obtained from ill-disciplined methods such as brainstorming (even when run properly) or
BOGSATS.
If time constraints or your superiors dictate a brainstorm or BOGSAT and dictate who is
present, then insist on it being run properly: (a) an initial period in which everyone silently writes
down their ideas and then submits their paper to you; (b) open presentation of ideas during
which you ruthlessly call out anyone who indicates approval or disapproval of an idea; (c)
anonymous voting to rank the ideas.
The (Dis)honesty Shift
Research indicates ‘that there is a stronger inclination to behave immorally in groups than
individually’, resulting in group decisions that are less honest than the individuals would tolerate
on their own. ‘Dishonest’ means the group decisions break or skirt the ethical rules of the
organisation and societal norms, and involve cheating and lying. Furthermore, the group
discussions tend to shift the individuals’ post-discussion norms of honest behaviour towards
dishonest. First the discussion tends to challenge the honesty norm, then inattention to one’s
own moral standards (during the actual discussion) and categorization malleability (the range in
which dishonesty can occur without triggering self-assessment and self-examination) create the
effect that ‘people can cheat, but their behaviours, which they would usually consider dishonest
do not bear negatively on their self-concept (they are not forced to update their self-concept)’.
The research indicates that it is the small group communication that causes the shift towards
dishonesty that enables group members to coordinate on dishonest actions and change their
beliefs about honest behaviour. The group members ‘establish a new norm regarding
(dis)honest behaviour’.
The research has not been done on military officers (to the best of my knowledge) so at worst
there is only a reasonable suspicion that it would apply during wargames involving military
officers. Although the systematic and unremitting focus of the military on ethics means that the
level of honour within the military is probably higher than in the civilian community, note that the
research implies subtle and sometime subconscious shifts in honesty. Experience however is
less charitable, and the behaviours of Flag and General Officers and O6s leading player cells in
wargames has been observed to go beyond ‘vigorously advocating for their positions’. As H. G.
Wells observed over a century ago (Wells, 1914).
‘... it is remarkable how elastic the measurements of quite honest and honourable men can
become.’
Appeals to ethics standards seem to be effective in the short term but there is little evidence for
long term effectiveness (Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008, Kocher, Schudy and Spantig 2016). So,
consider holding a short discussion before every wargame or refinement event around the
question ‘What are the legal and ethical concerns involved in the issue we are gaming or have
gamed?’ to remind and ground everyone in the ethical standards of the organisation. This will
provide protection for the immediate event.
The Risky Shift
Research into risky or cautious shifts during group discussion looks at whether and when a
group decision shifts to be riskier or more cautious than the decision that the individuals would
have made on their own (Batteux, Ferguson and Tunney 2017, Dodoiu, Leenders and Dijk 2017).
One element driving the shift appears to be who bears the consequences of the decision – the
group members, people the group members know (colleagues, friends, family), or people the
group members do not know. There is evidence that individuals tend to be myopically risk
averse when making decisions for themselves (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz 1997).
Research indicates however that ‘risk preferences are attenuated when making decisions for
other people: risk-averse participants take more risk for others whereas risk seeking
participants take less.’ Whether the group shows a risky shift or a cautious shift depends on the
culture from which the group is drawn and the size of the shift seems to depend on the degree
of empathy the group feels for those who will bear the consequences and risks of the decision.
As part of the design for a wargame or wargame refinement ask yourself the questions:
· ‘What are the relationships between the participants and those who bear the
consequences of any decisions informed by the wargame or wargame refinement?’
· ‘How risk seeking or risk averse does each participant appear to be?’
The Normative Process
Research has consistently indicated that working in a group produces fewer ideas and of lower
quality than the same people working independently and then combining their ideas in a group
process. The research does not compare the quality of ideas created by a group with the quality
of ideas created by any single individual in the group working alone, it compares the quality of
ideas of the group working together with the quality of the combined ideas created by all
individuals of the group working alone. In addition, individuals tend to believe they are more
productive in a group brainstorm than when working alone and are also more satisfied with their
individual performance in a group even though they produce fewer ideas. Research also
indicates the reason for the illusion being that, when working in a group, each individual is less
aware of when they themselves do not come up with an idea than when working alone – they get
to hide behind the group (Nijstad and Lodesijkx 2006).
The normative approach consists of three phases: (1) individual pre-meeting preparation; (2)
group meeting; and (3) individual post-meeting work. This method has been routinely proven by
experiment to generate better results than brainstorming or BOGSATs (Lehrer 2012). Note that
work groups should not be larger than about eight people. Observation shows that in larger
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groups only about eight people make constructive and sustained contributions. If your
group has more than eight people, consider breaking it up into smaller teams addressing the
same problem in parallel or addressing different but related problems.
· First, experts think about the weakness-based question (‘What interfered with us
producing the best possible result?’) on their own as individuals, write down their
proposed answers in correct English or other proper language sentences (i.e. not
 PowerPoint bullets or bumper stickers) and bring them to the AAR. This ensures that every
expert in the group has thought through the question without influence from others in the
group who might be more senior, vocal, or persuasive. You obtain input from all the
experts.
· Second, they meet in a group during which a disciplined process designed for purpose is
followed. For AARs that address weakness-based questions an excellent choice of process
is Language ProcessingTM (see Goal/QPC 1996 for a detailed description). The use of Silent
Clustering used in Language ProcessingTM is unintuitive, but experience shows it is
effective and fast.
· Finally, the group think again as individuals and mail in any additional ideas to the
process lead who combines the new inputs with those from the meeting into a final report.
The three-stage normative approach combines the benefits of individual expertise with those of
group work. However, the process lead must be familiar with the failure modes of group
processes and act to circumvent them or to factor them into the analysis if circumvention is not
possible.
Recommended best practices
We can extract a list of best practices aimed at wargame refinement that you should consider in
addition to those which should already be in place from considering the management of any
project. All of these are of course optional. You do not have to produce an excellent wargame or
create an excellent wargaming organisation if you, your leadership or your sponsor do not care
enough and can hide that fact. If you do care, then based on experience and logic, employing
the above sources of best practices, my recommendations are:
Meta-level best practices
· Design and execute the wargame refinement processes after a trade-off analysis of their
costs and benefits to your specific organisation.
· Take the wargame refinement process seriously.
· Understand the requirements for and limitations of effective group processes (Lorenz et
al 2011, Nijstad et al 2006).
· Be aware of, and take into account, group process pathologies such as the Risky Shift
(Batteux et al 2017, Dodoiu et al 2017, Thaler et al 1997) and Dishonesty Shift (Mazar et al
2008, Kocher et al 2016).
External: engage with the sponsor and stakeholders
· Ensure the event is a wargame with the possibility that Blue can lose, and the gamed
concepts can be overcome by Red. Do not call non-game events ‘wargames’.
· Recruit, not invite, senior leaders to lead game cells to execute the game as designed. Do
not permit these leaders to derail the game in-stride to fit their non-sponsor agendas.
· Playtest the game with sponsor participation or with sponsor’s empowered action
officers to ensure the sponsor is paying proper attention to objectives and design.
· If stakeholders are to play, put each of them in whichever cell each stakeholder wants to
win thus ensuring vigorous play aimed at success. If possible, recruit stakeholders that
disagree with each other and put them in opposing game cells. Do not let the sponsor or
key stakeholders be adjudicators.
· Be prepared to deal with attempts by your boss or sponsor and their chains of command,
or by the senior officers or executives you have recruited to lead player cells, to change
the game objectives or design at the last minute (Downes-Martin 2014) by explaining the
negative impact on the analysis of game data to support the sponsor's objectives. If these
 impacts are accepted by your supervisors, then document the changes and who made
them in the final game report to the sponsor.
Internal: work within the wargame organisation and its chain of command
· Create and use an empowered Independent Peer Review Board to examine objectives,
assumptions, scenario and capabilities data, design, game play, adjudication, data
collection and analysis.
· Minimise cognitive dissonance in the mind of the sponsor by ensuring wargame design
and play is as consistent as possible with their preconceptions, while not allowing these
preconceptions to drive objectives, design, game play, analysis or reporting.
· Conduct wargame forensics and reporting to provide actionable recommendations.
· Report ruthlessly and honestly, unencumbered by sponsor or stakeholder wishful
thinking.
· Do not use groupware technology: it is unnecessary and often counter-productive. Make
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everyone get out of their seats and actively participate using pens, paper, etc.
· Document the best practices you have identified from your own wargames in your
organisation’s own ‘Wargame Handbook’. Include warnings about those that are usually
ignored by your organisation and your chain of command. Submit your handbook or its
updates to the various wargaming repositories. Get an outside wargaming organisation to
review the handbook (i.e. treat it like an audit) and update it annually.
During game play: engage with the players
· Actively monitor for, and collect data on, players ‘breaking the game rules’. This provides
information on better game design and information on the innovative players and their
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ideas.
· Actively monitor for attempts by players to introduce items irrelevant to the sponsor’s
objectives into the game during play and deal with this by inductive adjudication.
· Actively monitor for attempts by senior leads of each player cell attempting to divert the
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game away from sponsor’s objectives and onto their own agendas.
· Design the game so that players rotate between Red and Blue cells.
Chapter 17. The Top 10 Things that Make a Good Wargame Designer
This chapter is a contribution from Ed McGrady and Peter Perla.
Introduction
Anyone can design a game. Game design is simple. Particularly wargames. As Jim Dunnigan, the
original guru of board wargame designers always said, ‘If you can play ‘em, you can design ‘em.’
Decide on a topic that interests you. Get a map. Make some pieces. Borrow a set of rules. Run
the game. It may not be a good game, much less a life-changing one that compels great men to
make epic decisions. But if you are doing a professional game for paying clients, at least you'll
get paid.
We have watched, and designed, a lot of games that we find compelling, and some we have not.
We also are repeatedly asked to define what makes a ‘good game.’ The answer is a ‘good
designer’ makes a good game. So, what makes a “good designer?” Based on our experience
there are several attributes that good designers have, and things that good designers know, that
enable them to design good games. And not only good games. Great games. Ground-breaking
games. Games that make people go, “Wow, I'm glad I paid half a million dollars for that!”
We want to talk about the dirty, nasty, cynical secrets that make a game, and game designer, go
from good to great.
First let’s understand what kind of games we are talking about.
We are not talking about what most people think of when they think of games. We are sure that
we can identify and list traits and practices of video, computer, board, and role-playing
designers, which will greatly improve all of our game designs. We can all learn from game
designers in the digital, print, professional and hobby communities. But in this essay we are
talking about what we call ‘professional’ games. Games designed to accomplish a goal unrelated
—or at least related only incidentally—to entertainment. Such games often involve role-playing
and place the players within the same processes and organisations that they would work in at
their real-world jobs. These games include most of the wargames used by the U.S. Department
of Defense, but also include organisational and business games. They can be used to
understand business or organisational dynamics, figure out military operations or how new
weapon systems might be used, or help players manage their day-to-day jobs. The designer
often moderates these games; that is, introduces and facilitates the game play.
Just because we draw many of our examples from wargames, that does not mean we are
excluding civilian or organisational games. Far from it. Most of the principles we will discuss
apply to all types of professional games—and all types of professional game designers.
For example, prior to hurricane Katrina officials from the region and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) engaged in a game to examine response to a hypothetical
hurricane Pam. The objective was to help develop joint response plans based on projected
storm damage and flooding levels. Emergency officials from 50 parish, state, federal, and
volunteer organisations played the scenario out over a five-day period. This is an example of the
types of games we are talking about: involving tens or hundreds of players, extended duration,
serious subject, and a complex set of processes and procedures to be followed.
In order to design these sorts of games the professional game designer combines a variety of
skills. These include the ability to understand complex problems, to ask critical questions on
topics about which they know little, and to manage a large group of potentially unruly people. In
addition, it requires the ability to manage a design team that has a wide range of different
abilities, attitudes, and personalities.
At this point we also should explain what we mean by ‘game designer.’ We mean the individual
responsible for the design and execution of the game. Often, in our experience the designer is
responsible not only for creating the initial game design, but also for running the team that will
construct and carry out the game. The designer may also run the actual game event, or be the
chief controller for the game. (We’ll talk more about this idea of control a bit later on.) Even if
this is not always the case (there are, after all, many different ways to organize a game design
and execution), the points we make about the designer, the manager, and the controller will
apply to each individual who is responsible for those parts of the game.
None of this is particularly easy which is why there are a relatively few game designers that can
pull of the most complex, difficult, and unusual games. We have had too many of these
opportunities to excel. We have put on games everywhere from the White House to the
Syracuse University Orange dome. We have had games with two players, twenty players, and
over a hundred players. Our games have been played in small rooms where only five or ten
people could fit, to a globe-spanning event with individuals from Japan to Germany to Africa
playing. Our games have included boardgames focused on military conflicts, to seminar games
dealing with policy and organisational issues.
We have had to do games where we knew almost nothing about the subject at the start of the
design. Try figuring out the military contracting process, or how the Department of Energy runs
laboratories, if you don't know anything about contracting or laboratories. We have also had to
run games where the players did not speak English as their first—or indeed any—language.
These challenges are all manageable, but they require some degree of knowledge, flexibility, and
respect for the players in order to pull off without a disaster. And we have had enough of those
(one or two is plenty!) to have learned our lessons the hard way.
When thinking about the skills and abilities the best designers have we can come up with a set
of traits that seem to be common to most. Even if they are not common to everyone, they are
things that every designer needs to think about as they approach the problem of designing a
game for professionals.
What secrets do most designers know that they don't tell anyone? What traits do they have that
make them the best?
Here we provide ten answers to those two questions.
Designers don't respect authority
Game designers don’t respect authority. This is perhaps the most common, and challenging,
trait we see in top line game designers. Of course, not respecting authority and not getting
along well with others is a poor recipe for success. But this isn't saying that to be a good game
designer you have to be an anarchistic jerk.
Game designers don’t respect the word of authority. They don’t respect the conventional
wisdom or whatever has been given to them as the truth. They do two things when they get the
conventional wisdom:
First, they ask themselves what they think of the problem.
Second, they ask why things are this way, and who benefits from it.
Both these questions are critically important to ask when beginning a game design. As Stephen
Downes-Martin says, sponsors and everyone else involved often want to influence the outcome
of games and are therefore at best vulnerable to self-deception and deception and at worst can
lie. This alone suggests that a serious amount of scepticism should be deployed by a
conscientious designer. But this scepticism of the conventional wisdom goes beyond simple
distrust.
Good designers know that it is the system itself that you can’t trust. People are often just
pawns of circumstance. The position they occupy drives their goals and objectives. The
organisational goals and objectives, incentives, and internal and external tensions set up the
framework within which sponsors want things out of games. It also creates the mental, political,
and social environment from which you will draw your players.
Understanding how these systems work can be used to a designer’s great advantage.
Asking: ‘What do I think of this problem?’ gives the designer a tension that can be used to gain
insight into the actual problems being played out in the game. Tension, here between what the
designer thinks and what everyone else thinks about the problem, leads to creativity. The
designer can focus in on the organisational and political issues that underlie the game problem,
creating something that goes beyond simply simulating an organisation or executing a process.
The designer’s point of view also cues the designer to ask what is going on within the game
problem that is unspoken but critical. It leads to asking the sponsor what they ‘really’ want. And
good designers understand that there is often a huge difference between what game sponsors
say they want, and what they really want.
There are many things that may lie hidden within a design problem. Let’s say that the sponsor of
the game wants to understand what might happen when unidentified friendly country green is in
a conflict with unidentified threat country red. Obviously, the U.S. sponsor wants to understand,
obviously, how the United States can affect the emergent conflict. But in many situations like
this the United States has only a peripheral role to play, and much of what it can do or offer may
not be terribly relevant. The sponsor, and the U.S. military, may not replace this. Trust us, they
often don’t replace how little influence they actually have in a situation.
But the good designers ask themselves what are the equities of everyone involved. How will
these be represented in the game? It’s not uncommon for a designer to immediately turn to the
sponsor and say, “We need some other organisations” in the game. Much to the puzzlement of
the sponsor and military, but not to those who have participated in real world operations. The
game needs to reflect the realities of the potential situation, its complexity, and the external
drivers that will affect the sponsor’s objectives. The good designer knows this and seeks to
introduce it by widening the lens of the game.
So how is a designer able to come up with an answer to what they think of the problem? There
are several things to keep in mind when confronted with a game design challenge:
· Conflict. Even if you don’t know anything about the particulars of the problem, you do
know how people behave. Any time you have limited resources people will be in conflict
over them. And resources don’t have to be money. They could be press coverage, fame,
honour, or access to senior leaders. Anything that people value, they will squabble over.
· Self-deception. People make assumptions based on pre-disposed biases. High echelon
leaders, for example, will often assume that the whole organisation is working toward a
common goal—which they themselves have articulated clearly and, of course, elegantly.
Even when that is far from the truth. The good designer just assumes someone,
somewhere, is misbehaving. You can usually find out just who is misbehaving by following
the conflict within the group, but not always. Sometimes you can find it by following the
engineers. In some games, particularly wargames, the underlying problem relies on the
performance of a system or process. There is widespread belief that such things work.
This belief increases as you go up the chain of command. It can be very amusing for the
designer to ferret out the invalid engineering assumptions and use the game to bring them
into question.
· History. It repeats itself (sort of) because the same human processes, social structures,
and values come into play over and over again. Even if organisations try to fix them. During
the anthrax event around 9-11 there was some miss-communication between the CDC and
HHS headquarters —as in the CDC and HHS HQ said two different things at the same time.
This was a challenge that HHS worked hard to fix. But if we were designing a game for
them again, that conflict is exactly where we would look for problems. As institutions CDC
and HHS are naturally set to be in conflict, and when politicians get involved that pressure
is even greater.
The second question designers ask is who benefits from the conventional wisdom. We assume
that our weapons will work as advertised. We assume that the nations we intervene in will
welcome our meddling. Most of all, we assume that we will win. Those assumptions benefit an
orderly and well-funded march toward certain organisational objectives. Sponsors may want
games to give them warm and fuzzies about their assumptions. But games help most when they
are a disruptive element. And designers ask themselves where assumptions need testing and
whether those assumptions are disruptive enough to be truly useful.
This exploration of conventional wisdom is very like looking for self-deception in an organisation
and focusing on that as an element of the game design. Games that not only address the
problem and scenario they were asked to address, but also bring out highly realistic
organisational, political, and interpersonal dynamics from within the participating organisations
are among the most insightful games that we have seen.
Designers worry about maps
Ok, we have gone from questioning authority, a broad and important subject, to maps. At most a
peripheral and trivial subject. But good game designers know a couple of important things about
maps.
First, maps are vital to orienting the players to the world where they will be playing. Maps
determine a lot of things about the game. There is a reason Tolkien put a map at the front of The
Lord of the Rings.
Second, good maps are hard to build. ‘Get a map’ is the first step in our fool-proof formula for
building a wargame. It is also one of the two hardest steps (more on the second hardest, orders
of battle, later).
Maps determine the relationships between players, and connect them to their actions. In a policy
game, political geography will determine which players or player groups will naturally be in
conflict, and which will naturally be allies. In an emergency response game players need to
understand the road network, which sections of road will be damaged, and what alternate routes
can be used to avoid the damaged areas. The distance from garrison bases to the enemy
determines deployment times. The distance from forward bases to the target determines time of
flight, the time delay before ordnance is on target, and the time it will take ground forces to
move to the objective.
Physical geography determines movement rates for ground forces, accessible areas (swamps or
shallow water), and cover. Road networks determine how the terrain affects movement, and
whether forces are vulnerable to detection when traveling on them. Road nets also determine
refugee flows, primary ingress and egress routes, and flows of logistics support. Likewise, for
rail networks and air- and sea-ports. Cities and towns provide cover, and complex urban areas
provide another type of terrain that can be quite challenging to represent in a map and rules.
At minimum a good, large, map gives the players something to point at while talking to each
other about the situation. And that is often a central contribution of a map.
Maps have some organic challenges associated with them. First, let’s assume the earth is
actually round, rather than the even more complex reality. Usually, you want to display things on
flat maps. This raises the question of what projection do you want to use. Over wide areas, say
an entire theatre of operations, nothing will be very good at representing all the various
distances accurately. Players get irritated when they realize that their carefully calculated range
rings don’t necessarily conform to the geography of the map. This can have real-world
implications when players decide something is in range when it isn’t, or they decide to defend
something that doesn’t need to be defended. There are no ideal solutions. One less-bad solution
is to put the centre of the area being fought over in the centre of the projection. The artist can
then measure other distances and fudge the geography until they are more or less correct. Of
course, players will now complain that the map looks ‘weird,’ but, again, no ideal solutions.
Finding a useful map, at the resolution that you need it, can be quite vexing. Dedicated mapping
software often draws simple vectors, which does not produce maps with high visual interest.
Complex maps with lots of detail look great until you realize that players only need half the
information being displayed and the half they don’t need is overlapping and obscuring the half
they do need. If you have access to the National Geospatial Intelligence Center then you can at
least call on them or other groups to provide high quality, detailed maps. But if you are an
independent, contractor, or a staff physician or logistician trying to build a game you may not
have the access that a Combatant Command would. The Internet provides some relief to the
map challenged, through places like the University of Texas map repository, or Open Street
Maps, but often the best option is just to take a bitmap screen shot of Google Maps and call it a
day.
The other option for maps is to take the basic data from various sources, including a
Geographical Information System, and then have an artist redraw it. This, of course, can get
expensive as drawing detailed, high quality maps takes experienced and capable artists. And
they do not come cheap. Strategy and Tactics Magazine runs some of the cleanest, clearest,
military history maps that you can find, following and building on the standards and traditions of
Redmond A. Simonsen, the godfather of wargame graphics from back in the days of
mechanicals and the two-colour process. Modern graphical methods have access to a dizzying
array of tools, textures, and colours. Using them all in a game map is seldom the right way to
go. So, your artist needs specialized understanding.
Game maps also have to be edited to make sure they contain the information the players need,
and not a lot of information that they don’t. Game maps are tools, and only incidentally art. This,
again, can take time and resources, something that professional game designers do not
necessarily have in abundance.
Maps are hard. Be nice to your artists.
Designers know stuff, a lot of stuff
A good game designer knows how things work. Not just engineering things, but social things as
well. The designer incorporates this knowledge into the materials they give the players. They
also use it to adjust and edit the ambitions of the game sponsor. There are several different
kinds of knowledge that the game designer should have: technical, political, and social.
Technical knowledge
Technical knowledge for wargames, or any professional game dealing with a specific subject, is
an obvious kind of knowledge that the game designer should have. Or at least be able to get.
Unfortunately, there is a problem with this obvious requirement: there is a lot of knowledge to
cover.
Depending on the scale of the wargame the designer may be required to have a working
understanding of everything from missile kinematics and end-phase seeker engagement physics
to the network of communications systems the commands involved will be using to chat.
As another example, suppose you are doing a game on avian influenza. You will need to know at
least the basics of poultry production and cock fighting. You will also have to know a bit about
how animal diseases spread, and how the response to an outbreak will be handled by the people
and agencies involved. As the cynical designer who does not respect authority, you will also
want to understand the rest of the poultry protein delivery process, looking for any unexpected
implications or consequences for a disease outbreak (egg production declines, impacting human
influenza vaccine production for next year's flu season, for example). This is a lot of stuff to
know for a game about chickens.
“But we will just use someone else’s rules system (or model).” Sure. Fine. Let’s make the broad
and – from personal experience – unfounded assumptions that you can push this off onto
someone else. Someone you trust to know more about the problem you are gaming than you
do. Unfortunately, the players probably have not made the same bargain that you have.
So, the players will ask ‘why?’ Why did the model produce a result? How did the extra widget or
capability that the players threw in and that's not in the model affect the outcome? What
happens when it starts raining?
Given that the players are generally experts on their weapon systems and capabilities, they will
not be willing just to trust the model. They will start pushing back. You need to be able to
answer them in at least a reasonable fashion. Game controllers will often find that modelers
have to take an urgent phone call when this happens. Or their answer fails to satisfy the players,
who continue to look to the controller, not the modelers, for answers in the game world.
On the other hand, the players are, after all, heavily invested as experts in the systems that they
are playing with. This tends to make them think that the systems will always work in ways that
are, perhaps, unlikely under real world conditions. You cannot simply take the players objections
at face value. They may be wrong, and the model actually may be correct.
You need to decide: the players or the model? That decision will need to be based on you own
knowledge. So, using the model does not relieve you from knowing how things work. At least in
general terms.
Now you don't have to know the physics of every single interaction. But you need to know the
direction the physics goes in. Infra-red will allow you to see things that have a temperature
difference against background. Unless the threat lights a bunch of fires. Then you will need to
factor those fires into the field of view of the seeker, and its frequency ranges compared to that
of fire. The designer does not need to know the IR frequency range emitted by fire, but they
need to know enough to know they need to ask the question when confronted with an IR sensor
with set frequency band. And so on.
Political knowledge
The second kind of knowledge game designers have is political. Understanding the political
situation helps you right from the start in working with the sponsor to define the problem. Any
time someone is paying a lot for a game there has to be some agenda going on, otherwise they
would just get some in-house staffer or contractor to do it. They may be guilty of all the hidden
(or not so hidden) sins that Stephen Downes-Martin talks about in his work, or they may just be
trying to satisfy some tasking or question that came up. But you need to understand the
sponsor’s political position in order to position the game in a way that complements their
agendas.
Notice that I said, ‘complements’ as opposed to ‘supports’ their agenda. There is nothing wrong
with designing a game that addresses the question of whether the Marine Corps needs robotic
dogs as part of the platoon. There is everything wrong with designing a game to prove that the
Marine Corps needs robotic dogs. But designing a game that does not even include robotic
dogs would be just wrong.
Designers also need to understand organisational politics. In any organisation, no matter how
small or big, no matter how squared away, somebody hates somebody else. Often entire
departments hate other departments. There are rivalries over resources, fame, or promotions or
all three. There are process challenges that mean the organisation inevitably does the wrong
thing despite publicly saying that they will do the right thing. For example, an organisation can
have a budgeting process that takes into account all of the various puts and takes, gets
everyone’s input, and manages to produce a coordinated, well considered, budget for the next
year. Then, at the very last minute, a small group sits down and decides who actually gets what
funding, who gets cut, and how they are going to, yet again, shove ten times the requirements
into one times the resources. True story.
Knowing how these things work allows the designer to identify where to look for the ‘big C’s’ in
their game: conflict, cooperation, compromise. The designer needs to know where the
organisational fault lines lie so that they can include them in their game design. Knowing how
the budget process actually works, rather than how the organisation says it works, allows the
designer to duplicate the external and internal processes and pressures that force the
organisation into those compromises. This will not only increase realism in the game, it will give
the players a way to work on the process challenges they face in addition to whatever else the
game is about.
And it makes the designer look like an all-knowing hero. Though no one will notice except the
designer. No one ever does.
Social knowledge
Finally, the designer needs to know how people work. People, after all, are the central engine
that drives the game. Otherwise it's just solitaire, which no one pays for.
The designer needs to know how people behave, and then how the specific subset of people
who will play in their game will behave. Military personnel behave very differently from college
students. Officers behave very differently from enlisted personnel. Students behave very
differently from professors. The designer needs to understand the diversity that will exist in
their game and what the players will be inclined to do, and not do.
This involves a wide range of knowledge and techniques. It ranges from understanding that
people from operational combat units do not necessarily like to sit still in a room and debate
stuff for long periods of time, to the knowledge that if you phrase your tasking to the players in
different ways you will get very different outcomes based on how people interpret your words. It
includes the ability of the designer facilitating a game to understand the narrow path between
fun and control, and making sure they draw the players back into serious work when they begin
to veer outside of the lanes.
Unfortunately, these types of knowledge cannot be taught easily. They come from the
designer’s experience, and their own inner curiosity.
Orders of battle are annoying
Knowledge will tell us how weapon systems work, but you also need to know how many there
are, where they are located, and how they are to be employed. This is not as obvious as it may
sound. Note that while we are using military examples here, the same concept applies to
everything from avian influenza (now where did we put those depopulation systems?) to
emergency response (who owns which fire trucks and how many hospitals in the area are
capable of level 1 trauma care?).
First, there are two sides. While intelligence professionals may have an estimated order of battle
for the other side, they may not always have it in a form that is useful to a game designer. In an
operational level game, it may not be important to know exactly where every launcher in every
air defense system is, as keeping track of thousands of vehicles is not something that you want
to be doing in a game. But it may be very important to intelligence analysts supporting strike
planning. Aggregating these individual vehicles into firing groups, batteries, and battalions or
regiments may not be relevant to them, but it is to the designer.
In many ways threat capabilities are the ‘good news’ story of orders of battle. Own force
organisation, deployment, and capabilities may be even harder to come by. The biggest
challenge is task organisation and the tendency of the military to reorganize at the drop of a hat.
This means that whatever information you find today may very well be inapplicable tomorrow.
Unfortunately, the organisation of military units is of keen interest to serving personnel, as it
determines their chain of command and other things. So, they will ‘know’ the ground truth far
more easily than the designer can. Of course, it is most amusing when everyone is wrong, all in
different directions.
Weapons systems and their underlying physics do not change all that frequently, and the
vagaries of the peacetime procurement system make any changes to weapons slower still. On
the other hand, organisations can change with the stroke of a pen, sometimes even with a
simple verbal order.
Second, the U.S. military typically deploys overseas. Deploying a large military force is a major
pain in the ass (PITA). You have to get everybody notified, find a way to get them where they are
going (hopefully without any enemy interference), then you have to move them into position of
contact with the enemy. This takes a long time, a lot of coordination, and it cannot all be done at
once. Of course, the U.S. military has systems and processes that allow it to manage
deployments to a very fine degree of detail: the Time-Phased Force Deployment process.
Except it doesn’t quite work like that. Like organisational structures, plans change all the time.
And often very few people know or understand the changes. But, because military units actually
have to deploy, the information they use is structured in a way that helps them load, schedule,
and debark their units. Which is not really what we do in a game. This can result in an incredibly
detailed and massive set of information that, again, does not easily aggregate into units.
Even worse is the problem of understanding exactly what you are going to get when everything
arrives. A squadron may sound like a sensible aggregation of aircraft to use in a game.
Unfortunately, it does not tell you how many aircraft are in the squadron at any one time. The
squadron could be shorted, all the squadrons in the community may be short aircraft, or they
may have too many. And that doesn’t even begin to get into the problem of aircraft that are
down for maintenance or safety issues. A squadron may have 24 aircraft on the books, but
detachments, exercises, and low maintenance numbers may reduce that. Across an entire
theatre this can become an irritating challenge for the designer.
Good designers know that these issues are going to exist and try to deal with them in several
practical ways. First, if you have any contact with the actual commands the best way to get
accurate numbers is from the local commands. Second, you can always work with, hire, or
otherwise obtain someone with experience in the service to help you sort out the deployment
process, locations, and numbers. Finally, good designer replace that they will pretty much
always be wrong; their goal is to be wrong in increments smaller than what matters. In a theatre
level game 20 vs. 24 aircraft per squadron may not really matter much in the final outcome. A
squadron or two mis-deployed between airfields also won’t lose the war for the allies. Usually.
You do the best you can, and then let the players move stuff around until they stop complaining.
Designers are curious
The best game designers are curious. They must be. There are simply so many things they need
to know, and many of them are things that you would not at first expect a game designer to
need to know.
Things that wargame designers must be curious about obviously include weapons systems,
military organisations, military tactics and operations, and policy decisions. But if designers are
going to do civilian games, they may also need to know how water systems, farms, and
industrial processes work.
Most professional game designers we know who are associated with the Department of Defense
have an avid interest in history, particularly military history. Knowledge of one area informs
designs and thinking in others. Napoleonic infantry tactics will give the designer perspective on
command and control, morale, firepower, and manoeuvre even though the weapons and tactics
are significantly different from modern combat. Understanding the British occupation of
Afghanistan, India, and South Africa during the Boer wars will give insight into insurgency and
counter-insurgency. At least enough to direct the designer’s attention toward the questions that
they need to ask in a modern environment.
Because wargame designers are curious, they have a broad perspective on military operations,
and can incorporate historical events into modern games. This is a major advantage over those
who lack a deep historical perspective.
However, a game designer that also designs for civilian clients has to go well beyond military
operations. They need to understand how international organisations like the UN work, or they
will be seriously limited in their design of policy games. They need to understand business and
economics, or they will be severely challenged in designing games that have an economic
component. They need to understand national response planning and emergency response,
along with infrastructure and how it operates, or they will be limited in their ability to design for
the emergency response sector. They need to understand how organisations work, and how an
individual’s psychology affects their leadership styles and the organisation, in order to do an
organisational game.
Even for those specializing in one set of clients, this is a much broader portfolio than simply
knowing the rate of advance for an infantry company moving across broken terrain. It involves
understanding everything from how the international system of governance works, to the
command system for our military, to the likely reaction of civilians in a nation affected by
conflict. Having any chance of doing this means that the designer must be constantly curious
about everything that crosses their path. Whether it’s how a college works (great information for
doing a game on managing a national laboratory) or how large-scale scientific projects are
managed (for gaming plans on planetary defense).
Finally, game designers love games. They are extremely curious about the latest techniques,
designs, and scenarios. They want to understand how others are designing games. Because
they get their own inspiration from those designs, if they don’t just steal them in the first place.
And this does not just apply to professional games. Designers are curious about how the latest
Euro game deals with the problem of economic competition, and the how role-playing games are
moving in the direction of storytelling rather than tightly controlled by system. They don’t
necessarily apply these insights directly, though they may, but they can get ideas from
commercial games to help design and run professional ones.
If such requirements seem overly broad, and irrelevant to you, you have not run a professional
game shop for very long. People come to you with any number of game ideas, ideas that range
from the micro to the macro. From things you know about to things you have never heard of. If
you’ve been curious you may be able to answer their questions with good game designs. If not,
they will go elsewhere.
Knowledge is critical to being able to design a realistic and effective game. Curiosity broadens
that knowledge beyond the immediate horizon and allows the designer to progress from basic
designs to advanced ones.
Designers steal rules from everywhere they can find them
Rules. Steal them. If you don’t know where to steal them from then go play some games before
you begin designing them.
Rules. Modify and adapt them. If you can’t modify the rules to account for things like an
artificial-intelligence seeker on an artillery round then you have not been curious enough. Go
learn more before trying to design a game.
Rules. Use them with confidence. Because if you do not, then the players will make you wish
you never took on the job of standing up and running a game.
But realize that, ultimately, rules are designed to be modified. For the kinds of games we are
talking about rules are guidelines and guidelines are the way you get the players through the
game without everything falling apart. Good designers stay constantly aware of that.
Designers are confident
Which can be annoying. Particularly for those close to them. Confidence can be a two-edged
sword, something that becomes quite obvious when you start hanging around with too many
game designers. Game designers—professional game designers—have an amazingly high
degree of confidence in what they know, and what decisions they make. They have to.
Otherwise the players will eat them alive.
Confidence mostly manifests itself during the execution of a game. If the designer is also the
chief controller, as is often the case, then the designer has to walk a fine line between being in
charge and being accommodating to input from players and others involved in the game.
Projecting confidence in the control of games is essential in order to get the players to buy into
the premise and legitimacy of the game. If you don’t feel confident about the game, why should
they? Once that confidence is lost so is the willing suspension of disbelief; the game of pretend
is over and the whole edifice comes crashing down.
You often see the warning signs when the old saws ‘don’t fight the scenario’ and ‘don’t fight the
game’ begin to come up in player conversations. Players fighting the game are essentially
disagreeing with some fundamental premise in the game, whether it’s the plausibility of the
scenario or the likelihood of the other side taking some sort of action. In order to play the game,
the participants somehow have to get over those objections, or else they begin to believe the
game is a waste of time.
A good designer knows how and when to accommodate objections, and when to push back on
player input. Accommodations that don’t derail the game or its objectives, or actually improve
the game (yes, it can happen), can be welcomed. However, designers have to project an aura of
still being in charge, lest the players see an opportunity to redesign the whole game right out
from under them.
The designer also has to be capable of pushing back against bad player inputs. In order to do
this the designer has to have built up credibility as an authority. Both in the control of the game
as well as the various problems and issues associated with the game. Because the good
designer has been curious, and learned about the systems and processes involved in the game,
they can early on in the game exhibit some of that knowledge in order to gain the player’s
confidence. This confidence can be cashed in when it comes time to move the game in a
direction not all of the players may like. Our friend and award-winning designer Mark
Herman tells one of our favourite stories about this. He was giving the weather brief at the start
of a game when one of the players objected. “I’m very familiar with this region,” says he. “I was
stationed there. And the weather is never like that!” Mark’s response was classic. “Well, I’ve
never been there, and I don’t claim to be an expert. But I can read. And this weather report is the
actual forecast for the region today.” We would pay good money for an opportunity to deal with
a player objection like that.
When a designer or controller is out of their depth, or just plain wrong, players can sense it.
They sense that the controller is uncertain or mistaken. To make matters worse the design is
also often askew because of the designer’s lack of knowledge. This only puts the players in a
worse mood. It is at times like this that the best designers shine. They know how to use player
input to move the game in the right direction, and they know how to fall back from the parts of
the existing design that may not be correct. They can do this without giving the players a sense
that the entire game is sideways, and that their authority should be questioned. It's not the best
way to do things, but sometimes it is the only way to save a game from disaster.

Amateurs talk about design; professionals talk about where to buy cheap
supplies
Yes, we stole that line from Picasso. Maps, orders of battle, pieces, and rules all form the
material components of a game. In a classical wargame, materials are required to give the
players a way to interact dynamically with the battlefield. In other types of professional games,
the design of materials leads the players into the story and keeps them there.
Good designers know this and try and avoid the basic instruction sheet or memo format. That's
where you tell the players the scenario, the key issues, and the game objectives in a short essay
about the game. Basically, giving the players a set of instructions. In those kinds of games, the
players will end up talking about the problem instead of playing through the game. Instead, good
designers try to set the stage for the story the players are about to enter, using forms and
styles of information the players will expect to see in reality. News reports. Op-Ed pieces. Even
custom video or audio reports from the scene of the action.
Designers also know that in game materials, more is better. The more you give the players the
more they will invest in the game. There are a couple of reasons for this. First the players sense
that this is a serious game, one where the designers have done their homework. There is a lot of
detail, and the players really have a job to do if they to participate effectively. This is part of the
‘flow’ experience in a professional game—the players need to be challenged. Flow experiences
keep the players hovering between too much and too little stress. Players need to feel they are
able to complete the work assigned to them, but that the work is meaningful enough to matter
when they do. This balance between too much information and complexity in the game, between
too many materials and not enough, is one that good designers learn from experience, and their
social knowledge.
But more materials alone are not enough to capture the players. The materials also need to
reflect the kind of information that the players would normally see in the context of an actual
event. Players in professional games often are expected to play the same roles in the game that
they play in real life. The more realistic a presentation they get the more likely they will be to
believe the other fictions in the game.
The information in the materials must also be presented in a way that is easy for the players to
digest. When the players show up at the game, they are unlikely to have read whatever read-
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aheads you may have sent. And some players may have been late substitutes or add-ons
and have no idea what the game is about. This means that at the start of the game players will
need to be given clear summaries, briefings, and other written materials in order to catch up. It
also means that the controllers will have to brief the players on the game situation at start. In
other words, good designers use read-aheads for the players, then give the materials to the
players again when the game begins, and then tell the players what they want them to know.
Good designers don’t trust the players to learn what they need to know on their own.
Good designers also know that bringing players into the game at the beginning is critical to
having a successful game. This means that when the players look at their materials they should
be transported immediately into the problem. If they expect briefings from the J-3 and J-2, then
the materials should look and feel like briefings from those organisations. Likewise, if they
expect media articles, game information should be presented as news articles. Some designers
even go as far as to use simulated news broadcasts at the beginning or even throughout the
game in order to give players a sense that they are in a media environment.
Game designers need to develop extensive materials that are clear and easy to access, but that
give the players the information that they would get in the real world. This is not as arduous as
it might seem; designers can cut out much of the irrelevant information that would be given to
players in the real world. But it also means that designers need to understand what real-world
information would be available, and how it would be presented.
Designers respect their players
Knowing how things work, how they really work, comes from knowledge, curiosity, and a healthy
willingness to disrespect authority. Knowledge in games begets accuracy in game construction
and game play. Knowing how weapon systems work allows the game designer to include
accurate representations in the game. Knowing how emergency response operations work, or
animal disease control is managed, allow designers to build games that are believable. More
importantly, on game day it allows them to adjust those representations in the face of player
shenanigans.
Without accuracy you will not have a good game. And you will likely have many upset players,
and sponsors.
However, accuracy is insufficient to make a good game. Good games also have to be fair in
addition to being accurate. Factual knowledge must be balanced with social knowledge,
because games are as much a social event as a simulation.
By fairness we do not mean game balance. Balance in game design is very important in
commercial products. Both sides in a commercial game need to have a realistic expectation of
winning. Even if winning means losing less spectacularly than the general did in the real battle.
Balance in this sense of the concept does not apply in professional games. In professional
games we are interested in exploring, understanding, or assessing the topic at hand. If one side
crushes the other side all the time, fine, that is part of what we are trying to understand. The
players being crushed may feel bad, but it doesn’t ruin the game.
Fairness is a much more subtle concept than balance in professional games. It means that the
game respects the players, the scenario, and the surrounding components of the scenario.
Players in the game don’t get the feeling that no matter what they do; the controller is going to
come down in favour of the other side. They feel that the models, scenario, and organisation of
the game have been designed to reflect their real circumstances accurately, even if those
circumstances are pretty dire.
Because the focus of many people is on models when they consider games, they miss the reality
that models cannot do everything in a game. Players will come up with ideas and concepts that
do not necessarily work in the models of combat (or whatever) as they are designed. Controllers
will need to make some decisions about those player actions. Dismissing them, shoehorning
them into existing models, or poorly reflecting the capability will lead players to believe that they
have been dismissed. Players who feel that control does not respect their decisions stop
playing. It's a natural feeling. If whatever I’m doing isn’t going to ever work, why should I do it?
Using rigid adjudication requires sensitivity and nuance on the part of the controllers. They need
to know when to go off script, especially when players invest a lot of their own energy and
sense of self in what they are doing. Controllers need to read the players’ focus and respond
with an equal degree of consideration.
But it's not just the adjudication process that affects the perception of fairness. The scenario
can be biased unfairly against one side or the other. Now we don’t mean that the situation
depicted in the scenario is unbalanced. That is fine. Rather the way in which player decisions in
the game are treated can become unfair. Players may feel that unrealistic or excessive limits are
imposed on their actions or capabilities. We often see this in terms of restrictions on what one
or another side would do during a conflict. The Red side may be told to sit quietly and watch as
coalition attacks brilliantly destroy their forces. Without the Red players being able to respond.
Another group of Red peer competitor players may be told not to escalate to nuclear use, even
though experts agree that the country would use them given the actions of their opponents.
While player-generated constraints are fair, arbitrarily imposed constraints on player actions
such as those described here can make the game seem biased, unfair, and a waste of time to
the victims. And it probably is.
The game designer also has to respect those elements that surround the scenario. These
include the way in which the players are organized the information that is given to players, and
how it is given to them. The units the players are given, and the time sequence for their arrival.
The designer must demonstrate to the players that they understand how these various elements
of their jobs work, at least at the most general level of understanding.
Player roles and organisation can significantly affect the perception of fairness in a game. The
most common problem is mismatch between player skills and the position they are placed in.
Surprising the colonel at the game by suddenly putting them in charge of the theatre-wide
operation can be seen as unfair.
The designer can address this kind of fairness by understanding the pressures and challenges
shaping the players, their participation, and their integration into the game. A colonel is going to
be sensitive to looking the fool because of some last-minute tasking they were not prepared for.
Better to sound them out privately before announcing it to the assembly. Better still to make
sure they understand their role before coming, including providing some read-ahead materials
so they look extra smart. And during the game keeping an eye on them and being willing to
brainstorm options or offer suggestions when they come up short of ideas.
Sure, this kind of ‘control’ does not conform to a rigorous, unbiased, and disinterested run of a
game. But fundamentally games are a human project. And it helps to treat the players like
humans sometimes. In fact, it’s downright unfair not to.
Designers know how, and why, to build a scenario
Now that we are at the end of our little essay, we come to what is too often the beginning of the
design process. The scenario. What is the game going to be about? What decisions are the
players going to make? What roles will the players have? These are all elements of the game
scenario.
The game scenario carries a lot of weight in creating a good game. Which is why it's a shame
that the scenario is often the first thing thought of – and specified – by the sponsor. They want
a game on NATO intervention in Fredonia, and from that comes all kinds of results including the
scale of the game, the roles of the players, the kind of forces employed and the adjudication
(and models) needed.
But a good designer knows that just because the scenario is specified, the game itself is not.
The scenario as often conceived of by sponsors and other civilians is no more than a shell, and
outline of who, what, where, when, and why. Modern operations live or die by the details of the
situation. The political, social, environmental, and other constraints imposed by outside forces
are what really shape the form of the scenario. These shape the roles and the decisions that the
players make. They are part of the scenario, but are not something that sponsors can or want to
specify.
A good designer knows that no matter what scenario they are given they still have room to
create the game that they need to create.
For example, suppose the sponsor is really interested in command and control and a possible
reorganisation of the staffs they will use as a Joint Task Force commander. The sponsor
specifies a particular scenario in their theatre, simply because this is the one that they are most
concerned about at the time. This may or may not be the ideal scenario to test different JTF
organisational concepts. A far better scenario may be one with a significant humanitarian
component, because all of the elements of the JTF staff can get exercised, not just the
warfighting pieces. Also, the designer knows (because it’s always been that way) that U.S.
military forces inevitably have difficulty during the initial phases of an operation interfacing and
working with outside organisations. This would be a much more sophisticated challenge for the
JTF force providers than a simple kinetic scenario, and everyone would learn a lot more. So
maybe the design can sneak in a humanitarian aspect of the scenario without being too obvious
or too dismissive of the sponsor’s favoured situation.
The good designer understands the power of the scenario to accomplish objectives, real
objectives, and is willing to work the sponsor and the game in order to bring things around to
the best overall scenario solution.
And so we find ourselves back at the beginning. A good game designer does not simply accept
the scenario as given by the sponsor – the authority. They ask themselves what the sponsor’s
real objectives are, not just the ones they are saying but the ones they are thinking. Or even the
ones they don’t want to think about out loud. The good designer pushes back on the objectives.
They refine them. The good designer pushes back on the scenario. They want it to match the
objectives and make it easy on the players to consider the decisions they need to consider. And
the good designer does this because they respect the players. They don’t want to waste their
time, they want them to be in a fair game, that accurately reflects the world, and that has the
potential to change the way the world actually works.
Part 4: Practising Successful Wargames
‘Wargames help strip down a strategic, operational, or tactical problem and reduce its
complexity in order to identify the few, important factors that constrain us or an opponent. They
provide structured, measured, rigorous – but intellectually liberating – environments to help us
explore what works (winning) and what doesn’t (losing) across all dimensions of warfighting.
They permit hypotheses to be challenged and theories to be tested during either adjudicated
moves or free play settings, thereby allowing current and future leaders to expand the
boundaries of warfare theory. And they provide players with the opportunity to make critical
mistakes and learn from them – and to perhaps reveal breakthrough strategies and tactics when
doing so.’

Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and Gen. Paul Selva,

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Revitalizing Wargaming is Necessary to be Prepared for Future Wars
Chapter 18. High-Engagement Games
‘Games – wargames – have a more powerful effect on participants than do other narrative
forms, because their participants not only are spectators but must act, engaging parts of their
intellect and emotions not accessed during simple storytelling. Games are story-living
experiences. By engaging their players in ways more similar to acting in the real world than
reading a novel or watching a film, games affect their players in ways more deeply remembered
and more transformative of their personae than other techniques for entertainment and
learning. As a result, wargaming is a powerful tool for affecting how people think, feel and
behave.’
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Peter Perla and Ed McGrady (2011)
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Introduction
Why does this chapter matter so much?
This chapter is central to successful professional wargames. Almost everything in this book
relates to, or stems from, it.
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‘[Games have] the power to alter how people perceive the world around them’ ...and ‘high-
engagement’ games top this list, where the psyche and emotions of players have been
accessed. ‘Like literature and film, high-engagement games give players a taste of the emotional
and empathetic challenges they may face during situations like those presented in the game.
Unlike literature and film, games give players active responsibility for their decisions, similar to
what they would experience in the real world, and force them to bear many of the same
consequences of those decisions, both positive and negative… The power of wargames is their
ability to open up participants to self-transformation through the force of a shared and
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constructed narrative’.
‘The designer who wants to use games as an expressive medium must be like the painter, the
musician and the writer in that they must learn what the strengths of the medium are, and what
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messages are best conveyed by it. …We are artists and teachers with a powerful tool.’
Standing on the shoulders of giants
This chapter draws upon the rich academic and practical research from the computer games
and wider gaming industry. This is supplemented by points from Peter Perla and Ed McGrady
(2011). Key references are:
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A Theory of Fun for Game Design, by Raph Koster.
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Reality is Broken, by Jane McGonigal.
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Game Design Workshop, by Tracy Fullerton.
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Rules of Play, by Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman.
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Why Wargaming Works, by Peter Perla and Ed McGrady.
 Figure 18-1. The giants of game design
What is a game?
The following lists of game traits and game elements are an amalgam of points made across the
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primary references:
Game traits: Game elements:
Goal Procedures
Rules Players
Feedback system Decisions
Voluntary participation Conflict
Boundaries
Resources
Outcome(s)
Unsurprisingly, there are striking similarities with the elements of a wargame discussed in
Chapter 2. A wargame is, after all, a game! Bernard Suits tell us that, 'Playing a game is the
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voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.' Jane McGonigal goes further:
‘Anything else you think you know about games, forget it for now. All the good that comes out of
games – every single way that games make us happier and help us change the world – stems
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from their ability to organise us around a voluntary obstacle.’
By getting players to engage voluntarily in a wargame, we evoke positive emotions and enhance
learning. Why is this so important? You need everyone to want to be in your wargame. This
does not just apply to the players, but also Control staff, computer operators, supporting
experts – even the administrative support staff. Ponder the implications of that statement. We
know that professional wargames can be big – really big. Many participants will not, initially, be
volunteers: they are ordered to attend. You must work hard to ensure that, as soon as they start
the wargame, people quickly decide – consciously or unconsciously – to participate voluntarily.
Draw them in and keep them engaged. This is easy in a hobby game, and relatively simple in a
small professional game. But how do you motivate all participants in a large, distributed
wargame? Relating the wargame outcomes to reality is a good start: ensure people understand
how the game will affect actual decisions, including ones on operations that could save lives.
There are many other obvious ways, and don’t forget that, unlike war, wargaming can be fun…
Work and fun
‘Work is more fun that fun’, said Noel Coward, while Tal Ben-Shahar tells us that, ‘We’re much
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happier enlivening time than killing time.’ Passive, low-engagement activities, and ‘relaxing’
do not make us feel good. These include watching TV, shopping and eating chocolate. People
are happy working. ‘The opposite of work isn’t play. It’s depression’ says Brian Sutton-
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Smith . If depression is a pessimistic sense of inadequacy and despondent lack of activity,
then the reverse is an optimistic sense of our own capabilities and an invigorating rush of
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activity. That sounds a lot like game play.
Work can be classified as: physical, mental, discovery, busy, team, creative and high-stakes.
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One ‘So what?’ for professional wargame practitioners is that we should not be frightened
of making people work hard – if that work has meaning and is well-structured. Giving games
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meaning is the basic premise of game design presented in Rules of Play. ‘Meaning’ will
resonate with military folk, used to working to a mission, but also with business people working
to a mission or vision. Business literature is replete with articles and books that discuss this,
but a 2018 example perfectly sums up the rationale: ‘When employees feel that their work has
meaning, they become more committed and engaged. They take risks, learn, and raise their
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game.’
Also note ‘high-stakes’ work. When you are writing and developing scenarios, bear in mind the
word ‘epic’. While you should stay within the bounds of credibility, consider ‘bigging up’
whatever mission, or context, you give your players. You’ll find a case study in Chapter 19
(Scenario Writing), in which I developed a setting and scenario for a Middle Eastern staff
college. At certain points during execution, we would express the mission we gave the students
as one in which they were explicitly saving the Arabian Peninsula from an existential threat. You
could see backs straightening and resolve shining in the students’ eyes as they went back to
‘work.’

Key concepts
Eustress
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Eustress means beneficial stress. The word is a combination of the Greek prefix eu-
meaning ‘good’, and ‘stress’, so literally means ‘good stress’. It must, however, be self-
generated, originating from within. More accurately, it must originate from within your players,
and it is your job to create the conditions to allow this. You need to instil in them a sense of
optimism and confidence so that they voluntarily put themselves into a position where they are
being stressed. Key to this is ensuring that players know they are in a safe-to-fail environment.
Fiero
Fiero is an Italian word broadly meaning ‘pride’. Raph Koster defines it as ‘the expression of
triumph when you have achieved a significant task. This is a signal to others that you are
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valuable.’ It’s the feeling, or reaction, you get when your team scores the winning goal, or
in the moment you finally achieve something difficult. It is usually accompanied by punching the
air or raising your arms in triumph. Fiero is such a primeval emotion that it is common to all
human cultures. It taps into our basic survival instincts. In achieving something challenging, we
are learning how best to survive. We are no longer killing mammoths, but creating ‘fiero
moments’ in our players still releases endorphins into their bodies. [331] Endorphins can also
result from physical exercise – and fun. Releasing them significantly enhances the learning
effect. It should not be a once-daily emotion, triggered by a ‘well-done’ at the After Action
Review (AAR); mini fiero moments should be constant. A slap on the back, a reinforcing snippet
of intelligence – seize any opportunity to induce them. But taking opportunities is not enough:
you need to engineer them. In that way, you tap into players’ visceral survival instincts.
Naches
Naches is Yiddish for ‘vicarious pride’: experiencing pride through someone else’s
achievements. ‘The feeling you get when someone you mentor succeeds. This is a clear
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feedback mechanism for tribal continuance.’ It again taps into our survival instinct, so
enhances learning and engagement. A common issue during staff college wargames is the
‘appointment change’: Student A has been Chief of Staff for Week 1, and is then given a lowly
logistics post for Week 2 to allow Student B the opportunity to shine (be assessed) as Chief of
Staff. Student A switches off, disengages and reaches for their phone. Why not get Student A to
mentor Student B? Why not get strong students to work with less confident ones? This needs
careful thought and in-game management, but results in better engagement and enhanced
learning in both the supported and supporting students.
Flow
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‘Flow’ is fundamental; all the key works on games highlight it. Most people have heard
about ‘being in the flow’, so you should be pushing at an open door. First, lodge the fact that
the originator of the concept, Csikszentmihalyi, is simple to pronounce: Cheek-SENT-me-high.
Flow is the frame of mind characterised by intense attention and maximum performance on a
task; achieving a deep and effortless involvement in a job that reduces awareness of everyday
life. Concern for yourself is reduced, but self-awareness rises after the event; and your sense of
time changes. Colloquially, it is being ‘in the zone’, or having ‘hard fun’.
‘In the flow’ is where you want all your participants (not just the players) to be all the time.
That’s a big ask, so how do you do it? I list below the conditions required for being in the flow,
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then expand on just the last two . Work to ensure that each of the following is embodied in
your games:
· Intense, optimistic engagement.
· Tasks are satisfying, exhilarating, challenging but achievable.
· Creative accomplishment.
· Heightened functioning.
· Structured, self-motivated work.
· Continuous feedback.
· Self-chosen goals and personally optimised obstacles
· Perfectly matching the challenge to capabilities.
Self-chosen goals and personally optimised obstacles. In an educational wargame, why not
invite the students to select their appointment? This is revealing in itself, and easy to
accommodate (for example, by asking for their top three preferences for positions within the
wargame). By doing this, you are helping to establish the conditions to get every student into
the flow, because they will be working at a job they themselves have chosen.
Perfectly matching the challenge to capabilities. Illustrated in Figure 18-2, this is a key
performance indicator, and my first agenda item for Control coordination meetings in an
educational or training wargame. The discussion of the level of pressure the players are under
informs all decisions taken in the meeting. To confirm this, a member of the Observer/Mentor
staff, or someone who is working alongside the Training Audience, must be present. Having
ascertained the level of pressure, the balance between challenge and ability can be regulated
using the methods I discuss in Chapter 22 (Controlling Wargames).
 Figure 18-2. Achieving ‘flow’: matching challenge to ability
To achieve the conditions for flow, your participants need to:
· Be able to concentrate on the task;
· Recognise the possibility of completing the task;
· Work to clear goals;
· Receive feedback; and
· Have control over their own actions.
The importance of these bullets to your wargames is apparent, and it should be simple to ensure
[335]
they feature in your games. But (mindful of that Clausewitz quote! ) let me give you an
example of how simple things can be difficult. Being able to concentrate on a task is one of the
prerequisites for achieving flow. I made this point to the Directing Staff at a European staff
college where I was shortly to facilitate a two-week wargame. About a week before it was to
start, I checked that nothing had been added to the wargame programme. It was as planned,
with no distractions. Arriving a week later, I found that the deadline for submission of the
Commandant’s Paper (a key assessed assignment) had been brought forward by one month to –
you guessed it – the last day of the wargame. At a stroke, the students had been effectively
prevented from concentrating on the wargame. Yet none of the wargame’s Directing Staff had
even thought to object when the new deadline was mooted. Use the bullets above as a checklist.
If you are in charge, refer to them constantly to ensure you are abiding by them; if not, check
them with whoever you are working to and try to ensure they are implemented.
Happiness
This is a lesson in life, brilliantly covered by Jane McGonigal (the full book title is Reality is
Broken; Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can Change the World), which directly
[336]
applies to wargames.
Extrinsic or intrinsic happiness
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‘When the source of positive emotion is yourself, it is renewable.’ Intrinsic
happiness comes from within, and is a result of something that you achieve, especially when
hard-won. An associated phrase is auto-telic: auto meaning ‘self’, and telic meaning ‘goal’ in
Greek. Extrinsic happiness comes from outside. It is, perhaps, best encapsulated in ‘The
American Dream’ (apologies to any States-side readers!): having a big car, nice clothes, grand
house etc. These consumer items, and money, do not make people happy: they always crave
more, and end up unhappy. Achieving challenging auto-telic goals makes you happy.
Extrinsic rewards in games include ‘bling’ on a first-person shooter avatar, victory points,
quantified success and scoring. These are less effective motivators than intrinsic rewards, such
as playing well, doing what you think the actor you are representing would have done and the
challenge of the game. Moreover, extrinsic rewards can crowd out intrinsic ones. I might give
players objectives, but I never assign victory points; rather, I invite the players in the AAR to
discuss how well they have done. This is often just as useful – and interesting – as the game
play.
The four secrets to happiness
The four secrets are:
1. Satisfying work. This is being immersed in clearly defined, demanding activities that
allow people to see the direct impact of their efforts. People must have:
· Clear goals.
· Actionable next steps towards reaching an achievable goal.
· Agency. People like to know that their actions produce an effect, and that their
decisions matter.
2. Experience success, or at least the chance of being successful. Succeeding is fine (and
needs no explanation) – but so is failure, if handled in the right way. People do not mind
failing if they have no fear of this and can see themselves improving. Many video games
involve constant failure, but the player will try again…and again…and again because each
time they get a little better – until they eventually succeed. Jane McGonigal introduces the
concept of ‘fun failure’, where failure is accompanied by ribbing. Counter-intuitively, this
mild teasing inoculates the ‘failed’ player against failure, and builds trust between the two
parties. Failure, and fun failure, are crucial concepts for successful wargames. ‘You win or
you learn.’
But your game’s outcomes must be fair. You cannot simply make someone fail for the sake
of it, even if there is a learning point to be made. The failure must teach players something,
and make them want to do better, see that they are improving and – eventually – have a
good chance of succeeding.
Many professional wargames are deliberately designed to ensure that players fail. If not
carefully managed, this can be dispiriting and cause players to disengage. The techniques
below can ensure continuing player engagement in the face of repeated failure.
· Brief people! With most professionals, this simple step will largely mitigate the
issue. If they understand what is being asked of them, and why, people usually play
along, even in the face of failure.
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· The accepted ‘safe-to-fail’ wargaming doctrine is particularly important. A
statement to that effect by the sponsor or senior officer present is critical, so players
know that failure is acceptable.
· Set players a challenge: to do better than [insert appropriate target], even though
failure is likely. Hobby wargames often use a historical benchmark: get off Omaha
taking fewer losses (D-Day at Omaha Beach); or hold more territory than the paras in
Operation Market Garden (Storm over Arnhem). A challenge that usually works well is
to tell players that the best the development team could achieve during playtesting
was ‘x’, and ask them to beat that.
· Switch player sides. If each team plays both sides, see who does least badly as the
failing side.
· Time permitting, play multiple iterations. Players will stay engaged if they can see
themselves improving.
 3. Social connections. This speaks for itself in professional wargames. Teamwork is
developed, bonds forged and relations pre-positioned prior to operations within a wargame,
as players organise around voluntary obstacles and take actions that matter. This talks to
the very heart of wargaming: shared story-living experiences, shaped by player’s
decisions.
Meaning. Happiness stems from being part of something greater than ourselves, belonging
and contributing to something that has lasting meaning beyond our individual lives. This
contributor to happiness is heightened if the thing to which we are giving service is of epic
proportions. Being part of an epic story can generate all four secrets to happiness – and
that is exactly what a wargame can deliver. Rules of play notes that ‘meaningful play’ relies
on discernibility (feedback) and integration into the game system. ‘The goal of successful
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game design is meaningful play.
A context for action
More awesomeness
Awe is one of the most powerful emotions. Awe involves delight and aesthetic appreciation – but
is transitory. It is something that should feature in wargames; they should, literally, be awesome.
Link that to ‘epic’, and the scale of your wargame’s context and story. Epic scale bestows the
power to act with meaning, to do something that matters in a bigger picture. The story is the
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bigger picture, but the player’s actions are what matter. This context for action should be
an epic environment and involve an epic project; in professional wargaming terms, an epic
mission. Everything must be credible, but that does not stop you emphasising the importance of
whatever it is your players are being asked to do. By their very nature, wargames ask that
players suspend disbelief. Introducing a sensible degree of epic awesomeness just requires
imagination tempered by common sense.
The possibility space
Wargames provides a ‘possibility space’, in which:
· Meaning is made.
· Players have the power to make choices within lots of possibilities.
· People can be sent to places you can’t go in real life.
· Players and their experiences are put first.
· Players author their own experiences.
· Events are visceral and compelling, disruptive and strange.
These points recur throughout this book. I make some suggestions, but you must use your
imagination to derive ideas appropriate to your games. For example, ‘making choices’ might
extend to a pre-game planning phase, where players have to select – or determine –some
capabilities to use that will affect the forthcoming game. A player might be given three cyber
operations to use in the game, and have to determine the system to be attacked and the effect
before play starts; or two Special Forces raid will be allowed, but the player has to select one
type of target (airfields, infrastructure, leadership, or whatever). In a futures game, a ‘world-
building’ session that allows players to create, or influence, the context within they will then
wargame is a particularly powerful technique.
Players should be challenged in a wargame. Raph Koster’s quote at the start of this chapter
reminds us that games are art and ‘We are artists and teachers with a powerful tool.’ He makes
the point that the best art – irrespective of the medium – is challenging. So, to, with wargames;
hence ‘disruptive and strange’. Encourage players to question their own assumptions and world
view, and to compare these with the models presented in the game.
Story-living
Active learning and the power of a constructed narrative
A ‘constructed narrative’ is one that the players create themselves. This as opposed to a
‘presented narrative’, when recipients are passive consumers of, say, a presentation or a book.
Allowing players to construct the narrative enables experiential learning: the story itself is the
fun of learning. This talks to the Confucian concept of active learning:
I hear, and I forget;
I see, and I remember;
I do, and I understand.
The concept of experiential, active learning – story-living via a constructed narrative – is a
primary reason why wargaming is so powerful. This applies to all wargaming. Player learning is
enhanced and internalised because ‘I do, and I understand.’
The dramatic elements of a story
Your wargame’s story needs to be shaped, both in its construction and its execution, as I
discuss in Chapters 19 – 21 (Scenario Writing, Development and Execution). In advance of that,
note the following, which concern the dramatic elements of a story. They apply to all story-
telling.
· The dramatic arc. This is illustrated in figure 18-3. Easy to understand, it requires
constant consideration during wargame execution because the arc should emerge from
game play. You cannot pre-script the story because that precludes players learning via a
constructed narrative.

Figure 18-3. The classic dramatic arc

 · Uncertain outcomes. A story in which outcomes are uncertain is far more compelling and
engaging than one that is predetermined. This also talks to the pre-scripting issue I have
discussed.
· Conflict and tension. This is explicit in most wargames, less so in games that do not
centre around conflict.
Suspension of disbelief and the ‘magic circle’
Johan Huizinga defined the ‘magic circle’ of game play as ‘a play-ground… isolated, hedged
round, hallowed, within which special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the ordinary
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world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart.’ All wargames require their players to
suspend disbelief and step into the game’s ‘magic circle’ because wargames are not real.
However, the more you can heighten players’ suspension of disbelief, the greater will be their
engagement with your wargame and the better the outputs.
People colloquially call Huizinga’s magic circle the ‘magic bubble’, or just ‘the bubble’. That’s
fine, if people know what you mean. The key point is that you must work hard, and continuously,
to get your players into the bubble with their disbelief suspended – and then keep them there.
Some ways to do this are:
· Invitation to Play. In performance art, there is always a moment when the lights go down
and the curtain goes up. The audience goes quiet and settle back to be entertained. In
gaming terms, this is the ‘Invitation to Play.’ It is the point, after all introductory
presentations have been made and administration explained, when the wargame starts. It
should be a definable point – tantamount to a ritual – at which players step into the magic
circle and start playing. It is critical, but seldom done well, if at all. All too often, I see
introduction briefs finish with, “Off you go, find your work-space, and start reading the
scenario. Lunch is in an hour…” Wrong answer! To get everyone into ‘the bubble’, all of
that should have been done: people have been briefed and finished setting up. At that
point, the Invitation to Play transports people into the scenario – and the game is on! The
Invitation to Play should be multi-sensory, multi-media and hard-hitting; it should be
visceral and compelling, disruptive and strange. Thereafter, everyone should be in-role (no
more talk of ‘Control’ etc). Events should start rolling as soon as the Invitation to Play has
occurred. These (a single inject might be enough) do not have to catapult players into high-
tempo decision-making, but something should happen to show that events are
demonstrably live. The Invitation to Play requires considerable thought and effort.
· Protect the magic circle. It is your duty to protect the magic circle as a sacred place.
Hunt down and stamp out all references to the real world. Make sure people answer e-mails
with an in-game address, not ‘Control – Hicon 1’ and such like. Do not allow people to talk
about the wargame in real-world terms. No-one should mention the ‘Green Cell’; use the in-
game host nation’s name. And so on.
· Perpetuate players’ suspended disbelief by:
1. Ensuring they stay in the flow.
2. Maintaining their intense, optimistic engagement.
3. Keeping, as far as is sensible, their missions and tasks epic and meaningful.
4. Building a rich, credible world as their context for action; their ‘possibility space’.
· Speed of decision-making. While this is not always appropriate, it is a technique worth
keeping up your sleeve. There are tricks you can play on players’ minds to enhance their
 suspension of disbelief. One of these is to confront them with high-tempo decision-making.
The players are so busy processing information and making decisions that they do not
have the capacity to consider anything else. Subconsciously, the decisions, and the
context for these, become real. Don’t do this if there is any risk of detracting from the
wargame objectives or making players exasperated – but it is worth noting.

Feedback
Feedback is the ‘discernible’ element of Salen and Zimmerman’s ‘meaningful play’. ‘Discernible
means that the result of the game action is communicated to the player in a perceivable
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way.’ There are many forms of feedback. For example, think about how feedback is
communicated in video games, then consider how these might be applied to your games. Rather
unimaginatively, most feedback in professional wargames still takes the form of an AAR. For the
military, and most professional organisations such as emergency services, AAR formats are
standardised. They also tend to occur at regular intervals, typically at the end of each period of
activity: after a mission; the end of each day; and then at the end of the exercise. That’s often
necessary, but there are some factors you should consider to make this, and the many other
forms, of feedback as effective as possible.
· Beware breaking the bubble. Anything that takes players out of the magic circle needs to
be carefully considered. Just because it is accepted practise to hold an AAR at the end of
every day doesn’t mean you must do it the usual way. Maybe you can get the person
leading the AAR to role-play a senior commander from the players’ chain of command.
Everything would have to be couched in terms of activities within the bubble – but so what?
Do not presume a standard AAR.
· Use multi-sensory methods to deliver feedback. The previous bullet included role-play.
Why not do this often, having visitors arrive in a player HQ? An in-game brief on the
changed situation, highlighting the role of player decision-making to deliver a favourable
outcome is good feedback.
· Feedback should take place during game play. Jan Chappuis, an expert on learning, tells
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us that feedback is most effective during learning, while there is still time to act on it.
If you hold one AAR at the end of a wargame, it’s too late to act on the points arising.
· Feedback should be frequent and direct. This might be a pat on the back, an event that
goes well due to good decision-making, or whatever.
Players must face the consequences of their own decisions
The most powerful feedback occurs when people are immersed in a well-crafted and protected
magic circle, construct their own narrative and face the consequences of the decisions they
make.
It is as simple as that. Putting it into practise is not quite so simple. The following chapters
suggest some ways you can do this.
Chapter 19. Scenario Writing

‘Begin with the end in mind.’ [344]

Stephen R. Covey (1989)
Introduction
The last point Ed McGrady and Peter Perla made in the concluding chapter of Part 3 was
‘Designers know how, and why, to build a scenario.’ This is so important that I devote three
chapters to scenario writing, development and execution. These could have been a single
chapter: writing and developing a scenario is a process that continues seamlessly into its
execution. For simplicity, I use ‘scenario’ initially and do not discuss ‘setting’ in detail until I
have defined both terms.
This chapter includes a worked example of the process followed to write a setting and scenario
from scratch. Before that I want to: look forward to scenario execution to understand where we
are heading; put pre-scripted ‘wargames’ to bed; define ‘setting’ and ‘scenario’; and consider
whether to write a new scenario or adapt an existing one.
The importance of the scenario
A sound scenario is fundamental for a successful wargame: it provides the context for all player
activity: the ‘possibility space’ within which decisions are made, consequences faced, and the
story lived. A poor scenario can result in a sub-optimal wargame because of skewed decisions,
disengaged players and the resultant lack of a story-living experience. In an analytical wargame,
the scenario must support the activities demanded by the analysis plan.

‘Begin with the end in mind’

The third of this trio of chapters is ‘Scenario execution’. That is another way of saying ‘wargame
execution’: executing the scenario is executing the wargame. And the scenario must be
executed dynamically, shaped primarily by player decisions and not pre-determined. If this
fundamental execution mind-set is not in place, players are far less likely to engage. Dynamic
execution is where the scenario is heading, and is the ‘end’ you need to keep in mind when you
begin devising a scenario.
Issues with overly pre-scripted ‘wargames’
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Too many wargame delivery organisations consider the scenario to be complete by Startex ,
with only minor refinements needed during wargame execution once the ‘go’ button has been
pushed on the scenario management tool.
That approach breaks the fundamental principle of the ‘primacy of player decisions.’ It is not
enough to write and develop a credible and coherent scenario that takes players to the start
point of a wargame (although that is essential). Executing the scenario beyond Startex delivers
the dynamic ‘possibility space’ that offers players the options and choices essential for an
engaging, effective, wargame. If players are railroaded through a set of pre-determined episodes
with immutable, pre-scripted injects they will disengage from the game as soon as they realise
that their decisions have no impact on events; no meaning.
In limited instances, some pre-scripting might help: when teaching a wargame’s processes; or a
hospital exercise that requires pre-determined patient inflow rates. There are also instances
when running a fixed scenario across multiple games is justifiable, for example to enable
comparison – but that is a separate case.
‘A common mistake that people make when trying to design something completely fool-proof is
to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools.’
Douglas Adams
I am constantly surprised by the widespread presumption that pre-scripting is not only
acceptable, but is the preferred option. This attitude is exemplified by lengthy and manpower-
intensive ‘scripting weeks’, which I discuss in the next chapter. Those adopting this approach
either: accept that they will deliver something of questionable benefit; or think that they can
anticipate player decisions to the extent that they can predict the course of events (hence the
Douglas Adams quote). Reasons for doing this that I have encountered include ‘playing it safe’
vis-à-vis achieving the objectives, genuine ignorance that there is a better way, but also
laziness. Pre-scripting is a result of not understanding wargames, a lack of confidence, a slavish
adherence to check-lists and, above all, a failure of imagination.
Bear in mind the dynamic ‘end’ towards which the scenario is heading as you read the next
three chapters. However (and this is not a contradiction), some indication of the general
direction the scenario will take is required, as I will explain.

Immersed, not drowned

Keep players immersed in the scenario, but not drowning in its depths. When writing and
executing a scenario, critically examine it from the perspective of the players: is it credible,
coherent, sufficiently ‘rich’ but also easy to assimilate? It is easy to deluge players with
impenetrable documents that contain all the scenario material in all the world (literally) – but
they will not read them. Assume that players will arrive at the wargame having read nothing in
advance, so you must bring players into the magic circle in a carefully considered process of
briefs and drip-fed information that includes the ‘Invitation to Play’ (Startex) and continues to
Endex.
Deciding how much detail to include in the scenario and how much to expose to the players, and
when, is a good example of art over science: there is no formula that prescribes this. Too thin,
and players can’t suspend disbelief or will ask so many questions that Control can be
overwhelmed. Too much complexity and players flounder.
The distinction between analytical and training games is important: players need not be as fully
immersed in an analytical wargame as in a training game. The US Naval War College makes that
case: ‘Scenarios should include only the required degree of detail and complexity necessary to
achieve game objectives. We should deplore the tendency to introduce the trappings and
ornaments in simulation to gain the “appearance” of reality, when it is the “essence” which we
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need’ ’ The War Gamers’ Handbook is written primarily to inform analytical games, and I
see the sense in minimising scenario information to make the underlying factors apparent.
But we need not be so minimalist in training wargames. The richer the scenario, and the more
immersive the experience (those things are not the same), the more players will engage and
internalise learning points: ‘…the masses of accurately reproduced details furnished in
immersive wargames do contribute to the conviction that the gameworld is startlingly
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realistic.’ But the immersion versus drowning balance remains.
You must design and develop all elements of the wargame, including the scenario, to a purpose,
with the end in mind and to the required level of detail. It is then up to the wargame controller(s)
to execute the scenario intelligently.
What is a setting and scenario?
I have only mentioned ‘setting’ in passing so far. Some use the single term ‘scenario’ to
encompass the setting. This is another example of lazy terminology, because it is important to
differentiate between ‘setting’, ‘scenario’ and ‘vignette’. I define those below, as well as
‘fictionalised’.
A setting is ‘a geographic and strategic situation designed to provide all the conditions required
to support the achievement of high-level exercise aims and objectives. The setting, which can be
real world, fictionalised or synthetic, is the framework on which the scenario can be
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developed.’
The scenario is ‘the background story that describes the historical, political, military, economic,
cultural, humanitarian and legal events and circumstances that have led to the specific current
exercise crisis or conflict. The scenario is designed to support exercise and training objectives
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and, like the setting, can be real, fictionalised or synthetic as is appropriate.’ The scenario
is crisis-specific.
A vignette is ‘a discrete action, or series of connected actions, confined to a very specific and
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limited situation. A vignette can be a subset of a larger scenario.' I define the term now
because I refer to it henceforth, but it more properly fits in the event – incident – vignette –
inject hierarchy explained in Chapter 21 (Scenario Execution). Note that, in US parlance,
‘vignette’ can also refer to a very short scenario, particularly in very tactical games.
[351]
Fictionalised is simply ‘a situation made by changing real-world details.’ Many scenarios
are fictionalised due to sensitivities and classification issues. The UK Staff College, for example,
has students from all over the world. The settings and scenarios for its wargames tend,
therefore, to be fictionalised to avoid offending students who might object to their country
featuring. In an educational or training context, it might be sensible to fictionalise a real-world
scenario to control the complexity and so not overwhelm participants. However, as the Israeli
example in Chapter 1 illustrated, using anything other than real-world settings and scenarios
could be a squandered training opportunity.
(Scenario Planning. Used extensively in business, and related to business wargaming, Scenario
Planning is a technique, and not to be confused with planning a scenario. I discussed it in
Chapter 5. In Scenario Planning, ‘Scenarios are consistent and coherent descriptions of
alternative hypothetical futures that reflect different perspectives on past, present, and future
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developments, which can serve as a basis for action.’ .)
Scenario modules
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The six scenario modules described in NATO’s Bi-SC 75-3 serve as a useful check-list that
helps ensure all aspects of a scenario have been produced, and are well-organised during
development and execution. I list only the module headings and key points below; full details are
in Bi-SC 75-3. These are NATO-centric and some pertain to the operational-level within a
political-military context, so use them as a start point, not slavishly.
1. Geo-strategic situation. A general description of the crisis area’s major actors, and the
crisis background, including the historical, political, military, economic, cultural, humanitarian
and legal context.
2. Theatre of operations information. Static information about the region to support strategic
assessments and operational planning. It can include: mapping; Country Books/information;
orders of battle; and infrastructure.
3. Strategic Initiation documents. International and NATO desired end-states, assessments,
limitations and direction. Examples include: UN Security Council Resolutions or other
 documents providing the legal basis for the operation; and Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) and North Atlantic Council warning orders and initiating documents.
4. Crisis Response Planning information. Current information about the international and
regional situation, such as current Intelligence Summaries; forces available, including:
readiness states; Civil-Military (CIMIC) assessments; and logistics data.
5. Force Activation and Deployment information. These are military documents, such as:
Activation Orders; Intelligence Summaries; and Status of Forces Agreements.
6. Execution and Startex documents. These provide the current situation at Startex, and
execution material, such as: the ‘Road to Crisis’ (a narrative summary of the main events
leading to the situation); Situation Reports; force positions; and the Main Events List/Master
Injects List (MEL/MIL).
Note the inclusion of MEL/MIL products in this NATO list. This reinforces the tendency for
excessive pre-scripting.

Do you use an existing setting and/or scenario, or write new products?

Be careful if you are asked to adapt an existing setting and/or scenario to meet your specific
wargame requirements. Counter-intuitive and seldom apparent at the outset, it often takes more
time and effort to modify an existing setting and scenario than to write new ones. ‘Just tweak
the names on the map’ or ‘Add in a faction that looks like (such and such)’ are suggestions that
should ring alarm bells. Changing the elements of a setting and scenario is like pulling at a
thread in a rug: small tugs lead to complete unravelling. Coherency is easily lost and, despite
countless editorial checks, this often comes to light only during execution when the setting and
scenario are fully tested.
This is particularly the case with a setting, which is more expansive than a scenario. It is
relatively easy to re-write a crisis-specific scenario that nests within the framework of a setting
without changing that setting. But if you need to substantially adapt the setting, you have
probably chosen – or been given – the wrong one. Writing a geo-political setting is a major task.
The NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) used to employ over a dozen people full-time writing and
updating settings and scenarios. (They have now outsourced scenario writing to a private firm.)

Existing settings
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There are open source settings you can use, although many are fictionalised. Examples
include:
· The US Army Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). This provides ‘…a detailed
description of the conditions of five operational environments in the Caucasus region:
specifically, the countries of Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas and Limaria.’ This is a
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fictionalised setting, approved for public release.
 Figure 19-1. US Decisive Action Training Environment
· Cerasia and Sorotan. These are fictionalised NATO settings in the Horn of Africa suitable
for ‘near peer’ warfighting and ‘hybrid’ operations. Fisko is a new setting, under
development.
· Skolkan. This is a fictionalised NATO Article 5 setting that ‘transforms our Partner
Nations of Sweden and Finland into various countries of instability and/or concern. In
addition, North Island New Zealand is added as a new country off the coast of Norway to
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add to the level of complexity in the maritime domain.’
Writing a setting and scenario
What follows is a worked example of writing a setting and scenario for an educational wargame.
This was a rare opportunity to write from a blank piece of paper, so it illustrates the full process.
It is followed by a discussion on writing a scenario for an analytical wargame.
Writing a setting and scenario for an educational wargame
In 2014 I had the pleasure of designing, developing and delivering a new computer-
assisted ('Simulation-Supported Exercise’, or SIMEx) training wargame for a Middle Eastern staff
college. I was working with NSC, who delivered a ‘managed service’ (complete wargame
package). My thanks to NSC for permission to use this.
Figure 19-2 shows the steps we devised to write the setting and scenario as we first
whiteboarded them (they are listed in full after Figure 19-2). This was during a week-long
Wargame Design Workshop, so we had already worked through the design steps in Chapter 12.
(Wargame Design) We therefore had a full understanding of the requirement and could devise
the setting and scenario to precisely meet the aim and objectives.

Figure 19-2. Derivation of a process to write a fictionalised setting and scenario

Setting:
 1. Confirm the exercise aim and learning objectives.
2. Derive the major themes, domains and geo-spatial aspects. Examples of themes are high-
intensity warfighting, humanitarian operations, counter-insurgency and so forth.
3. Confirm any real-world sensitivities and ethical issues. All organisations have
sensitivities, so ask the question ‘are there lines we should not cross?’
4. Derive the protagonists. Bullets 4 through 8 might be considered in parallel.
5. Derive other actors, factions and associated human terrain.
6. Derive the casus belli.
7. Derive the adversary(ies) objectives and broad plans.
8. Identify real-world examples to use as a basis for fictionalisation. The closer the setting
and scenario to reality, the more plausible they will appear to the players – even if this is
subconscious. We settled on the (then current) 2014 situation in Sudan/South Sudan and
‘pasted’ it onto our setting. We even gave the fictious primary antagonist a cowboy hat
(President Kiir), so that players would subliminally recognise the allusion.
9. Determine protagonists' and regional/international actors' capabilities, including UN and
other Powers.
10. Determine orders of battle to the required level of detail. These would be thoroughly
playtested during the wargame development phase, so an estimate sufficed at this point.
11. Determine the infrastructure to the required level of detail. This is especially important if
Stability Operations will feature.
12. Determine International Community actors, stances, positions and reactions, including
IOs/NGOs.
13. Consider any future exercise requirements and identify 'hooks' for subsequent
development. Within the setting we created three ‘hooks’ for future scenarios (and even an
entirely new future exercise).
Scenario:
14. Determine the Road to Crisis. This was the crisis-specific narrative that weaved elements
of the setting into the events leading to the Startex position.
15. Produce a Summary of Recent Events and Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) covering the
necessary period. This put more flesh onto the bones of the Road to Crisis. If you think of
this as a story, the Summary of Recent Events is more akin to a bullet list suitable for a
PowerPoint brief, while the INTSUM is much the same material in a military format. The
adversary’s assessed order of battles, readiness states etc are contained in the INTSUM.
16. Confirm the Joint Operations Area. We pre-determined this, but it might be an iterative
process between Control and players.
Startex and Execution Documents:
17. Storyboard the likely execution events (effectively a synchronisation matrix for Control
use only). This was our first attempt at the ‘waypoints’ that would provide the execution
roadmap: those events that we knew we had to reach during the wargame (the next chapter
explains this ‘waypoint’ approach). These would be tested to destruction and refined
during the development phase, then delivered dynamically during execution. The Game
Director and Game Controller were central to this step.
18. Start to produce a broad, flexible MEL/MIL. The events and outline injects were a
development of the ‘waypoints’ mentioned above. We did not waste time on detailed
scripting, but produced a spreadsheet that contained just the key events and a few
 constituent incidents. We left the actual inject serials to be developed and executed
dynamically by Control during execution.
19. Determine any Decisive Conditions to be met. These are the Training Audience’s
operational milestones.
20. Determine the correct balance of forces. We used rapid, manual, wargaming to do this.
Although all orders of battles would be refined during the development phase, the initial
‘guesstimate’ proved surprisingly accurate, even though we were still in the design phase.
See Figure 19-3.
21. Confirm Startex positions.
22. Produce Operational Staff Work (OSW).

Figure 19-3. Rapid, manual wargaming to determine the balance of forces

The final step, to produce OSW, illustrates the point that each of the above bullets requires
substantial effort, which will occur during the development phase. Creating the entirety of a
setting and scenario is a significant task. For example, bullets 4 – 11 demanded the production
of ‘Country Books’ containing the required level of detail for eighteen nations. However, we did
not want to drown students, so these were limited to just two sides of paper, and then
developed during execution as required. Some Country Books, such as those produced by the
NATO JWC, run to many chapters.
A setting is often used to generate multiple scenarios. Per bullet 13, I inserted a number of
‘hooks’ into the setting in the belief that scenario requirements would change over the (real)
years and we would have to adapt the setting to meet these. Building such scenario ‘hooks’ into
a setting is easy if you consider it during initial writing. They need the barest of details, because
you can add those when asked to develop a new scenario. Inserting the hooks into a setting
early helps maintain coherence as you develop these subsequently – as opposed to belatedly
banging in a new and incoherent hook. They also add richness to the setting, as these
flashpoints could be played up or down during execution to add depth to the scenario.
Writing a setting and scenario for an analytical wargame
In some ways, the process of writing the setting and scenario for an analytical wargame is more
straightforward than that used for an educational or training wargame – but it requires more
rigour.
First, the setting and scenario are not as critical. Players, understanding that the wargame is
analytical in nature, tend to be more forgiving than participants in a training wargame; there is
less ‘fighting the scenario.’ It remains good practice to immerse players as fully as is sensible,
but it is necessary to take people in and out of the magic circle for analytical purposes. Players
accept this.
Second, the scenario for an analytical wargame should be directly derived from the research
question, issues and sub-issues being examined, and then focus on the subjects of analysis
(SoAs) and essential elements of analysis (EAA). This per the discussion of the Data Collection
and Analysis Plan (DCAP)/Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP) in Chapter 8 (Analysis).
While the scenario must still evolve to accommodate player decisions, it is 100% a vehicle to
enable analysis, including scenario requirements. These could include specific vignettes and
injects to trigger activities to be observed. When derived from a good DCMP, you often find that
the scenario almost writes itself. However, while procedurally straightforward, this does not
mean that the task is easy: the number and diversity of issues, sub-issues and SoA/EEAs to be
examined can be overwhelming. Serials can often run into hundreds and, even after robust
prioritisation, often require multiple facets of more than one scenario to examine them all.
Real-world parallels
Bullet 8 (Identify real-world examples to use as a basis for fictionalisation) from the Middle
Eastern staff college example warrants developing. Players better engage if they can –
consciously or subconsciously – relate the wargame context and their decisions to a real-world
situation, or an extrapolation of such to a plausible fictionalised situation.
Asked in 2010 by the UK Staff College to ‘refresh’ an out of date setting, I introduced a province
seeking to secede from the key antagonist. That fictionalised province was based on elements
drawn from various real-world situations, primarily Catalonia and the Basque region, but with
various Hamas-like groups incorporated. I named the province ‘Katalysta’ because that alluded
to both Catalonia and the fact that its potential secession was the catalyst for the scenario
crisis.
In a 2014 divisional-level wargame, the Dstl Red player created a wonderful ‘state-within-a-state’,
based on the fictionalised city of Agdash. The evolving situation arose entirely out of game play,
but was constructed using aspects of Hezbollah and Hamas. These details were developed
within the DATE setting – but the narrative that arose was palpably real-world.
Sources of real-world inspiration
Given what amounts to an unlimited amount of data in today’s information-rich environment, I
recommend the following sources of real-world inspiration:
· The real world! Maintain a good understanding of current and historical real-world
events, actors and factions.
[357]
· The CIA World Fact Book. This is unclassified and available online.
· The Economist. Ranging from Espresso (a pithy daily summary) through the weekly
newspaper to detailed reports produced (at a price) by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the
data and information is first class.
[358]
· A Quick & Dirty Guide to War. In its 4th Edition (2008), Jim Dunnigan’s and Austin
Bay’s (both wargamers) book, although dated, is useful for its summaries and analysis of
real-world conflicts.
· The Military Balance, Jane’s Defence Weekly and Jane’s Intelligence Review etc. These
are essential reference documents.
· International Organisation and Non-Governmental Organisations’ web sites. These
provide detailed data and reports on current and historical trouble spots. For example,
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and web site are gloomy but
useful sources of information.
Chapter 20. Scenario Development
‘The scenario can have a significant, if not overwhelming, effect on the decisions players are
able to make. As a result, the game designer must carefully determine how the scenario may
affect the factors he is most interested in exploring.’
[359]
Peter Perla

Introduction
This is a short but critical chapter. Players are too often implored not to ‘fight the white’ when
querying aspects of setting or scenario (in)credibility. Any such instance indicates players
whose ‘magic circle’ has been violated due to a poorly developed setting or scenario. The
development phase must ensure that the setting and scenario are credible, coherent and fit for
the purpose of enabling the wargame. The development mantra of ‘playtest, playtest, playtest!’
applies. Aspects to be tested include: the balance of forces; the anticipated broad progression
of the narrative ‘story-board’; determination of the likely information flows into and out of
Control; the number of people required to support this; and the required level of detail in
paperwork and briefings. Throughout the development of the setting and scenario, it is
important to ‘keep the end in mind’, which is executing the scenario dynamically to enable a
constructed narrative.
Unstructured inject scripting workshops are a waste of time
Significant time, effort and money is spent conducting Main Events List/Master Injects
List (MEL/MIL) ‘scripting workshops’, sometimes involving hundreds of personnel and
contractors making up ‘stuff’ and populating data bases with dozens of events and hundreds, if
not thousands, of associated injects. NATO’s Bi-SC 75-3 suggests that, ‘The MEL/MIL includes
the complete set of events, incidents and injections, and constitutes the detailed script of the
exercise play. These should be developed before the exercise. They may also be dynamically
scripted during the exercise. The purpose is to generate responses from, as well as to ‘paint the
[360]
picture’ for, the Training Audiences.’ (My italics.) Although this statement accepts some
dynamic scripting, the intention is to determine all injects prior to the exercise, with little scope
to adjust these during execution.
For the past few years, I have tried to quantify the percentage of pre-scripted injects used
during the subsequent wargame. The figure ranges from 0 (yes, zero – and I was working with
the Scenario Manager, so that is accurate) to about 20%. Furthermore, many of the injects used
have nil, or a detrimental, effect on the wargame: players are unable to act on them, or – worse
– they make no sense in the current situation. This is usually due to the situation having
changed since the inject was conceived – yet they are still played in because ‘it’s in the script.’
I am not suggesting that MEL/MIL workshops are eliminated: a premeditated (versus
predetermined) roadmap is usually required, and there is great utility in wargaming this to
visualise the broad sequence of events. But there is a better way to run MEL/MIL scripting than
the current prevalent method: use wargaming, as explained below.
Confirming a scenario is fit for purpose
How, then, do we reach the Nirvana of a setting and scenario that supports the wargame
objectives, yet will be executed dynamically with player decisions paramount? The following
suggestions apply to training and analytical wargames, but should be adapted to fit your
wargame specifics. Many will require a ‘leap of faith’ by the sponsor and Control staff, because
the comfort blanket of a pre-determined wargame script is discarded in favour of a flexible
‘waypoint’ approach to dynamic scenario execution.
The key is the series of playtests detailed in Chapter 13 (Wargame Development). Do what you
can prior to the Internal Playtest to ensure the scenario’s coherence and internal consistency,
including ‘staff checks’ by the sponsor organisation. Then take the sanity-checked setting and
scenario into the series of playtests and MEL/MIL scripting. Focus on the following three
aspects:
· The antagonists’ anticipated plans, to ensure they will support the objectives.
· A broad ‘road map’ or story-board consisting of scenario ‘waypoints.’
· The balance of forces, to confirm this can deliver the anticipated outcomes.
These are all likely to start with fairly wide parameters, which are refined during playtesting. It
helps to achieve an initial narrowing while playtests involve only a few people: to attempt the
refinement from broad to narrow with many participants risks lengthy debate and wasted time.
Validating antagonists’ anticipated plans
Adversary plans are much easier to control in a one-sided wargame, when Red is essentially a
pressure lever that Control can adjust as required. It is far more difficult to credibly control
adversary plans in a free-play, two- or more-sided wargame. Accordingly, during playtesting, you
should test and refine the scenario to deliver a situation that, even when it evolves with minimal
Control influence, meets the wargame’s objectives but remains challenging and finely balanced
throughout execution. I recently witnessed an analytical wargame in which the Red plan (a flank
guard action) dovetailed neatly into the Blue plan, allowing both sides to achieve their given
objectives without fighting. Red advanced to a certain point, just short of the main Blue
positions – and stopped. Both sides declared that their plan had succeeded. Unfortunately, the
experiment demanded that the Blue defensive capability be tested – something the Red player
had no intention of doing. The Game Controller had to step in and – somewhat incredibly – ask
the Red player to launch attacks. This should have been identified and rectified during
playtesting.
Story-board ‘waypoints’
The waypoints might be the wargame’s objectives (e.g. practise amphibious operations) and/or
events or themes that the sponsor requires (e.g. suffer multiple and increasing set-backs when
operating within a humanitarian crisis). The crucial point is that, while the Game Controller is
responsible for steering the game to reach these waypoints, the route between them will be
determined by player decisions.
While not required at all playtests, the Game Controller must be involved at some point, because
it is they who ultimately steers the wargame to reach the waypoints. The earlier the involvement,
the more confident the Game Controller will be that waypoints can be reached. Refinements to
the scenario might be required, e.g. a credible reason why one side cannot immediately destroy
the other’s air force in the 1973-like example I cited previously. Once the Game Controller is
comfortable with the waypoints along the broad story-board, these should then be played as
part of scenario testing during subsequent playtests. The sponsor, Game Director and Game
Controller should come away from playtesting confident that the waypoints can be achieved –
but they must also be comfortable with the fact that the exact route between them will not be
determined until the players derive and execute their actual plans.
Confirming the balance of forces
The balance of forces must be correctly assessed during playtesting. The process can start
during the design phase (per the Middle Eastern staff college example), but must feature from
the very first playtest.
An example of the process in action
We were able to follow this process for a divisional-level Command Post Exercise (CPX) in 2015.
Having worked together the previous year, the Game Controller was confident that we could
deliver the required training objectives using the ‘waypoint’ approach, allowing Red freedom of
manoeuvre and with well-balanced capabilities on both sides. Following internal playtests, we
conducted a half-day wargame with the Game Controller and Red Cell to investigate the broad
Red options and confirm the balance of forces. Following that, the Test Exercise concentrated
on playing through the anticipated Red and Blue plans to see if the waypoints were achievable.
That teed up a much-reduced period of inject writing, with the scripters having just played
through the scenario waypoints. We achieved such a fine balance of forces that, during the
actual exercise, the divisional Chief of Staff took the Game Controller to one side saying that the
Training Audience were seriously concerned that the division would be overwhelmed, and were
frantically planning contingencies; could the Game Controller not tone down the threat?
Confident from playtesting, the Game Controller stood his ground and the ultimate outcome,
while uncertain throughout, delivered a favourable result for Blue. The Training Audience
emerged exhausted but elated, and with the learning outcomes firmly internalised.
MEL/MIL scripting workshops using wargaming
MEL/MIL scripting might not be required, particularly for analytical wargames. For training
events, certainly large-scale ones, I would recommend it – but structured around wargaming.
Attendees are too often briefed just the top-level scenario events, and then asked to make up
detailed injects to support these. The result is a large bucket of injects that are either generic
(‘fuel contamination downs the F-16 fleet’) or fixed (‘it’s Tuesday so must be the outbreak of
disease at the refugee camp’). It’s this bucket from which the 0-20% of used injects are drawn
that I referred to earlier.
An example of an effective scripting week
In 2018, I ran a scripting week in preparation for a divisional CPX. We based this around simple
manual wargaming, which delivered a visualisation of the broad story-board and a structured
framework for discussion. The top-level events were actions on various geographical objectives.
These were contained in higher command’s orders and correlated closely to the training
objectives, so were a given. We wargamed the possible routes from event to event to elicit
incidents that were likely to occur between, and during, them. One event was an airborne
assault. The incidents we derived included: reactions from in-situ IOs and NGOs dealing with
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); the actions of local armed non-state actors and organised
crime should any power vacuum emerge; the degree of control required over actors and
factions; detailed Red play that would demand player decisions in response to well-balanced
kinetic outcomes (Operational Analysis was used to examine the expected outcomes); the level
of support from in-place host-nation forces to enable the operation; IDP movements as a result
of the operation; and regional and international reactions.
Having premeditated the broad course of action, scripters created inject serials with a clear idea
of the type of incidents likely to occur during execution. Everything created remained
provisional: it could not be a prediction because we could not know the players’ decisions until
execution. Incidents and injects would be confirmed and developed during dynamic execution –
ideally by the same people who had attended the scripting week – in response to player
decisions and Control guidance. Incidents and injects included kinetic events and the non-
kinetic ‘wrap around’ so crucial in providing an immersive context that, as far as it can, reflects
the complexity of the real world. Where an incident was complicated, or involved multiple cells’
injects, we divided it into vignettes for ease of conceptualisation and coordination. In between
bouts of wargaming, we paused to allow people to populate Exonaut (the computerised MEL/MIL
tool) while what they had just experienced was fresh in their minds.
The outcomes from the scripting week were:
· An experiential visualisation of the likely, but provisional, execution story-board, to be
refined during execution into a full MEL/MIL adaptive to player decisions.
· Population into Exonaut of definite events, likely incidents and vignettes, and some
plausible injects.
· Familiarisation with Exonaut.
· A backbrief of the anticipated key serials and scenario ‘hooks’ for potential development.
· Confirmed balance of forces, which would deliver enough play to last execution.
· Identification of Control requirements e.g. personnel, information flows etc.
· Crucially, a Game Controller confident of executing the scenario dynamically and flexibly
– but with a light touch – to achieve the objectives.
Chapter 21. Scenario Execution
'What unites people? Armies? Gold? Flags? Stories? There's nothing in the world more powerful
than a good story. Nothing can stop it. No enemy can defeat it.'
Tyrion Lanister, final episode of Game of Thrones

Introduction
Scenario development, with sufficient playtesting, has brought you to Startex with a coherent
product; broad scenario way points; a good understanding of the antagonists’ plans; balanced
forces; and, crucially, a Game Controller confident that all this is fit for purpose. Now the
scenario must be executed dynamically, balancing the tension between player decisions and
objectives. Much of that control is discussed in the next chapter (Controlling Wargames), but
there are key aspects specific to executing the scenario.
Your task is that of a storyteller or storyshaper, but using a light touch
I find it useful to consider myself a storyteller if I am directly relating events or outcomes,
explaining these, as far as possible, as if they were a story. More often, however, my role is that
of a storyshaper: the player actions and conversations tell the story, and my task is to shape
this and give colour to the grey areas around it. The two different styles are respectively best
suited to a small wargame, when you fulfil most or all of the control functions, and a large game
where you are part of a Control organisation. Whichever style is appropriate, they are points on
the same spectrum.
Ideally, control (verb) and Control (noun) remain invisible. Clearly, if player decisions are likely to
result in a failure to achieve the objectives, you will need to intervene to keep the game on
course. But a well-designed and thoroughly playtested wargame should, with a gentle hand on
the tiller during execution, be capable of withstanding most player decisions. The following are
some suggestions that might help in this regard.
Ensure that the Startex situation tees up the initial waypoints
The situation at Startex should point the players towards the first one or more waypoints.
Unless working at the highest levels – for example in a political-military game, there will almost
always be direction given to the players from a ‘virtual’ superior. Combined with the starting
‘laydown’ positions, this should enable you to create the required situation. When we re-fight
the Falklands War with the Royal Marines Advanced Amphibious Warfare Course, we use the real
initial mission as at 17 April 1982 (‘Land on the Falklands with a view to re-capturing them’), but
we know that we will shortly inject further guidance: ‘Port Stanley must be captured’; then
worsening weather imposes a deadline of 5 June by which to achieve this. The initial mission
ensures we hit the waypoints of conducting the investment of the Falklands and executing an
amphibious landing; the subsequent guidance results in a fight to Stanley under time pressure.
How the students achieve this is up to them.
…but, where possible, be flexible over waypoints and objectives
Heretical as it might sound, if an evolving situation is delivering valuable wargame outcomes, it
is sometimes better to concentrate on that rather than dogmatically move on to the next
waypoint. This does not contradict the previous discussion. Clearly, flexing the objectives might
not be appropriate, and must be discussed with the Game Director and sponsor. However, if
learning and/or insights arising from Waypoint A are rich, and it is apparent that more can be
gleaned, at least consider concentrating on that objective (or even accepting that a new one has
arisen) and marginalising Waypoint B.
Look ahead
Constantly think ahead to player decision points and the next waypoint to gauge the options
open to evolve the scenario. If any of these might take the game down a route the Game
Controller does not want, you will need to pre-empt decisions that lead that way. The further
ahead you can think, the better your chances of doing this with a light touch. The intervention
might be by way of an inject, direction from a superior commander or adversary activity.
Whatever it is, make it credible and intervene in good time, so that it is a gentle nudge, not a
crude shove.
Avoid clumsy interventions
Resist Control interventions that come out of the blue or are ‘acts of God’ such as ‘There’s been
a landslide that blocks all roads’. Players immediately spot these as hasty corrections. I talk
about the ART of injects later. For now, simply register that injects must be credible and usually
develop over game time.
Minimise the moderation of outcomes
Try to resist moderating the results of combat and other interactions. If outcomes, and the
factors that lead to them, are transparent, it is usually better to run with whatever
stochastic result occurs, even if it is towards one end of the outcome distribution curve.
Understanding a result makes it more likely that players will accept it, even when an adverse
outcome arises.

Dramatic considerations
As discussed in Chapter 18, consideration during execution of dramatic factors will help ensure
player engagement. These were: The Invitation to Play; tension and conflict; uncertain
outcomes; and the dramatic arc. I re-state them because they will not be the foremost
considerations for the Game Controller, so you should champion them as appropriate during
execution.
Techniques for managing scenario execution
We are now morphing into pure execution and there is considerable cross-over with next
chapter, but I want to concentrate on executing the scenario for a while yet. There are several
processes and techniques that can be used during execution that help Control – and the Game
Controller in particular – manage the evolving scenario to ensure it reaches the various
waypoints.
Conduct a ‘Turn 0’
I discussed the Turn 0 in Chapter 14. Allowing players to play through a complete turn, then
resetting the game clock back to Startex, is an excellent way to ensure your wargame gets off to
a good start, heading towards the first waypoint.
Hold ‘Next-Day Wargames’
A ‘Next-Day Wargame’ is a Control game conducted prior to the period to be executed for real,
typically the day before. It is a game within a game. Its purpose is for Control to anticipate,
premeditate and plan the next day’s activities. This is a key activity, and the process is detailed
in the next chapter. It is predicated on players’ plans, and Control’s shaping activities should
conform to these. Outcomes pertaining to scenario execution are:
· The understanding by all Control staff of the likely outcomes when the events being
wargamed are executed for real the following day.
· A list of injects to be introduced dynamically the next day. These might range from a
necessary adjustment to steer the wargame towards a waypoint/objective, to developing
the non-kinetic ‘wrap-around’, to adding richness and colour to the scenario.
 · Confirmation of media products required for the next day, with sufficient time to produce
these.
· Production of a ‘flanks’ or ‘higher command’ situation. This might just add depth to the
scenario, but could elicit potential direction and guidance to the players. Whatever the
outcome, the risk of players feeling that they are operating in a vacuum is mitigated.
· Advance warning of issues arising. These might range from a developing imbalance of
forces to a major decision point that might skew the remainder of the event.
Premeditation of such issues enables measured Control action.
· Parameters within which Lower Controllers and computer operators are to work when
executing the game using real-time simulations.
Control levers and mechanisms
There are several levers and mechanisms that the Game Controller might use to gently steer a
wargame. In a perfect world, these remain unused, and the players’ decisions will naturally
navigate the spaces between waypoints – but that is an unlikely ideal.
· Injects. See the next section for more detail.
· Higher commander’s direction. Considered in advance, and delivered to a credible and
sensible timeline, this can provide absolute direction to participants. Direction should not
come as a surprise to players; Warning Orders and drip-fed information should precede it.
Use such direction sparingly if it does not arise naturally in response to game play.
· Adversary activity. In a one-sided wargame, adversary cells are a Control lever. Red
(Orange, Black etc) is not there to win in a one-sided game, it is there to ensure that
objectives are met. This is the flip-side of higher commander’s direction, so the same
factors apply: early consideration and credibility. You must also take care not to surprise
players. There is a fine balance between an adversary cell achieving surprise in the
doctrinal sense, and players assuming that ‘Control (Red) is making it up’ when the
adversary does something unexpected.
· Bring players into the process. If you ask a player to ‘step into Control’ or accept privy
information, you take them out of the magic circle, and disbelief will be suspended.
However, it is sometimes justified; the forthcoming time jump discussion provides one
example.
Managing injects
Terminology
· Main Events List/Master Incidents List (MEL/MIL). ‘The MEL/MIL, the main tool (normally
a database) for the Excon to control the exercise, is maintained by Excon and is structured
on the main events developed to support achievement of the exercise objectives. Each
main event will have one or more incidents that are presented to the Training Audience by
[361]
way of injections.’
· Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). The MSEL is the US equivalent of the MEL/MIL.
· Event. An event is ‘an inserted major occurrence or a sequence of related incidents.’
[362] It is the highest level of the hierarchy explained below. Events should equate to, or
directly support, the primary wargame objectives, waypoints and themes.
· Incident. ‘An incident is an element or subset of an exercise event.’ [363] Several
incidents combine to create the higher-level event.
· Vignette. Per Chapter 19, a vignette is a discrete action, or series of connected actions,
confined to a very specific and limited situation. NATO does not use the term, but it is
common parlance and useful when deconstructing an incident, which is often necessary.
· Inject (NATO ‘injection’). An inject is ‘the way of bringing an incident to the attention of
the players for whom it was created (and from whom a reaction is expected). The intent is
[364]
to simulate the likely source of such information in a real situation/operation.’ (My
italics) Event, incident and vignette are umbrella terms, an inject is a serial as if delivered
by an actual entity in the wargame e.g. a report.
A hierarchy of injects
A standard hierarchy used to develop and manage injects is shown at Figure 21-1.

Figure 21-1. Event – incident – vignette – inject hierarchy

An example is:
· Event: A humanitarian crisis.
· Incidents. A natural disaster, ethnic cleansing or movements to IDP camps.
· Vignettes: A village being attacked while Blue forces are in the local area.
· Injects. Simulated reports from in-game entities, such as a Lower Controller radio report
from troops near the attacked village, police reports, IO/NGO reports etc.
The ART of injects
There is an ART to managing injects, but I’ll now re-order those letters. The key to successful
injects is to ensure that each is a RAT: reasonable, actionable and traceable. These same criteria
can also be used to validate events, incidents and vignettes, but are most directly applicable to
injects.
· Reasonable. Injects must be credible in the eyes of the participants and readily accepted.
If an inject causes players to roll their eyes, you risk their disengagement. Conversely, a
reasonable inject, especially when clearly associated to a player decision, will help build the
shared story-living narrative.
· Actionable. Players must be able to act on the inject. The value of an inject is limited if
the participants can do nothing about it. At worst, Control ends up exercising itself,
presenting a problem to the players that is immediately passed up to Higher Control or
down to Lower Controllers to resolve. This is a distraction and creates unnecessary work.
However, some injects are justified simply because they add colour to the background
story (‘the wallpaper’), while some might be required as a precursor to subsequent injects.
· Traceable. All elements of an inject should be traceable in two respects: tracking back
activities to discover their genesis; and deconstructing and mapping player decisions onto
the triggering activity. Although it might only be apparent to players after the event, there
should be a clear audit trail within each vignette, incident and event showing the decisions
taken and the rationale for these. Figure 21-2 illustrates this.
Additionally, the following factors must be considered by Control for each inject: purpose;
pressure; trigger; and required Control actions. These can be used to construct a simple table,
or spreadsheet, to manage injects, as shown in Figure 21-5.
Example incident, with associated vignettes and injects
We ran a tactical (platform level) wargame to address the research question ‘What will be the
[365]
doctrinal implications to “find” in an armoured infantry brigade following the introduction of
new capabilities within the 2020 timeframe’. The wargame was semi-closed: Blue force elements
(FEs) were played openly, but Red’s and other battlefield activities were only declared to Blue
when adjudicated as found. One of the events was to conduct an advance to contact, and an
incident within that was an enemy anti-tank ambush. Cursory consideration might have led to
the conclusion that the ambush was an inject. But it wasn’t: the ambush was the incident, and
constituted several vignettes, each of which contained one or more injects. Some injects were
declared to Blue, but others weren’t unless and until adjudication determined that Blue acquired
knowledge of them. But they were all required in the hierarchy of the event and to ensure the
‘RAT’ criteria.
Figure 21-2 shows the slide prepared by the Red Cell that de-constructed the incident into
discrete vignettes (bullets 1 – 6). The purpose of the vignettes was to test Blue’s ability to ‘find’
each separate Red activity, and then to understand the passing of information and the players’
reactions. Launching the anti-tank ambush as a single inject would not have elicited the
necessary level of detail to properly examine Blue’s capabilities and decision-making.
In the wargame, adjudication determined that the Blue players did not ‘find’ vignettes 1 and 3
(preparing positions and infiltration), although the injects were duly noted by Control. Blue did
‘find’ vignette 2 (being observed by civilians), receiving reports from their Lower Controllers –
but did not have sufficient circumstantial information to make the correct deductions. Hence
vignette 4 (the actual ambush) came as a surprise, to the chagrin of the Blue players. The
injects were reports from the ambushed vehicles. Blue did not ‘find’ vignette 5 (enemy
exfiltration), although they were aware of the Internally Displaced Persons movement due to
injects from their Lower Controllers and police reports via higher formation. They then suffered
incoming Indirect Fire (vignette 6) as they dealt with the ambush casualties, reported by the
Lower Controllers. This sequence of events caused consternation within the Blue cell. The
players’ vexation was only ameliorated when the incident was de-constructed, declaring all the
injects during the Scientific After Action Review. Each inject was then agreed to have been
reasonable, Red having made no ‘magic moves’. All had been actionable, had the Blue find
capabilities and decision-making been more effective. That insight, and the different ‘treatments’
discussed during the ensuing conversation directly addressed the research question. The
actions, re-actions and decisions taken by both Red and Blue could be traced throughout every
vignette and inject.

Figure 21-2. Example of an incident, with associated vignettes (1-6)

Tools and techniques for managing injects
Many tools and techniques are available to assist Control evolve the scenario and coordinate
injects. Note the word ‘assist’; scenario management tools can be useful, but excessively
complicated (electronic) solutions are often used where simpler solutions would suffice. The risk
is that these become ‘beasts to be fed’, consuming significant resource as Control staff
continually generate input for them. In the worst cases, the processes by which these tools are
serviced become a significant distraction for Control. Do not succumb to the technology or a
pro-innovation biases discussed in Chapter 9. Select appropriate technology, not the glitziest
(and probably most costly). A distributed requirement almost certainly demands an electronic
solution, but that does not automatically equate to the most complex solution and using the
entirety of its functionality. Methods of coordinating injects are listed below, progressing from
simple to complicated. You might combine several.
Whiteboarding. Simple wargames need nothing more than a whiteboard to coordinate injects.
Figure 21-3 is from a three-week staff college educational wargame that featured 40 students
and 12 Control staff. Control was in one room, and the whiteboard approach – apparently messy
– worked perfectly. It was always on display, available for formal and informal discussion, and
cost nothing.

Figure 21-3: Simple MEL/MIL whiteboarding

Birdtable. A ‘birdtable’ is an appropriately-sized (often large), flat table, upon which physical
maps, overlays and components are placed for planning and visualisation purposes. It provides
a formal and informal forum for discussion, and enables shared situational awareness for those
with access to it. Do not discount a birdtable as in any way old fashioned. The advantages are
that it:
· Cannot go wrong, and is powered solely by imagination.
· Is an inexpensive ‘analogue Common Operations Picture’ that often suffices.
· Is always available as a forum for discussion, for which it provides visualisation.
Electronic birdtable. An electronic birdtable can – if well configured and managed – deliver the
benefits of a manual birdtable, but delivers additional capabilities such as: capturing and
distributing information; simple touch-screen staff planning tools; rapid Line of Sight (LOS) and
indivisibility checks; virtual ‘fly-bys’; and the provision of references, look-up tables and
Operational Analysis aides. But do not presume that an electronic birdtable will suffice, or is
automatically better than a manual one: they need servicing, and often have limitations that are
not immediately apparent. And be prepared to adopt a reversionary manual mode when they
break down!
PowerPoint (ppt). Ppt slides can help manage scenario development and injects, but usually
need to be used in conjunction with other techniques. Figure 21-4 shows a summary of daily
incidents from a divisional-level wargame with a Control of some 200 people and a Training
Audience of about 1,000. The ppt slides were an output from the Next-Day Wargame conducted
at a birdtable (see the front cover), and formed the basis of subsequent MEL/MIL coordination
conferences. The injects devised by Control cells were input into the Exonaut Training and
[366]
Exercise Manager, a java-based product that distributed serials, including to
Observer/Mentors (O/M) co-located with the players. Some injects were delivered by Advanced
Battlefield Computer Simulation (ABACUS), a real-time computer simulation.

Figure 21-4. Ppt slides used to coordinate

injects
Spreadsheets. A MEL/MIL spreadsheet allows injects to be managed, projected and distributed.
Many people presume that a spreadsheet is better than a whiteboard, but I have too often seen
loose discussions in Control because the spreadsheet is closed or locked to another user.
Figure 21-5 shows how a serial can be coordinated across Control.
 Figure 21-5. MEL/MIL spreadsheet showing coordination measures
Coordination meetings. Scenario management and coordination meetings are a critical element
of the Control process. In a small wargame, these might be combined into just one coordination
meeting, but there is usually a series of meetings throughout the day.
· 48-hour look-forward. The primacy of player decisions means that any attempt by
Control to precisely predict what will happen beyond the 48-hour point is likely to be
nugatory effort (unless considering a new phase of an operation or campaign or a time
jump). The 48-hour look forward is a high-level Control meeting, probably with just the
Game Director, Game Controller and Chief MEL/MIL, possibly with the leads from key cells.
The discussion centres around the feasibility of achieving the anticipated objectives, or
waypoints, and any corrective action required to keep the game on track.
· Simulated Press (Sim Press) look-forward. It can take a Sim Press team considerable
time to produce media. The more warning the Sim Press team has of what is likely to be
required, the better will be their product. Clearly, a degree of caution is required as the
situation might change, but a heads-up regarding anticipated key events allows footage to
be sourced, computer-generated products to be made, reports to be scripted etc.
· 24-hour look ahead/Next-Day Wargame. This is the crucial Control meeting, and will
usually be chaired by the Game Controller, with all key staff and cell heads present. Player
plans should be available in enough detail to anticipate the next day’s activity, even if this
is predicated on Locons being ‘in the mind’ of their player commanders and understanding
a broad intent. The Next-Day Wargame is covered in detail in the next chapter.
· MEL/MIL coordination meetings. The purpose of these is to confirm injects for the next
period and ensure that those with multiple participating cells are coordinated. An O/M
representative should attend if possible, even if a distributed exercise management system
is being used: face to face discussion is best. The MEL/MIL coordination meeting will
usually be run by Chief MEL/MIL, and a representative from all Control cells should attend.
They are generally held at the start of the day, at some point in the late afternoon, and
 occasionally at lunchtime, depending on the intensity of injects anticipated. Meetings can
be quick, with ad hoc ones common.
· ‘Flanks’ play. Activity peripheral to the players might need to be generated by a specific
cell if it is sufficiently important, or it might be subsumed into a Control cell, typically
Higher Control (Hicon) or ‘Sidecon’. Whatever the method, flanks play needs, as a
minimum, to be coordinated between Hicon and other Control cells. In a training event it
might require a separate wargame to determine outcomes. In an analytical wargame, flanks
play might be determined by Control to provide the context for player activities.
Bespoke tools. There are many computerised scenario management tools. One commonly used
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is NATO’s Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM), but others include Exonaut and
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MEEDS . There are web-based applications such as WebMSEL . If your wargame is
geographically distributed beyond, say, a nearby classroom, you will almost certainly need a
computerised tool to coordinate injects: computer-assisted solutions such as ppt and
spreadsheets still require face-to-face meetings (although video conferencing might suffice).
Distribution often includes to O/M, who will likely be with the Training Audience. Many of these
tools’ functionality goes beyond simple injects management. Exonaut, for example, has modules
that can assist in wargame planning, by linking each inject serial to a specific objective within
the event – incident – vignette hierarchy. But the more complicated the tool, the more Control
resource is required to service it.
Chapter 22. Controlling Wargames
‘A good game is a unique way of structuring experience and provoking positive emotion. It is an
extremely powerful tool for inspiring participation and motivating hard work… Games, in the
twenty-first century, will be a primary platform for enabling the future.’
[370]
Jane McGonigal (2012)
Introduction
Scalability particularly applies to this chapter. The Control functions remain the same,
irrespective of the format, size and context of your wargame, and it’s often just the enabling
technology that differs. The discussion applies to both training and analytical wargames,
although I will draw distinctions where necessary.
A generic wargame structure
Figure 22-1 shows a generic wargame structure. For the sake of simplicity, I’ve included this
diagram as a singular example, and will extrapolate from it as necessary. Most applicable to a
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middle-sized, one-sided training wargame, it suffices to illustrate the key wargame
structures, roles and Control functions. Minor tweaks make it applicable to two- or more sided
games, and most of the same roles and functions exist in an analytical wargame.

Figure 22-1. Generic wargame and Control structure

Key roles and functions
NATO’s Bi-SC 75-3 provides the following useful definitions:
· ‘Direction is the authoritative instruction issued by the Exercise Director to guide the
exercise activity to best achieve the Officer Scheduling the Exercise’s aim and objectives.
· ‘Control is the minute-by-minute activity that ensures the exercise is conducted as
planned. A crucial aspect of control is ensuring that progress towards the achievement of
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the training objectives is constantly monitored.’
This accords with the explanation of the Game Director and Game Controller roles given in the
Wargaming Handbook. However, Bi-SC 75-3 then lists myriad posts, roles and responsibilities
that add complexity to what should be as simple a construct as possible. This is
understandable, given the enormous range of exercises and wargame variants that NATO
conducts. It explains that ‘Excon models should be adjusted according to the specific exercise
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requirements’. If you are working for NATO, or an organisation that follows its guidelines,
you should understand the roles described in Bi-SC 75-3. If not, strip back the complexity to
keep everything as simple as possible, as suggested in the Wargaming Handbook. I discussed
the role of the Game Controller and Game Director in Chapter 7, so will now only describe the
other appointments and functions that support these key roles. Relate these to Figure 22-1.
Facilitation
Facilitation is the subject of Chapter 23. It might be subsumed into another role (as is the case in
many small wargames) or might require one or more suitably qualified and experienced
facilitators, working directly to the Game Controller in a very close relationship.
Adjudication
Adjudication might also be combined with another Control role, or require a separate person or
even entire organisation with bespoke sub-processes. Combining adjudication with facilitation in
a single person is feasible in small games, but places great responsibility on that individual.
Additional roles
The following roles might be required, depending on the size, complexity and geographical
distribution of your wargame. Unless you are running a very small game, it is worth considering
all these roles and functions during wargame design, even if the decision is taken that they can
be combined or are not needed.
Chief Control/Excon. Chief Control’s role is to act as Chief of Staff to the Game Controller.
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Chief MEL/MIL The primary role of Chief MEL/MIL is to manage the injects that constitute
events, incidents and vignettes. Chief MEL/MIL might also be given some responsibility for
shaping the direction the scenario takes during execution. Placing Chief MEL/MIL into this
position elevates them beyond coordination and into a directing role, along with the Game
Director and Game Controller. But Chief MEL/MIL still works to the Game Controller.
Game Manager. The Game Manager is responsible for administration, equipment support and
the like. They must be part of the wargame team from the outset. The Game Controller should
not be distracted by administrative responsibilities.
Analysts. Analysts and recorders need ‘front row’ access to the players (during and after
gaming sessions) and wargame instrumentality to ensure effective data capture.
Floorwalkers. Covering a wide range of roles and tasks, floorwalkers can swell the number of
wargame participants, so consider their impact during wargame design and development. I list
below the main categories of floorwalker, and suggest considerations.
 [375]
· Observer/Mentors (O/M). In training wargames, O/M require a similar level of access
to data and players as do analysts in an analytical game. They are key to the successful
garnering of data and observations on which After Action Reviews (AARs) are based.
Because O/M are generally co-located with the players, there will probably be a requirement
to distribute information to them electronically. Test the tools and processes to do this
during playtesting.
· Senior mentors. ‘Grey beards’ in US parlance, senior mentors can add immense value –
but are a double-edged sword. As well as invaluable experience in higher command
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positions, senior mentors can carry ‘baggage’. I watched one ABCA wargame led by
the nose by a senior mentor who wanted to re-fight a major Iraq battle during which he had
been the second-ranking officer. The experiment was skewed because the gentleman
concerned – consciously or subconsciously – wanted to justify his historical decisions.
Another pitfall is that more junior officers tend to defer to senior mentors, which can result
in stifled innovation and group-think. To best leverage senior mentors, consider bringing
them into the Control process. While the wargame direction remains the responsibility of
the Game Director and Game Controller, senior mentors can add to deliberations and will
be party to Control decisions, understanding the direction the wargame needs to take, and
why. One characteristic I find in all senior mentors is intelligence; if they know what the
wargame is trying to achieve, they usually fall in line with Control direction.
· Visitors. Visits are inevitable and need to be managed deftly. They will impact your
wargame programme, and you should assume that game play time will be lost to
preparation as well as the actual visit. It is likely that visitors will include the Game
Director’s and Game Controller’s immediate superiors, so you could lose one or both to the
visit, or at least have them distracted. Some suggestions concerning managing visits are:
1) Do not bring visitors to see a rehearsed sequence of wargame play. They will
register the lack of free play and find the experience lacklustre. While some sponsors
might consider it a risk to bring visitors into a ‘live’ situation, the benefits far outweigh
the risks (which can be mitigated by a good briefing to the visitors as to what to
expect). You might play a wargame turn up to a certain point, then pause until the
visitors arrive to pick up play at a key juncture – but do not rehearse what will then
happen.
2) Do not assume you will get useful game play during a visit. Be prepared to discard
game play that takes place during a visit. Players act differently under the scrutiny of
senior officers: some will say nothing, others will dominate or push an agenda.
Assume that you will reset the game to the point before the visitors arrived. This is a
worst-case scenario, and some useful insights will probably arise. However, if you
retain these, they should be analysed judiciously to ensure they are free from ‘senior
visitor bias’.
3) Get visitors actively involved. This is a stretch target, and many sponsors and
Game Directors will not countenance it. However, if you can bring the visitors
sufficiently into the scenario and then give them a decision to make – or ask for their
input to a decision – they will experience something of the wargame’s active learning.
Some will resist making a decision, demanding more information or whatever, but the
better ones will (literally) play along. If you want the visitors to take away a sense of
the power of wargames, get them involved.
4) Build more time into the programme than you think to prepare for and conduct the
visit. Although time is always tight during wargames, it is better to plan turns and
activity on the assumption of constrained time (due to the visit) than find yourself
scrabbling to make up game play because a visit took longer than anticipated. What’s
to lose? If the visit takes less time than anticipated, you gain that ‘additional’ time for
 more gaming, analysis or just reflection. If you are trying to make up for lost visit time
you will curtail these crucial activities.
5) Time visits for the beginning or end of the day, when briefings of outcomes or
decisions are already scheduled. That way, visitors can play an active role as the
recipient of the brief (for example, as a senior decision-maker), while also being read
into game play in a way that doesn’t interrupt game flow.
· Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The expertise provided by SMEs is invaluable. However,
like senior mentors, they can be a double-edged weapon. Experts must be given a voice;
that is why they are at the wargame. Some will be of junior rank and some will be ‘deep
experts’; both categories might need encouragement to share their knowledge. However,
many experts’ favourite subject is the one they are expert in! An expert can skew a
wargame so that their area of expertise dominates discussion. The facilitator and Game
Controller must control and balance these factors.
· Critical Thinkers/Red Teamers. The role of Critical Thinkers is to challenge assumptions;
they keep the wargame and its players ‘honest’. It is the worst job in the world! I have seen
Critical Thinkers dismissed because they (more accurately, their views) were considered
objectionable. Again, it is the job of the facilitator and Game Controller (possibly escalating
to the Game Director and even sponsor) to ensure that the challenges and questions
proffered by Critical Thinkers are considered.
· (Pure) observers. Differentiated from O/M, pure observers have no direct role in the
wargame, and attend for their own – or their job’s – benefit, because insights arising from a
wargame are often best understood when witnessed first-hand. However, there can be
issues. Because good wargames are compelling, observers can find it hard to resist
contributing. This is fine if it adds value, but increasing the number of people with a
speaking role increases the length of discussion. Observers can overcrowd a wargame.
This can be mitigated by corralling observers (for example by providing seating and a
remote view using cameras and/or a host to explain and answer questions); controlling
observed sessions; including breaks when observers can talk to players; and judicious
management by the facilitator and Game Controller.
Cells
A cell can consist of one person through to numerous fully staffed command posts, each with
one or more subordinate ‘response cells’.
Cell terminology
The colour ‘coding’ of [cells] varies between nations and organisations, sometimes causing confusion. The colours
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suggested below accord with the Red Teaming Guide:
Blue – friendly or allied forces.
Red – the opposing force(s).
Orange – armed non-state actors.
Black – organised and transnational organised criminals.
Green – indigenous security forces.
Brown – neutral actors or civilian population.
White – national and supranational political organisations and diplomats, humanitarians, international
organisations and non-governmental organisations.

I explained the potential confusion concerning the use of ‘White Cell’ as a Control label in
Chapter 3 (Wargaming Misnomers and Misunderstandings). The NATO definition of White Cell
includes ‘local police’, who I classify as ‘Green’ (host nation), and ‘local civilians’, who I call
‘Brown’ (local populations). The key point is that you must define and communicate what your
cell colours mean throughout the entire Wargame Lifecycle.
Cell leads
Control can consist of many cells beyond the ‘colours’ described above: media, senior mentors
etc. Cells often consist of disparate people from diverse organisations. While cell numbers and
composition will differ from wargame to wargame, one suggestion common to all is to nominate
and work through a designated cell lead. That person is responsible for coordinating the cell’s
effort, usually reporting directly to the Game Controller, sometimes via Chief Control. Without a
lead, cells can easily fragment and produce incoherent products. Careful consideration must be
given to the selection of cell leads (criteria can include rank, expertise or personality, or players
might select their lead – there is no right or wrong answer) and the processes by which they
interact with the facilitator and Game Controller.
Cell liaison staff
It is often worth assigning a liaison officer(s) from the wargaming delivery team to cells and
wargame support staff. White Cells, analysts and Sim Press are prime examples: they usually
consist of non-military folk, and assigning someone to translate ‘mil-speak’ avoids
misunderstanding and improve the effectiveness of such cells’ products.

Information flows
The range of possible information and communications media precludes an explanation of every
possibility. However, two key areas that are often poorly executed are Requests for
Information (RFIs) and Information Management (IM).
Requests for Information
RFIs are requests, generally from players, to someone, or a cell, within Control for information.
That statement has hidden complexities, and I have seen wargames falter due to poor RFI
systems and management. Four observations:
· If you think there will be more than occasional RFIs, consider using a dedicated RFI
Manager, or even organisation. The RFI Manager tracks RFIs and can ‘name and shame’
the owners of RFIs that remain unanswered if you think that appropriate.
· A standard e-mail system is unlikely to suffice if there will be more than infrequent RFIs.
A bespoke tool is likely required that will allow RFIs to be: tracked; replied to, forwarded
and shared; accessed and answered collectively; and sorted into different cells or
headquarters with appropriate access permissions.
· Differentiate the RFI system from the – simulated or real – command and control
system(s). Orders etc should not be passed using the RFI system.
· Test the RFI system rigorously during playtesting.
Information Management
IM differs from RFI management and specific data capture in that it encompasses all sources,
types and repositories of information. All but the smallest military headquarters have an IM
Manager. Unless your wargame is very small, you should consider having one, probably with a
specific IM sub-process. If I haven’t been able to do so during development, one of the first
things I do when arriving to run a wargame is check the filing system – often to find that there
isn’t one, or not one configured for the wargame. Remind (enforce) players and Control about IM
as soon as possible after they arrive.
IM is integral to the Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP) process. Specific IM
processes will flow from this consideration, for example physical and colour-coded player
message slips with ‘To’ ‘From’ and ‘Time’ fields might be required to capture player intentions
and decisions.

Player interfaces
Figure 22-1 shows a single box labelled ‘Control/Player Interfaces.’ This box hides significant
complexity: interfaces can range from incredibly simple to exceedingly complex, in terms of
both tools and processes.
Shared situational awareness, Common Operations Pictures and Recognised Pictures
There is a fundamental requirement to share evolving situational updates. These need not
necessarily be distributed, but usually are in larger professional wargames. That distinction – to
distribute or not – is crucial. Many small wargame variants are played around a single table or
board, upon which all information is displayed. In these cases, the map, or board, and
associated components deliver shared situational awareness (SSA).
There are many factors that might preclude a single table approach: geographically distributed
participants; the number of players; the necessity for a closed game using several tables; and
the need to show an ‘intelligence’ picture. In these circumstances a method must be found to
distribute the situation and/or filter information. Terms such as a Common Operations
Picture (COP) and Recognised Picture (RP – Air, Maritime, or Land) are used. Numerous options
exist to record and distribute SSA. Per my usual caution against technology- and innovation-
bias, you should ensure that appropriate tools are selected. I have listed some of the available
options below, generally progressing from simple to complicated. Note that even a ‘simple’ SSA
solution still requires effort to populate and manage. There is often a ‘credibility factor’ that
precludes low-tech solutions. That is a matter of a frank discussion with the sponsor to
determine how much resource they are prepared to devote to ensuring the wargame is
presentationally acceptable.
Methods of sharing situational awareness
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Single table. The simplest solution is to use a single birdtable and a manual, time-stepped,
simulation. The number of players is realistically limited to those who can see the information
on the table. Furthermore, such games must be open or semi-open because it is too clunky to
run all sides in a closed wargame on one table; this is better done using multiple tables. The
situations arising on a single table, and the associated conversations, can be recorded
relatively easily, but any requirement to distribute SSA (for example to player cells for separate
study) requires some sort of electronic solution.
Multiple tables. Control (possibly a single umpire) manages a central table which is a 100%
accurate ‘Truth view.’ Reports are delivered from there to players’ tables, which are screened
off or in separate rooms. Players maintain their own tables, using reports received and their
own assessment. Players’ orders are passed back to Control, which adjudicates outcomes.
Control reports and player orders can be generated and passed manually, but could be
automated. Recording situations requires an electronic solution.
Stills photography. Stills photography can capture situations as they arise and/or at the end of
turns. Some sort of ‘clapper board’ (think of shooting film scenes) placed on the table is
required to ensure each photograph is date-time stamped. An example is in Figure 23-2.
Motion-picture photography. Video cameras can be used to project the situation onto a screen
in real time. These also enable stills photography. See Figure 22-2.
 Figure 22-2. Motion-picture cameras project the birdtable situation
Scribes. Scribes need to be trained, unbiased, and have access to players during and after
game play. Multiple scribes might be required to capture all necessary conversations. For
example, separate scribes will likely be needed on every table in a multi-table wargame to record
player conversations and adjudication.
Voice recorders. Presumed to assist note taking, the quantity of material recorded can be
overwhelming and so remain unused. And that is assuming that the equipment is sensitive
enough to capture everything said. Passing a microphone to each speaker is awkward. While a
scribe or analyst might use voice data capture to confirm an occasional key statement, I would
caution against relying solely on this for recording purposes.
PowerPoint. It is simple to produce slides that capture the situation on a birdtable(s). Graphics,
such as schematics, are easily overlaid. However: this might be deemed presentationally
unworthy; and it can take considerable time to populate and annotate slides, often requiring one
or more person full-time.
Player orders and ‘Intent’ slides. One technique used by Dstl to record and distribute player
decisions and plans is the ‘Intent’ slide. An example is shown below in Figure 22-3. A second
slide generally contains a schematic, or map to illustrate the plan or scheme of manoeuvre.
Intent slides are populated prior to each wargame turn, or phase, then refined as required to
reflect amendments and capture insights arising. The US Naval War College’s War Gamers’
Handbook suggests a similar concept of ‘Move Sheets’ to capture decisions and their rationale.

Figure 22-3. ‘Intent’ slide format

Automation
Online gaming engines. There are several free online tools that enable, for example, live internet
or play-by-mail (PBM) gaming. These can, with some effort, be adapted to support professional
wargames, both by distributing and recording situations. However, be careful of:
· Classification. If your wargame is anything other than unclassified, online gaming
engines might be precluded due to their use of remote servers.
· Functionality. Many of the free tools aimed at the hobby market will not do what you
need them to, for example filtering to produce anything other than a ‘Truth view’.
· Effort. Someone must be given the task – and time – to keep the tool up to date.
‘Dumb’ situational awareness products. By ‘dumb’ I mean computer tools that stop short of
computerised simulation. These can show, for example: intelligence views; non-military events;
filtered ‘cell’ colours (e.g. a Blue picture only); and unit statuses. They are not simulations, but
[379] [380]
some can be sTimualted by a simulation. One example is iNet , shown in Figure 22-4).
The icons can be sTimulated by another simulation, or manually dragged and dropped,
populated and interrogated – but there is no simulation functionality. Such tools are, therefore,
considerably cheaper than a full computerised simulation, but still ‘look good’ for reasons of
presentation and credibility. They automatically record snapshots or live action, along with all
details (icons can still be interrogated, even in ‘play-back’ mode). This can be used to replay
events, for example during an AAR or subsequent analysis.
Computerised simulations. A bespoke computerised simulation will almost certainly be capable
of filtering and distributing a COP and RP. But you should still check this, as some: are limited
in this respect; are not easy to manually edit; or struggle with different scales of mapping etc.
Real Command Information Systems
If Command Information Systems (CIS) are being used, their set-up, configuration and operation
will almost certainly fall outside your remit. However, you should ensure that they are tested
prior to execution, and CIS inadequacies during execution are attributed to that, not to other
elements of the wargame

[381]
Figure 22-4. NSC’s iNet.
Control processes
Much of the discussion in this and the last chapter pertains to methods, models and
tools (MMT). Irrespective which of these you select to support your game, a robust and
effective execution process is essential for delivering a successful wargame. It is impossible to
cover all the Control processes that could arise across the gamut of game formats and variants,
but I cover situations that commonly arise. Extrapolate from these to ensure they are
appropriate for your wargame.
Control/Excon ‘battle rhythm’
It is hard to conceive of a professional wargame without some sort of higher-level controlling
function. Potentially, a small group of officers sat in a mess or wardroom playing a hobby game
of their own volition might not need one. But even that simplest of examples would benefit from
some sort of AAR to consolidate learning. In which case, time needs to be allocated to the end
of the wargame and, ideally, someone might be given the role of recorder. Why not call that
person ‘Chief AAR’, and ask them to also facilitate the AAR? That person is now part of a
Control team. They will need time allocated in the process, or ‘battle rhythm’ to ensure events,
communication and insights are captured. Examples of battle rhythms from various events,
both analytical and training, are at Figures 22-5, 22-6 and 22-7.
Figure 22-5 shows a relatively straightforward daily timetable. As well as the wargame turns, the
key serials are: prioritisation of observations, insights and lessons identified arising;
presentation of new capabilities, and consideration of how these might have influenced the
previous wargame turn; an analyst consolidation period; and the key Excon Coordination
Meeting that determines the next day’s programme. This is a relatively simple example, although
there are complexities in each serial.

Figure 22-5. Analytical event daily programme

Figure 22-6 shows the agenda from an Excon adjudication meeting in an educational staff
college exercise. The purpose is to confirm the computerised COP and associated Reports and
Returns (R2) to be released the following morning.
Figure 22-7 shows the daily Excon process for a divisional-level HQ Command Post
Exercise (CPX). Many elements have been discussed previously, but note the centrality of the
‘RCAT Execution of X Day events & Excon Coord 1600 – 1700’ meeting; this is the key ‘Next-Day
Wargame’, discussed below.
Figure 22-6. An adjudication meeting agenda
The ‘Next-Day Wargame’
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The Next-Day Wargame is a critical component of Control battle rhythm. The process is
simple but effective, and can be applied to educational, training and analytical wargames.
· All Control cells bring their plans for the next day (or whatever period is being examined)
to the table. In the case of Lower Control cells, plans will likely be predicated on orders and
warning orders received from the players.
· These plans are wargamed. Specifics will vary from event to event, but you can see what
the wargame might look like on the front cover of this book.

Figure 22-7. Divisional-level CPX Excon battle rhythm

· The outputs include: an understanding across Control of the detailed injects for the next
day; parameters for computer operators to work within; media products required from Sim
Press; and – crucially – confirmation by the Game Controller that the overall event is on
course to achieve the objectives.
· Control then gets on with the coordination of these outputs, having received direction
and guidance from the Game Controller during the Next-Day Wargame.
Turns
We are about to probe the guts of the simulation, as distinct from the wargame. For that
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reason, you should read pp.83-84 and pp.104-106 of Simulating War, where Professor Phil
Sabin discusses various types of turn (or ‘Move Steps’ as the US Naval War College War
Gamers’ Handbook calls them) and the factors that determine their lengths. There are
numerous variations of turn, including: simultaneous, based on pre-written orders; ‘Igo-Ugo’;
symmetrical alternating or integrated; impulses; initiative-driven and so on. I will not stray too
far into simulation design, but there are some necessary overlaps. You need to consider ‘turns’,
even when using a real-time simulation, as you will see.
Parallels with the Course of Action Wargaming turn
I start any discussion of turns by reminding military staff of the Course of Action (COA)
Wargame turn sequence (see Chapter 26). All are familiar with the COA Wargaming schema, so
the similarity between its ‘Action – Reaction’ mechanism and the basic turn structure of most
manual simulations is a good start point. I also highlight the ‘Consequence Management’ (CM)
step, which considers the implications of the turn’s events on populations and actors (and is
discussed shortly).
Managing real-time simulation ‘turns’
Although most ‘real-time’ computer simulations still calculate outcomes in small time-steps of,
say, 30 seconds, it is sensible to think of them as real-time. Likewise role-play, as discussed in
chapter 5. One disadvantage of real-time simulations is the difficulty of moderating outcomes
once they have occurred: results are instantly known to one or both sides’ players. Should the
outcome not be one desired by the Game Controller, it is difficult to change it without popping
the players’ ‘magic bubble’. This doesn’t just apply to combat: intelligence detections, collateral
damage, population movements and so forth can all have a significant impact on the
progression of a wargame. Methods of mitigating undesirable real-time results include:
· Ensuring the simulation has a built-in delay before information release. This might sound
simple from a computer coding point of view, but it is difficult to manage in a wargame:
Control has to work in two ‘time zones’, subjecting it to continual mental gymnastics. I
have not seen this work well; at best it adds friction and stress to Control, and at worst it
results in chaos and incoherence.
· Rehearsing key incidents and vignettes by running these through the simulation to
gauge likely outcomes. This also raises issues. If done during execution, a stand-alone
simulation will need to be dedicated to this function, with supporting personnel. If done
prior to execution, it is difficult to anticipate players’ decisions, so variables will change by
the time the incident actually occurs. Even if Control estimation is accurate, an outcome
from a computer simulation is just ‘one roll of the electronic dice’ and the same outcome
can’t be guaranteed when the simulation is run for real; even more so for role-play.
· Manual premeditation of anticipated outcomes. A good way to premeditate real-time
simulation outcomes is to run the situation using a transparent manual simulation, with the
agreed spread of outcomes then presented to computer operators (or role-players) as
parameters within which to work. The Next-Day Wargame is one example. A manual
simulation is necessary to do this, hence why you need to consider manual simulation
turns, even if your wargame will be supported by a real-time computer simulation.
Stepped-time simulation turns
Some computer simulations are time-stepped, for example, NSC’s Joint Operational Command
and Staff Training System (JOCASTS). This has supported numerous educational wargames,
most notably at various staff colleges. Note that the students at these are being educated, not
trained. They would not cope with real-time simultaneous planning and execution, and so
receive a COP at time-stepped intervals, supplemented by R2 as appropriate. The COP release
times are determined by Control and can be every 6, 12 or 24 hours. Each COP issued is static:
it does not change until the next release. This allows students to plan in a controllable and
relatively low-tempo environment, and mitigates the almost inevitable and paralysing ‘Nintendo
effect’ of reacting to activity on a real-time display. In the same way that many people assume
that ‘electrons are best’, time-stepped computer simulations also suffer from the erroneous
presumption that they cannot be as good as real-time simulations. When using time-stepped
computer simulations, the period modelled between COP releases must be determined – which
takes us to turn lengths.
Deriving turn lengths
Phil Sabin’s suggestions regarding how to design turns centre around the challenge of fixed-
length turns within a rigid simulation system. This factor largely disappears in a professional
wargame, where the Game Controller or facilitator determine each turn’s length. This is not
easy. It is another example of art over science, with the final decision regarding all-matters-turn
usually coming down to the instinct of the wargame practitioner.
The length of a turn can be flexible, so how do you determine each one? There are three cases
to consider:
 · Deriving turn lengths while developing the overall wargame programme. It is tempting to
adopt a simple mathematical approach: the campaign is x weeks, we have y days for the
wargame and expect to conduct z turns per day; do the maths. But deeper deliberation at
this stage will reap benefits during execution. Campaigns usually feature pulses of intense
action, when turns should cover shorter periods, interspersed with phases of little activity.
Determining these periods of relative activity takes thought, but you are in the
development phase and have time to do this. You can also wargame the anticipated turns
during development to refine their lengths. Bear the following in mind:
1) Allow longer than you think to conduct initial turns, when people are becoming
familiar with the processes.
2) Build in flexibility, for example allowing time for repeat turns.
3) Allow time for effective player planning. Rushed plans, particularly in analytical
wargames, will skew the outcomes and frustrate the players.
4) Allow time to give players (and Control) breaks; wargaming is hard work.
5) Allow programme ‘white space’ for reflection.
· Deriving turn lengths in-game. Despite your best efforts, it is likely that adjustments will
be required in-game. This is where art, intuition and the skill of the wargame practitioner
really kick in. Consider the following, ideally during breaks, but possibly ‘hot’ during a turn.
1) Assess upcoming critical activity, including periods of intense and light activity.
Relate the critical activity to the event’s aim and objectives to gauge how much effort to
devote to wargaming it.
2) Assess the amount, and complexity, of forthcoming player actions, and how much
real time it is likely to take to plan and game these (including adjudication).
3) Confirm with the simulation experts the ideal time-step for their models, and what
latitude there is to flex this.
4) From all this, determine what it will be practicable to cover in the next turn, how
much in-game time that will cover, and any activities that might have to be postponed to
subsequent turns.
5) Check that your proposal will satisfy the game’s objectives. If not, something will
have to give.
6) Take your suggestion to the Game Controller for affirmation.
· Retrospective determination of turn length. It is perfectly feasible to alter a turn’s length
once it has finished. If you arrive at the end of a turn and it is apparent that none of the
players are likely to conduct much in-game activity soon, ask them if extending the length
of the just-ending turn will affect their plans. If they answer ‘no’, consider extending the
turn to cover the forthcoming period of inactivity. But only do this by consensual
agreement.
Dealing with discrete in-turn vignettes
As players table their plans, it sometimes becomes clear that a significant discrete action (a
vignette) will arise that needs to be resolved within the time frame of the overall turn. If you are
mindful of this prospect, it is possible to deal with the vignette as a separate sub-turn, resolving
it and then returning to the overall turn. Spotting such occurrences relies on thinking ahead,
and quickly deciding the best point within the turn to drill into the vignette. You will need to
conduct enough of the overall turn to provide the correct context, but not to have progressed
so far that the result of the vignette is resolved out of sequence. Such occurrences are best
avoided if possible, but are sometimes unavoidable: the deployment of a reserve or an
unexpected action taken by a player, for example.
Example turn process
There are many examples of turn processes. Figure 22-8 shows one. Note the blank ‘Turn
order’ space, top right, which varies, and so has a blank space to write cell colours as required.

Figure 22-8. RCAT analytical wargame turn sequence

Consequence Management
Incorporating CM into the COA Wargaming process was a lesson learned from operations in
Afghanistan. CM involves consideration of the consequences of in-game player actions on other
actors, factions and capabilities. These can range from local population groups through to the
UN, but CM can also include infrastructure, logistics, economies and capabilities such as
communications, command and control, and cohesion. Deliberations can range from a simple
discussion and verbal feedback to the players through to a discrete sub-process. Note,
however, that any attempt to simulate what are usually soft – human – factors will not produce
an accurate outcome – or even one that multiple experts concur on. Hence it is critical to
include the Game Controller in the CM process, ideally actively involved but, as a minimum, in a
‘rubber-stamping’ affirmation role. CM should be considered a matter of course during all
wargames, and every wargame turn, irrespective of the turn mechanism used.
Time jump planning and execution
Time jump pitfalls and frictions
Treat time jumps with caution. Many people naively consider time jumps an easy and convenient
way to skip between phases of an operation. This is a fallacy. Time jumps are complex: they
take considerable effort to plan and execute, and time for players to assimilate. There is also a
significant risk that players will respond to a post-time jump brief by saying, “But we wouldn’t
have done that!” – at which point you have lost them. However, there are occasions when a time
jump is necessary, for example: a campaign with an extensive logistics in-load phase; or an
analytical game that must cover multiple campaign phases.
When planning a time jump, the first point to decide is not ‘Where shall we jump to?’ with a
subsequent argument about how to get there and the implications; that is the wrong way
around (but often the approach adopted). Rather, the discussion must start with, and focus on,
'What are we trying to achieve?' Begin with the end in mind, and work backwards from there.
A further hinderance to clear thinking is the compulsion to extrapolate from the current
scenario situation: ‘This is happening, so that will happen, and then that…’ etc. If participants –
and I include Control staff – are story-living, there is a natural inclination to project that story
into the future and hope that it delivers the required post-time jump position. This tendency is
understandable but must be resisted.
Finally, time jump planning tends to rely on players’ plans. These are frequently incomplete
when time jump planning occurs, so Control must plan on assumptions. This adds to the risk of
delivering a post-time jump situation that the players reject.
A robust time jump planning process
In a training wargame, post-time jump situations must: enable the associated objectives;
maintain scenario coherence; and present a picture the players recognise. In an analytical game
the post-time jump situation must: enable the required data to be derived; and ensure
consistency of variables and analysis. To achieve either, you need a logical and robust time
jump planning process. The one in Table 22-1 is from a training wargame, but can easily be
adapted to an analytical event.
1. Review the Re-confirm understanding of the aim and
event aim and objectives to ensure that the post-time jump
objectives situation will achieve these.
2. Confirm Brief the players’ plans to ensure that all
the player elements of Control understand it.
HQ’s plan
3. Confirm Subordinate HQs could be players or part
subordinate of Control. Whichever, ensure you know
player HQs’ what their role is in the higher plan.
understanding
of their role
4. Confirm An example of a key timeline is the arrival
any critical of forces into theatre. Ensure you know
timelines the forces available, their desired order of
arrival and planned 'laydown.’ Another
example is developing trends on a non-
military line of activity, some of which
might take weeks to show results.
This will encompass any adversary
factions, but will likely also include other
actors such as neutrals, IOs and NGOs,
nations’ political reactions etc.
5. Confirm
the plans of
other actors
in the
scenario
6. Determine Ensure that the evolving post-time jump
the situation situation will set the conditions for the
required to players to make the decisions required of
achieve the them.
reaffirmed
objectives
7. Determine This should fall naturally out of the
the time preceding steps. It is the point at which the
jump date managed projection of the existing
and time situation into the future is intersected by
the players’ plans and the actions of other
actors to deliver the situation required to
support the wargame objectives.
8. Determine These can range from a simple brief
the required through to a complete operations order. Do
products, and not underestimate the workload; this must
how they will be assessed in advance and time and
be delivered people allocated to the task.
Table 22-1. Time jump planning process
Executing the time jump
A time jump is usually delivered by way of a situation update briefing, supplemented by R2.
Considerations, which apply to training or analytical wargames, are:
· Sufficient products and R2 must accompany the brief to fully situate the players.
· The new situation must be coherent, and players’ plans recognisable to them. You can
include reverses and set-backs, but these need to be credible and explained.
· Major decisions that the players could have made during the time jump period should be
avoided if possible.
· Sufficient time must be allocated to allow players to assimilate the new situation before
expecting them to make decisions or continue planning. Do not underestimate the time this
takes.
Chapter 23. Facilitation
‘Read the room.’
The answer from all four panellists at the
Connections UK 2018 Facilitation Clinic to the question
‘What is your number 1 tip for a facilitator?’
[384]
Introduction
Facilitation is one of Professor Rex Brynen’s ‘Three Pillars’ of successful professional
[385]
wargames . Rex points out that a good facilitator might be able to salvage something useful
from a poorly designed game (at the least by examining what made it a bad game, and how it
might be improved), but a bad facilitator will render even a well-designed game useless. I use
‘you’ and ‘facilitator’ (/’facilitation’) interchangeably. There is an aide-memoire for facilitators as
an appendix to this chapter.
What is facilitation?
The role of the facilitator
The dictionary definition of ‘facilitate’ is ‘to make easy’ or ‘ease a process.’ A facilitator guides a
group through a process to ensure that objectives are met effectively, with clear thinking, full
participation and buy-in from all involved.
The facilitator must always be objective and neutral. Let the players make the decisions that
drive the narrative, and elicit others’ opinions and ideas, rather than give your own.
The facilitator is a ‘guide on the side’, not a ‘sage on the stage.’
You should use the lightest touch possible when managing the process. That said, there are
instances when, working closely with the Game Controller, you might need to subtly influence
an event to achieve the objectives.
Relationship with the Game Controller
You are always in support of the Game Controller. The Game Controller is the principal role,
even though the facilitator is usually ‘front of house’. Consult regularly with the Game
Controller, confirming that they are content with progress, the level of detail and key decisions
made by the players. It is the Game Controller’s responsibility to steer the game to achieve the
objectives, so overt influence is best exerted by them. However, you must remain equally
cognisant of the objectives and watch out for potential deviation from these.
Facilitation is more than following a process
Robust processes are crucial, but facilitation entails far more than reading out a series of
procedural headings. On the art versus science spectrum, facilitation is way over in the art area.
A process is a guide-rail, which a facilitator might deviate from but will return to.
Planning
The facilitator should be intimately involved throughout the wargame design and
development phases. You will be the person delivering what is being planned, so should help
making decisions; you will enact these in the face of participants, and issues overlooked during
design and development will probably default to the facilitator to rectify during execution.
Planning considerations you should pay particular attention to are below.
Planning turns
The following bullets augment the discussion in the previous chapter.
· Are all relevant game objectives addressed within the overall proposed turns?
· Are any turns over-crowded? Should any be broken down into separate vignettes, or
need separate turns?
· Are there too many turns in a single day of play?
· Is the turn sequence coherent? Generally, a chronological approach is easiest for people
to follow but temporal distortion is sometimes necessary, with events necessarily being
considered out of sequence. Are time jumps required?
· Try to include a ‘test turn’, mini-game or ‘Turn 0’ to ensure players are familiar with the
game mechanics.
The wargame team
Have all roles on the delivery team been identified and filled by suitably qualified and
experienced people? Key roles and functions are discussed in Chapters 7 and 22, but any
number of Subject Matter Experts (SME)s, analysts etc might be required to ensure event
outcomes are achieved.
Introductory briefs
These should include a section for you to cover the game process and mechanics.
Players
Consider two aspects:
· Numbers and ergonomics. Are there enough players to generate the required planning
and execution functions? Are there too many? Who needs a – literal – seat at the table, and
how will other supporting staff be involved?
· Player cells, personalities and psychology. Do the cells cover all actors and factions?
Have the effects of dominant personalities, potential agendas and cognitive biases been
mitigated?
Playing with what’s on the map
Players will only consider what they see in front of them. If there is no representation of human
terrain they will not think about it. What goes onto the – physical or electronic – map is a key
consideration.
Recording
Scribing must be planned, tested and rehearsed. Consider:
· The number of scribes required. Multiple player locations might need numerous scribes,
and/or other methods of recording.
· Will the scribes have time to capture the required data?
· Has the primary (and I mean the best) position on the birdtable(s) been allocated to the
scribes, who need to be able to see and hear everything?
· Can you easily see the scribes and vice versa, so you can communicate?
· What IT is required, and who will operate it?
Dealing with detractors
Manual simulations and gaming systems may attract negative comments. Try to pre-empt and
[386]
mitigate these. Prepare responses to comments such as, “It’s just Dungeons & Dragons ”, or
“Where are the computers?” Such unwarranted comments must be immediately countered, so
plan how they will be answered, and by whom. Keep the resulting ‘Detractor Brief’ to hand. An
example is at Figure 23-1.

Figure 23-1: Example of a ‘Detractor Brief’

Playtesting
The series of playtests, culminating in the Test Exercise (Testex), is vital. The facilitator must be
involved throughout.
Final preparation
Go through the following final preparations at the Testex to ensure everything is ready for
execution. However, it is likely that you will not be able to fully explore all of these until
everything and everyone is gathered in one place for the actual event.
Shared situational awareness (SSA)
Confirm the following:
· Are maps and electronic displays large and clear enough so that sufficient detail can be
seen by all participants?
· Likewise, counters, cards and visual aids. Is the data or information contained on these
large enough? Are look-up tables required if the data cannot be clearly expressed on
counters or cards? Do visual aids need to be projected?
· Are the ergonomics of the central birdtable(s) correct? Is a tiered system (e.g. bench –
chair – stand) required? Can key players physically reach to everywhere they need to?
· Are place-names and labels in place at the birdtable?
· Is any electronic system for remotely sharing information in place and tested?
Equipment
The facilitator will need:
· An aide-memoire, which should contain the following in plastic sheets that can be written
on:
o Rules extracts as required.
 o The overall process.
o Turn guide.
o Look-up tables.
o Key references.
o Orders of battle.
o (In an analytical game) the research question and key extracts from the Data
Collection and Management Plan (DCMP).
o (In a training game) the learning objectives.
· Pointers, both manual and laser.
· A plasticised ‘turn board’ (‘clapper board’) showing the current turn, timeframe, weather
etc. See Figure 23-2.
· Informational counters, cards etc.
· Spare counters, including blanks.
· Random number generator, as appropriate: e.g. dice, mobile phone application, laptop
etc.
· Notebook and pens, including non-permanent markers.
· Flip-charts and white boards (although you should not necessarily be the person writing
on these).
· Coffee – in a closed cup!

Figure 23-2: An example date/time ‘clapper board’ and labelled player positions
Final tidy up and equipment check
Just prior to starting, tidy up the play space and check that all equipment is available and to
hand. Once stood at the table with play started, you are fixed in position until the next break.
Final mental rehearsal
Mentally visualise and rehearse what is about to happen just before you start. Do this alone if
necessary, but a sotto voce run-through with a trusted member of the delivery team is ideal. This
is simply a ‘walk-through-talk-through’ of the first turn’s process in order to have this fresh in
your mind.

Managing the process

It is critical that you have the overall process, and the detailed turn structure, clear in your own
mind and to hand in an aide-memoire. But the process alone will not suffice. Beyond it, you must
constantly: keep the aim and objective at the forefront of your mind; think ahead; and read the
room. The following suggestions may help.
Use an aide-memoire diligently
Even the best facilitator will momentarily lose track of exactly where they are within the process
or game turn. Keep a fully tested aide-memoire open in front of you and use this religiously. It
takes a second to glance down, and this will save you stumbles and missed steps.
Make a list of peoples’ names
With everyone assembled, go around the table and list their names. Keep this list to hand to
remind you who’s who. Beyond that, in your reading of the room, try to anticipate when others
might forget the names of people they are about to address. Subtly assisting people in this way
helps smooth the process.
Confirm the timeframe at the start of each turn
Show people the plasticised ‘clapper board’ to confirm the time period of the forthcoming turn.
Do not assume that players have been paying attention, so keep the board clearly visible on the
table at all times, and refer to it often. It can contain additional information such as weather.
Think one serial ahead
Although difficult, as the turn progresses you should try to think one serial ahead of the current
agenda item. A quick glance at your aide-memoire will confirm who is required to speak next,
and a surreptitious glance at that person will confirm that they are following the action and
ready to speak. Then, at the required point, introduce this next speaker to keep the flow of
events moving naturally. If necessary, alert non-attentive speakers overtly, saying “I’ll turn to
you in a second for x, but just before that…”.
Think one turn ahead
Even harder, make time to consider what might happen in the next turn. This requires multi-
tasking as you do it during the ongoing turn, while listening to what is being said and thinking
one serial ahead. Examples of the kind of issue you might premeditate are endless. I cover
managing the turn in the next paragraph, but others might include warning an SME to consider a
prospective situation arising from game play; different components or maps to be made ready;
or warning the Game Controller that a key decision is about to arise.
Manage the turn flexibly
If thinking ahead elicits forthcoming issues, do not hesitate to apply the turn process flexibly. Do
this in conjunction with the Game Controller. Highlight any changes to players so they know
what to expect, and explain your rationale. Examples of issues arising that you might need to
flex the process for include:
· Splitting a turn into vignettes, or sub-turns. I discussed this in the last chapter.
· Changing the player turn order. Do not be afraid to do this – but explain the rationale to
everyone.
Managing debate
Managing debate is a primary task. During debate, you should consider all of the following all of
the time – and apply them with as gentle a touch as possible.
Manage time ruthlessly
Time is precious, so use it judiciously and protect it jealously. You face a delicate and continual
balancing act between encouraging players to contribute and avoiding time wasting. The
following points play into this.
Avoid irrelevant discussion
Minimise discussions that do not support the wargame objectives. Personal agendas and SMEs
dwelling in their areas of expertise can add friction. The best mitigation is to gently declare the
point a good one – but time precludes, etc. Without suggesting that you avoid responsibility,
refer to the Game Controller if necessary, because they are the final arbiter of the relevance of
any discussion.
Relegate relevant but non-urgent topics to sidebars
Some discussions are worthy but best examined in a subsequent ‘sidebar’ discussion. Delegate
such points to a small working group, with a designated time to back-brief. Another technique is
[387]
to create a ‘parking lot’ for good ideas.
Empower all participants
Encourage contributions from all players. Rank can impede this, so you might need to support
juniors in the face of contrary arguments from senior officers. Make all participants feel that
their contributions matter, with recognition and reinforcement of noteworthy points.
Avoid simultaneous discussion
Multiple simultaneous discussions result in points, or entire topics, not being captured by
scribes. It also undermines the confidence of the speaker. The rule is simple and absolute: one
person speaks at a time.
Avoid private discussions
Everybody should be party to all discussions. Discourage quiet conversations between small
groups. If a discussion only concerns a few people, it should take place elsewhere and not use
precious plenary time; if it concerns everyone, then everyone should hear it.
Speak up!
Similarly, even when addressing someone near them, ensure that everybody speaks to the
scribe or to back of the room, whichever is further away. Everyone should hear everything said.
Ensure cross-communication
Not everyone will pay attention all the time. Consciously consider who needs to register the
points being made. A casual glance usually suffices to ensure information is being assimilated,
but it is sometimes worth asking, “Did you get that?” when an important point arises, maybe
just with a thumbs-up and enquiring glance.
Assist the scribes
Scribing is relentless and arduous. Assist scribes, and step in as required:
· Periodically check that the discussion is at a speed that allows its capture.
· Check that the scribes capture important points. This does not need a complete read-
back of the point, just a question, glance or thumbs-up to and from the scribes.
· Give the scribes a metaphorical (or physical) ‘red card’, to be played at any time they
miss a point, someone is talking too fast etc.
Assist the operational analyst in delivering outcomes
Calculating and presenting event and combat outcomes is similarly arduous. The analyst should
have had time to consider the spread of results in advance, and have checked these with you
and Game Controller – see Chapter 25 (Affirming and Presenting Outcomes). While planning and
forethought should mitigate most surprises, occasions will inevitably arise when game play
throws up a new situation that must be resolved during the turn. At that point, check that the
analyst(s) has the required information and give them time to calculate outcomes. This might
necessitate a short break, possibly with players remaining in-place. Even though these breaks
can feel like a pregnant pause, do not put analysts on the spot with unreasonable demands for
an instant calculation.
Consult constantly with the Game Controller
Even when not strictly necessary, it is good practice to ask the Game Controller if they are
happy with aspects such as the length of debates, relegating topics to sidebars etc. This
ensures the correct depth of debate, and makes it clear that you are acting on behalf of the
Game Controller (and the sponsor) to achieve the objectives as efficiently and effectively as
possible.
Deliver a story-living experience
As far as you can, deliver the event as a narrative that enhances the story-living experience.
This is where the art of facilitation absolutely outweighs any science: you are a
storyshaper and/or storyteller. Ideas that might help are:
· Where possible, deliver outcomes and results as a story; here you are storytelling.
· …but ensure that player decisions drive that story; here you are storyshaping.
· Add colour to the scenario by filling in details around those decisions.
· Keep players inside the ‘magic circle’. Do not refer to the real-world if possible.
· If necessary, initiate each turn with a brief ‘catch-up’ summary of events.
· Include a quick ‘look forward’ at the end of the turn.
· Maintain game tempo as far as peoples’ ability to assimilate events and capture outputs
allows.
· Improvise as necessary. This is not a substitute for an intimate knowledge of procedures
or poor planning, but no rules or process can cover all eventualities.
· Build excitement leading up to the resolution of key events. For example, allow the
players to reveal inverted ‘results’ counters.
· Use humour as appropriate.
· Make game play fun, where appropriate.
· Where appropriate, let players role dice or generate random numbers themselves. There
are significant pros and cons in allowing this; see the next chapter (Generating Outcomes).

Other considerations
Dice, and other random number generators
I discuss dice and other random number generators (RNG)s in the next chapter. The key points
to note here are that dice and RNGs add value; but there is a misplaced and lingering perception
among the inexperienced that dice connote childish games, so be cautious when introducing
them.
Fatigue and breaks
Wargames should be fun, but they are also hard work. Look out for tell-tale signs and body
language that indicate the onset of fatigue. Facilitation itself is relentless and requires
significant mental effort. Plan sessions of manageable duration and, if necessary, take
impromptu breaks. As a rule of thumb, if a turn takes, say, 60 minutes, then two turns in the
morning and two in the afternoon is a comfortable number. Breaks are not dead time, and
enable:
· Refreshment.
· Players to plan, think and reflect.
· Players to record the reasons for their decisions.
· The scribes to check logs, and to confirm details with individuals.
 · The facilitator to think through the forthcoming turns.
· Operational analysts and simulation experts to consider forthcoming event outcomes.
Ensure final recording
By the end of the day, everyone will be tired. You must ensure that the Game Controller and
scribe(s) are content that the necessary wargame outputs have been captured. Do not allow
people to leave until the immediate recording process is complete. The scribes’ logs, photo
records and so forth must be in a fit state at the end of each day, even if they are to be fully
written-up later. The detail will be forgotten unless it is clearly captured immediately.
One team approach
Participants in analytical events usually comprise one team, despite players filling diverse and
adversarial roles. Where appropriate, encourage cross-cell cooperation. For example, an air
SME designated ‘Blue Air’ should assist the Red Cell if the latter does not have an appropriate
SME, or Blue and Red might consider their next actions collaboratively if this is appropriate to
the event objectives.
Neatness
The game space should remain uncluttered, so tidy-up constantly. This ensures efficient game
play and conveys a professional impression. Remain cognisant of the balance between having
enough counters, informational aids etc necessary to convey information, and presenting a
cluttered play space that detracts from SSA. This does not just apply to military units: human
terrain, humanitarian agencies, militia groups, police forces etc can easily overwhelm a map.
Appendix 1 – Wargame facilitator’s aide-memoire
Planning
· The facilitator, Game Controller and sponsors must work together from the outset.
· Turns. Keep the event aim and objectives firmly in mind.
o Are all the objectives captured within the proposed turns?
o Are any over-crowded?
o Do some need breaking down?
o Are there too many turns in any one day?
o Is the turn sequence coherent?
o Is it possible to include a test turn?
· The delivery team. Have all roles on the delivery team been identified and filled?
· Are all briefs ready?
· Players. Are there enough players to represent the required actors and factions? Are
they the right people?
· Recording. Has scribing been fully considered?
· Detractors. Has a brief been prepared?
· Testex. Essential.
Final Preparation
· Shared situational awareness. Players will only play what is on the birdtable.
o Maps.
o Counters.
o Tracks.
o Ergonomics.
o Labels.
o IT for distributing SSA.
· Equipment:
o Aide-memoire, which should contain:
§ The overall process.
§ Turn guide.
§ Look-up tables.
§ Rules extracts as required.
§ Key references (such as the answers to detractor comments).
§ Orders of Battle.
§ (In an analytical game) the research question and key extracts from the DCMP.
§ (In a training game) the learning objectives.
o Pointers (manual and laser).
o A plasticised ‘turn board’ showing the current turn, date, timeframe etc.
o Informational counters, cards etc as required for placement onto the map.
o Spare counters, some blank.
o RNG: dice, mobile phone application, laptop or whatever is appropriate.
o Notebook and pens, including non-permanent markers.
o The RCAT ‘4-box’ plasticised board or similar matrix game-style board.
o Flip-charts and white boards.
o Coffee.
· Final tidy-up and equipment check.
· Final mental rehearsal.
Execution
· Keep the aim and objective at the forefront of your mind.
· Read the room.
· Make a list of everyone’s name.
· Know the overall process and game turn processes, but use an aide-memoire as well.
· Confirm each turn’s timeframe.
· Think one serial ahead.
· Think one turn ahead.
· Manage the turn flexibly. Split the turn or change the player turn order?
· Manage debate:
o Manage time ruthlessly.
o Avoid irrelevant discussion.
o Relegate relevant but non-urgent topics to sidebars.
o Empower all participants.
o Avoid simultaneous discussion.
o Avoid private discussions.
o Ensure everyone speaks up.
o Ensure cross-communication.
· Assist the scribe.
· Assist the analyst.
· Refer to the Game Controller constantly.
· Ensure a story-living experience.
· Use dice and RNG, but carefully.
· Use 'plug-in' outcome generators as required.
· Watch out for fatigue and take breaks as necessary.
· Ensure final recording before people leave.
· One team; help each other.
· Neatness:
o De-clutter the birdtable.
o Tidy up constantly.
Chapter 24. Generating Outcomes
‘All models are wrong, but some are useful. The practical question is how wrong they have to be
[388]
to not be useful?’
George Box, professor of statistics (1987)

Introduction
This chapter is not about designing models and simulations; for that, read Professor Phil
Sabin’s Simulating War. What I do here is suggest how you might use models and simulations
to ensure they best support your wargame.
The next two chapters augment the adjudication discussion in Chapter 4, and explain the
methods, models and tools (MMT) shown in Figure 4-1. Adjudication was defined as ‘the
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process of determining outcomes, usually by an objective human-in-the-loop.’ In this
chapter I focus on generating the outcomes from players’ decisions; in the next on presenting
those outcomes to controllers and players, and affirming these before they are played into the
game. I briefly cover the adjudication MMT in Figure 4-1, but concentrate on warfare models,
which require the fullest explanation.
As George Box alludes to, anyone who claims that their model accurately predicts reality is, at
best, misguided and, at worst, a charlatan. This is especially the case with models that claim to
simulate the human characteristics of warfare. That is why my preferred method of adjudication
is the deliberative approach: the results presented will be wrong, but are useful as a start point
for expert judgement that leads to an outcome that, even if not consensual, will have been
subjected to a forced discussion. Your task is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of
the models and simulations you use; to leverage their strong points and mitigate their
limitations.
Two people are better than one
This point applies to generating, presenting and affirming outcomes, although it is less
important in the last two cases. Irrespective of the simulation used, I find it tremendously useful
to work as a pair, because this:
· Leverages the combination of simulation and military expertise. The most effective
double-acts are those that combine a simulation expert or operational analyst with
someone military. Clearly, you can delete military and insert the relevant organisation:
humanitarian, business, emergency services, aid worker etc.
· Spreads the workload, reducing the scope to make errors.
· Reduces the risk of forgetting factors that play into outcome determination.
· Provides a sanity check as a minimum and, ideally, expert confirmation, to make sure the
outcome is within acceptable parameters.
· Prevents lengthy outcome generation by committee. Two is a good number; more will
unduly prolong the process.
· Improves recall and recording. Adjudicators working in pairs must explain their reasoning
to each other to reach agreement. This forcing function of required discussion improves
recall for data capture.
Manual adjudication methods, models and tools
Human-in-the-loop (HITL) adjudication and moderation
HITL adjudication can entail the human being the loop, with outcomes determined by one person
or a small group. These can be based solely on an individual’s, or group’s, judgement, or take a
suggested outcome from another simulation method and moderate it. The following apply:
· The outcome arrived at must balance achievement of the game’s objectives with the
primacy of player decisions, while remaining credible.
· If more than one person, keep adjudication groups small to minimise what can become
prolonged discussions.
· The Game Controller must be involved, and is the final arbiter. See the next chapter for
more details.
· Adjudication discussions must be captured by scribes.
Role-play
As discussed, role-play can be considered a real-time simulation. Role-play is a perfectly valid
method of determining outcomes in any wargame. However, unless the entire construct of the
game is role-play, I find the technique most effective when used as an adjunct to other, more
easily controlled, forms of adjudication. Research demonstrates that role-play is at least as
effective as experts’ forecasts. Kesten Green’s findings are that, 'Contrary to expectations,
earlier research found game theorists' forecasts were less accurate than forecasts from student
role-players.... Current evidence suggests that decision makers would be wise to prefer
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forecasts from simulated interaction [role-play].'
To get the best from role-play, ensure that people are actually in role and invested in the
decisions and outcomes, not merely acting a role. Tom Schelling said, ‘Everybody was expected
to play the role that had been assigned to him, and if you were assigned the role of Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union, you displayed your talent by speaking the way you thought a
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union would participate… What I wanted was for the participants
to be truly, personally engaged in the decision making, not to play a role, but to be a role and
engage in the discussion [and]… the argument of, “where do we stand and what do we do next
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and how do we read what the adversary is doing” ’. Role-players should make what they
think is the best decision in the circumstances, not the one they think whoever they are role-
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playing would make.
To achieve this, you need to ensure role-players are sufficiently briefed to step into role, with
enough Control guidance – explicit or implicit – and objectives to at least set the role-play off in
the right direction. Once the simulated interaction has started, it is difficult to credibly intervene,
per Chapter 22.
Argument-based adjudication
Argument-based adjudication is most closely associated with, but pre-dates and is certainly not
exclusive to, matrix gaming. Being quick, simple and effective, it is easily adapted to many
situations. Tom Mouat explains a simple application of the technique as follows.
‘Actions are resolved by a structured sequence of logical arguments. Each player takes turns to
make an argument, with successful arguments advancing the game, and the player's position. In
the “pros and cons system”, each argument is broken down into:
· The active players state: something that happens; and a number of reasons why it might
happen (pros).
· The other players then state a number of reasons why it might not happen (if they can
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think of any) (cons).’
These arguments can easily be turned into an outcome determined by a facilitator/adjudicator or
Game Controller (especially if there are no counter-arguments, which is consensual
adjudication) or used to derive a probability (percentage) chance of occurrence, with the result
being chosen or determined stochastically. The 4-box method discussed later in this chapter
and illustrated at Figure 24-5 is an example of this.
The aggregated modelling line
I differentiate combat models between those that generate outcomes above and below an
‘aggregated modelling line’.
· Models that work above the line base outcomes on algorithms that aggregate (combine
together) equipment and personnel capabilities into a score, or factor, and then compare
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these to the opponent’s. A common approach is to use Force Ratios (FR) as a basis
for outcome determination, moderated by – or in conjunction with – various other factors.
· Models that work below the line consider individual platforms and the effects of discrete
shots, missiles or whatever. There can be blurring, for example vehicles are often modelled
individually, but alongside an infantry fire team or section. A common approach is to use a
series of ‘p’ [something] to determine outcomes. ‘p’ stands for probability (usually
expressed as a percentage chance) and the ‘something’ is typically ‘detect’, ‘hit’, ‘kill’ etc.
A precursor ‘Line of Sight’ (LOS) check is required. Modifiers are usually applied to ‘p’
steps and the LOS check; more on this later.
Being aware of the broad modelling approach of the simulation you are using, and the key
modifiers, helps you assess its strengths, weaknesses and potential idiosyncrasies.
Force Ratios
FR form the basis of many combat models that work above the aggregated modelling line (and a
few below). The aggregated combat factors for both sides’ engaged forces are totalled and
compared to derive either a fixed outcome or a spread of possible outcomes from which one is
selected, or determined using a stochastic method. FR-based models have weaknesses:
· FRs do not always explain historical combat outcomes. Any number of indeterminable
factors might account for success against the odds.
· Many other factors need to be considered, such as leadership, surprise, morale, training,
equipment, advantageous positioning and so forth. While some of these might be
incorporated into aggregated numbers, FRs are just another factor, and arguably of lesser
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importance. Jim Wallman’s Army 2020 system, for example, includes FRs as but one
modifier among others such as surprise and troop quality to derive a numerical score for
both sides. The result is then determined by the differential between the two totals.
· How do you derive a numerical combat factor from aggregated capabilities and human
factors, and how do you know this is accurate? For example, intangibles such as levels of
training and motivation might be incorporated. Even the Dstl Balanced Analysis Modelling
System (BAMS), which is the basis of many FR models, has those who question its validity
inside Dstl.
· Aggregating capabilities and characteristics into a gross combat score risks losing sight
of individual factors when subsumed into a single number.
However, I find FRs a good starting point for determining combat outcomes at the aggregated
level if they are:
· Clearly and transparently explained;
· Used to inform expert judgement; and
· Presented using a deliberative approach rather than as a definitive result.
FRs are fundamental to the Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset (RCAT), which was subjected to a
rigorous two-year long Dstl Verification and Validation process. RCAT has been in constant use
since 2012 in front of military players and hobby grognards; it has ‘survived contact’ in every
instance.
Typical outcomes from FR models can include any or all of:
· Reductions in the capabilities or Combat Effectiveness (CE) of forces involved. CE might
be displayed as casualty figures (but it includes leadership, morale, fatigue, logistics etc),
a percentage figure or a fraction of the capability remaining.
· An effect on one or more of the force elements (FEs) involved, usually ‘destroyed’,
‘defeated’, ‘neutralised’, ‘fixed’, ‘suppressed’ etc.
· Retreats and advances during and following combat.
Force Ratio Risk Levels explained
Cognisant of FR limitations, the table below remains a useful reference. It was created by Paul
Syms as a quick ready-reckoner when part of a Dstl Operational Analysis (OA) team supporting
a Higher Command and Staff Course wargame.
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This table now appears in the Planning and Execution Handbook – but with no explanation.
Hence, it is often misused, with potentially dangerous results, so here is a quick example to
show how to use it.
A force conducting a prepared attack against a hasty defence (find this on the left-hand axis) at
a FR of 3:1 (find 3.0 on the bottom axis) has a borderline ‘Nominal’/ ’good/safe’ probability of
success (read up from 3.0 and you will intersect the type of attack line at this boundary).
I chose this example because it explodes one of the military’s ‘urban myths’, that attacking at a
3:1 ratio will deliver success. OA conducted during the 1991 Gulf War and thereafter indicates
that a FR of 5:1 is required to deliver a ‘V Good’ probability of success – but the ‘3:1 equals tea
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and medals’ syndrome persists to this day. The key in Figure
 Figure 24-1. Force Ratio Risk Levels
.
24-1 only loosely defines the outcomes. That is the correct approach because the graph’s
purpose is to inform military judgement prior to a HITL decision.
P [insert effect]
Using the ‘p’ probability of achieving an effect entails modelling at a greater level of fidelity than
FRs. Typical outcome generation steps are:
1. LOS check. Does the firer have an unimpeded view of the target?
2. p (detect). Some models differentiate between detect, recognise and identify (DRI):
there’s a vehicle moving; it’s a tank; it’s a T-72. Whichever, this check establishes whether
the firer can sufficiently sense the target to engage it.
3. p (hit). Does the firer hit the target? This might be calculated as a p (hit) per shot, or
multiple shots within a given time frame, for example including jockeying for position or a
submarine obtaining a successful firing solution. Several shots might be fired using the
latter method, but only one p (hit) calculated.
4. p (kill). What effect does the shot have on the target? Some models differentiate
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between ‘kills’: ‘mission’ (K kill) ; ‘mobility’ or ‘movement’ (M kill); and armament (F
kill). Other outcomes can include suppression, degradation of sensors, abort etc.
Figure 24-2 shows a platform-level outcome resolution look-up table. Note the ‘LOS check?’ top
centre, p (hit) table and a combined p(detect) and p(kill) table; many variations on the basic
approach are possible.
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Figure 24-2. A look-up table showing LOS check, p (hit) and p (combat ineffective)
Deterministic and stochastic methods
All simulations based on rigid or semi-rigid adjudication use a deterministic or stochastic
method to generate outcomes. These can be used in combination.
· A deterministic model is one in which there is no random variation. Every potential state
is uniquely determined by parameters in the model, and the result of a given interaction will
be the same every time the model is run.
· A stochastic model features randomness. Variable states are described by probability
distributions, and the result will be different each time the model is run because the
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element of chance is incorporated.
Random number generators, and how to introduce and use dice
There are many random number generators (RNG) you can use, including computers, look-up
tables, mobile phone apps – and dice. But dice are what I want to focus on, because they are
tremendously useful but carry unjustified baggage. Annex A of Francis McHugh’s 1966 The
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Fundamentals of War Gaming is devoted to ‘Chance devices’. He starts with a coin,
mentions dice and then quickly moves on to tables of random numbers: ‘Currently, the most
widely used wargaming device is a table of random numbers [that] are often compiled by
electronic devices or computers. Random number generators can also be prepared, three digits
at a time, by rolling three unbiased 20-sided dice, and writing down the digits… Random number
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tables are also used in a similar manner to 20-sided dice…’ I would like to have asked
Francis, “If you use dice to construct these tables and determine percentages – why don’t you
just use dice during the game?” I suspect that the answer might have centred on the
(un)acceptability of dice, even back in the 1960’s. If this was the reason, I echo Francis’ caution.
Introducing and using dice
You should introduce and use dice cautiously. Pulling dice from your pocket will usually elicit a
response from military players. Initially, this can be visceral scepticism and incredulity; latterly,
once they recognise the utility of dice, it tends towards excitement and even trepidation.
Dice (singular, die) are but one method of generating random numbers – and these methods all
do the same thing. Open an Excel spreadsheet and enter the formula =RAND () into cell A1. Go
to cell B2, enter =(A1)*100. Right click in B2 and Format Cells/Number to show zero decimal
places and /Font to size of 72. Zoom until cell B2 fills the screen. Now press F9 to recalculate
the formula and cell B2 will generate a number between 1 and 100. Ironically, computers only
generate pseudo-random numbers, while dice generate truly random numbers.
So what? I am constantly amazed at players who readily accept a number generated by a
computer that determines a stochastic outcome, but who will shout, “You killed my orc!” if that
exact same number is generated by dice. Players also happily accept mobile phone apps; in
fact, any RNG – so long as it isn’t dice! I have a short cut to an Excel spreadsheet on my
desktop so that I can generate a random number within seconds. But such measures are only
necessary until you have properly introduced players to dice. Until an opportunity like those
below presents itself, I do not even mention dice, and certainly do not have any visible at the
start of a wargame. When the opportunity arises, I find the most effective way to introduce dice
is as tools to illustrate risk management and Clausewitzian chance.
Dice as risk management tools
Managing risk is inherent in any military or business career. Indeed, anyone in Defence,
business, the emergency services or humanitarian assistance who is not comfortable managing
risk is probably in the wrong job.
1. Assume that an interaction produces an outcome that is assessed (by whatever
adjudication MMT you are using) to have an approximately 70% probability of success.
2. At this point, present a pair of percentage dice or a 10-sided die to whoever ‘owns’ the
risk of failure. That discussion, of who owns the risk, is worthwhile it its own right.
3. Make sure the risk owner – and everyone else listening – understands the risk, and the
consequences of an unfavourable outcome. Ask the risk owner to heft and feel the dice
(they should be large) and visualise rolling them in front of their peers, superiors and
subordinates – but not to throw them.
4. Ask the risk owner if they are happy to roll the dice, hoping to get an outcome of 1-70
(assuming a 70% probability of success). If not, why not? Make sure the discussion is
captured.
5. Then stop. Take the dice back before they are rolled. They have done their job. They
have helped the decision-maker understand the risk, and visualise taking it cognisant of
possible consequences.
6. Explain this, and the fact that, in this instance, you will not throw the dice because that
moves us from risk management to prediction. When you come to a point where you need
to move the wargame narrative forward, and so need an outcome, dice will be rolled; but
that is different to understanding and managing a risk.
This is a simple but powerful procedure. I find actual commanders (those who are committing
their own men and women into danger, albeit in the wargame) uncomfortable with an assessed
probability of success of less than 80%. They look for ways to increase the chances of success;
they are managing the risk. Those not in actual positions of command are far more blasé, and
just want to chuck the dice to see what happens. There are lessons there, both for the real-
world and who you place in command positions in a wargame.
This process gets you into the anatomical guts of decision-making (with factors and rationale
captured, of course), illustrates risk management – and tees up a hook that, when the wargame
demands a narrative, you will roll the dice. That is a subliminal point: now we understand their
utility, we will not scoff when dice next appear.
Clausewitzian chance is exemplified by dice
Using dice to resolve outcomes might be inappropriate in some games (for example in some
analytical contexts or when adjudication is wholly reliant on expert judgement), in which case
don’t force them on people. However, let’s assume an opportunity arises to use dice when
exploring ‘chance’. Ensure that whatever adjudication MMT you are using incorporates a
transparent spread of outcomes. Then:
1. Introduce Clausewitz. Ask the players what constitutes Clausewitz’s ‘Paradoxical Trinity’.
Note that definitions and interpretations of this differ, but the three points I use are: logic,
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passion and chance. Focus on ‘the play of chance and probability (see footnote).’
2. Present a pair of percentage dice or a 10-sided die. Explain that the function of the dice
is to introduce chance and probability. This incontrovertible link to Clausewitz cannot be
argued. Then give the dice to the player initiating the action to be resolved (or to the risk
owner, as above).
 3. Explain the spread of possible outcomes suggested by whatever adjudication MMT you
are using, and relate the dice to these. This is where a single 10-sided die works well
because some people struggle to apply percentage spreads. So, your patter might run
thus, if using a 10-sided die: “You have a 10% chance of destroying the enemy (a roll of 1).
You have a 50% chance of forcing the enemy to retreat (a roll of 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6). You have a
30% chance of neutralising the enemy (a roll of 7, 8 or 9). And you have a 10% chance of
merely fixing the enemy (a roll of 10).”
4. The player will now want to throw the die, desperate to see if the attack succeeds. Do
not allow this - yet.
5. Rather, present and explain the expected outcome. Then ask the Game Controller if they
want to accept the expected result and use that as the outcome. If the Game Controller
decides to do so, put the die away.
6. However, if the Game Controller decides to allow the intrusion of chance, let the player
role the die. Then explain the outcome.
7. Remind everyone of the expected outcome and double-check with the Game Controller
that they are still content to let the randomly determined (stochastic) result stand. This
reinforces to everyone: the divergence from the expected outcome; and that the Game
Controller remains in control of the wargame – it’s not just chance and RNG.
8. Finally, gently mock bad rolls, and extoll the tactical genius behind good rolls. This is
light-hearted and engages the players. Over the course of the game, you will find that
some players role consistently well or poorly (apparently so, at least). Player
engagement builds with such outcomes, and you can reinforce the role of chance and
probabilities. Everyone knows that Napoleon said, ‘Give me lucky generals’, so now you
can link dice to both Clausewitz and Napoleon (and generate subsequent discussions on
the role of luck, war being most like a game of cards etc, and so prompt educational
opportunities from the wargame).
Once participants are comfortable using dice, they often demand they are used, even in
analytical wargames. This is important, because conflict does not produce ‘expected outcomes’
and our training and analysis should consider outcomes from the ends of distribution curves.
Furthermore, players and analysts usually insist on using unmodified die rolls, to reflect the
uncertainties of war and ensure that less likely outcomes are considered. Using expected
outcomes, or ones that are moderated towards that, precludes this essential discussion, as
explained in Chapter 4.
6-sided, 10-sided or percentage dice?
Although the 6-sided die is accepted as a cultural norm for games in most parts of the world,
10-sided and percentage dice have advantages. I find people understand percentages and can
relate the spread of probabilities and outcomes to a 10-sided die. Simplicity aids transparency.
One 6-sided die is reasonably easy to understand: everyone knows that there is a 33.3%
probability of rolling two numbers and a 50% probability of rolling three of the six. Clearly,
there’s a 16.66% probability of rolling one of the six numbers. But those are clumsy numbers to
bandy about when explaining possible outcomes.
This becomes even more awkward when you add a second die; see Figure 24-3, below. Rolling
dice in combination produces a bell curve, whereas using percentage, or a single die, produces
a linear outcome: there is an equal chance of rolling a 1 as a 6. In wargame terms, you can use
the two-dice approach to generate results that tend towards the expected (centre) outcome,
with outliers a less-common occurrence. But how can you ever be sure what the ‘expected’
outcome is? If you can’t know that, is it not better to accept a wider spread of linear
possibilities? Military players embrace more extreme outcomes because it accustoms them to
adverse outcomes and instils a resilient mindset.
I find that explaining percentages and probabilities using two 6-sided dice detracts from
transparent, easy-to-understand outcomes. It’s relatively easy to explain to a player that a
Special Forces raid has an 80% probability of success so they must role 1-80% on percentage
dice or 1 – 8 on a ten-sided die to succeed. The dice skitter across the table and the result, and
the factors that quantified it, are clear and apparent to all. That essential discussion is more
difficult if you are using combinations of dice. From the graph in Figure 24-3, you can see that
there is a 83.1% probability of rolling a 2 – 9, so that would be the dice roll needed for success
in the Special Forces example above. But it is difficult to explain the 2 through 9 roll required
and the associated 83.1%.

Figure 24-3. Percentage chances of outcomes from two 6-sided dice

Once players are comfortable with dice, and how they help elicit insights, a strange
phenomenon occurs. I mentioned that initiated players insist on unmodified results. In slight
contradiction of that, many say that extreme results should be the only ones used, to better
represent the vagaries and unpredictability of war. Using linear outcomes produced by one die
better enables this. In Dstl-run Force Development wargames, analysts and players demand that
we use unmodified die rolls to deliver more extreme results. This because unexpected and
adverse outcomes generate more by way of insights, ‘What if?’ questions and genuine ‘OMG’
moments. In this world of surprises and Black Swans, there is a lot to be said for mentally
preparing our players to deal with the unexpected, coping with adversity and developing a
resilient and flexible mind-set.
Outcomes should be ‘rubber stamped’ by the Game Controller (see the next chapter). Results
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do not necessarily have to be ‘accurate’, as long as they are deemed fit for purpose and
the factors that generated them are clearly understood.
There is no right or wrong approach, and others will have opposing views. Do what is right for
your wargame. Whatever method of determining outcomes you use, let’s now look at how
science can inform the numbers behind these.
Operational Analysis
The following section was written in collaboration with Jeremy Smith, Head of the Simulation
and Analytics Department, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the UK.
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Operational Analysis (OA ) is ‘The application of scientific methods to assist executive
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decision-makers.’ . OA, with Historical Analysis (HA) and other analytical techniques,
provides the scientific basis for the models and simulations that support wargaming. It is
central to adjudication.
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Peter Perla covers OA and Operations/Operational Research in The Art of Wargaming , and
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updates this in Zones of Control. For a clear explanation of sufficient maths to support
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most wargaming, read Phil Sabin's Simulating War Appendix 3: Basic mathematics. I will
not summarise those here, but would like to highlight a few key points.
 · Although OA is generally quantitative and grounded in scientific or historical data, it is
not a perfect tool (‘All models are wrong…’) and is best used to inform military judgement
within a wargame.
· Use it! Some wargames, certainly at the operational and strategic levels, will feature
formal OA in support of players. There might even be an OA cell in Control. Whatever OA
there is, seek it out and work with the analysts to leverage their expertise to better inform
the generation of wargame outcomes. Don’t worry about possible discrepancies between
Control and player OA cells: understanding these informs decision-making.
· …but know what you are using. In the same way as you need enough knowledge of
models and simulation to use them to best advantage, you also need to understand OA.
Get to know the analysts and their tools – and I mean really dig into whatever
spreadsheets, look-up tables or models they are using. Question assumptions until you
are satisfied that the analysis will inform, not skew, military judgement. Challenge
outcomes you are not convinced about. This will either show that the outcomes are
questionable, or allow you to fully understand them and explain them to others.
· Apply multiple sources of OA to derive a ‘triangulation’ of possible outcomes. A
correlation increases confidence; divergence suggests that further investigation is
required. Irrespective of the primary MMT being used to generate outcomes, I always run
my own OA in the background. This as a sanity check, but also to inform the questions I
need to ask.
There are many models that can support OA, ranging from look-up tables through spreadsheets
to computer simulations. The key balance to be struck is between accuracy and speed of
response, whether for wargaming or planning. You may have available a detailed, accurate
computer model, but if it needs significant data entry and run-time and you only have a few
minutes, it is not the right tool. Many of the MMT used for OA support are therefore fast
running and easy to access because the aim is to produce a timely answer that is ‘about right’.
A good analyst will look at the question or problem they have been posed, consider the models
they have and choose the one (or, if there is time, several) that seems most appropriate. None
of these should be used without reflecting on their utility and accuracy.
Examples of OA include Lanchester’s equations, developed by FW Lanchester in the early part
of the 20th century. These are differential equations (a type of mathematical expression) which
have different forms depending on the type of combat: direct fire, indirect fire, etc. They can be
used with pen and paper (if you’re quick and experienced enough) or in a spreadsheet or simple
computer model. These types of models are quick to run but require experience to avoid
pitfalls. For example, Lanchester’s equations tend to overestimate casualties.
Figure 24-4 shows a simple example of an OA tool, produced by the UK PJHQ OA Branch as a
simple FR ready-reckoner. Note the close relationship between this and Paul Syms’ FR Risk
Levels chart at Figure 24-1.

Figure 24-4. PJHQ FR analysis

The ‘4-box’ method
I use a ‘catch-all’ technique for generating outcomes when other MMT and OA are not
appropriate, or where the interaction is so ‘soft and fluffy’ that traditional techniques will not
work: the 4-box method. The genesis of this goes back to when I ran UK Staff College syndicate
vs syndicate wargames in the early 2000s. These were simple, and unsupported by any
technology beyond a telephone in each room. One syndicate was Control, the other a player
HQ. When my syndicate was Control, we determined results by listing possible outcomes on a
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whiteboard, assigning probabilities to each, and then throwing percentage dice to
determine the result. We planned ahead of our paired syndicate, developing outcomes into
injects to create the unfolding narrative.
Fast forward fourteen years, and I’m facilitating a Dstl Future Force Development wargame. A
Special Forces action took place, and there were no tools or spreadsheets to inform its
resolution. Latching onto an in-vogue term, I asked the player, “What does success look like?”
and then applied the same technique as I had used during those Staff College wargames. Step
forward Tom Mouat, who was also supporting the event. “That’s just like matrix game
adjudication”, says Tom. We got together, and the 4-box approach took about ten minutes to
develop.
‘The 4-box method is a straightforward technique for quickly examining a critical event that
carries with it a probability of success or failure e.g. the destruction of a vital supply route or
neutralisation of a High Value Target. The process is simple and allows for the rapid articulation
of outcomes. Having a more complete range of outcomes is of benefit for subsequent analysis
and, if the result was one of the “outliers” it is easier to conduct sensitivity analysis on the
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overall results of the event.’
The 4-box template is at Figure 24-5. The process is:
· The player initiating the action describes the desired outcome in terms of ‘what
success looks like’.
· They then explain the best three (only) reasons why this success will be achieved.
· The other player(s) counter with the best three (only) reasons why the described
success will not be achieved.
· These factors are captured. This is the vital activity and enables subsequent analysis.
· Control, in conjunction with the players, agree the possible outcomes and ascribe
percentage chances to each of the four boxes in Figure 24-5.
· The actual outcome is determined by Control, or stochastically by the initiating player
rolling percentage dice.
 Figure 24-5. 4-box template
It is notable how taking players through the 4-box method often reverses their initial
presumption of an event’s outcome. This simply by getting them to tease through the problem
and consider it from both sides.
Deciding the order in which outcomes are determined during turn-based
wargames
This is a distinct function from determining the order of vignettes that I discussed in Chapter 22
(Controlling Wargames).
The ‘Igo-Ugo’ technique used in many hobby games is a common method for determining the
order of outcomes. Alternatively, the player with the initiative might determine the order of
resolution. In a professional wargame, such hobby-style approaches can appear ‘gamey’.
Furthermore, they do not apply when opponents are planning simultaneously or in ignorance of
each other’s plans. Determination of the outcome resolution order is usually a combined effort
between the facilitator and simulation expert. It is important because one or more results are
likely to influence others.
[412]
My preferred method is to: collect the plans from all cells; declare these together; and then
determine the order of outcome resolution. During the statement of players’ plans, note all
instances where the sides will clash or interact. Maybe place a marker as they talk to remind
you of these. At the end of the players’ statements, take a moment to determine the order of
resolution. Briefly explain this to everyone in an open game to ensure that you haven’t missed a
nuance or complexity that invalidates your suggested order. Then resolve each interaction in
order – but do this flexibly, cognisant of other potential outcomes and how they might interact.
If necessary, jump from one to another, then back again. But try to avoid this if possible, to
keep things simple. As ever, there is more art than science to this approach. The key is
transparency and inclusive consultation.
Historical and Operational Commanders Tests
'If you want your wargame to predict the future, make sure it can predict the past.'
Jim Dunnigan, Connections USA 2006
Do not overlook the benefits of historical playtests when designing and developing your models
and simulations. If you are fortunate enough to find actual operational commanders from recent
conflicts and wars to playtest your systems, grasp the opportunity. When developing RCAT, we
were incredibly fortunate to have General Julian Thompson and Commodore Michael
Clapp agree to playtest the system. They had respectively been the Commander Landing Force
and Commander Amphibious Task Force during the 1982 Falklands War. There can be no better
test of your game system than to ask real commanders whether it throws up command
challenges, risks and dilemmas similar to those they faced. The Operational Commanders Test
(OCT) we conducted with Julian and Mike was immensely useful in terms of game development,
unnerving as a professional game designer under scrutiny – and a personal career highlight!
(Hence it features on the back cover.)
Absent actual commanders, testing your system against historical events is still a worthwhile
activity, although it is often hard to discern what caused the historical result, so difficult to have
confidence that a simulation is generating an ‘expected’ outcome. Phil Sabin discusses this in
[413]
Simulating War. Being able to talk through multiple plausible outcomes with the people
who managed the real risks is invaluable. During the Falklands OCT, the RCAT system
generated – admittedly with some eyebrow-raising dice rolls – five Royal Navy ships sunk or
crippled on 21 May 1982. I turned with some trepidation to Julian and Mike, knowing that only
one ship was actually sunk (HMS Ardent), but Mike said, “That’s exactly what the 1st Sea Lord
Sir Henry Leach told Margaret Thatcher to expect: about five ships to be sunk that day.”
Knowing that, plus the in-depth discussion of Argentine bomb fusing, the geography of San
Carlos Water and numerous other factors, was immensely useful.

Figure 24-6. OCT with Professor Phil Sabin, General Julian Thompson and Commodore Mike
Clapp
‘We liked the manual simulation very much and wish we had had such a system in Ascension
[Island] with Fieldhouse, Moore, Trant, Curtiss, Woodward, Commander 5 Bde and us sitting
around the map table thrashing through possible courses of action and, hopefully, agreeing a
thoroughly well-considered plan.’
General Julian Thompson and Commodore Michael Clapp
Chapter 25. Presenting and Affirming 0utcomes
‘Rules are for the guidance of wise men and the obedience of fools.’
Attributed by Douglas Bader in Reach for the Sky
to Harry Day, Royal Flying Corps WW1 fighter ace.
Introduction
Before outcomes are presented to players, they are often affirmed by the Game Controller. The
act of presenting outcomes to the Game Controller is different to presenting them to players:
they are prospective in the first case, and definitive in the second (although sometimes subject
to a deliberative approach). However, much of the discussion below pertains to both.
Presenting outcomes
Transparency
Transparency is critical. There can be situations where players might not be privy to the factors
and calculations that determined an outcome, for example in a closed game. However, if the
purpose of a wargame is to explore player decisions and their rationale, the greater the players’
understanding of an outcome and its associated factors, the better informed will be their
decision-making. Even if players are to remain unsighted, the Game Controller needs to
understand the derivation of outcomes. Analysts, Observer/ Mentors et al even more so. The
explanation of outcomes could include the factors incorporated and an honest estimate of the
confidence in the result. If possible, outcomes should be presented and explained completely
transparently.
Spread of probabilities and possible outcomes
Operational Analysis (OA) best practice is to present probabilities and outcomes as a spread:
best case, most likely, and worst case. Explaining this spread – and the factors that determine it
– to Game Controllers and players is tremendously informative. It helps them understand the
possible consequences of the decision that leads to the result, and moderation of a
stochastic result is better informed.
The deliberative approach: presenting outcomes for comment
Applying SME judgement and collective common sense to outcomes delivers high dividends.
The Douglas Bader quote continues the sentiment of George Box’s in the previous chapter.
While there are instances when rigid adjudication is appropriate, in professional wargames I find
that generating, presenting and affirming outcomes is usually best conducted using rational
science as a start point – but then applying a good dose of military and common sense. If no
rule or model can guarantee an accurate prediction, don’t pretend that they can; rather,
leverage yours, and your participants, collective expertise in an honest and deliberative
discussion, as explained in Chapter 4. This delivers better outcomes and analysis by
acknowledging that simulations are not predictive; ensuring that players retain ownership of the
wargame by being part of the adjudication process; increasing engagement; pre-empting cries
of, “It’s all chance!”; and forcing a discussion that enables analysis.
Precise military language
The military use precise language, and for good reason. There are fundamental differences
[414]
between ‘defeat’ and ‘destroy’, ‘feint’ and ‘demonstrate’, and so forth. If the military use
well-defined terminology, we should reciprocate by understanding and using theirs, while
explaining and using ours correctly. The key point is that you must understand and speak
‘military’ and use the wargame lingua franca precisely. This reinforces the utility of working as a
pair, with at least one of the two being fluent in ‘mil-speak’. Clearly, the same applies to
wargaming with other professions.
Deconstructed computer simulation
We know that computer simulations tend to use Line of Sight (LOS) checks, p (effect) and/or
Force Ratio (FR) comparisons as a basis for their models. What then, is the difference between:
a tactical-level computer simulation conducting a LOS check on a geo data base, and then
cross-referencing an electronically generated random number with a data base to determine
whether a platform is sensed, hit and killed; and a manual simulation that requires a human to
conduct an indivisibility check on a map, and then cross-referencing a die roll with look-up
tables to determine whether a platform is sensed, hit and killed? Procedurally, none.
Mechanically, the map replaces the geo data base, the look-up tables replace the data base and
the die replaces the electronic random number generator (RNG).
Intuitively, a LOS check should be more accurate using a digital geo data base than an
indivisibility study. But experiences shows that geo data bases do not always include buildings
(!) or vegetation, and so permit LOS and fire through woods and even urban areas. Why is a
computer’s internal data base more accurate than a look-up table? In fact, it is no more than
data from a look-up table turned into 0s and 1s. And, as we have seen, a RNG is a RNG.
Similarly, a computer simulation that uses FRs to calculate outcomes follows, to all intents and
purposes, identical procedures to those used in many manual simulations.
When you are transparently working through an outcome using a manual simulation, the players
are watching a de-constructed computer simulation. Make this point – but then go further. They
are not just watching, they are part of the process. At every step they see and understand the
factors involved; can question those factors and any assumptions made, suggesting modifiers;
understand the spread of outcomes; and watch the result being determined. That is very
powerful in terms of increased understanding and engagement.
Affirming outcomes
Except when a rigid method of outcome determination is used, affirming outcomes is a key
element of adjudication. The following discussion applies to any sort of simulation outcome,
including real-time simulations.
What do I mean by ‘affirm?’
[415]
‘Affirm’ means ‘assert, declare the truth of something, state as fact.’ A Thesaurus entry
adds ‘pronounce’, ‘certify’ and ‘corroborate’. The person doing this in a professional wargame
is ultimately the Game Controller, but affirmation checks by adjudicators prior to presenting
results to the Game Controller are sensible. The point in the process where these checks and
the final affirmation take place falls between simulation outcomes being provisionally
determined and being delivered to the players. That’s why the ‘Simulation results and
outcomes’ arrow in Figure 22-1 changes from dotted to solid. The difference between affirming
real-time and stepped-time simulation outcomes comes down to when and how you do this. If
done well, it should ensure that simulation outcomes help keep the wargame on track, heading
for the next objective/waypoint and, ultimately, achieving the overall aim. This sounds obvious,
but indulge me with two examples where affirmation did not occur.
A computer simulation expert presented results in a staff college wargame. These included a
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) being shot down by a submarine. A submariner in the room
expressed his amazement. On digging into the simulation reports, it transpired that the MPA
had been downed by small arms fire, because the computer modelled ‘bottom-up’ and there was
a – tiny – chance of this happening. This was declared publicly, someone muttered, “Bloody
accurate those submariners with their pistols!” and the room dissolved in laughter. The result
was a complete loss of faith in the simulation outcomes. The cause was no affirmation of the
simulation results prior to presentation.
During a recent divisional-level Command Post Exercise using a real-time computer simulation,
a squadron of Challenger 2s was destroyed in the space of a minute at long range by anti-tank
guided weapons. Amidst the splutterings of the Royal Armoured Corps player, it transpired that
the computer simulation did not model buildings, so the ‘covered’ approach route the player
had selected was, in the simulation, open ground. The result was an embarrassing
‘resurrection’ of the tank squadron, witnessed by all players, now firmly extracted from the
magic circle, and a question mark over the appropriateness of the buildings-free computer
simulation.
I do not pick these examples to detract from computer simulations. Plenty of manual simulation
results are similarly incredible. Rather, the examples introduce a discussion on how to affirm
outcomes in both stepped and real-time simulations.
Affirming outcomes in time-stepped simulations
Affirming time-stepped simulation results is comparatively simple. Build checks into the process
as follows:
· Conduct an initial ‘sanity check’ of all simulation outcomes. This in a closed group,
consisting of the simulation expert and one more person, ideally someone who can apply
military common sense. Any results that seem unlikely in the extreme – such as the
submarine example – should be investigated to ascertain the reason. I am not saying that
unexpected results should be ‘smoothed’, just investigated before being declared to
ensure they are credible.
· Conduct a review of the overall simulation outcomes to ensure these holistically support
the wargame objectives; and identify any variances that need to be highlighted. This is still
a small-group activity. Again, I am not saying that results should be moderated towards a
desired outcome, just that any that cause concern are investigated before being declared
so they can be explained and considered.
· The reality-checked and reviewed outcomes are then presented to the Game Controller,
along with up-front declarations of unexpected or undesirable results and the reasons for
these. With the reasons for the results clear, the Game Controller can apply their
judgement; results can stand, or moderations can be made. The outcome of this part of
the adjudication process is a certified and authorised set of results that can be presented
to the players, by whatever means.
Affirming outcomes in real-time simulations
The key to affirming real-time simulations - including role-play - is to premeditate likely
outcomes and, through this, give computer operators and role-players (where part of Control)
parameters within which to work. This is the approach enabled by the Next-Day
Wargame discussed previously. During execution, should operators’ sense that they are likely
to exceed the given parameters, they can take pre-emptive action to prevent this. If the
parameters will be exceeded unless unrealistic action is taken, the operator should immediately
inform the Game Controller. Hopefully, such a situation should not arise out of the blue, and
there will be time to take credible corrective measures to keep the game on track. Otherwise,
the Game Controller will have to work with the simulation experts and appropriate Control staff
to manage the situation without having to take the final recourse of revealing what is happening
to the players and breaking the magic circle.
Of course, there will be wargames where you do not want to impose constraints. Player-on-
player role-play could be an instance where whatever happens, happens! Let it roll (or is that
role?).
[416]
In the case of manual simulations that are resolved live (in-stride) , the key is to premeditate
outcomes as above if possible, but then for the simulation expert and/or facilitator to constantly
refer to the Game Controller at every step of the process. This is to ensure that the Game
Controller is assimilating the factors involved, assumptions made, and the final proposed
outcome. By doing this, you should arrive at the end of the resolution process with a straight
forward question for the Game Controller: “Are you happy with that outcome, or do you want to
moderate it?” Having been fully engaged, and knowing the next objective waypoint to be
reached, the Game Controller should be well-placed to affirm the result.
Chapter 26. Course of Action Wargaming
"I consider it a duty of anyone who sees a flaw in this plan not to hesitate to say so. I have no
sympathy with anyone, whatever his station, who will not brook criticism. We are here to get the
best possible results."
Eisenhower, 5 May 1944, Model Room,
HQ British 21st Army Group
Introduction
Course of Action (COA) Wargaming is the most prevalent form of wargaming practised by the
military. It is mandated in the doctrines of the US, UK, NATO and most associated militaries.
Hence, it warrants a chapter to itself.
This chapter is an updated version of the original draft section I wrote in 2012 for the Army’s
Staff Officer’s Handbook (SOHB). Since then, various editors have mangled the SOHB text and –
crucially – removed key one-page aide memoires (and replaced these with a meaningless flow
diagram). A much-reduced version is included in the 2018 Planning and Execution
Handbook (PEHB), which has replaced Part 3 of the SOHB. I have corrected these edits and
reinstated the original text and aide-memoires to present what I hope is a consolidated and
complete guide to COA Wargaming. Note that this is written from a British Army perspective.
Most units and formations have got a reasonable handle on COA Wargaming, certainly within the
British Army and in UK Joint HQs. They recognise its utility and try to apply it – but lack the
experience or wargaming intuition to overlay art on top of the raw procedures to deliver the full
benefits. When delivering COA Wargaming training, I find that a few nudges are all that is
needed to make clear what a powerful tool it is.
Examples of such ‘nudges’ are: deriving turns from the commander’s key risks; conducting
these turns in a series of short ‘impulses’, flicking between Blue and Red in a series of staccato
‘action-reaction’ cycles; explaining the different options for the commander’s participation; and
teaching – empowering – the G2/J2 officer how to play the adversary. These are straightforward,
and ‘no-brainers’ once introduced, but elude people until they have seen them. Apparently
minor, they make a huge difference to the quality of COA Wargame delivered. Please note these
details in this chapter; they are not in the SOHB or PEHB.
The COA Wargaming ‘action-reaction’ mechanism provides the turn structure start point for
many wargame formats. The overall COA Wargame approach is, arguably, the best schema to
apply to any context beyond the military. Business wargames, in particular, are well suited to the
competitive action, reaction, consideration, Critical Thinking, ‘So what?’ and Consequence
Management steps. But so, too, are emergency service and humanitarian games – the process
can be applied to almost anything. I COA Wargamed my wedding – but I’m not going to tell you
who was the Red Cell!
Introduction to COA Wargaming
COA Wargaming and Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills are related but discrete tools that
support different elements of decision-making. The distinctions between these terms (and Red
Teaming, discussed elsewhere) are outlined in Table 26-1.
Table 26-1: COA Wargaming, ROC Drill and Red Teaming [Critical Thinking] distinctions

COA Wargaming and its characteristics

COA Wargaming is a systematic method of analysing a plan in a conscious attempt to visualise
the ebb and flow of an operation or campaign. Adversarial by nature, COA Wargaming
superimposes friendly, neutral and hostile elements together to identify risks and shortcomings
in potential or selected COAs. It pitches planners against each other in a deliberate attempt to
spark debate and generate insights. By COA Wargaming, commanders and staffs attempt to
foresee the dynamics of actions and reactions, and the possible consequences of these. COA
Wargaming is an essential part of the planning process. Unfortunately, when not understood,
COA Wargaming is sometimes viewed as an unwelcome intrusion that competes for valuable
staff planning time.
The UK Warfare Science & Technology (S&T) Branch lists the characteristics of a COA Wargame
as: [417]
· Time pressured. At brigade HQ and below it is rare for a COA Wargame to last more than
60 minutes. At divisional level 1-2 hours is usual. Even at corps level only 4 hours is usually
allocated.
· Adversarial.
· Conducted primarily by non-experts in COA wargaming.
· Largely manual, i.e. not computerised.
Factors considered essential to successful COA Wargaming by S&T are:
· Simplicity.
· Transparency of outcomes.
· Thorough preparation and planning.
· Effective control.
· Having the correct Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) present.
· The application of comprehensive COA Wargaming doctrine.

Why COA Wargame?

The purpose of a COA Wargame is to identify risks and areas of weakness in a forming plan.
This can be in multiple COAs under development for comparative reasons or in a single selected
COA to refine it and add robustness. A COA Wargame must rigorously test the forming plan.
Because COA Wargaming brings a wide cross-section of the staff and SMEs into the planning
process it:
· Provides a thorough understanding of the likely actions and reactions of friendly, neutral
and hostile actors within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and, where relevant, beyond.
 · Provides an indication of the likely effects of military activity, and the associated risks –
both threats and potential opportunities – that such activity might generate. These often
manifest as branches requiring Contingency Plans (CONPLANs).
· Exposes potential unintended consequences.
· Enables refinement and development of COAs, including detailed synchronisation
requirements, resource allocation, force (re-)deployments and logistic implications.
· Highlights tasks that are important to the operation and makes apparent any that may
have been overlooked.

Who participates in a COA Wargame?

The personnel listed below are typically involved in COA Wargaming. Appointments are listed for
a formation or higher HQ, but are easily translated into their battlegroup HQ equivalents.
· Chief Controller (e.g. the COS). The Chief Controller directs and controls the COA
Wargame.
· Blue Cell/Friendly Forces (J3 and/or J3/5 staff). The Blue Cell, who have developed the
plan, should include key J5 and J3/5 planners. It might include, as appropriate, J1/J4, J6, J3
staff, coalition partners, Consequence Management staff and other contributors to Joint
[418] [419]
Action such as CIMIC personnel, CULAD, POLAD and LEGAD . The Blue Cell,
usually through a spokesperson, controls Friendly Forces.
· Red/Adversary Cell. This is generally a J2 staff officer, or team, who control adversary
activities.
· Critical Thinkers [Red Teamers].
· SMEs and Partners Across Government (PAGs). Available SMEs and PAGs should share
their time between the Blue and Red Cells where necessary.
· Operational Analysis (OA) personnel. OA is ‘the use of mathematical, statistical and other
[420]
forms of analysis to explore situations and help decision-makers to resolve problems'.
OA delivers scientific rigour and objectivity to operational planning and decision-making.
OA will not make the decision for decision-makers; its purpose is to advise them and
enable informed decisions. Analysts should be tasked as early as possible (well in advance
of the COA Wargame) to give them time to conduct meaningful analysis to input into the
COA Wargame; they should not be ‘ambushed’ during a COA Wargaming with complex
questions to be answered on the spot.
· The commander. Commanders may wish to attend a COA Wargame personally for the
insights they can bring and derive. These benefits, however, should be balanced against
the risk that staff may be uneasy criticising elements of the (commander’s) plan, resulting
in this not being robustly tested. There are four options for a commander:
1. Hand the plan over to the COS to test, and not attend until the post-COA Wargame
back-brief.
2. Attend, but remain in the background and do not interfere.
3. Attend, but interject only where necessary. (In practice, option 2 generally turns into
option 3.)
4. Play as Red, joining the J2 Red Cell. Sun Tzu said. ‘If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but
not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know
[421]
neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.’ COA
Wargaming presents arguably the best opportunity to step into the adversary’s shoes
and understand the situation from the enemy’s perspective.
When to COA Wargame
There are three occasions when a COA Wargame can be appropriate, as shown in Figure 26-1.

Figure 26-1: Opportunities to COA Wargame

COA development. COA Wargaming can help to indicate the art of the possible in embryonic
COAs and enable impractical COAs to be discarded or changed. Early wargaming should yield a
better understanding of a proposed COA, including relevant planning considerations such as the
correlation of forces, relative strengths, and synchronisation. Finally, it helps to ensure that
COAs are distinct and not merely a variant on the same scheme of manoeuvre.
COA evaluation and comparison. COA Wargaming can be used to evaluate and compare COAs.
COA Wargaming at this stage informs the relative strengths and weaknesses of each COA for
evaluation against a commander’s COA selection criteria.
Plan refinement. Once the commander has selected a COA, wargaming can contribute
significantly to its refinement into a plan, including identifying risks, areas of weakness and
further Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). In addition, wargaming assists
in the production of coordinating instructions, indicates specific requirements for battlespace
management and highlights potential tasks and associated readiness for reserves. Wargaming
may also identify potential unplanned or unfavourable effects, and hence the requirement for
CONPLANs.
However, because COA Wargaming is usually time-pressured, attempting it during COA
development or evaluation carries risk: rushed COA Wargames are seldom effective, and other
forms of comparison (such as scoring against commander’s criteria) are often quicker and just
as effective. It is at the plan refinement stage, when a single COA has been selected, that
detailed wargaming must occur.

How to COA Wargame

COA Wargames require three phases to deliver: plan; prepare; and execute .
Plan
Determine the time available. The limited time available will dictate the number of critical events
that can be COA Wargamed and the time dedicated to each; this informs the determination of
'turns'.
Select the event(s) to be COA Wargamed. This is a command decision. The event(s) should be
those the commander believes to hold most risk, due to vulnerability to opponent action or
perhaps the complexity of coordination required.
Select the wargame turns (not ‘method’). Previous ‘methods’ of wargaming, such as ‘belt, box,
avenue-in-depth, by phase, segment of the battlespace, Decisive Condition/Supporting Effect’,
were confusing. Do not use these. The turn(s) to be wargamed should simply be those aspects
of the campaign or operation that the commander deems to hold the highest risk. The in-game
duration and geographical area encompassed in these turns is determined by military common
sense.
Select the adversary COA. The Red Cell and/or J2 cell should advise the commander/Chief
Controller which adversary COA should be selected. The choice is usually between the
adversary's Most Likely (ML) or Most Dangerous (MD) COA. COA Wargaming is an adversarial
activity, so consideration should be given to selecting an adversary COA that tends towards the
MD; the Blue plan will be only be fully tested if Red is doing everything it can to win. Red COAs
should be agreed between the G2 and COS, so should not come as a surprise to the COS during
the wargame.
Select the recording method. The output of the COA Wargame should be captured as a
narrative, a work sheet or maybe as a Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix (JASM). This should
be a consolidated stand-alone product, in addition to amendments made by individual branches
to staff products.
Identify the personnel required. The context and scope of the COA Wargame determines player
participation. The usual commander's advisors should be present as a matter of course, but
consideration should be given to SMEs to cover relevant domains such as human terrain, cyber
etc.
Task OA (if not already done). OA subjects of analysis should have been identified during the
preceding steps of the estimate/7 Questions. These should be briefed to the analysts
sufficiently in advance of the COA Wargame to enable analysis, with findings presented during
the COA Wargame as an input.
Prepare
See Appendix 1 for a check-list of items to prepare.
Situational awareness (SA) aids. Despite the increasingly digital nature of command and control
there is a strong argument for using manual forms of SA to enable COA Wargaming. Digital
media such as BOWMAN/ComBAT and PowerPoint have their advantages, but so do manual
media such as a birdtable, map and 'stickies' or counters. A traditional birdtable enables the
required visualisation of the situation, cannot be broken, and is powered by imagination. It
provides a physical forum for discussion, that is to say all staff involved in the planning process
engaged at the same time focused upon literally one physical view. The birdtable remains both
the preferred COA Wargaming medium and venue in the UK’s Collective Training Group (CTG).
Mapping and counters or iconography must be prepared, be these digital or physical.
Venue. A suitable venue should be arranged formally, with front row seats designated for key
players and SMEs. Additional seating should be available for other participants. The Chief
Controller must be able to control, and the Scribe see, all proceedings.
[422]
Staff products. Relevant draft Operational Staff Work (OSW) must be available (e.g. DSO ,
[423] [424]
DSM , Synchronisation Matrix, Messaging, Task Organisation, CCIRs , OA inputs etc).
Rehearsals. In a particularly complicated or large COA Wargame, a rehearsal might be required.
Execute
Sequence. A sequence of events for a COA Wargame is at Table 26-2. This features a formation-
level HQ for illustrative purposes, but adapting it to a battlegroup HQ is simple.
Event or Person
Ser Remarks
Activity Responsible
(a) (d)
(b) (c)
Preliminaries
1. Initial brief: Chief Controller
· Aim (usually COS or
· Attendance: Chief J5)
role and
function
· Mechanics
· Wargame
turns and
timings
· Inputs
available
 · Recording
· Higher
Commander’s
guidance
· Key estimate
outcomes
· Key
assumptions
2. Adversary J2/Red Cell [425]
review CONOPs
or ends,
ways, means
to the
required level
of detail
3. Armed Non- J2/Red, As required
State Actor [426]
(ANSA) and Orange and
Organised [427]
Black Cells
Crime (OC)
reviews
4. Humanitarian White Cell and As required
and human CULAD
terrain reviews
5. Wider planning J5, J35 or As required
context POLAD
6. Friendly Blue/Green Cells: CONOPs or
Forces review, J3 or lead ends, ways,
including Host branch means to the
Nation (HN) required level
and Coalition of detail
partners
7. Joint Action J3 From JASM,
review as required
8. J-Branches By J-Branch As required.
review Component,
HN and
Coalition
partners input
likely
 For Each Wargame Turn
9. [428] J3 or lead Starting
Cell A Action branch situation then
plus J- CONOPS or
Branches; ends, ways,
means to the
or J2/Red required level
Cell of detail, with
likely input
10. Cell B Reaction
from J-
Branches,
Components
and partners
11. Frictions and Red Challenge
oppositional [429] assumptions
factors Team
Short break for OA and Chief Controller consideration
12. Adjudication of OA (if Best case,
Outcomes present) MD and ML,
or Chief then selected
Controller outcome
judgement
13. Cell A J3 or lead Having heard
[430] planning action,
Consideration branch reaction and
outcomes,
what would
Cell A5
change?
14. ‘What if’ Chief Examine
considerations Controller alternatives
15. Consequence White Brainstorm
Management Cell, possible
POLAD, unintended
CULAD, consequences
LEGAD
 16. Cognition Chief Confirm
Phase Controller/
understanding,
Scribe consolidation
and recording
of outcomes
Repeat sers 9 – 16 as necessary
After final turn
17. Recording Scribe Summarise
confirmation key findings,
as required
18. COA Wargame Chief Summarise
summary Controller key outputs,
and provide
D&G

Table 26-2: COA Wargame sequence of events at formation level

Initial Brief. The Chief Controller's initial brief is key. Tailored to the level of COA Wargaming
expertise (some bullets might be omitted or simply be ‘per Standing Operational Procedures’
with an experienced team), it could include:
· Aim. This is usually to test (try to break) the plan, or aspects of this.
· Attendance and participant roles, including who is expected to have a speaking role and
who are observers. Liaison Officers, PAGs et al might be present.
· Mechanics. Unless the HQ is practised in COA Wargaming, it is worth reiterating the key
turn mechanics, highlighting the likely interjection by the Chief Controller to control
‘impulses’ (see below).
· Inputs available, including OSW and OA.
· Recording methods.
· Higher commander's guidance, Mission Analysis outcomes and key assumptions. This
might be prefaced by a White Cell/POLAD review of the strategic environment.
· Critical event(s) to be COA Wargamed, and the resultant turns. This is key, so everyone
must understand these.
· Timings, including how much time will be dedicated to each event/turn.
· J2 review and update, to include the adversary strategic or operational intent and force
dispositions (as required).
· Green/Orange/Black Cell reviews and updates, outlining key neutral, or other, actors,
their intentions and dispositions (as required).
· J5 or J35 review of the COA to the required level of detail. There is no need to repeat all
information, but key information might be highlighted.
· Other staff branches augment the J3 overview, to the required level of detail.
Who goes first? Traditionally, the side with the initiative has the first action. However,
consideration should be given to Blue always having the first action – or at least explaining their
‘laydown’ – irrespective of who has the initiative; it is the Blue plan being tested.
Turn mechanics. Whichever side goes first, the mechanism remains the same. Note the key
‘Impulses’ bullet, below. Assuming Blue has the first action:
· Action. The Blue Cell spokesperson should explain their first action, moving icons or
counters as these are referred to. Timings can be included in the narrative.
· Reaction. The Red Cell spokesperson describes the adversary's reaction to the Blue
action, moving icons or counters as required.
 · ‘Impulses’. The Chief Controller should not allow Blue or Red to explain all their activity
for the entire turn. Rather, conduct the turn in a series of short ‘impulses.’ An impulse is
‘an impelling, or motivating, force; an impetus; and the motion produced by such a force.’
In COA Wargaming terms, this translates into the activity of one side or the other
compelling a reaction by the other. The turn should continue in a series of action-reaction
impulses of varying durations – often short – until the Chief Controller is happy that the
turn has been stepped through sufficient to visualise it and elicit outcomes and frictions.
This process requires practise.
· Frictions and oppositional factors. All cells should express key frictions (in the
Clausewitzian sense) and oppositional factors that might hinder, or prevent, them achieving
what has been discussed during the turn (or impulse).
· Adjudication. The Chief Controller, ideally informed by pre-mediated OA, determines the
outcomes of any interactions.
· Consideration. Note that this has replaced the previous ‘counteraction’ step, which was
erroneously thought of as an extra (free) turn. The Chief Controller leads a discussion of
necessary changes to the forming plan, nominating staff to action these as appropriate.
The J2 then does likewise for the Red plan, to identify how the enemy might evolve their
plan in light of Blue activity.
· ‘What if’-ing. The Chief Controller leads an examination of alternative assumptions.
· Cognition. The Chief Controller (usually) or Scribe confirms the collective understanding
of insights. Not all points need be reviewed; just those the Chief Controller considers key.
· Consequence Management (CM). All relevant SMEs 'brainstorm' possible unintended
consequences that might arise from the activities discussed in the turn.
· Recording confirmation. The Scribe might be asked to summarise key findings and actions
arising recorded. A quick round-table check might be required. However, time often
precludes what can develop into a fresh discussion of already-identified insights, so an
element of trust is required that the Scribe has captured the necessary outputs.
Irrespective, all participants should analyse the game turn as it develops within their area of
expertise, noting amendments to their own staff plans and OSW.
COA Wargaming Outputs
COA Wargaming outputs include:
· Identified and managed risks. Risk is an expression of the probability and impact of an
uncertain activity or event. They can have positive or negative consequences. JDP 5-00
Campaign Planning Chapter 2 Annex H has more detail on risk management. However, two
tools warrant a mention here:
o A useful mnemonic for the treatment of risks is: CRAPT: Contingency; Reduce;
Accept; Prevent; and Transfer.
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o The Probability Impact Graph (PIG) . Details are in JDP 5-00, but an example PIG
is at Figure 26-2.
 Figure 26-2. Example Probability Impact Graph
· Identified CONPLANs (whether branches or sequels) to mitigate or exploit risks.
· Amendments to the CONOPs and coordination measures.
· Amendments to draft OSW.
· Time and space considerations.
· CCIRs/RFIs, assumptions, points for clarification etc.
· Data for the commander's COA decision brief.
· Measurements of Effectiveness (MOE) criteria.
COA Wargaming dos and don’ts
Best practice guidelines are summarised in Figure 26-3. Points are further explained below that,
where necessary.

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Figure 26 - 3: COA Wargaming dos and don'ts
Time management is crucial. The Chief Controller must strike a balance between useful
discussion and driving the COA Wargame relentlessly forward. Most points raised can usually
be noted for subsequent action or captured by staff branches for their own use. Not everyone is
equal, not everyone has a speaking role, and a COA Wargame is not a career moment!
COA Wargaming is command-led. The commander decides which COA(s) to COA Wargame and
the elements within the selected COA to wargame (as turns).
Recording. Accurate recording is vital. This task should be given to a good staff officer who is
fully conversant with the plan and able to garner findings without prompts from the Chief
Controller. A simple COA Wargame record sheet is essential. Suggested headings are at Figure
26-3.

Effect
Effect on on Decision
Timeframe Action Reaction Consideration
Adversary Friendly Taken
Forces

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

Table 26-3: Suggested COA Wargame record sheet headings

The enemy has a vote, and oppositional factors will apply. The Red Cell should play to win. It
should use all capabilities and its COA should tend towards the MD. Additionally, frictions will
occur. For both these reasons, if there is one ‘take away’ COA Wargaming mantra, it is:
‘Run to the pain!’
Appendix 1. COA Wargaming set-up and preparation
To properly conduct a COA Wargame the following equipment and aides are required:
· One or more maps or charts on a birdtable or cloth model on a floor, of sufficient size and
detail to enable participants to see relevant details.
· Counters or icons to represent friendly, adversary and other actor Force Elements,
humanitarians and populations to the required level of detail. These can already be on the
map, or be placed as players explain their laydowns.
· Chairs or benches to allow the ‘1st XI’ to sit at the birdtable with supporting staff behind
them, probably stood. The scribe and OA are among the 1st XI.
· Projection facilities with relevant products ready to view.
· Scribe’s record sheet.
· Pointers, electronic or manual.
The following need to be premeditated by the Chief Controller, and constitute the initial brief
(see Sequence of Events):
· Aim of the wargame.
· Attendance, including role and function.
· Mechanics (unless everyone is familiar with the COA Wargaming process).
· Wargame turns and timings. Each turn should be defined, ‘bounded’ and have an
allocated time in which to conduct it. The wargame turns are derived from the
Commander’s highest priority risks, or perceived areas of weakness in the plan. There is
rarely time to ‘step-through’ an entire plan, so expect discrete turns, possibly in entirely
different phases of the operation, or even the repetition of a turn using different
assumptions.
· Inputs available. See draft staff products, below.
· Recording method and the primacy of the Scribe.
· Higher Commander’s guidance, as appropriate.
· Key estimate outcomes, as appropriate.
· Key assumptions, as appropriate.
The following draft staff products are required (this is a guideline only; the situation dictates):
· Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix.
· CONOPS paragraph for the overall plan and for each wargame turn, with at least an Intent,
Scheme of Manoeuvre and Endstate.
· Manoeuvre schematics.
· Target lists.
· Battle Space Management (BSM) products.
· ORBAT/TASKORG and envisaged ‘laydown’ for the initial situation and each wargame
turn.
The following are also required:
· A Red Cell plan (tending towards the MD enemy COA) and CONOPS for each turn. These
must have been reviewed and agreed by the Chief Controller.
· Staff- and OA-provided answers to likely combat outcomes, time & space calculations,
logistics usage, CCIRs etc. These are identified during the estimate and enough time
allowed to enable considered answers to be presented during the COA Wargame.
Chapter 27. Connections: The Conference for Wargaming Professionals
The Connections mission:
'To advance and preserve the art, science and application of wargaming.'
This chapter is a contribution by Matt Caffrey, the father of the Connections interdisciplinary
wargame conferences.
Introduction
What became the Connections series of conferences began on the eve of Christmas eve 1992.
It was after lunch and I was already thinking about what I needed to do before going home and
what could wait until after the holidays. Then the phone rang. “John Warden here,” the voice
said, “I want to talk to you about wargaming.”
I was stunned, for two reasons. First, Colonel John Warden was (and is) something of a living
[433]
legend. Author of The Air Campaign , he had led the joint group in the basement of the
Pentagon that created the Instant Thunder plan. After the plan was transferred to theater it had
evolved into the plan Desert Storm. Later, he had received a mandate from the Chief of Staff of
the US Air Force to assume the position of Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College
(ACSC). His task was to completely re-work the curriculum to develop future Joint Air
Component Commanders, that is, the leaders who could help develop overall war strategy and
win the air slice of future Joint campaigns. Second, I did not (and to this day do not) know why
he chose me to call on wargaming. I had been in the audience during two of his talks, but we
had not been introduced. I did work for him indirectly – as Commandant he oversaw the USAF’s
School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) – and I worked for the Dean of SAAS as the
Research Assistant for Wargaming. Maybe his staff told him of the wargames I had designed
and developed for ACSC, or he may have remembered me as the author of the chapter on
wargaming for all three editions of the Project Warrior Professional Development Guide.
I had little time to wonder why as our conversation was brisk. I learned he was dissatisfied with
Air Force wargaming. He stated his Instant Thunder plan was put in jeopardy by a wargame that
did not reflect second order effects of his bombing campaign. Now leading ACSC, he was
working to teach the ability to analyse and ultimately defeat an enemy by understanding them
as a system, yet the school’s current wargames (including mine) only showed the direct effects
of destroying enemy weapons. Further, these wargames seemed cumbersome at best, forcing
students to spend more of their limited time learning the game then learning about war. He
asked me if all wargames were as poor as those he had encountered.
I replied that the worst published wargame was less cumbersome to execute than the best
government-produced wargame – but few published wargames depicted airpower. I reported
that the Navy had made some interesting advances in wargaming; the Army had created
wargames that were more mobile; the Marines had aligned the type of wargame they used to the
level of warfare they depicted; and an Australian publisher had made some real breakthroughs
in the application of Artificial Intelligence. Col Warden asked, “Is anyone doing everything
right?” I said, no. He asked if there was anything we could do to improve the state of
wargaming. I said that perhaps we could get practitioners from different sectors of the
wargaming field together, so they could learn best practices from each other. He said, “Go
ahead” and immediately asked another question.
Just four months later, the first Connections conference brought together the biggest names in
wargaming: James Dunnigan, Dr. Peter Perla, Dr Al Nofi and Joseph Miranda, along with
Hollywood screen writers like Flint Dille. Actually, the first Connections was not called
Connections. Early in the planning we had decided the conference should also include talks by
experts in areas no one was wargaming well. First on that list was airpower. Specifically, our
plan was to educate commercial wargame publishers about airpower so more future published
wargames would depict airpower and those that did would depict it well. So, our original name
was the Airpower Education and Wargaming Conference. You can see why we shortened it to
Connections the second year. Connections benefited from, and would continue to benefit from,
the strong, direct support and participation of the Air University Commander Lieutenant General
Joseph Redden. From the start our mission has been to advance the art and science of
wargaming.
Each year, Connections added new elements, increasing our effectiveness. In 1996 we added a
‘First timers’ Day, so that folks new to wargaming could be brought sufficiently up to speed to
benefit from the remainder of the conference. In 1997, when the Air Force Wargaming Institute
(AFWI) became co-executive agent (with ACSC) of Connections, their action officer, Red Urban,
initiated ‘Demo Night’ and soon had forty government and commercial providers demonstrating
their latest achievements. The next year Red added ‘Game Night’, during which participants
could get hands-on experience with some of the wargames demonstrated the night before. In
1999, we added Friday seminars to cover advanced topics in greater depth. Perhaps our biggest
advance came in 2002. In that year we added ‘application’ to our mission statement ‘to advance
the art, science and application of wargaming.’ We also introduced working groups and the last
day out-brief from these. The advanced seminars moved to the first day replacing ‘First Timers’
with seminars appropriate to the range of participants’ knowledge and need. 2002 would also be
the last time Connections would be held at Air University for many years.
Connections then adopted its current mode of recruiting a different sponsor each year. The
sponsor provided the venue and some logistical support, and picked that year’s theme. Also,
one of the working groups would tackle a problem of the host’s choice. Over the years
Connections has been held at the National Defense University (NDU), Washington DC, The
Marine Corps Wargaming Division, Quantico VA, the USAF Academy Colorado Springs,
Colorado, HQ Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Dayton Ohio and the AFRL Research Site
at Rome, New York. It was also held in Orlando, Florida, and hosted by the Air Force Agency for
Modelling and Simulation in parallel with another conference. In 2016 Connections made it back
to the Air University with the LeMay Center Wargaming Directorate as the host.
Over the years Connections has benefited from the insights of many excellent keynote
speakers. These have included: Col John Warden, Major General (later Lieutenant General)
David Deptula, James Dunnigan (the ‘dean’ of popular wargaming), Mark Herman (former vice
president for wargaming with the defense contractor Booz, Allen, Hamilton), Joseph
Miranda (the most prolific war-game designer and editor of Strategy and Tactics) and Larry
Bond (designer of Harpoon and co-author of Red Storm Rising with Tom Clancy). Perhaps our
most memorable keynote speaker was the Nobel Laureate, nuclear theorist and wargame
pioneer, Dr. Thomas Schelling. Not only did he deliver an outstanding talk, his remarks to our
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conference were transcribed and published in the wargaming anthology Zones of Control.
The untimely passing of Mo Morgan in 2014 was a reminder that the generation who grew up
playing Avalon Hill and SPI games in the 1970’s, and remain many of the key figures in the
wargaming profession, are not getting any younger. Then, in 2016 during our post Connections
‘hot wash’ Ellie Bartels observed that all the men then on stage were ‘hair pigment challenged
(gray), and stated that we needed to do more to bring young people into the planning and
execution of Connections. This prompted several steps including the latest adjustment to our
mission statement, ‘to advance and preserve the art, science and application of wargaming.’
Connections has renewed its commitment to being an opportunity for students and young
professionals with a serious interest in professional wargaming to meet and interact with the
practitioners they might hope to join.
Connections has always been about building ties between the various parts of the professional
wargaming community. As time has gone on, we have expanded our scope and reach to include
practitioners outside traditional defense-oriented wargaming, for the simple reason that we all
have much to learn from each other. Gaming as a tool for research, analysis, education, and
policy has emerged in many places, often spontaneously, often without linkages to others doing
similar work. Like the Galapagos finches, wargaming develops independently on each of these
little islands of practice, evolving specialized approaches and practices independent of what
might be going on elsewhere. The many opportunities to learn from each other grow from this
fractured map of the discipline. Connections exists to bridge those gaps, to provide
practitioners a place to conduct a professional dialogue about techniques and best practices.
My conference co-chair, Tim Wilkie, spoke about this at Connections 2012, describing our
collective effort as ‘navigating the archipelago of excellence.’
Connections continues to evolve. In 2012 Prof. Rex Brynen originated our popular Game Lab
segment. For several years, Dr. Stephen Downes-Martin has been increasing the rigor of our
working groups. The most effective recent innovation came in 2018 when Scott Chambers, NDU
reworked our Game Lab segment into a kind of speed dating for wargame consulting. One thing
that has not changed: Connections remains an all-volunteer organisation, and each
Connections depends on the contributions of long-time supporters like Paul Vebber, US Navy,
and youngish folks like Chris Cummins, Decision Games.
In recent years, the Connections model has inspired others to undertake similar ventures, many
of whom have even adopted the Connections name. In 2013 the United Kingdom began their
extremely successful Connections UK conferences at King’s College London (they attracted
participants from 19 nations in 2017 and 2018). They were followed in 2014 by the Australians.
Connections Netherlands followed in 2015. The Canadians began Connections North in 2017
and the French launched a Connections-like conference in late 2018. This is now truly an
international movement.
So, with all the international emulation of Connections have we achieved our mission? Can we
rest? No, for two reasons. First, our adversaries have been investing money and people in
developing their wargaming abilities; we need to keep advancing to avoid falling behind.
Second, we may be close to a breakthrough in wargaming. For two hundred years wargaming
has sought to win wars with fewer casualties, less loss of national treasure and in less time. As
Sun Tzu wrote 2,500 years ago, the apogee of strategy is to win without fighting. Can wargames
become so effective they will help us avoid wars all together? If wargames ever evolve into
‘peacegames’, something like Connections will be needed to bring together experts in all
necessary disciplines to create something no one discipline could create.
Maybe it is appropriate that all this started on the eve of Christmas eve.
Chapter 28. Conclusion
The primary purpose of this book was to suggest, share and stimulate wargaming best practice.
An important secondary aim was to capture a snapshot of wargaming in 2019, albeit from an
admittedly UK perspective and given that Defence is my background and current domain.
Cognisant of Peter Perla’s ‘sine wave’ of wargaming acceptability, I will focus in this conclusion
on where wargaming could go, because we might be able to break the boom and bust
application of wargaming. To achieve this, and set wargaming on an ever-upwards trajectory, we
must leverage the world-wide Connections community, which is the focus for so much serious
wargaming.
First and foremost, absent centralised MOD or DOD initiatives, the Connections community
should expand to fill the gaps in wargaming governance. That is certainly what is happening
with Connections UK, which is the de facto driving force behind MOD UK wargaming. This is not
how it should be, but is currently the case.
Next, we need to harness the creativity of the entire Connections community, whether they be
serious practitioners, hobby gamers, business folk, academics or whatever. Debating and
sharing best practice is crucial, be this face-to-face or tapping into global connectivity. Forums
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such as PAXsims play a key role in this. So do e-mail exchanges, but we must find a way of
capturing these discussions between relatively small groups and sharing them. Someone will
need to manage this information in accessible repositories. However, online media cannot
replace the invaluable networking and ideas exchange that takes place in person at Connections
(US, UK, Netherlands, North/Canada, Australia and France) and similar conferences such as
those hosted by various Operations Research societies. You should make every effort to attend
these conferences and participate to whatever degree you feel comfortable.
The longevity of the Connections community depends on succession planning. This has been
mooted repeatedly over the years, but we have yet to turn these beginnings into reality. We
must, and soon: within the period of conceiving and writing this book Peter Perla has retired,
Andrew Sharpe has left the Army and Phil Sabin has announced his retirement from King’s
College London.
We need to influence the existing and potential users of wargames, but not in a shrill “You must
wargame!” sort of way. The tactic of targeting senior officers appeared sensible, but we have
suffered greatly from personnel ‘churn’ and senior ranks leaving the Services; we convince a
champion, who promptly departs to pastures new. Wargaming should be inculcated during initial
education and training, so that newcomers carry the technique forward and institutionalise it.
Finally, we must stand tall and put our heads and torsos ‘above the parapet’, proclaiming and
explaining the utility of wargaming, while using that term unabashed. To my shame, this is
something I did not do for much of my Army service.
This is all feasible, but our wargaming movement remains fragile, and Peter’s sine wave could
easily take another downturn. Wargaming funding is subject to the whim of senior policy
makers, and the advancement of wargaming is dependent on the efforts of a tiny band of
dedicated souls. These are the folk I referred to in my acknowledgments, nearly 500 pages ago,
and they number maybe two dozen people around the globe. It is these stalwarts who lead the
effort to ‘push the wargaming ball up hill’. But if we can harness the energy of the Connections
family, then maybe – just maybe – we will find that we have pushed the ball into the gently
sloping sunlight uplands of wargaming and, as Matt Caffrey said at the end of the previous
chapter, ‘peacegaming’ that will help to prevent future conflicts.
Bibliography
Essential reading

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professional wargaming, this should be the one.
MOD. (2017) MOD Wargaming Handbook Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre. This
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Downes-Martin, S. (2015) Stress, Paranoia and Cheating: The Three Furies of Innovative
Wargaming Connections US Wargaming Conference, National Defense University Washington
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Downes-Martin, S. (2016) Wargaming to Deceive the Sponsor: Why and How? Connections UK
Annual Wargaming Conference, London.
Downes-Martin, S. (2017) Validity and Utility of Wargaming, MORS Wargaming Special Meeting.
Available online
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Downes-Martin, S. (2018) Swarm Gaming Approach to Organizing In-Stride Games, In-Stride
Adjudication Working Group, Connections US Wargaming Conference, National Defense
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Harrigan, P and Kirschenbaum, M (Eds) (2016) Zones of Control; Perspectives on Wargaming
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MOD. (2018) Planning and Execution Handbook.
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Concept’ Maintenance Journal of Marketing Research Vol. 45, No. 6.
McGonigal, J. (2012) Reality is Broken, Vintage Books.
Nijstad, B., Stroebe, W. and Lodewijkx, H. (2006) ‘The illusion of group productivity: A Reduction
of Failures Explanation’ European Journal of Social Psychology, 36(1):31 - 48.
Sabin, P. (2007) Lost Battles: Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World Continuum
International Publishing Group Ltd. Classic analysis of history through wargaming.
Salen, K and Zimmerman, E. (2004) Rules of Play; Game Design Fundamentals The MIT Press.
Schroeder, D. (2011) Business in the Trenches SPW.
Stefano, G., Gino, F., Pisani, G., Staats, B. (2014) Making Experience Count: The Role of
Reflection in Individual Learning Harvard Business School Working Paper 14-093. Available
online
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-093_defe8327-eeb6-40c3-aafe-
26194181cfd2.pdf

Examples of professional wargaming methods

For other examples see www.wargaming.co.

Curry J. and Price T. (2014) Matrix Games for Modern Wargaming Developments in Professional
and Educational Wargames Innovations in Wargaming Volume 2 The History of Wargaming
Project. The book on how to run matrix games.
Curry J. and Price T. (2016) Sandhurst Kriegsspiel: Wargaming for the Modern Infantry Officer
Training for War: Volume 1 The History of Wargaming Project. Straightforward training games
for the military.
Curry J. and Young M. (2017) The Confrontation Analysis Handbook: How to Resolve
Confrontations by Eliminating Dilemmas The History of Wargaming. Less a game, more a
structured operational method, this book explains the method and gives examples from
professional use in the UK.
Curry J. and Price T. (2017) Modern Crises Scenarios for Matrix Wargames. The History of
Wargaming Project. More sample games used in professional military education in the UK.
Curry J., Engle C. and Perla P. (eds) (2018) The Matrix Game Handbook: Professional
Applications from Education to Analysis and Wargaming The History of Wargaming Project. A
more academic examination of the application and value of matrix games.
King, R. (2015) It Could Happen Tomorrow Emergency Planning Exercises for the Health
Service and Business The History of Wargaming Project. Detailed examples of games that
have been used in the UK health service.

Examples of professional Counter Insurgence (COIN) wargames

There are few examples in the public domain. Listed below are some of those readily available.
For other examples see www.wargaming.co.
Armatys J. and Curry J. (2019) The Pentagon's Rural AGILE/COIN Wargame (1966): A
wargaming counter insurgency megagame Level The History of Wargaming Project
Curry, J. (2012) Innovations in Wargaming, Vol 1 The History of Wargaming Project. The History
of Wargaming Project. Examples of different methods of gaming including two COIN games.
Curry J. (2018) Pentagon Urban COIN Wargame (1966): A wargaming counter insurgency
megagame Level The History of Wargaming Project.
Griffith. P. (2016) Curry, J. (Eds) Paddy Griffith’s Counter Insurgency Wargames (1980) The
History of Wargaming Project.

Hobby wargaming books

Featherstone, D. (1975) Skirmish Wargames Patrick Stephens Limited.

Sources of Further Information

PAXsims: https://paxsims.wordpress.com/ PAXsims has the most active and informative series of posts on all-
matters gaming, thanks to the boundless energy of Professor Rex Brynen and his team of associate editors.
Connections (US): https://connections-wargaming.com/ The original Connections!
Connections UK: http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/ This has grown to be a unique repository of wargaming
information, thanks to the efforts of Tom Mouat. The audio and, in most cases, video of all talks since 2013 are
available to download; a fantastic resource.
War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/ This hosts the most ‘grown up’ series of discussions and interviews
on wargaming and Defense matters.
Simulating War: https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/simulatingwar/info Initially centring around Phil’s eponymous
book, this forum has naturally expanded to cover many wargaming topics.
RAND Published Research: https://www.rand.org/pubs.html
RAND Centre for Gaming: https://www.prgs.edu/research/methods-centers/gaming.html
Op Analytics: http://opanalytics.ca/
Simulation and Gaming Journal: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/sag
ConsimWorld http://www.consimworld.com/
Grogheads: http://grogheads.com/
Story-Living Games: https://www.storylivinggames.com/
Play The Past: http://www.playthepast.org/
UIS Naval War College Review: https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review
US Army War College Quarterly Parameters:
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/
National Defense University Press Joint Force Quarterly:
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/
[1]
See MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, Annex A – Applying wargaming to Defence problems: Case study 1 –
Wargaming in campaign and operational planning: shaping peace support operations in Afghanistan, 2011, pp. 66-
69.
[2]
The events were publicly known as ‘Synchronisation of Efforts’ (SoE) conferences rather than ‘wargames’ due to
the political sensitivities of some of the civilian agencies involved. See p. 34 for reputational and connotative issues
of using the term ‘wargame’, and advice on what to do.
[3]
Connections UK was the first extension of the Connections ‘franchise’, started in the US by Matt Caffrey (see
Chapter 27 for more information). The ‘franchise’ has since expanded beyond the US and UK and includes
conferences in the Netherlands, Australia, Canada (‘North’) and, most recently, France.
[4]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook.
[5]
Air Marshal Edward Stringer's talk on ‘Advancing the UK’s Analytical Tools to Address Modern Deterrence and
Strategic Competition’
https://soundcloud.com/warstudies/event-advancing-the-uks-analytical-tools-to-address-strategic-competition-and-
modern-deterrence/s-zoK88?in=warstudies/sets/events dated April 2019.
[6]
See p. 8 and the remark on the fact that those who take warfare seriously, wargame.
[7]
The Naval War College Department of Wargaming has one of the largest, re-configurable and state of the art
facilities – a 100,000+ square-foot wargaming facility.
[8]
http://www.jhuapl.edu/CAC/#
[9]
Dstl is the UK’s leading government agency in applying science and technology (S&T) to the Defence and
security of the UK.
[10]
For further information see the UK MOD ‘Global Strategic Trends – The Future Starts Today’ publication,
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends
[11]
The contents of this foreword include views and opinions expressed by the author that do not necessarily
reflect official policy. The foreword has been cleared for release by the UK MOD’s Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory (public release identifier DSTL/PUB115861).
[12]
Moved to the Planning and Execution Handbook in 2018.
[13]
www.wargaming.co
[14]
For example, see http://www.anquangroup.com/
[15]
www.lbsconsultancy.co.uk
[16]
Sabin (2012).
[17]
Perla (1990).
[18]
McHugh (1966).
[19]
Caffrey (2019).
[20]
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/
[21]
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, see www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-science-and-
technology-laboratory
[22]
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-wargaming-handbook
[23]
www.jwc.nato.int/
[24]
This is the mission statement of the Connections wargaming conference, the subject of Chapter 27.
[25]
A conference for wargaming professionals, and a ‘franchise’ of Matt Caffrey’s (US) original Connections.
[26]
Rubel (2006), p. 111.
[27]
For example, see ‘Outgunned. Buying butter, not guns: why Germany needs a better army. Generals are
worried about Russia. Voters are not.’ The Economist July 28th 2018, p.23.
[28]
Photo: Vladimir V. Burov, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic license, unmodified.
[29]
Vakademii Genshtaba poiavilsia tsentr voennykh igr, 24 marta 2017, (https:// russian.rt.com/
Russia/news/371695genshtab-centrvoennykh-igr, quoted in ‘How Russia ‘Plays’ at War’, Dr Steven J Main, British
Army Review 171: Winter 2018, p.53.
[30]
This is the name of a 2008 Decision Games Wargame.
[31]
See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2016WargamingwiththePLA.pdf
[32]
Ibid, slide 15.
[33]
The Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies in the Operations Directorate of the Israel Defense Forces
General Staff is a body whose purpose is to advance the operational thinking and learning processes in the IDF
(Wikipedia).
[34]
A vignette is ‘A discrete action, or series of connected actions, confined to a very specific and limited situation.’
See chapters 19 – 21 for more detail.
[35]
A wicked problem is ‘a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and
changing requirements that are often difficult to recognise.’ Wikipedia.
[36]
Perla (1990), p. 156.
[37]
Ibid, pp. 15 – 160 and Caffrey (2019).
[38]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017), pp.19 – 20.
[39]
Strong (2017) available at https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/2017-12-10-watu-mors.pdf
[40]
See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2017.html
[41]
Note the parallel with von Muffling’s 1824 statement “This is not a game: it is training for war!”
[42]
For further reading, see: Lillard (2016), pp.88 – 128 in particular; Nofi (2010); and Nofi’s paper in the Afterword
to the 2010 edition of Peter Perla’s The Art Of Wargaming.
[43]
Taken from a speech by Admiral Nimitz to the US Naval War College in October 1960, and quoted in the MOD
Wargaming Handbook, (2017), p.4.
[44]
Perla, quoted in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p. 178.
[45]
This had been built up by the Research Department (later Intelligence and Research; then Intelligence) at the
Naval War College.
[46]
For more detail see Lillard (2016), p.106.
[47]
For more detail see ibid, p.125.
[48]
Ibid, p.74.
[49]
Ibid, p. 129.
[50]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017).
[51]
Rice, C and Zegart, A, ‘Managing 21st-Century Political Risk’, Harvard Business Review May - June 2018, p.135.
[52]
Caffrey (2019).
[53]
Ibid, pp. 277 – 290.
[54]
Levine, Schelling, and Jones (1991, original 1964), p.27.
[55]
Also attributed to Richard Lingard. A Letter of Advice to a Young Gentleman Leaveing the University Concerning
His Behaviour and Conversation in the World, 1670. 'If you would read a man's disposition see him game, you will
then learn more of him in one hour, than in seven years conversation.'
[56]
Available at https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/gaming-the-system-obstacles-to-reinvigorating-defense-
wargaming/
[57]
Naval War College Review (Winter 2014), vol. 67, no. 1.
[58]
A CNA and Naval War College paper (September 2004).
[59]
Speaker’s notes to a presentation to Connections UK (2016).
[60]
Naval War College Review (Summer 2011), Vol. 64, No. 3.
[61]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, pp.12-13.
[62]
William F. Owen (2019), What’s Wrong with Professional Wargaming? draft paper.
[63]
See Levine, Schelling, and Jones (1991, original 1964) for the genesis of this discussion.
[64]
The Free Dictionary.
[65]
Cambridge Dictionary.
[66]
Ibid
[67]
Merriam-Webster.
[68]
Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank; Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, David A. Shlapak and
Michael Johnson, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html
[69]
For example, see War on the Rocks https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-
how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/
[70]
Downes-Martin (2016), p.1. See also Downes-Martin (2014).
[71]
'Greenwashing' is the use of marketing to portray an organisation's products, activities or policies as
environmentally friendly when they are not.
[72]
Levine, Schelling, and Jones (1991, original 1964), p.1.
[73]
‘A common language between speakers whose native languages are different.’ Oxford Dictionaries.
[74]
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/
[75]
https://warontherocks.com/
[76]
http://opanalytics.ca/navair/
[77]
Downes-Martin (2014), p.31.
[78]
Pettijohn and Shlapak (2016) Gaming the system: obstacles to reinvigorating defense wargaming. Available at
War on the Rocks at https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/gaming-the-system-obstacles-to-reinvigorating-defense-
wargaming/
[79]
Sabin (2012).
[80]
http://www.elliebartels.com/uploads/1/1/0/6/110629149/mors_cop_gaming_community_survey_briefing_7sept2017.pdf
[81]
McHugh (1966), pp. 2-3.
[82]
Presentation to Connections UK 2018.
[83]
NATO AAP-6 Glossary.
[84]
MOD (2013), Red Teaming Guide.
[85]
MOD (2017) Wargaming Handbook p.5.
[86]
‘Operation Fleet Street’, devised by Military Formats in Business, in conjunction with PricewaterhouseCoopers
Netherlands. See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/pwcmfibbusinesswargamedemo.pdf
[87]
See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2016Keynote-McGrady.pdf
[88]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, p.43.
[89]
3 (UK) Division (1999) Wargaming Aide Memoire 2nd Edition, p.1.
[90]
See King (2015) for scenarios gamed by emergency services and business.
[91]
Rubel (2006), p.110.
[92]
Lind (1985), p.46.
[93]
‘Setting’ and ‘scenario’ will be differentiated later; run with ‘scenario’ for now.
[94]
Dstl, Defence and Security Analysis Division. Dated. 28th March 2017.
[95]
Department of Defense Instruction Number 5000.61: ‘Modeling and Simulation Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation’. Department of Defense. 2009-12-09.
[96]
MOD (2013) Red Teaming Guide, p.1-3.
[97]
Idid, p. 3-9, 3-11 and A-29.
[98]
UK MOD Defence Standard 03-44, p.1-2.
[99]
Caffrey (2019), p.262.
[100]
Perla (1990), Part 2 ‘Principles’.
[101]
Caffrey (2019), Part 2 ‘Towards More-Effective Wargaming’.
[102]
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.
[103]
Perla (1990), p.164.
[104]
Introduced at Connections 2016.
[105]
NATO APP-6, 2008, Glossary.
[106]
MOD (2017) Wargaming Handbook, p.5-6.
[107]
Ibid, pp.8-9.
[108]
McHugh (1966), p. 9, reproduced in the MOD (2017) Wargaming Handbook, p.10.
[109]
See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2015.html
[110]
Koster (2005), p.146.
[111]
Ibid, p.148.
[112]
See, for example, Perla (1990), p.183.
[113]
This refers to Downes-Martin (2013), pp.67-80.
[114]
Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p.175.
[115]
Levine, Schelling, and Jones (1991, original 1964), p. 40.
[116]
Peter Perla, writing in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p.180.
[117]
See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2013.html
[118]
Bunch Of Guys Sitting Around A Table, a term used to describe an unstructured discussion.
[119]
Ibid, p.2.
[120]
Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset Rules v5.2 dated December 2017, p.4.
[121]
McHugh (1966), p.8.
[122]
Ibid, p.2.
[123]
UK Dstl’s Peace Support Operations Model.
[124]
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
[125]
http://paxsims.wordpress.com/2012/07/06/comments-wanted-draft-cgsc-stability-operations-simulation-
requirements/#comment-3940
[126]
US Naval War College (2011), Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report, 14, p.4.
[127]
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2016/12/21/reflections-on-the-wargame-spectrum/
[128]
The chapter is the full, and updated, version of the draft COA Wargaming section I wrote for the UK Staff
Officer’s Handbook.
[129]
UK MOD Defence Standard 03-44, p.2.
[130]
Ibid, p.2.
[131]
Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p.184.
[132]
A definition of ‘scenario’ from dictionary.com.
[133]
MOD (2017) Wargaming Handbook, p.34.
[134]
For more detail, see Downes-Martin (2013), pp.67-80.
[135]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, p.24.
[136]
Ibid, p. 43.
[137]
Observe – Orient – Decide – Act, Colonel John Boyd, USAF.
[138]
There are several versions of this diagram. Colin Marston’s Dstl version is available on the PAXsims website at
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2016/12/21/reflections-on-the-wargame-spectrum/
[139]
A wargame with a map-table for each of two sides, plus one for umpires. Both sides' dispositions and
movement remain hidden until intelligence or surveillance activities reveal them, with outcomes determined by
umpires.
[140]
See Downes-Martin (2013).
[141]
Dstl/WP100280, Wargaming in Defence; A Thinkpiece for VCDS v2.0, dated 20170201.
[142]
Ibid., page 8.
[143]
Interactions can be kinetic (for example, combat) or non-kinetic (for example, a meeting or aid delivery).
[144]
OED.
[145]
Green (2004), pp. 463–47.
[146]
MOD (2017) Wargaming Handbook, pp.43-44.
[147]
See Pettijohn, S, Strategic Wargaming at Connections UK 2016. Slides, audio and video available at
http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2016.html
[148]
OED.
[149]
See slide 2 at https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/dstl-adjudication.pdf
[150]
Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016).
[151]
Source unknown, but a staple comment among OA practitioners.
[152]
Literally translated from the French as ‘grumbler’. A grognard was a soldier of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard,
officially formed in 1804. Having served the Emperor for years, while remaining loyal to him the grognards – like all
soldiers – were prone to complain about their treatment and use in battle. The term is now applied to wargamers –
and with good reason!
[153]
Sabin (2012), pp. 202-220.
[154]
Developed by Mark Flanagan and shown at Connections UK 2016.
[155]
Go to http://rprod.com/index.php?page=description-22 to see what it looks like.
[156]
Some combinations are clearly mutually exclusively, such as a solitaire megagame.
[157]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017), pp.39 and 45-46.
[158]
One form of this is the Crisis Management Exercise; see explanatory text below.
[159]
Sometimes called ‘domains’, in Defence these are land, air, maritime, space and cyber.
[160]
Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time.
[161]
Source: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/emergency-planning-and-preparedness-exercises-and-training
[162]
Source: https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-8890/hseep_apr13_.pdf
[163]
Miniatures, typically 1/300th scale, are also used for vehicle recognition training because they are more
effective than computer recognition packages.
[164]
See, for example, Featherstone (1975).
[165]
Heiden (2005).
[166]
Typically using SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, interviews and clustering.
[167]
Koster (2005), p.232.
[168]
See the forthcoming Rosenstrasse, which ‘is a highly structured historical role-playing scenario about the
eponymous women-led protests in 1943’, War Birds, currently on Kickstarter.
[169]
Compare these extracts from the D&D 5th Edition Starter Set to the characteristics of professional games and
the requirements of the facilitator discussed in Chapter 23: ‘The DM [Dungeon Master] is a referee… The DM is a
narrator… Although the DM controls the adventure, the relationship between the players and DM isn’t adversarial.
The DM’s job is to challenge the characters with interesting encounters and tests, keep the game moving, and apply
the rules fairly… [The DM should]: be consistent; make sure everyone is involved; and be fair… D&D gives structure
to the stories – a way of determining the consequences of the adventurers’ actions.’
[170]
US Naval War College (2015), p.6.
[171]
Downes-Martin (2013).
[172]
Intelicons are 'a codified visual language that can augment the current suite of symbols and reflects the
complexity found in complex multi-actor environments' devised by AW2 Consulting.
[173]
For more on ‘in-stride’ adjudication, see the Connections US 2018 In-Stride Adjudication Working Group
report at https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2018/09/12/in-stride-adjudication-connections-2018-working-group-report/
[174]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017).
[175]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017), p.21.
[176]
See also Gaming the semi-cooperative, available on PAXsims at
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2016/02/02/gaming-the-semi-cooperative/
[177]
Friction has been defined as ‘the propensity of unexpected delays to occur during armed conflicts.’
Simpson (2015).
[178]
Defined in Chapter 2 as ‘The act of opposing or resisting; something that acts as an obstacle to some course
or progress.’
[179]
Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, section # 28.
[180]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017), p.22.
[181]
Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, section # 28.
[182]
MOD Wargaming Handbook (2017), pp.22-23.
[183]
For more on uncertainty, see the MIT press monograph at https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/uncertainty-games
[184]
Ibid, p.23.
[185]
Commander Field Army presentation to General Staff Conference, 12 January 2017.
[186]
Brig Dr Meir Finkel, IDF, speaking at the I/ITSEC Conference, 3 December 2015.
[187]
Lind (1985), p.43.
[188]
Ed McGrady, Introduction to Wargaming Class, MORS Wargaming Special Meeting, Alexandria, Virginia, US, 17
October 2016.
[189]
Co-author of Red Storm Rising and wargame designer, including the Harpoon series.
[190]
Persian Incursion (2010), Clash of Arms, Game Rules p.4.
[191]
Military strategy; Wargames. To understand war, American officials are playing board games, The Economist,
March 15th 2014.
[192]
Koster(2005), p.96.
[193]
Ibid, p. 23.
[194]
Ibid, p.28.
[195]
See, for example The Technical Cooperation Program (2006) and the UK Land Handbook – Force Development
Analysis and Experimentation (2014).
[196]
For more information, see Pournelle (2014).
[197]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, p.25.
[198]
Dunnigan (2000), p.147.
[199]
KCL War Studies graduate, https://medium.com/smart-war/4daf4895c0fe
[200]
Brian Train, ‘Abstracted for Your Attention’, available at http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2013.html
[201]
Sabin (2012), pp.19 and 30.
[202]
Perla (1990), p.183.
[203]
Simpson (2015).
[204]
US Naval War College, War Gamers’ Handbook, A Guide for Professional War Gamers, p.10.
[205]
Professor Rex Brynen, ‘Ten (Not Entirely Randomly-Generated) Reflections on the Social Science of
Wargaming.’ See http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2016.html
[206]
Ibid.
[207]
Downes-Martin (2016), Wargaming to Deceive the Sponsor: Why and How? Speakers notes at Connections
UK September.
[208]
Downes-Martin (2014). See also Downes-Martin (2013).
[209]
Ibid, p.37.
[210]
Some lessons from history about wargaming and exercises, quoted in Perla (2010 edition), Afterword.
[211]
This has been periodically updated. See: Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016); Nofi in Perla (2010 edition),
Afterword; and Pournelle (2014).
[212]
Perla (1990), p.287.
[213]
Perla, writing in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p.176.
[214]
The Technical Cooperation Program (2006), p.12 - 16. Note the Experiment and Campaign Planning Flowchart
on p.31 and the detailed discussion of the GUIDEx Principle 4 (Defense experiments should be integrated into a
coherent campaign of activities to maximize their utility) on pp.107-116.
[215]
Land Handbook: Force Development Analysis and Experimentation, UK Army Director General Capability,
undated, pp. 3-1 and 3-10.
[216]
US Naval War College (2015), p.5.
[217]
Ibid, p.5.
[218]
Wikipedia. For a deeper discussion of inductive and deductive game designs and their impact on adjudication
see Downes-Martin, S. (2013) ‘Adjudication: the Diabolus in Machina of War Gaming’, Naval War College Review, Vol.
66, No. 3
[219]
US Naval Air Systems Command Wargame Course, Background for the Basic Analytic Wargaming Course from
the Naval Postgraduate School at China Lake, 31 July to 4 August 2017. See http://opanalytics.ca/navair/dcmp.html
[220]
Ibid.
[221]
Knoco stories: OILs - Observations, Insights and Lessons http://www.nickmilton.com/2013/02/oils-
observations-insights-and-lessons.html#ixzz5EKi5xAI2
[222]
The WGD defines analytical wargaming as a systematic research method for analysing war-fighting decisions
and decision-making behaviour. A wargame is a representation of a decision-making challenge, which may or may
not closely resemble what we can or will observe in the naturally occurring world. It is a representation of ‘real
warfare’ in the sense that players are making real war-fighting decisions. From a practical perspective, analytical
wargaming provides an opportunity to think deeply about a policy, strategy, operating concepts, operating plans, or
course of actions; rehearse decision-making; or create a learning experience for participants in making decisions
and experiencing the effects of interaction with an aggressive competitor.
[223]
The U.S. military is a joint force (Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marines, and Navy) that prepares to fight in
combined arms with coalitions and other partners in all warfighting domains (air, space, land, the surface of the
oceans, undersea, and in the littorals) using a full range of hard and soft power capabilities including cyber and
other information operations.
[224]
McCarty Little was appointed in 1887 as a member of the faculty and developed two-sided wargaming at the
College (Brightman and Dewey 2014). McHugh also credits McCarty Little with introducing wargaming in the College:
see McHugh (1966). McCarty Little’s papers on war gaming include Rules for the Conduct of War Games, Naval War
College, Newport RI (1901 and 1905); The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver, U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 38, No. 4, Whole No. 144 (1912); and The Chart Maneuver, Naval War College, Newport, RI (1920).
[225]
Jon Scott Logel reports on Van Auken’s appointment as Director of the Research Department at the College
and his team’s work analysing wargames in the inter-war period. See Jon Scott Logel, Captain Van Auken and the
Research Department of the Naval War College: Considerations of Analytical War Gaming in the Decade Before
Midway, prepared for the 2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium, US Naval Academy, 14-15 September 2017. Also
see, Lillard (2016).
[226]
For a professional wargamer’s perspective on McHugh’s influence see David DellaVolpe’s foreword to the
Naval War College reprint of McHugh’s 1966 volume. McHugh’s influence is reflected in the current U.S. Naval War
College War Gamers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional War Gamers, which was edited by Shawn Burns.
[227]
See McHugh (1966). McCarty Little’s 1912 lecture, which is entitled The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart
Maneuver, is reprinted in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 38, No.4, Whole No. 144.
[228]
Adapted by the authors based on Mr. Patrick Molenda’s and RADM John T. Palmer’s classified briefing,
Integrated Training, Wargaming, and Modelling and Simulation, dated 14 December 2017.
[229]
For detailed descriptions of the NWC WGD’s wargaming methodology, see McHugh (1966) and US Naval War
College (2015).
[230]
M Polski, extension based on US Naval War College (2015).
[231]
By ‘replicate’ we mean that another equally capable research team could duplicate the analysis using the same
data and obtain the same insights or findings. By ‘repeat’ we mean that the same game design could be played again
by another research team or the same research team with the same players or another group of players. By ‘iterate’
we mean that a new game could be designed and played that would represent the next step in a series of inquiries
with respect to the war-fighting challenge. For a more comprehensive discussion of how the WGD situates itself in
military operations research, see Polski, War Gaming Department Working Paper WGD_20181, U.S. Naval War
College, Newport, RI. April 2018.

[232]
Our definitions of validity, reliability, and replicability are drawn from King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).
Campbell and Stanley, who are concerned with experimental design, distinguish ‘internal validity’ from ‘external
validity’. Findings have internal validity if we can say that the experimental treatment made a difference in a specific
experimental instance. External validity refers to the extent to which findings can be generalized across other
populations, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables (Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley,
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, Rand McNally College Publishing Company (1963). For a
general primer on research design and planning, see Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research:
Planning and Design, Ninth Edition, Pearson (2010).
[233]
Polski, M (2018) A Warfighter’s Guide to Analysis, Wargaming Department Working Paper WGD 20181, U.S.
Naval War College, Newport RI.
[234]
Logel, J, Analysis Up Front: Planning and Managing Wargame Analysis, Presentation for the NWC International
Wargaming Course, June 2018.
[235]
See p. 171 for definitions of validity, reliability, and replicability.
[236]
Presentation to Connections UK 2018.
[237]
2016 e-mail exchange.
[238]
Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p.XVI.
[239]
NATO SAS Research Task Group (RTG) 139 is an operations research task group proposed by NATO Allied
Command Transformation. (ACT). The title for SAS-139/RTG is ‘NATO Analytical Wargaming – Innovative Approaches
for Data Capture, Analysis, and Exploitation’.
[240]
See: https://sgnfr.wordpress.com/serious-games-forum/
[241]
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency
[242]
NATO SAS Research Task Group RTG 139.
[243]
Summarised in Sabin (2012), p.22-27, published in Literary & Linguistic Computing, 26/3, September 2011, and
presented to the ‘Digital Humanities’ conference in July 2010.
[244]
Sabin (2012), p.23.
[245]
Ibid, p.26.
[246]
Abbreviations are: Training Audience (TA); Common Operations Picture (COP); Joint Operations Command
and Staff Training System (JOCASTS); Exercise Control (Excon); and Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset (RCAT).
[247]
Brynen, R ‘Gaming the Non-kinetic,’ in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016). See also Rex Brynen, ‘Gaming
Indirect Effects: From Cyber to Social Media,’ presentation made to the Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory, Dstl Portsdown West, June 2018, at https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/dstl-social-media-
cyber.pdf
[248]
Brynen, R, ‘Gaming Fog and Friction: How Simulations Enhance Student Understanding of Complex Policy
Processes,’ in Anna MacLeod and Matthew Schnurr, eds., Simulations and Student Learning: An Interdisciplinary
Perspective (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
[249]
For a broader discussion on the factors associated with more effective forecasting, see Brynen, R, ‘Here (Very
Likely) Be Dragons: The Challenges of Strategic Forecasting,’ in Thomas Juneau, ed., Strategic Analysis in Support
of International Policy Making (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). For the application of this to wargaming, see
Rex Brynen, ‘Wargaming and Forecasting,”’ presentation made to the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory,
Dstl Portsdown West, June 2018, at https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/dstl-forecasting.pdf
[250]
On messy problems, and the importance of unanticipated consequences and second and third order effects,
see Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,’ Policy Sciences 4 (1973), and
Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning, and Ramesh Chandra Thakur, eds., Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping
Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).
[251]
Dixson, M and Ma, F, An Investigation into Wargaming Methods to Enhance Capability Based Planning, DRDC-
RDDC-2017-D147 (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2018), Annex B, at http://cradpdf.drdc-
rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc293/p806080_A1b.pdf
[252]
Brynen, R, ‘Playtesting RCAT,’ PAXsims blog, 30 November 2015, at
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/playtesting-rcat/
[253]
Dixson, M and Ma, F, An Investigation into Wargaming Methods to Enhance Capability Based Planning, p. 20.
[254]
This is an actual example drawn from Paddy Griffith’s clever ‘Longreagh Village’ counterinsurgency game. See
John Curry, ed., Paddy Griffith’s Counter Insurgency Wargames (1980) (History of Wargaming Project, 2016).
[255]
Varda Liberman, Steven Samuels, and Lee Ross, ‘The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves,’ Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 30, 9 (2004). See also, Rex Brynen, ‘Ten (Not Entirely Randomly-Generated) Reflections on the Social
Science of Wargaming,’ keynote address to Connections UK, September 2016. Slides and video of presentation at
http://www.professionalwargaming.co.uk/2016.html
[256]
Perla and McGrady (2011).
[257]
Dunnigan (2000), p. 147.
[258]
Brynen, R, ‘Experimenting with DIRE STRAITS,’ PAXsims blog, 7 October 2017, at
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2017/10/07/experimenting-with-dire-straits/ See also Rex Brynen, ‘In the eye of the
beholder? Cognitive challenges in wargame analysis,’ presentation to the Connections UK, September 2018,
available at http://www.professionalwargaming.co.uk/2018.html

[259]
In one larger game of ISIS Crisis, for example, each actor was represented by a team in which there were
divergent interests, and simple decision rules for each team brought these to the fore without extensive involvement
by the game controller. By contrast, in DIRE Straits (a game exploring crisis stability in East Asia), the internal
dynamics of the Trump Administration were represented by a large policy game, which itself was nested into the
broader regional strategic game. See: Rex Brynen, ‘Exploring matrix games for mass atrocity prevention
and response,’ PAXsims blog, 3 June 2016, at https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2016/06/03/exploring-matrix-games-
for-mass-atrocity-prevention-and-response/ and Rex Brynen, ‘Dissecting DIRE STRAITS,’ PAXsims blog, 9
September 2017, at https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2017/09/09/dissecting-dire-straits/
[260]
This also reflects real world perspectives: many Sunnis in Iraq do tend to overestimate their share of the
population.
[261]
Brynen, R, Exploring US Engagement in the Middle East (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2016), at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/exploring-us-engagement-in-the-middle-east
[262]
Brynen, R, ‘(Ending) Civil War in the Classroom: A Peacebuilding Simulation.’” PS Political Science &
Politics 43, 1 (January 2010), available at https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2010/01/18/ending-civil-war-in-the-
classroom/

[263]
During the 1992 US election campaign, Bill Clinton had a sign in his office to keep him on message: ‘The
economy, stupid.’ Similarly, a robust process to design, develop and deliver a wargame is fundamental.
[264]
Cayirci and Marinicic (2009), p.16.
[265]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, p.51.
[266]
‘Through-Life Management is an integrated approach to management of the delivery of all aspects of military
capability, from identification of the need for the capability to its disposal.’ UK National Audit office, Ministry of
Defence Through-Life Management, 21 May 2003.
[267]
Perla (1990), pp.183 – 272.
[268]
This is an enhanced version of the diagram on p.51 of the MOD Wargaming Handbook.
[269]
Background for the Basic Analytic Wargaming Course from the Naval Postgraduate School at China Lake, 31
July to 4 August 2017, http://opanalytics.ca/navair/
[270]
US Naval War College (2015), p.14.
[271]
Ibid, p.7.
[272]
In a 2018 e-mail.
[273]
Downes-Martin (2014).
[274]
McHugh (1966).
[275]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, pp.52 – 55.
[276]
NATO (2013).
[277]
Perla (2010 edition of The Art of Wargaming), final chapter.
[278]
US Naval War College (2015), p.21.
[279]
NATO (2013), Appendix 1 to Annex M.
[280]
NATO (2013), p.4-28.
[281]
See ibid, p.C-1 to C-4, for a summary.
[282]
Ibid, p.C-1.
[283]
Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset, a Cranfield University/Dstl manual simulation system.
[284]
Quoted above, from the MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, pp.56-57.
[285]
Electronic voting featured, but other approaches are common: Deep Dives, Delphi analysis etc.
[286]
Start of Exercise (or wargame). Endex is the end of exercise (or wargame).
[287]
What A Good Idea If...
[288]
Commanding Officer’s Really Good Idea.
[289]
And/or Orange (armed non-state actors), Black (organised crime) etc.
[290]
The recreational wargame term for this is ‘plumpire’: a combination of ‘player’ and ‘umpire’. ‘Control’ is a more
formal term, likely to be more acceptable in the context of a serious game.
[291]
Something is sound, strong or fit for purpose; see Chapter 3 (Misnomers and Misunderstandings).
[292]
UK Defence Systems Approach to Training, Glossary of Terms.
[293]
Ibid.
[294]
Presentation to Connections UK 2018.
[295]
See https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/08/better-wargaming-helping-us-military-navigate-turbulent-
era/150653/?oref=d-river and https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/10/how-joint-staff-calculated-defense-
programs-return-investment/152171/ for links and articles on the DWAG repository.
[296]
Slides, notes and audio are available in the Day 3 section at http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2018.html
[297]
Consider surgery for example. Unless immediate life-saving surgery is required, a botched brain operation is
probably more damaging than no operation. There are obvious caveats to this principle.
[298]
US Naval War College (2015), p.46.
[299]
Bunch of Guys Sat Around a Table.
[300]
This is the informal practice at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (in which the US Naval War College’s
Wargaming Department resides) for research faculty and wargame staff.
[301]
‘Intellectual fraud’ refers to the generation of results at best not supported by analysis and at worst
contradicted by analysis. Its primary motive is not to gain an unearned financial or career benefit, although it may be
true that both result from the fraud.
[302]
My thanks to Paul Vebber for the term ‘madness of mobs’ in this context.
[303]
For details of this kind of problem and how to deal with it see the briefings and reports on the Puppet Mastery
web page at https://sites.google.com/site/stephendownesmartin/puppet-mastery
[304]
I have observed this to be true over many years and a huge number of meetings. I have no idea why it is true.
[305]
Everyone with their heads down typing into their groupware laptops means they are not engaging with each
other. Alternatively sitting slumped in a chair while a facilitator types onto a screen at the direction of members of
the group is one of the lesser known but more painful circles of hell. You might find it helpful to remove all the chairs
from the room.
[306]
One of the informal rules of wargaming is that ‘players cheat’. This is not necessarily a bad thing (Downes-
Martin 2015).
[307]
At an observed wargame a retired three-star leading the Blue Cell stated: “We mustn’t allow the game
schedule to interfere with this interesting conversation”, thus ensuring that critical data needed to analyse the
objectives of the active duty four-star sponsor was missing because the game director did not have the intestinal
fortitude or the support of his boss to deal with it. The sponsor blamed the wargaming organization, not his retired
three-star colleague.
[308]
Pre-game briefings.
[309]
Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and Gen. Paul Selva, Revitalizing Wargaming is Necessary to be
Prepared for Future Wars, War on the Rock, 8 December 2015. Bob Work was the Deputy Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Defense, General Paul Selva the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[310]
Perla and McGrady(2011), p. 125.
[311]
This chapter is based on a presentation I gave at 2016 Connections UK. See Connections UK 2016, Day 2,
Plenary 1 at http://professionalwargaming.co.uk/2016.html
[312]
Koster (2005), p.148.
[313]
Perla and McGrady (2011), p.113 and p.127.
[314]
Koster (2005), p.158 and p.184.
[315]
Ibid.
[316]
McGonigal (2012).
[317]
Fullerton (2008).
[318]
Salen and Zimmerman (2004),
[319]
Perla and McGrady (2011).
[320]
See especially McGonigal (2012), p.21 for more on game traits.
[321]
Bernard Suits (1978), The Grasshopper: Games, life, Utopia, quoted in McGonigal (2012), p.22.
[322]
McGonigal (2012), p.34.
[323]
Ibid, quoted on pp.31 – 33.
[324]
Ibid, quoted on p.28.
[325]
Ibid, paraphrased from p. 28.
[326]
See ibid, pp. 29 – 31, for descriptions of these.
[327]
Salen and Zimmerman (2004), pp.31-37.
[328]
Robert E. Quinn and Anjan V. Thakor, ‘Creating a Purpose-Driven Organization’, Harvard Business Review,
July – August 2018, p.81.
[329]
Ibid, see p. 32.
[330]
Koster (2005), p.92.
[331]
Endorphins are the body’s natural opiates; a chemical in the brain that leads to feelings of happiness, even
euphoria.
[332]
Koster (2005), p.92.
[333]
See in particular McGonigal (2012), pp.35 – 38.
[334]
I think the significance of each word, phrase or condition is self-evident, but you should still read the
references at the start of the chapter for the full context.
[335]
Everything in war(gaming) is simple, but doing the simplest thing is difficult.
[336]
McGonigal (2012), pp. 45 – 51.
[337]
Ibid, quoted on p.47.
[338]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, pp. 24 – 25 paragraph 2.10.
[339]
Salen and Zimmerman (2004), p.37.
[340]
McGonigal (2012), pp.95 – 115.
[341]
Huizinga (1955), p.10.
[342]
Salen and Zimmerman (2004), p.34.
[343]
See http://www.janchappuis.com/
[344]
'Begin with the End in Mind' is Habit 2 from Covey, S, (1989), The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People.
[345]
Start of exercise.
[346]
US Naval War College (2015), p.23.
[347]
Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, writing in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), p.334.
[348]
NATO (2013), Glossary.
[349]
Ibid.
[350]
Simpson (2015).
[351]
NATO (2013), Glossary.
[352]
van Notten, P, ‘Writing on the Wall: Scenario Development in Times of Discontinuity’, quoted at
http://www.oecd.org/site/schoolingfortomorrowknowledgebase/futuresthinking/scenarios/37246431.pdf
[353]
NATO (2013), pp. M-1-1 to M-1-4.
[354]
There are many real-world settings, but these tend to be classified.
[355]
You can read a review and download DATE from the PAXsims website at
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2016/05/17/decisive-action-training-environment/
[356]
NATO Joint Warfare Centre The Three Swords Magazine, 21/2011, p.5.
[357]
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
[358]
Dunnigan and Bay (2008).
[359]
Perla (1990), p.165.
[360]
NATO (2013), p.M-1-4.
[361]
NATO (2013), p. A-25.
[362]
Ibid, p. A-15.
[363]
Ibid, p. A-23.
[364]
Ibid, p. A-23.
[365]
Find: Detect, Recognise, Identify and/or Locate a unit, object, activity, situation, event or individual or group.
UK Army Staff Officer’s Handbook.
[366]
See https://www.4cstrategies.com/exonaut/
[367]
https://www.4cstrategies.com/exonaut/
[368]
http://www.nsc.co.uk/simulation/constructive-simulation/
[369]
https://www.c4itrgtech.com/webmsel-2/
[370]
McGonigal (2012).
[371]
And 1 ½-sided if following the US Naval War College War Gamers’ Handbook.
[372]
NATO (2013), p.5-1.
[373]
Ibid, p. 5-3.
[374]
Main Events List/Master Incidents List.
[375]
Also known as Observer/Trainers.
[376]
American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Programme.
[377]
MOD (2013), Red Teaming Guide, p. 3-6 and Lexicon.
[378]
‘Event-stepped’ is an alternative to ‘time-stepped’.
[379]
Feeds from a simulation generate a picture in a separate tool.
[380]
http://www.nsc.co.uk/simulation/constructive-simulation/#
[381]
iNet is part of a collaborative and inclusive working environments. See
http://www.nsc.co.uk/simulation/constructive-simulation/
[382]
Termed Forces Synchronisation (F Synch) by HQ ARRC and HQ 3 UK Division.
[383]
Sabin (2012), pp.83-84 and pp.104-106.
[384]
This chapter is an adaptation of a ‘Facilitation Guide’ I wrote for the Defence Research and Development
Canada (DRDC). It incorporates comments from Rex Brynen, who was involved on the same project.
[385]
Design to a purpose, analysis and facilitation.
[386]
Actually, having your game compared to one that has sold millions of units should be considered a compliment.
[387]
Note them on a whiteboard or flip chart for subsequent discussion.
[388]
Box (1987), p.74.
[389]
MOD (2017), Wargaming Handbook, p.24.
[390]
Green (2004), pp.465 – 470.
[391]
Schelling, writing in Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), pp.229 – 230.
[392]
This is positive, not normative decision-making.
[393]
Mouat, T (2016), Baltic Challenge: A Matrix Game about NATO/Russian posturing in the Baltic Sea, MORS
Special Event.
[394]
Also called Force Equivalency Ratios (FER).
[395]
Wallman, J (2015), Army 2020: Wargame Guidelines for Operational-Level Combat 2020-25.
[396]
MOD (2018) Planning and Execution Handbook, p.10-6.
[397]
i.e. If one achieves 3 to 1 odds, that the engagement will be successful.
[398]
Sometimes referred to as a ‘catastrophic kill.’
[399]
Author’s original, enhanced by Sandbox Ltd and Cranfield University.
[400]
Clearly, identical outcomes are possible within the bounds of randomly generated probabilities.
[401]
McHugh (1966).
[402]
Ibid, p.210-211.
[403]
Clausewitz’s original work lists these as (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and
probability; and (3) war's element of subordination to rational policy. They are not the military, the government, and
the people.
[404]
Ed McGrady differentiates between 'precision' (meaning consistency) and 'accuracy' (meaning how close to
being right).
[405]
OA is also an abbreviation for Operational Analyst.
[406]
Dstl Support to Operations.
[407]
Perla (1990), pp. 105-114 and pp.273-290.
[408]
Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), pp.159-182.
[409]
Sabin (2012), pp.267-273.
[410]
That I still had from my Donald Featherstone Skirmish Wargaming days in the mid 1970’s!
[411]
Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset, Rules v5.2, dated December 2017, p.32.
[412]
The presentation of player cells’ plans should be predicated on these having already been determined and
recorded. In this way, cells cannot change their mind when they hear others’ plans before they present theirs.
[413]
Sabin (2012), pp.55 – 56.
[414]
MOD (2018) Staff Officer’s Handbook:
Defeat: To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is unable to participate further in the battle
or at least cannot fulfil his mission.
Destroy: To kill or so Damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless.
Feint: To distract the action of the enemy through seeking contact with it.
Demonstrate: To distract the enemy’s attention without seeking contact.
[415]
OED.
[416]
See the Connections US 2018 In-Stride Adjudication Working Group report at
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2018/09/12/in-stride-adjudication-connections-2018-working-group-report/
[417]
UK Scientific Advisor (Land) (now Warfare Science and Technology Branch), Course of Action Analysis
Requirements, 12 April 2012.
[418]
Civil Military Cooperation.
[419]
Cultural, Political and Legal Advisor.
[420]
JDP 0-01.1 UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational terms and Definitions.
[421]
Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
[422]
Decision Support Overlay.
[423]
Decision Support Matrix.
[424]
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.
[425]
Concept of Operations.
[426]
Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA).
[427]
Organised Crime (OC) and Transnational Organised Crime (TOC).
[428]
Traditionally the side with the initiative goes first, but consider Blue always having the first Action; either
approach can work.
[429]
Note distinction between Red Cell (adversary) and Red Team (challenging assumptions).
[430]
Consider the Blue Cell always having the Counteraction, because it is their plan being examined.
[431]
Also known as a Risk Impact Graph, although this is simplistic.
[432]
Longley-Brown (2005), p.49.
[433]
John Warden (1988) The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists republished many
times.
[434]
Harrigan and Kirschenbaum (2016), pp. 229 – 240.
[435]
https://paxsims.wordpress.com/