In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's core metaphysical doctri... more In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, are defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. There is inherence over and above conceptual dependence; there is causation in addition to causal explanation; the world has a nature that we can grasp and that our way of grasping it does not interpose an impenetrable conceptual veil between it and us. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza's notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza's claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza's metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. I... more The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. In this volume, the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the PSR, which currently is considered primarily within the context of various cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Discussing several forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes from Parmenides, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, such as metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melam... more In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melamed.
Perhaps no philosopher of mind has been subjected to more widely divergent interpretations than S... more Perhaps no philosopher of mind has been subjected to more widely divergent interpretations than Spinoza. He has been described as, among other things, a substance dualist, 1 a materialist, 2 an idealist, 3 and a property dualist. 4 Why so many conflicting interpretations? A partial answer is that Spinoza's philosophy of mind is both difficult and, at crucial junctures, unclear. But this is not the complete answer. Another part of the explanation is that Spinoza's philosophy of mind is strikingly original and thus resists assimilation to the traditional categories of materialism, idealism, and dualism. And yet despite this originality, Spinoza's philosophy of mind purposely retains certain attractive features of each of them in ways that make it easily mistaken for any one of them. Spinoza's thinking about the metaphysics of mind and body must be understood against the background of a philosophical revolution started by Descartes, who arguably introduces into philosophy the mind-body problem as we know it today. Descartes claims that the world divides neatly into two realms: the mental and the physical. These two realms are radically distinct and have nothing in common. By insisting on this radical distinction, Descartes thus purifies the physical realm of colors, sounds, smells and other qualities, which he considers covert mentalistic features—projections of the mind— and thereby paves the way for, or so he hopes, a purely mechanistic physics. By the same token, Descartes also develops a new conception of mind as an essentially thinking thing whose nature can be understood completely independently of the body to which it is connected. But once the world is split into two completely different realms, how can they be brought back together again? How can the body convey sensations to the mind and how can the
Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in... more Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of the Essay, he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.
Kant, who helped introduce the term 'ontological argument' into the philosophical vocabulary, und... more Kant, who helped introduce the term 'ontological argument' into the philosophical vocabulary, understands the term in this way. 3 Cf. Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers. 4 This is the position of Joachim and Earl. Wolfson thinks that all but the third argument are ontological.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. I... more The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. In this volume, the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the PSR, which currently is considered primarily within the context of various cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Discussing several forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes from Parmenides, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, such as metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
This chapter investigates Spinoza’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) an... more This chapter investigates Spinoza’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and its role in his system. What sorts of things does Spinoza think require a cause or explanation? What counts, for him, as a cause or explanation? The PSR is often associated with doctrines such as necessitarianism, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Plenitude, and the existence of God. Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR leads him to accept all of these doctrines. This paper examines each of these doctrines as they pertain to Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR and his metaphysics more generally.
This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the r... more This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.
Spinoza believes that all things “strive to persevere in their being.” This claim, known as Spino... more Spinoza believes that all things “strive to persevere in their being.” This claim, known as Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, raises many questions. Does Spinoza believe that nature is goal directed? Does he think that all natural things, including ones that are typically classified as inanimate, such as particles of matter and stars in the sky have desires and goals? This chapter explicates the meaning of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine and argues that it must be interpreted teleologically despite the apparent tension between teleology and mechanism. It also examines Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine and argues that it is not meant to follow from claims about the impossibility of self-destruction alone, as many commentators would have it. Rather, he must be relying on important assumptions about the nature of God and the expressive relationship that finite individuals bear to it. It concludes by considering the problem of goal-directed human action in Spinoza.
In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's core metaphysical doctri... more In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, are defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. There is inherence over and above conceptual dependence; there is causation in addition to causal explanation; the world has a nature that we can grasp and that our way of grasping it does not interpose an impenetrable conceptual veil between it and us. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza's notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza's claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza's metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. I... more The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. In this volume, the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the PSR, which currently is considered primarily within the context of various cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Discussing several forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes from Parmenides, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, such as metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melam... more In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melamed.
Perhaps no philosopher of mind has been subjected to more widely divergent interpretations than S... more Perhaps no philosopher of mind has been subjected to more widely divergent interpretations than Spinoza. He has been described as, among other things, a substance dualist, 1 a materialist, 2 an idealist, 3 and a property dualist. 4 Why so many conflicting interpretations? A partial answer is that Spinoza's philosophy of mind is both difficult and, at crucial junctures, unclear. But this is not the complete answer. Another part of the explanation is that Spinoza's philosophy of mind is strikingly original and thus resists assimilation to the traditional categories of materialism, idealism, and dualism. And yet despite this originality, Spinoza's philosophy of mind purposely retains certain attractive features of each of them in ways that make it easily mistaken for any one of them. Spinoza's thinking about the metaphysics of mind and body must be understood against the background of a philosophical revolution started by Descartes, who arguably introduces into philosophy the mind-body problem as we know it today. Descartes claims that the world divides neatly into two realms: the mental and the physical. These two realms are radically distinct and have nothing in common. By insisting on this radical distinction, Descartes thus purifies the physical realm of colors, sounds, smells and other qualities, which he considers covert mentalistic features—projections of the mind— and thereby paves the way for, or so he hopes, a purely mechanistic physics. By the same token, Descartes also develops a new conception of mind as an essentially thinking thing whose nature can be understood completely independently of the body to which it is connected. But once the world is split into two completely different realms, how can they be brought back together again? How can the body convey sensations to the mind and how can the
Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in... more Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of the Essay, he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.
Kant, who helped introduce the term 'ontological argument' into the philosophical vocabulary, und... more Kant, who helped introduce the term 'ontological argument' into the philosophical vocabulary, understands the term in this way. 3 Cf. Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers. 4 This is the position of Joachim and Earl. Wolfson thinks that all but the third argument are ontological.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. I... more The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. In this volume, the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the PSR, which currently is considered primarily within the context of various cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Discussing several forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes from Parmenides, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, such as metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
This chapter investigates Spinoza’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) an... more This chapter investigates Spinoza’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and its role in his system. What sorts of things does Spinoza think require a cause or explanation? What counts, for him, as a cause or explanation? The PSR is often associated with doctrines such as necessitarianism, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Plenitude, and the existence of God. Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR leads him to accept all of these doctrines. This paper examines each of these doctrines as they pertain to Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR and his metaphysics more generally.
This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the r... more This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.
Spinoza believes that all things “strive to persevere in their being.” This claim, known as Spino... more Spinoza believes that all things “strive to persevere in their being.” This claim, known as Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, raises many questions. Does Spinoza believe that nature is goal directed? Does he think that all natural things, including ones that are typically classified as inanimate, such as particles of matter and stars in the sky have desires and goals? This chapter explicates the meaning of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine and argues that it must be interpreted teleologically despite the apparent tension between teleology and mechanism. It also examines Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine and argues that it is not meant to follow from claims about the impossibility of self-destruction alone, as many commentators would have it. Rather, he must be relying on important assumptions about the nature of God and the expressive relationship that finite individuals bear to it. It concludes by considering the problem of goal-directed human action in Spinoza.
Perhaps no philosopher of mind has been subjected to more widely divergent interpretations than S... more Perhaps no philosopher of mind has been subjected to more widely divergent interpretations than Spinoza. He has been described as, among other things, a substance dualist, 1 a materialist, 2 an idealist, 3 and a property dualist. 4 Why so many conflicting interpretations? A partial answer is that Spinoza's philosophy of mind is both difficult and, at crucial junctures, unclear. But this is not the complete answer. Another part of the explanation is that Spinoza's philosophy of mind is strikingly original and thus resists assimilation to the traditional categories of materialism, idealism, and dualism. And yet despite this originality, Spinoza's philosophy of mind purposely retains certain attractive features of each of them in ways that make it easily mistaken for any one of them. Spinoza's thinking about the metaphysics of mind and body must be understood against the background of a philosophical revolution started by Descartes, who arguably introduces into philosophy the mind-body problem as we know it today. Descartes claims that the world divides neatly into two realms: the mental and the physical. These two realms are radically distinct and have nothing in common. By insisting on this radical distinction, Descartes thus purifies the physical realm of colors, sounds, smells and other qualities, which he considers covert mentalistic features—projections of the mind— and thereby paves the way for, or so he hopes, a purely mechanistic physics. By the same token, Descartes also develops a new conception of mind as an essentially thinking thing whose nature can be understood completely independently of the body to which it is connected. But once the world is split into two completely different realms, how can they be brought back together again? How can the body convey sensations to the mind and how can the
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