Spanning the period of 1523 to 1534, the compositions in Volume 78 of the Collected Works of Eras... more Spanning the period of 1523 to 1534, the compositions in Volume 78 of the Collected Works of Erasmus detail Erasmus' theological disagreements with the Swiss and Upper German 'evangelicals' and the German Lutherans, including Luther himself. While volumes 76 and 77 of the series focus on the controversy with Luther over the .freedom of the will,. the wider lens of this volume also captures the conflicts between Erasmus and contemporaries such as Hutten, Eppendorf, Oecolampadius, Capito, and Bucer. These writings reveal the dialogue between Erasmus and those evangelicals who had appropriated and adapted his views on the Eucharist and set forth his defense of the toleration of heretics and a point-by-point rebuttal of Luther's ultimate accusations, which had rejected Erasmus as a Christian. Throughout, the original words of Erasmus are presented in contemporary English translation by eminent scholars of sixteenth-century studies, who also discuss the historical and theological contexts of the controversies.
The one thing Erasmus of Rotterdam has not often been accused of is theological consistency, 1 pa... more The one thing Erasmus of Rotterdam has not often been accused of is theological consistency, 1 particularly in regard to his position in debate with Luther. Nearly everyone who has commented on De Libero Arbitrio or Hyperaspistes, his two-part reply to Luther's De Servo Arbitrio, has noticed that Erasmus' sympathies seem divided between an "Augustinian" doctrine that attributes something to free choice, but "very little," and a far more optimistic assessment of what the human will can accomplish without the aid of divine grace. 2 It will not be the aim of this paper to argue that Erasmus did after all hold to a single coherent view of the relationship between nature and grace. Rather, its purpose will be to show that he was conscious of the ambiguity of his position, and was capable of entertaining two divergent opinions, albeit for different reasons and in different ways. On the one hand, as a student of the New Testament he recognized that the letters of St. Paul, particularly as understood by St. Augustine, envisioned a human will enslaved by sin until liberated by grace, so that it might consent to the grace of divine forgiveness. On the other hand, as a student of Origen and the Greek Fathers, and an admirer of the pagan sages of antiquity, he had some sympathy for the view, taught by late scholastic theologians and never to Erasmus' knowledge 3 condemned by the Church, that the human will unaided by grace might perform morally good actions that could fittingly (de congruo) be rewarded by divine grace. If this deliberate double entendre be understood, it will be seen that his writings against Luther, especially the neglected Hyperaspistes II, 4 are of unusual interest for the intellectual history of the next two centuries, for Erasmus' mind, divided between the * A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Luther Jubilee in Washington, D.C., November 6-12, 1983. I am indebted to my colleague at the University of Minnesota, Professor Jasper Hopkins of the Philosophy Department, for helpful criticisms and suggestions.
Wars with France made Charles V's government in Brussels dependent on the creditworthiness of... more Wars with France made Charles V's government in Brussels dependent on the creditworthiness of the provinces. The provincial states issued long‐term bonds (underline renten), using the capital to pay off high‐interest bankers' loans, but the states (not the central government) collected the taxes by which bonds were funded. By 1557 things looked so desperate that Philip II summoned the States General—a risk his father had carefully avoided. While the revenue plan adopted was found to be unworkable, the fact that the larger assembly had been convened to deliberate on high policy did much to enhance its prestige. Meanwhile, Antwerp's bankers followed the money; they dealt not with government officials (who now had little disposable revenue) but with the provincial parliaments.
Kitson’s research reveals much more than such standard tactics. Most surprisingly, the reader lea... more Kitson’s research reveals much more than such standard tactics. Most surprisingly, the reader learns of a Vichyiste obsession with ‘horizontal collaboration’, the relations between French women and German occupiers. Well before the épuration, such women were arrested and imprisoned, their heads shaven as a symbol of guilt, all with the explicit support of major figures like Maxim Weygand. The chapter concerning the fate of Nazi spies provides a further shock: the use of torture in order to extract confessions. The descriptions of electrocutions, beatings, and starvation would not be out of place in the notorious memoirs of the Battle of the Casbah by Paul Aussaresses, and demonstrate that such practices certainly predated the Algerian War. Naturally, the incidents mostly concerned French nationals, for the abuse of German citizens provoked ugly diplomatic incidents. In the final analysis, Kitson writes, this curious combination of appeasement and coercion symbolizes both Vichy’s counter-espionage programme and Franco-German relations en-soi. There is little doubt about the anti-German position espoused by Huntziger, Weygand or Henri Rollin, the director of counter-espionage. Even Laval, certainly no German foe, agreed with the jailing and trial of spies after the November 1942 occupation of the southern zone. Yet, such actions were never allowed to interfere with the primary objectives – collaboration and the maintenance of France’s supposedly privileged status in the new Nazi Europe. In any case, as Kitson notes, ‘the Nazi leaders knew how to play Vichy’, ignoring a counterespionage programme which never really produced substantial results, lacking the necessary manpower and resources. Such conclusions greatly enhance our historical knowledge of Franco-German relations and the nature of the Vichy regime. That they are presented alongside superior archival research and engaging prose only increases the value of this highly recommended work.
... Hollanders more convinced than ever that men-of-war could not protect herring busses.39 War c... more ... Hollanders more convinced than ever that men-of-war could not protect herring busses.39 War continued the following year, when a fishing village ... to take occasion of this war to break Hol-land's traditional refusal to recognize the authority of his office.41 Adolph of Burgundy ...
In 1572, towns in the province of Holland, led by William of Orange, rebelled against the governm... more In 1572, towns in the province of Holland, led by William of Orange, rebelled against the government of the Habsburg Netherlands. The story of the Dutch Revolt is usually told in terms of fractious provinces that frustrated Orange's efforts to formulate a coherent programme. In this book James D. Tracy argues that there was a coherent strategy for the war, but that it was set by the towns of Holland. Although the States of Holland was in theory subject to the States General, Holland provided over 60% of the taxes and an even larger share of war loans. Accordingly, funds were directed to securing Holland's borders, and subsequently to extending this protected frontier to neighboring provinces that, like Holland, lay north of the great rivers running east to west. Shielded from the war by its cordon sanitaire, Holland experienced an extraordinary economic boom, allowing taxes and loans to keep flowing. The goal—in sight if not achieved by 1588—was a United Provinces of the north, free and separate from provinces in the southern Netherlands that remained under Spanish rule. With Europe increasingly under the sway of strong hereditary princes, the new Dutch Republic was a beacon of promise for those who still believed that citizens ought to rule themselves.
This chapter describes the role of town governments in Holland's state debt, 1572-1588. It di... more This chapter describes the role of town governments in Holland's state debt, 1572-1588. It discusses and summarizes the relationship among the various kinds of transactions. The companies on Holland's payroll were now posted a bit beyond the frontier, preferably in towns along the rivers that gave access to Holland. This is precisely the kind of thinking that William of Orange and his closest collaborators condemned as "particularist", that is, focused on the good of an individual province, not on that of the commonwealth as a whole. This chapter argues that it makes more sense to follow the Revolt from the standpoint of this one province, where key decisions were made about how to allocate the resources of the rebel government. In sum, it seems that Holland's burgher-lenders got the kind of war for which they were willing to pay, one that put the interests of Holland's garden first and foremost. Keywords: burgher-lenders; Holland; state debt; town governments
With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they calle... more With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they called “Holland's Garden”. This meant subjecting loyalist towns to Orange's authority; Amsterdam, hitherto a center of loyalism, was reunited with Holland by an internal coup (May 1578). One also had to reduce the war budget, by cutting back the number of mercenary companies; less‐desirable units were sent off to fight for the States General—leaving open the question of how they were to be paid. Finally, Holland itself could not be secure without a chain of fortified positions, not only along the the border, but also upstream at key points along the rivers flowing into Holland. In the Union of Utrecht, Holland agreed to pay for the defense of selected areas in neighboring provinces. The strategic goal, as one deputy put it, was to “fight the war on someone else's ground”.
Historians of republicanism have focussed on states where princely rule was overthrown (15th‐cent... more Historians of republicanism have focussed on states where princely rule was overthrown (15th‐century Florence, 17th‐century England). Yet even in princely realms town magistrates claimed to be part of a underline respublica mixta, a state combining the principles of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Dutch writers understood the United Provinces as a underline respublica mixta—that is, a stable, balanced constitution. Some embraced the democratic principle, invoking the memory of ancient Athens. Others (partisans of the House of Orange) bemoaned the weakness of the monarchical principle. Still others, like Holland's Hugo Grotius, saw the town oligarchies as forming a proper, aristocratic republic, like Sparta or Venice. Thus understood, the new polity was hardly democratic; but in a Europe dominated by strong monarchies, it was a beacon of republican liberty.
Spanning the period of 1523 to 1534, the compositions in Volume 78 of the Collected Works of Eras... more Spanning the period of 1523 to 1534, the compositions in Volume 78 of the Collected Works of Erasmus detail Erasmus' theological disagreements with the Swiss and Upper German 'evangelicals' and the German Lutherans, including Luther himself. While volumes 76 and 77 of the series focus on the controversy with Luther over the .freedom of the will,. the wider lens of this volume also captures the conflicts between Erasmus and contemporaries such as Hutten, Eppendorf, Oecolampadius, Capito, and Bucer. These writings reveal the dialogue between Erasmus and those evangelicals who had appropriated and adapted his views on the Eucharist and set forth his defense of the toleration of heretics and a point-by-point rebuttal of Luther's ultimate accusations, which had rejected Erasmus as a Christian. Throughout, the original words of Erasmus are presented in contemporary English translation by eminent scholars of sixteenth-century studies, who also discuss the historical and theological contexts of the controversies.
The one thing Erasmus of Rotterdam has not often been accused of is theological consistency, 1 pa... more The one thing Erasmus of Rotterdam has not often been accused of is theological consistency, 1 particularly in regard to his position in debate with Luther. Nearly everyone who has commented on De Libero Arbitrio or Hyperaspistes, his two-part reply to Luther's De Servo Arbitrio, has noticed that Erasmus' sympathies seem divided between an "Augustinian" doctrine that attributes something to free choice, but "very little," and a far more optimistic assessment of what the human will can accomplish without the aid of divine grace. 2 It will not be the aim of this paper to argue that Erasmus did after all hold to a single coherent view of the relationship between nature and grace. Rather, its purpose will be to show that he was conscious of the ambiguity of his position, and was capable of entertaining two divergent opinions, albeit for different reasons and in different ways. On the one hand, as a student of the New Testament he recognized that the letters of St. Paul, particularly as understood by St. Augustine, envisioned a human will enslaved by sin until liberated by grace, so that it might consent to the grace of divine forgiveness. On the other hand, as a student of Origen and the Greek Fathers, and an admirer of the pagan sages of antiquity, he had some sympathy for the view, taught by late scholastic theologians and never to Erasmus' knowledge 3 condemned by the Church, that the human will unaided by grace might perform morally good actions that could fittingly (de congruo) be rewarded by divine grace. If this deliberate double entendre be understood, it will be seen that his writings against Luther, especially the neglected Hyperaspistes II, 4 are of unusual interest for the intellectual history of the next two centuries, for Erasmus' mind, divided between the * A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Luther Jubilee in Washington, D.C., November 6-12, 1983. I am indebted to my colleague at the University of Minnesota, Professor Jasper Hopkins of the Philosophy Department, for helpful criticisms and suggestions.
Wars with France made Charles V's government in Brussels dependent on the creditworthiness of... more Wars with France made Charles V's government in Brussels dependent on the creditworthiness of the provinces. The provincial states issued long‐term bonds (underline renten), using the capital to pay off high‐interest bankers' loans, but the states (not the central government) collected the taxes by which bonds were funded. By 1557 things looked so desperate that Philip II summoned the States General—a risk his father had carefully avoided. While the revenue plan adopted was found to be unworkable, the fact that the larger assembly had been convened to deliberate on high policy did much to enhance its prestige. Meanwhile, Antwerp's bankers followed the money; they dealt not with government officials (who now had little disposable revenue) but with the provincial parliaments.
Kitson’s research reveals much more than such standard tactics. Most surprisingly, the reader lea... more Kitson’s research reveals much more than such standard tactics. Most surprisingly, the reader learns of a Vichyiste obsession with ‘horizontal collaboration’, the relations between French women and German occupiers. Well before the épuration, such women were arrested and imprisoned, their heads shaven as a symbol of guilt, all with the explicit support of major figures like Maxim Weygand. The chapter concerning the fate of Nazi spies provides a further shock: the use of torture in order to extract confessions. The descriptions of electrocutions, beatings, and starvation would not be out of place in the notorious memoirs of the Battle of the Casbah by Paul Aussaresses, and demonstrate that such practices certainly predated the Algerian War. Naturally, the incidents mostly concerned French nationals, for the abuse of German citizens provoked ugly diplomatic incidents. In the final analysis, Kitson writes, this curious combination of appeasement and coercion symbolizes both Vichy’s counter-espionage programme and Franco-German relations en-soi. There is little doubt about the anti-German position espoused by Huntziger, Weygand or Henri Rollin, the director of counter-espionage. Even Laval, certainly no German foe, agreed with the jailing and trial of spies after the November 1942 occupation of the southern zone. Yet, such actions were never allowed to interfere with the primary objectives – collaboration and the maintenance of France’s supposedly privileged status in the new Nazi Europe. In any case, as Kitson notes, ‘the Nazi leaders knew how to play Vichy’, ignoring a counterespionage programme which never really produced substantial results, lacking the necessary manpower and resources. Such conclusions greatly enhance our historical knowledge of Franco-German relations and the nature of the Vichy regime. That they are presented alongside superior archival research and engaging prose only increases the value of this highly recommended work.
... Hollanders more convinced than ever that men-of-war could not protect herring busses.39 War c... more ... Hollanders more convinced than ever that men-of-war could not protect herring busses.39 War continued the following year, when a fishing village ... to take occasion of this war to break Hol-land's traditional refusal to recognize the authority of his office.41 Adolph of Burgundy ...
In 1572, towns in the province of Holland, led by William of Orange, rebelled against the governm... more In 1572, towns in the province of Holland, led by William of Orange, rebelled against the government of the Habsburg Netherlands. The story of the Dutch Revolt is usually told in terms of fractious provinces that frustrated Orange's efforts to formulate a coherent programme. In this book James D. Tracy argues that there was a coherent strategy for the war, but that it was set by the towns of Holland. Although the States of Holland was in theory subject to the States General, Holland provided over 60% of the taxes and an even larger share of war loans. Accordingly, funds were directed to securing Holland's borders, and subsequently to extending this protected frontier to neighboring provinces that, like Holland, lay north of the great rivers running east to west. Shielded from the war by its cordon sanitaire, Holland experienced an extraordinary economic boom, allowing taxes and loans to keep flowing. The goal—in sight if not achieved by 1588—was a United Provinces of the north, free and separate from provinces in the southern Netherlands that remained under Spanish rule. With Europe increasingly under the sway of strong hereditary princes, the new Dutch Republic was a beacon of promise for those who still believed that citizens ought to rule themselves.
This chapter describes the role of town governments in Holland's state debt, 1572-1588. It di... more This chapter describes the role of town governments in Holland's state debt, 1572-1588. It discusses and summarizes the relationship among the various kinds of transactions. The companies on Holland's payroll were now posted a bit beyond the frontier, preferably in towns along the rivers that gave access to Holland. This is precisely the kind of thinking that William of Orange and his closest collaborators condemned as "particularist", that is, focused on the good of an individual province, not on that of the commonwealth as a whole. This chapter argues that it makes more sense to follow the Revolt from the standpoint of this one province, where key decisions were made about how to allocate the resources of the rebel government. In sum, it seems that Holland's burgher-lenders got the kind of war for which they were willing to pay, one that put the interests of Holland's garden first and foremost. Keywords: burgher-lenders; Holland; state debt; town governments
With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they calle... more With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they called “Holland's Garden”. This meant subjecting loyalist towns to Orange's authority; Amsterdam, hitherto a center of loyalism, was reunited with Holland by an internal coup (May 1578). One also had to reduce the war budget, by cutting back the number of mercenary companies; less‐desirable units were sent off to fight for the States General—leaving open the question of how they were to be paid. Finally, Holland itself could not be secure without a chain of fortified positions, not only along the the border, but also upstream at key points along the rivers flowing into Holland. In the Union of Utrecht, Holland agreed to pay for the defense of selected areas in neighboring provinces. The strategic goal, as one deputy put it, was to “fight the war on someone else's ground”.
Historians of republicanism have focussed on states where princely rule was overthrown (15th‐cent... more Historians of republicanism have focussed on states where princely rule was overthrown (15th‐century Florence, 17th‐century England). Yet even in princely realms town magistrates claimed to be part of a underline respublica mixta, a state combining the principles of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Dutch writers understood the United Provinces as a underline respublica mixta—that is, a stable, balanced constitution. Some embraced the democratic principle, invoking the memory of ancient Athens. Others (partisans of the House of Orange) bemoaned the weakness of the monarchical principle. Still others, like Holland's Hugo Grotius, saw the town oligarchies as forming a proper, aristocratic republic, like Sparta or Venice. Thus understood, the new polity was hardly democratic; but in a Europe dominated by strong monarchies, it was a beacon of republican liberty.
Uploads
Papers by James Tracy