International Journal of Business and Management, 2020
In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling sharehold... more In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders poses significant issue. Managers may pursue, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, the interest of the controlling shareholder. When there is a controlling shareholder, independent directors may not prove sufficient to monitor the management behaviour, given that they are ultimately appointed by the same controlling shareholder whose possible opportunistic behaviour they are meant to constrain. Therefore, minority shareholders may be given appointment rights to the board: directors elected by minority shareholders may work as a corporate governance mechanism that fosters the board’s willingness and ability to monitor managers’ behaviour, on the assumption that managers are appointed by the controlling shareholder. This paper examines empirically whether having a minority-elected director on corporate boards increases the ability of the board ...
Si parla molto di incostituzionalità del bail-in, specie da parte di chi rappresenta gli interess... more Si parla molto di incostituzionalità del bail-in, specie da parte di chi rappresenta gli interessi delle banche. Si tratta però di argomentazioni prive di fondamento, a meno che non si voglia sostenere che è incostituzionale che le banche falliscano. Esiste però un grave problema di transizione.
Con il piano sulle banche venete, lo stato salva depositanti, obbligazionisti senior e dipendenti... more Con il piano sulle banche venete, lo stato salva depositanti, obbligazionisti senior e dipendenti. Ma abbandona al loro destino gli azionisti danneggiati dalle condotte tenute in sede di collocamento e di esecuzione degli ordini di vendita.
Il codice della crisi detta una disciplina articolata degli strumenti stragiudiziali di composizi... more Il codice della crisi detta una disciplina articolata degli strumenti stragiudiziali di composizione della crisi, che vanno dagli accordi in esecuzione di piani attestati di risanamento, agli accordi conclusi con l’assistenza dell’OCRI, agli accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti nelle diverse varianti (agevolati, “normali” e ad efficacia estesa ai creditori non aderenti e al fisco). L’Autore esamina le novità, molte delle quali apprezzabili, e pone in luce alcuni punti critici della nuova disciplina, tra cui spiccano la sorte delle ipoteche giudiziali anteriori al ricorso e il metro della “convenienza” per l’imposizione dell’accordo al fisco.
Revista de derecho concursal y paraconcursal, 2019
This paper focuses on giving an overview of the development of the Italian insolvency law, concen... more This paper focuses on giving an overview of the development of the Italian insolvency law, concentrating the analysis on restructuring frameworks and whether our recent reform of the Crisis Code complies with the recent Directive on Restructuring and insolvency.
La nuova disciplina del concordato preventivo detta requisiti stringenti sia per il concorda- to ... more La nuova disciplina del concordato preventivo detta requisiti stringenti sia per il concorda- to con continuità aziendale, sia per il concordato che il Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolven- za definisce «liquidatorio». Nell’articolo si sostiene che tra i due tipi di concordato vi sia spazio per un concordato con continuità aziendale “atipico”, che non soddisfa appieno i requisiti del concor- dato con continuità aziendale come definito dalla legge. L’articolo esamina poi la disciplina appli- cabile a questa forma di concordato
International Journal of Business and Management, 2020
In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling sharehold... more In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders poses significant issue. Managers may pursue, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, the interest of the controlling shareholder. When there is a controlling shareholder, independent directors may not prove sufficient to monitor the management behaviour, given that they are ultimately appointed by the same controlling shareholder whose possible opportunistic behaviour they are meant to constrain. Therefore, minority shareholders may be given appointment rights to the board: directors elected by minority shareholders may work as a corporate governance mechanism that fosters the board’s willingness and ability to monitor managers’ behaviour, on the assumption that managers are appointed by the controlling shareholder. This paper examines empirically whether having a minority-elected director on corporate boards increases the ability of the board to monitor management behaviour. Using a sample of the largest listed Italian companies in years 2008-2017, we find that minority-elected directors have a positive and statistically significant effect on board monitoring tasks. We also document that this effect is higher when they are elected by institutional investors. Our results have important implications for policy makers and, more generally, corporate governance best practice in all contexts in which companies have a concentrated ownership structure.
Questioni di Economia e Finanza della Banca d’Italia (Occasional Papers), 2020
The Italian insolvency framework makes several restructuring tools available to firms and their c... more The Italian insolvency framework makes several restructuring tools available to firms and their creditors, so that distress does not necessarily lead to liquidation. This paper analyses two such instruments: debt restructuring agreements (DRAs) and compositions with creditors (CCs), both commonly used to reorganize distressed firms and preserve their continuity. These procedures typically involve large firms, particularly in the case of DRAs where judicial control over negotiations is milder. Firms using DRAs are in less critical economic conditions when they file for restructuring, but they do so after longer periods of distress. Despite their declared aim, the effectiveness of these instruments in terms of business continuity is limited: many firms that use them end up exiting the market, in particular in DRAs. Firms that survive display only partial recovery, which is relatively more intense in CCs. However, the apparently superior performance of CCs is overshadowed by the long duration of restructuring, which may prevent us from observing definitive outcomes.
the Italian insolvency and pre-insolvency frameworks have been reformed recently (2019, due to en... more the Italian insolvency and pre-insolvency frameworks have been reformed recently (2019, due to enter into force in September 2021 but now probably in 2022). this article recalls the intense period of reforms in Italian insolvency law, started in 2005 and culminated with the new ‘Code of enterprise crisis and of insolvency’. the Code introduces new rules for court-confirmed debt restructuring agreements (similar to schemes of arrangement) and judicial composition with creditors, as well as with regard to new rules for insolvency of groups, international jurisdiction and directors’ liability. the article addresses these novelties pointing out some unresolved issues. Finally, the article touches upon the compatibility of the new law with the Directive on restructuring and insolvency (directive 2019/1023)
International Journal of Business and Management, 2020
In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling sharehold... more In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders poses significant issue. Managers may pursue, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, the interest of the controlling shareholder. When there is a controlling shareholder, independent directors may not prove sufficient to monitor the management behaviour, given that they are ultimately appointed by the same controlling shareholder whose possible opportunistic behaviour they are meant to constrain. Therefore, minority shareholders may be given appointment rights to the board: directors elected by minority shareholders may work as a corporate governance mechanism that fosters the board’s willingness and ability to monitor managers’ behaviour, on the assumption that managers are appointed by the controlling shareholder. This paper examines empirically whether having a minority-elected director on corporate boards increases the ability of the board ...
Si parla molto di incostituzionalità del bail-in, specie da parte di chi rappresenta gli interess... more Si parla molto di incostituzionalità del bail-in, specie da parte di chi rappresenta gli interessi delle banche. Si tratta però di argomentazioni prive di fondamento, a meno che non si voglia sostenere che è incostituzionale che le banche falliscano. Esiste però un grave problema di transizione.
Con il piano sulle banche venete, lo stato salva depositanti, obbligazionisti senior e dipendenti... more Con il piano sulle banche venete, lo stato salva depositanti, obbligazionisti senior e dipendenti. Ma abbandona al loro destino gli azionisti danneggiati dalle condotte tenute in sede di collocamento e di esecuzione degli ordini di vendita.
Il codice della crisi detta una disciplina articolata degli strumenti stragiudiziali di composizi... more Il codice della crisi detta una disciplina articolata degli strumenti stragiudiziali di composizione della crisi, che vanno dagli accordi in esecuzione di piani attestati di risanamento, agli accordi conclusi con l’assistenza dell’OCRI, agli accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti nelle diverse varianti (agevolati, “normali” e ad efficacia estesa ai creditori non aderenti e al fisco). L’Autore esamina le novità, molte delle quali apprezzabili, e pone in luce alcuni punti critici della nuova disciplina, tra cui spiccano la sorte delle ipoteche giudiziali anteriori al ricorso e il metro della “convenienza” per l’imposizione dell’accordo al fisco.
Revista de derecho concursal y paraconcursal, 2019
This paper focuses on giving an overview of the development of the Italian insolvency law, concen... more This paper focuses on giving an overview of the development of the Italian insolvency law, concentrating the analysis on restructuring frameworks and whether our recent reform of the Crisis Code complies with the recent Directive on Restructuring and insolvency.
La nuova disciplina del concordato preventivo detta requisiti stringenti sia per il concorda- to ... more La nuova disciplina del concordato preventivo detta requisiti stringenti sia per il concorda- to con continuità aziendale, sia per il concordato che il Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolven- za definisce «liquidatorio». Nell’articolo si sostiene che tra i due tipi di concordato vi sia spazio per un concordato con continuità aziendale “atipico”, che non soddisfa appieno i requisiti del concor- dato con continuità aziendale come definito dalla legge. L’articolo esamina poi la disciplina appli- cabile a questa forma di concordato
International Journal of Business and Management, 2020
In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling sharehold... more In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders poses significant issue. Managers may pursue, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, the interest of the controlling shareholder. When there is a controlling shareholder, independent directors may not prove sufficient to monitor the management behaviour, given that they are ultimately appointed by the same controlling shareholder whose possible opportunistic behaviour they are meant to constrain. Therefore, minority shareholders may be given appointment rights to the board: directors elected by minority shareholders may work as a corporate governance mechanism that fosters the board’s willingness and ability to monitor managers’ behaviour, on the assumption that managers are appointed by the controlling shareholder. This paper examines empirically whether having a minority-elected director on corporate boards increases the ability of the board to monitor management behaviour. Using a sample of the largest listed Italian companies in years 2008-2017, we find that minority-elected directors have a positive and statistically significant effect on board monitoring tasks. We also document that this effect is higher when they are elected by institutional investors. Our results have important implications for policy makers and, more generally, corporate governance best practice in all contexts in which companies have a concentrated ownership structure.
Questioni di Economia e Finanza della Banca d’Italia (Occasional Papers), 2020
The Italian insolvency framework makes several restructuring tools available to firms and their c... more The Italian insolvency framework makes several restructuring tools available to firms and their creditors, so that distress does not necessarily lead to liquidation. This paper analyses two such instruments: debt restructuring agreements (DRAs) and compositions with creditors (CCs), both commonly used to reorganize distressed firms and preserve their continuity. These procedures typically involve large firms, particularly in the case of DRAs where judicial control over negotiations is milder. Firms using DRAs are in less critical economic conditions when they file for restructuring, but they do so after longer periods of distress. Despite their declared aim, the effectiveness of these instruments in terms of business continuity is limited: many firms that use them end up exiting the market, in particular in DRAs. Firms that survive display only partial recovery, which is relatively more intense in CCs. However, the apparently superior performance of CCs is overshadowed by the long duration of restructuring, which may prevent us from observing definitive outcomes.
the Italian insolvency and pre-insolvency frameworks have been reformed recently (2019, due to en... more the Italian insolvency and pre-insolvency frameworks have been reformed recently (2019, due to enter into force in September 2021 but now probably in 2022). this article recalls the intense period of reforms in Italian insolvency law, started in 2005 and culminated with the new ‘Code of enterprise crisis and of insolvency’. the Code introduces new rules for court-confirmed debt restructuring agreements (similar to schemes of arrangement) and judicial composition with creditors, as well as with regard to new rules for insolvency of groups, international jurisdiction and directors’ liability. the article addresses these novelties pointing out some unresolved issues. Finally, the article touches upon the compatibility of the new law with the Directive on restructuring and insolvency (directive 2019/1023)
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Papers by Andrea Zorzi