In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, c... more In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, conditionals of the form ‘If A had been the case, then B would have been the case’. According to the standard account, a counterfactual is true if the then-sentence is true in all closest worlds in which the if-sentence is true. Closeness is spelled out in terms of an ordering of worlds by their similarity. Dohrn explores resources of defending the standard account against several challenges. In particular, he defends the standard logics for counterfactuals. He discusses exemplary doubts as to whether conditionals have truth conditions. He inquires into the interaction between truth and probability of counterfactuals. He tackles problems with the similarity ordering. He address the interaction between counterfactuals and normalcy conditions. He closes with elaborating peculiarities of future-directed counterfactuals
I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Har... more I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Hare\u2019s solution rests on distinguishing two kinds of ought: The Ought of Omniscient Desire: what you oughtOD to do is what an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate interests would want you to do. The Ought of Most Reason: what you oughtMR to do is what there is most reason to do. I argue that the distinction does not dissolve the problem. Moreover, I show that Hare\u2019s proposal to spell out his distinction in terms of an embedded counterfactual (if you had not done what you did, then, if you had done what you did, what would the consequence have been?) is flawed
Can’t one truly judge that one is judging? Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritative... more Can’t one truly judge that one is judging? Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritatively knowing one’s own mental acts which depends on a surprising assumption: One cannot truly judge that one is judging. After briefly criticizing his account of one’s awareness that one is judging, I critically scrutinize two of his arguments against the possibility of truly judging that one is judging. Firstly, assuming such a possibility leads to a regress. Secondly, the second-order judgement inevitably replaces the first-order judgement such as to make the former wrong. Matthew Soteriou (2005) has provided a thorough analysis of our intuitive claims to be directly and authoritatively aware of our own mental activity. Soteriou opposes non-occurrent belief and conscious judgement. The latter is a mental act, the former is not. Conscious judgement is identified with occurrent belief (Soteriou 2005, 96). While one can have a non-occurrent belief that one is believing that p despite not be...
Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, Descartes´ umfassendes Ideal menschlicher Rationalitat zu rekonstru... more Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, Descartes´ umfassendes Ideal menschlicher Rationalitat zu rekonstruieren. In diesem Ideal spielen das richtige Erkenntnisverhalten und der methodische Erwerb von naturwissenschaftlichem Wissen eine entscheidende Rolle, die in der Forschung umfassend gewurdigt wurde. Aufgrund dieser herausragenden Stellung erkenntnistheoretischer Fragen sowohl in Descartes´ Denken als auch in der Forschungsdiskussion setzt die Untersuchung mit der Frage nach der Motivation von Descartes´ radikaler Erkenntniskritik ein. Aber ebenso wichtig fur Descartes´ Begriff eines rationalen Willens sind Descartes´ rudimentare Ethik und seine Auffassung geistiger Aktivitat in ihrem Zusammenhang mit praktischem und theoretischem Wissen einerseits und einem korperlichen Geschehen andererseits, aus der sich seine Sicht menschlichen Handelns ergibt. Letztere haben sehr viel weniger Aufmerksamkeit in der Forschung gefunden. Im ersten Hauptteil wird eine praktische Sicht des Erkenntniserwer...
Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with t... more Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with the question of how thought experiments manage to provide knowledge. Ernst Mach’s seminal contribution has eclipsed other approaches in the Austrian tradition. I discuss one of these neglected approaches. Faced with the challenge of how to reconcile his empiricist position with his use of thought experiments, Moritz Schlick proposed the following ‘Sinnkriterium’: a thought experiment is meaningful if it allows to answer a question under discussion by imagining the experiences that would confi rm that the thought experimental scenario is actual. I trace this view throughout three exemplary thought experiments of Schlick’s.
... Thus Hookway is probably committed to grant Conrad a positive epistemic standing. ... Page 13... more ... Thus Hookway is probably committed to grant Conrad a positive epistemic standing. ... Page 132. 116 Epistemology and Emotions Laurence BonJour's example of a clairvoyant points in the same direction (BonJour 1985, 41). ...
It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explai... more It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand-and-fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear-headedly intend a metaphysical reading. In recent years, counterpossibles, that is subjunctive conditionals with metaphysically impossible antecedents, have been intensely debated. On the one hand, there is the orthodox view, established among others by Lewis (1973) and Williamson (2007): (VACUISM): counterpossibles are vacuousl...
no es algo sui generis, el procesamiento de la ficción será a menudo parásito de la las capacidad... more no es algo sui generis, el procesamiento de la ficción será a menudo parásito de la las capacidades cognitivas que pueden reemplazarla; en la medida en que es sui generis, nada garantiza que la ficción se comporta suficientemente bien para acatar las constricciones del discurso del discurso científico y filosófico, por no hablar de los requisitos mínimos de coherencia conceptual y lógica.
Traditional accounts of modal epistemology, which may be subsumed under the label of modal ration... more Traditional accounts of modal epistemology, which may be subsumed under the label of modal rationalism or neo-rationalism, are nowadays faced with empiricist alternatives.1 Very recently, Manolo Mart\uednez has made a radical proposal. He points out that empiricists like Ot\ue1vio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski draw on "moderately sophisticated cognitive abilities" of knowing modality. However, Mart\uednez points out, even "mice and monkeys are able to estimate probabilities" and thus to modalize.2 Mart\uednez presents a model of how primitive bodily mechanisms of modalizing work. He aims to rebut a claim that has been endorsed by Stephen Yablo and Christopher Peacocke, among others. They find a bodily mechanism purportedly attuned to modal features of the world "dubiously intelligible."3 In a weak sense, Mart\uednez clearly has rebutted the doubts of rationalists. Given two assumptions that he straightforwardly accepts, there are bodily mechanisms attuned to modal features of the world. The assumptions are, first, that his exemplary bodily process indeed tracks probabilities and, second, that probabilities correspond to possibilities.4 However, the key question that lurks in the background of the doubts of rationalists is whether cognizers like us can know metaphysical modalities without using rational capacities. Mart\uednez's results are of only limited interest in modal epistemology if they do not bear on answering this key question. Hence, the claim endorsed by rationalists may be read as follows: (NoBody): It is doubtful that cognizers like us can know metaphysical modalities purely by virtue of bodily mechanisms and without using rational capacities
Prediction draws on both simulation and theory. I ask how simulation is defined, and what the rol... more Prediction draws on both simulation and theory. I ask how simulation is defined, and what the roles of simulation and theory are, respectively. Simulation is flexible in structure and resources. Often simulation and theory are combined in prediction. The function of simulation consists of representing a situation that is relevantly like the target situation with regards to the feature predicted.
I critically assess Stephen Yablo's claim that ''cassinis are ovals'' is an a posteriori conceptu... more I critically assess Stephen Yablo's claim that ''cassinis are ovals'' is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by ''would have turned out''-conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo's claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo's conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I develop a more literal metaphysical interpretation: Yablo's conditionals draw on scenarios which are qualitatively identical to some original situation. None of these interpretations sustains Yablo's core thesis. Keywords Conceptual necessity Á Analyticity Á Metaphysical necessity Á Narrow content Á A priori Á Conditionals Á Counterfactuals Á Modal rationalism Á 2D-semantics 1 ''Cassinis are ovals'' as a posteriori conceptual necessity The once venerable connection of necessity, analyticity, and aprioricity has lost much of its appeal. Recently, Stephen Yablo has attacked one of the last traditional dogmas: Conceptual necessities are knowable a priori. He provides an a posteriori conceptual necessity: CAO: ''Cassinis are ovals'' Yablo characterizes ''oval'':
In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, c... more In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, conditionals of the form ‘If A had been the case, then B would have been the case’. According to the standard account, a counterfactual is true if the then-sentence is true in all closest worlds in which the if-sentence is true. Closeness is spelled out in terms of an ordering of worlds by their similarity. Dohrn explores resources of defending the standard account against several challenges. In particular, he defends the standard logics for counterfactuals. He discusses exemplary doubts as to whether conditionals have truth conditions. He inquires into the interaction between truth and probability of counterfactuals. He tackles problems with the similarity ordering. He address the interaction between counterfactuals and normalcy conditions. He closes with elaborating peculiarities of future-directed counterfactuals
I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Har... more I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Hare\u2019s solution rests on distinguishing two kinds of ought: The Ought of Omniscient Desire: what you oughtOD to do is what an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate interests would want you to do. The Ought of Most Reason: what you oughtMR to do is what there is most reason to do. I argue that the distinction does not dissolve the problem. Moreover, I show that Hare\u2019s proposal to spell out his distinction in terms of an embedded counterfactual (if you had not done what you did, then, if you had done what you did, what would the consequence have been?) is flawed
Can’t one truly judge that one is judging? Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritative... more Can’t one truly judge that one is judging? Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritatively knowing one’s own mental acts which depends on a surprising assumption: One cannot truly judge that one is judging. After briefly criticizing his account of one’s awareness that one is judging, I critically scrutinize two of his arguments against the possibility of truly judging that one is judging. Firstly, assuming such a possibility leads to a regress. Secondly, the second-order judgement inevitably replaces the first-order judgement such as to make the former wrong. Matthew Soteriou (2005) has provided a thorough analysis of our intuitive claims to be directly and authoritatively aware of our own mental activity. Soteriou opposes non-occurrent belief and conscious judgement. The latter is a mental act, the former is not. Conscious judgement is identified with occurrent belief (Soteriou 2005, 96). While one can have a non-occurrent belief that one is believing that p despite not be...
Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, Descartes´ umfassendes Ideal menschlicher Rationalitat zu rekonstru... more Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, Descartes´ umfassendes Ideal menschlicher Rationalitat zu rekonstruieren. In diesem Ideal spielen das richtige Erkenntnisverhalten und der methodische Erwerb von naturwissenschaftlichem Wissen eine entscheidende Rolle, die in der Forschung umfassend gewurdigt wurde. Aufgrund dieser herausragenden Stellung erkenntnistheoretischer Fragen sowohl in Descartes´ Denken als auch in der Forschungsdiskussion setzt die Untersuchung mit der Frage nach der Motivation von Descartes´ radikaler Erkenntniskritik ein. Aber ebenso wichtig fur Descartes´ Begriff eines rationalen Willens sind Descartes´ rudimentare Ethik und seine Auffassung geistiger Aktivitat in ihrem Zusammenhang mit praktischem und theoretischem Wissen einerseits und einem korperlichen Geschehen andererseits, aus der sich seine Sicht menschlichen Handelns ergibt. Letztere haben sehr viel weniger Aufmerksamkeit in der Forschung gefunden. Im ersten Hauptteil wird eine praktische Sicht des Erkenntniserwer...
Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with t... more Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with the question of how thought experiments manage to provide knowledge. Ernst Mach’s seminal contribution has eclipsed other approaches in the Austrian tradition. I discuss one of these neglected approaches. Faced with the challenge of how to reconcile his empiricist position with his use of thought experiments, Moritz Schlick proposed the following ‘Sinnkriterium’: a thought experiment is meaningful if it allows to answer a question under discussion by imagining the experiences that would confi rm that the thought experimental scenario is actual. I trace this view throughout three exemplary thought experiments of Schlick’s.
... Thus Hookway is probably committed to grant Conrad a positive epistemic standing. ... Page 13... more ... Thus Hookway is probably committed to grant Conrad a positive epistemic standing. ... Page 132. 116 Epistemology and Emotions Laurence BonJour's example of a clairvoyant points in the same direction (BonJour 1985, 41). ...
It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explai... more It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand-and-fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear-headedly intend a metaphysical reading. In recent years, counterpossibles, that is subjunctive conditionals with metaphysically impossible antecedents, have been intensely debated. On the one hand, there is the orthodox view, established among others by Lewis (1973) and Williamson (2007): (VACUISM): counterpossibles are vacuousl...
no es algo sui generis, el procesamiento de la ficción será a menudo parásito de la las capacidad... more no es algo sui generis, el procesamiento de la ficción será a menudo parásito de la las capacidades cognitivas que pueden reemplazarla; en la medida en que es sui generis, nada garantiza que la ficción se comporta suficientemente bien para acatar las constricciones del discurso del discurso científico y filosófico, por no hablar de los requisitos mínimos de coherencia conceptual y lógica.
Traditional accounts of modal epistemology, which may be subsumed under the label of modal ration... more Traditional accounts of modal epistemology, which may be subsumed under the label of modal rationalism or neo-rationalism, are nowadays faced with empiricist alternatives.1 Very recently, Manolo Mart\uednez has made a radical proposal. He points out that empiricists like Ot\ue1vio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski draw on "moderately sophisticated cognitive abilities" of knowing modality. However, Mart\uednez points out, even "mice and monkeys are able to estimate probabilities" and thus to modalize.2 Mart\uednez presents a model of how primitive bodily mechanisms of modalizing work. He aims to rebut a claim that has been endorsed by Stephen Yablo and Christopher Peacocke, among others. They find a bodily mechanism purportedly attuned to modal features of the world "dubiously intelligible."3 In a weak sense, Mart\uednez clearly has rebutted the doubts of rationalists. Given two assumptions that he straightforwardly accepts, there are bodily mechanisms attuned to modal features of the world. The assumptions are, first, that his exemplary bodily process indeed tracks probabilities and, second, that probabilities correspond to possibilities.4 However, the key question that lurks in the background of the doubts of rationalists is whether cognizers like us can know metaphysical modalities without using rational capacities. Mart\uednez's results are of only limited interest in modal epistemology if they do not bear on answering this key question. Hence, the claim endorsed by rationalists may be read as follows: (NoBody): It is doubtful that cognizers like us can know metaphysical modalities purely by virtue of bodily mechanisms and without using rational capacities
Prediction draws on both simulation and theory. I ask how simulation is defined, and what the rol... more Prediction draws on both simulation and theory. I ask how simulation is defined, and what the roles of simulation and theory are, respectively. Simulation is flexible in structure and resources. Often simulation and theory are combined in prediction. The function of simulation consists of representing a situation that is relevantly like the target situation with regards to the feature predicted.
I critically assess Stephen Yablo's claim that ''cassinis are ovals'' is an a posteriori conceptu... more I critically assess Stephen Yablo's claim that ''cassinis are ovals'' is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by ''would have turned out''-conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo's claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo's conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I develop a more literal metaphysical interpretation: Yablo's conditionals draw on scenarios which are qualitatively identical to some original situation. None of these interpretations sustains Yablo's core thesis. Keywords Conceptual necessity Á Analyticity Á Metaphysical necessity Á Narrow content Á A priori Á Conditionals Á Counterfactuals Á Modal rationalism Á 2D-semantics 1 ''Cassinis are ovals'' as a posteriori conceptual necessity The once venerable connection of necessity, analyticity, and aprioricity has lost much of its appeal. Recently, Stephen Yablo has attacked one of the last traditional dogmas: Conceptual necessities are knowable a priori. He provides an a posteriori conceptual necessity: CAO: ''Cassinis are ovals'' Yablo characterizes ''oval'':
Uploads
Papers by Daniel Dohrn