Papers by Anna Boukouvala
Philosophia, 2017
In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the ... more In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions. Most human beings don’t know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are. Although, they are by their definition as particular things obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus. According to Spinoza, this consensus is built upon the biological substrate defined by human body’s physiology, through the mechanism of imitation and is supported by empathy. Leading researchers in affective neuroscience argue for a theory of embodied cognition and recent research in neurosciences attributes human capacity for empathy to mirror neurons, recognising in Spinoza’s texts the philosophical roots of current scientific thinking on body, mind and feeling. Keeping in mind the debate concerning how different levels of explanation can be related to each other or how different disciplines can form the context for interpreting neuroscience’s data, we attempt to promote an implicit dialogue between Spinoza’s psychological theory and the neuroscientific findings, supporting that is legitimate and necessary to examine these questions from the point of view of philosophy and formulate new research questions that can promote further theoretical and empirical study of the complex phenomena concerning human nature and society.
δια-ΛΟΓΟΣ, 2019
Στο βιβλίο της Les transclasses ou la non-reproduction, η Chantal Jaquet επιλέγει να φωτίσει το φ... more Στο βιβλίο της Les transclasses ou la non-reproduction, η Chantal Jaquet επιλέγει να φωτίσει το φαινόμενο των διαταξικών , των εξαιρέσεων στον κανόνα της κοινωνικής αναπαραγωγής, όσων δεν ακολούθησαν τον δρόμο που αναμενόταν με βάση την καταγωγή τους, αλλά πραγματοποίησαν μια απρόβλεπτη μετάβαση σε μια άλλη τάξη, με τον αναγκαίο επαναπροσδιορισμό της ατομικής τους ταυτότητας . Σύμφωνα με τη συγγραφέα, η βιβλιογραφία εμφανίζεται αμήχανη απέναντι στο θέμα ή οδηγείται σε αναγωγές που απλουστεύουν ή διαστρεβλώνουν τις προϋποθέσεις του και οι εξηγήσεις που έχουν προταθεί συχνά λαμβάνουν ως αιτία το αποτέλεσμα και συγχέουν την προκατάληψη με την επιστημονική εξήγηση. Η ίδια δηλώνει ότι επιχειρεί να κατανοήσει τη φύση και τους όρους παραγωγής του, να αναδείξει τους αιτιακούς προσδιορισμούς του, διαπερνώντας το προπέτασμα καπνού που έχουν δημιουργήσει διαφόρων τύπων και ιδεολογιών μυθολογικά εξηγητικά μοντέλα, τα οποία παραπέμπουν μάλλον στους όρους που καθορίζουν αυτούς που τα συνέλαβαν παρά στη φύση των πραγμάτων που εξηγούν . Η Jaquet παρότι αξιοποιεί εννοιολογικά εργαλεία από περιοχές όπως η κοινωνιολογία και η λογοτεχνία, δεν παύει να επιχειρεί μια φιλοσοφική προσέγγιση, με αναφορές στο έργο του Spinoza κατά κύριο λόγο και αυτό δεν συμβαίνει μόνον στο προφανές επίπεδο της ανάλυσής της, αλλά διαπερνά τον βαθύτερο χαρακτήρα του έργου της.
Το εγχείρημα αυτής της εργασίας, που εντάσσεται εξίσου στη σκοποθεσία της Jaquet, ακολουθεί τον ίδιο δρόμο με αντίθετη φορά. Αξιοποιώντας την ανάλυσή της σχετικά με τη διαδικασία που οδηγεί στην εκ νέου δόμηση της ατομικής ταυτότητας των διαταξικών και επιτρέπει την απόσπαση από το καταγωγικό τους παράδειγμα, θα προσεγγίσουμε έννοιες της σπινοζικής ανθρωπολογικής θεωρίας επιχειρώντας λεπτότερες διακρίσεις και διεύρυνση του πεδίου εφαρμογής τους και θα αναδείξουμε την ουσιαστική συμβολή της λογοτεχνίας σε αυτή τη διαδικασία, παραμένοντας στο πλαίσιο της σπινοζικής φιλοσοφικής θεώρησης.
Yπόμνημα στη φιλοσοφία, 2008
Η Κοινωνική και Πολιτική Φιλοσοφία σήμερα. Αφιέρωμα στον ομότιμο καθηγητή κοινωνικής και πολιτικής φιλοσοφίας Παναγιώτη Νούτσο, 2022
Στο πλαίσιο των θεωριών του κοινωνικού συμβολαίου, φιλόσοφοι όπως ο Hobbes και ο Locke τον 17ο αι... more Στο πλαίσιο των θεωριών του κοινωνικού συμβολαίου, φιλόσοφοι όπως ο Hobbes και ο Locke τον 17ο αιώνα και ο Rousseau τον επόμενο επιχειρούν, από εμπειρική ή ορθολογική προοπτική, με διαφορετικού τύπου προσεγγίσεις να εξηγήσουν «επιστημονικά» τη γένεση και τη δομή της πολιτικής κοινωνίας. Το αίτημα για θεμελίωση της πολιτικής επιστήμης τέθηκε ρητά από τον Hobbes, στην προσπάθειά του να διαφοροποιηθεί από προγενέστερους στοχαστές που εγγράφονται στην παράδοση του φυσικού δικαίου και η θεωρία του κοινωνικού συμβολαίου, που εισάγει, αποτελεί ορόσημο στην προσπάθεια θεμελίωσης της νεότερης πολιτικής θεωρίας (Στυλιανού, 2006β). Όσοι την υιοθετούν, παρά τις διαφορές τους, κυρίως ως προς τη φύση και τη στόχευση του συμβολαίου, πρεσβεύουν την αντίληψη ότι η πολιτική κοινωνία, σε όποια χρονική στιγμή και αν την τοποθετήσουμε, αποτελεί προϊόν σύμβασης, που διαδέχεται κάποιου τύπου φυσική κατάσταση.
ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ 1ου ΔΙΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΟΥ ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΥ ΠΟΤΕ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΠΕΘΑΙΝΟΥΜΕ
Ο άνθρωπος, ως πεπερασμένος τρόπος στην οντολογία του Spinoza, είναι ένα εξαιρετικά σύνθετο άτομο... more Ο άνθρωπος, ως πεπερασμένος τρόπος στην οντολογία του Spinoza, είναι ένα εξαιρετικά σύνθετο άτομο, που αποτελείται από μεγάλο αριθμό επιμέρους εξίσου σύνθετων ατόμων. Συνίσταται από σώμα και ψυχή και στο επίπεδο του σώματος η συνθετότητά του εκφράζεται μέσα από τη συνύπαρξη των επιμέρους συστατικών στοιχείων του, ενώ στο επίπεδο της ψυχής από τη συνθετότητα της ιδέας, η οποία συνιστά την ψυχή του σώματος ως υπάρχοντος ενεργά. Oτιδήποτε συμβαίνει στο σώμα έχει την αντίστοιχη έκφρασή του και στην ψυχή. Για να περάσει ο άνθρωπος στην ενεργό ύπαρξη και τη διάρκεια απαιτείται μια ιδιαίτερα πολύπλοκη δόμηση σχέσεων, μια αλυσίδα αιτίων, η οποία δημιουργεί τις κατάλληλες συνθήκες που την επιτρέπουν. Η ύπαρξη, ακριβώς στο βαθμό που είναι σχέση, απαιτεί τη συναρμογή των επιμέρους μερών με τρόπο που ορίζεται από τους νόμους ή τη φύση της ουσίας που θα υπάρξει, καθορίζοντας έτσι την ατομική της ταυτότητα. Ο ρόλος της μνήμης στη διατήρηση της ατομικής ταυτότητας είναι ουσιαστικός, τόσο στο επίπεδο του σώματος όσο και της ψυχής. Ο άνθρωπος λοιπόν, ως πεπερασμένος τρόπος, έρχεται στην ύπαρξη από τη στιγμή που τα συστατικά του μέρη, καθορισμένα έξωθεν από μια σειρά αιτιών αποκτούν αυτή τη συγκεκριμένη σχέση μεταξύ τους. Συνεχίζει να υπάρχει όσο η δύναμή που εκφράζει το conatus του επιτρέπει στη σχέση αυτή να διατηρείται στο πλαίσιο των συσχετισμών της με τις εξωτερικές δυνάμεις που επενεργούν πάνω της, αν και μπορεί, υπό την επενέργεια αυτή, να τροποποιείται στο εσωτερικό της. Αντίθετα, παύει να υπάρχει, όταν τα συστατικά μέρη μπουν σε μια νέα σχέση, συνθέτοντας έτσι την ύπαρξη κάποιου άλλου ή κάποιων άλλων τρόπων. Ο άνθρωπος υφίσταται το θάνατο ως μια τροποποίηση που υπερβαίνει το εύρος της ικανότητας προσαρμογής του σώματός του. Κάθε σώμα κινδυνεύει να συναντήσει ένα άλλο σώμα το οποίο θα είναι σε θέση να καταστρέψει τη σχέση που το ορίζει. Η ανθρώπινη επιθυμία, που δεν είναι άλλη από την ίδια τη φύση ή την ουσία του ανθρώπου, είναι συνώνυμη με την ενεργό ύπαρξη και τείνει να διατηρήσει την ιδιαίτερη σχέση που ορίζει το σώμα και κατά αντιστοιχία και την ψυχή του σώματος αυτού στη ζωή, όσο εξαρτάται από την ίδια. Η επιθυμία θανάτου που οδηγεί στην αυτοκτονία δεν μπορεί, στο πλαίσιο αυτό, να κατανοηθεί παρά μέσα από το δίπολο ενεργητικότητα-παθητικότητα, που συνιστά κεντρικό θέμα της ανθρωπολογίας και της ηθικής φιλοσοφίας του Spinoza, η οποία πρώτιστα επιχειρεί όχι να κρίνει, αλλά να κατανοήσει την ανθρώπινη φύση μέσα στο πλαίσιο των αλληλεπιδράσεών της.
Ηuman being, as a finite mode in Spinoza's ontology, consists from body and mind and is an exceptionally complex individual, constituted by a big number of equally complex individuals. Regarding the body, his complexity is expressed through the coexistence of his individual constitutive parts and that complexity is reflected in its corresponding idea, which is his mind. Whatever happens in the body is reflected or expressed in the mind. Human being exists in duration as the result of a long chain of causes, which create the suitable conditions. Existence, to the extent that it is a relation, is determined by the laws or by the nature of the substance that will exist, forming thus her individual identity. The role of memory in the maintenance of individual identity is essential. Human being therefore, as a finite mode, comes to existence from the moment where his constitutive parts, determined from a chain of causes acquire a concrete relation and continues existing as long as his force, his conatus, is able to maintain this relation against the exterior forces that act upon her. On the contrary, human being ceases existing when his constitutive parts enter in a new relation, which determines the existence of some other or certain other ways. Death is a modification that exceeds the capability of adaptation of a certain body and the corresponding mind and their dispositions to act and be acted upon. Each body can meet another body which will be in position to destroy him. Human desire, the very nature or essence of a man, expresses human essence's active existence and strives to persevere in it, as far as it can by its own power. The desire of death that leads to suicide cannot, in this frame, be comprehended despite through the distinction activity-passivity, which consists a key doctrine in Spinoza's anthropology and ethics, which tries not to judge but to understand, through the notion of necessity, human nature and human relations.
Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 2017
In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the ... more In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions. Most human beings don’t know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are. Although, they are by their definition as particular things obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus. According to Spinoza, this consensus is built upon the biological substrate defined by human body’s physiology, through the mechanism of imitation and is supported by empathy. Leading researchers in affective neuroscience argue for a theory of embodied cognition and recent research in neurosciences attributes human capacity for empathy to mirror neurons, recognising in Spinoza’s texts the philosophical roots of current scientific thinking on body, mind and feeling. Keeping in mind the debate concerning how different levels of explanation can be related to each other or how different disciplines can form the context for interpreting neuroscience’s data, we attempt to promote an implicit dialogue between Spinoza’s psychological theory and the neuroscientific findings, supporting that is legitimate and necessary to examine these questions from the point of view of philosophy and formulate new research questions that can promote further theoretical and empirical study of the complex phenomena concerning human nature and society.
Σύμφωνα με τον Σπινόζα δεν είμαστε όντα που έχουν επιθυμίες, όπως έχουν άλλα χαρακτηριστικά, είμα... more Σύμφωνα με τον Σπινόζα δεν είμαστε όντα που έχουν επιθυμίες, όπως έχουν άλλα χαρακτηριστικά, είμαστε επιθυμία που εκδηλώνεται μέσα από κάθε είδους ενέργεια, διότι για μια επιθυμητική φύση είναι και ενεργείν είναι ένα και το αυτό. Αν λοιπόν η επιθυμία είναι η ίδια η ουσία του ανθρώπου, όταν επιθυμώ κάτι σημαίνει ότι κάνω ένα βήμα, μικρότερο ή μεγαλύτερο, προς το να εκφράσω το είναι μου, να εκδηλώσω δυνατότητες που συγκροτούν την ιδιαίτερη ταυτότητά μου και τελικά, στην ευδαιμονιστική, όπως έχει αποκληθεί, φιλοσοφία του Σπινόζα, κάνω ένα βήμα προς το να ζω καλά και να είμαι ευτυχής;
Thesis Chapters by Anna Boukouvala
PhD Thesis, Ioannina 2006.
If the objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, as it is formulated in his... more PhD Thesis, Ioannina 2006.
If the objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, as it is formulated in his central work, the Ethics, is to lead man to happiness as if taking him by the hand, then he should define what this happiness consists of and he should also delineate the basic content lent to the moral principles of good and evil. Yet what kind of content can these terms acquire in a philosophy according to which a) both God as well as each and every singular thing comply with the law of causal necessity, b) where will, be it God’s or man’s, is not free but is always determined causally and c) perfection is induced to reality?
This thesis focuses attention on the study of the notions of good and evil. More specifically, it attempts to elucidate the way in which three different views are articulated within Spinoza’s system of philosophy and to see the outcome of their correlation. The philosopher discards any ontological status regarding the notions in question and considers them to be modes of thought and more specifically beings of reason, relevant notions that are created by man in an effort to comprehend things through their interrelation. Nevertheless, people act aiming at the achievement of goals and deem things as good or evil, even though the philosopher insists that “we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we judge something to be good because ……we desire it”. Why is it then that he believes that despite this “still we must retain these words (vocabula)”? “For because we desire to form an idea of man as a model of human nature, which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words, with the meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by wich we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before ourselves. By evil what we certainly know prevents us for becoming like that model”. And furthermore why does he proceed to genetic definitions of the notions of good and evil defining as good “what we certainly know to be useful to us” and as evil “what we certainly know prevents us from acquiring something good”?
The chapters of our thesis follow the train of thought indicated by our questions. In the first chapter we are attempting to define and determine the real by studying beings and their distinctions. According to Spinoza in nature there are only substances and modes. More specifically there is a substance called God related to innumerable attributes, eternal and infinite, each in its own right, and independent from one another. Each one of them is expressed through modes (modi) or modifications (modificationes) infinite or finite. Man is one of God’s finite modifications. A singular thing (res singularis) consisting of body and soul, which constitute expressions of its essence in relation to the attributes of extent and thought respectively. Good and evil can’t have an ontological status, as they do not pertain to any of the categories of beings. What does their characterization as beings of reason mean then?
In the second chapter we are analysing the gnosiology principles by which man approaches the real, one’s ability for knowledge and the limits to this knowledge, the mechanisms through which knowledge is gained, as well as further distinctions related to the kinds of knowledge laid out in Spinoza’s philosophy. A fundamental axiom in Spinoza’s system is the principle of absolute comprehensibility of all that is real, based on which man can know things in the same way God does, through intellect, so that man’s truth is God’s truth. But in order to understand how man knows, we must know the nature of man’s soul (mens). The human soul is an idea, the idea of the body as actually existing, but this is the idea God has of it. The soul itself, does not have the idea that is, but it knows itself and other bodies through its own body, and more specifically through the modifications it undergoes during its interaction with surrounding things, and then forms ideas about these modifications.
If human knowledge is to perceive things as they are, it should be able to distinguish between things that really exist, modes of thought, and the impact of the use of language on this process. The kinds of knowledge that man can gain fall within three categories. The first is imagination, that is the way in which the soul perceives through the images that things imprint on its body. The analysis of the way imagination works allows us to grasp the notion of beings of reason. The first kind of true knowledge is Reason, that is the perception of common notions. This knowledge is a result of an innate ability of the soul, is related to the psychosomatic status of man, and it is definitely true. Reason is an attribute of man and all men. At the climax of the progress towards knowledge man can attain a third kind of knowledge; intuitive knowledge. At the last part to this chapter we are also examining the role of experience in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge.
In the third chapter, in the light of our familiarisation with the basic principles governing Spinoza’s philosophy, we attempt an analysis of the ontological status of good and evil. We present the views pertinent to the relativity of the notions of good and evil through different works of his, only to conclude that they remained unalterable from his first Treatises to Ethics. Within the framework of this chapter we quote the correspondence of the philosopher with Blyenbergh, elaborating on the topic of evil, and then we present the theory on the perception of good and evil emanating form the theory of the encounter of bodies.
In the fourth chapter we highlight that these notions have a meaning viewed in the light of man, perceived as good and evil for man. We proceed thus to the analysis of human nature through the study of the fundamental notion of conatus and its expression as desire. We define the notion of affect (affectus) and then go on to the basic distinction between active and passive affects, a distinction based on the knowledge they comprise, which alludes to the distinctions touched upon in chapter two. The definition of good and evil refered on desire, integrates these notions in the very human nature, which is expressed as a desire and is oriented towards things according to the other two fundamental human emotions; joy and sorrow. We examine the mechanism of imitation based on the perception of the other man as same, as a thing like us (res nobis similis) and then we analyse how good and evil are defined by desire as a passion.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the definition of notions based on the distinction between good and evil and truly good and evil, as perceived by Reason. It then goes on to explore the notion of an exemplary human nature and elucidate on the definitions of truly good given according to that exemplar, aiming at finding the reason that leads the philosopher to the preservation of the phonemes and allows him to proceed to genetic definitions. The ability of Reason to grasp what is common is bound to lead to the true knowledge of human nature, so that by this yardstick the content of the terms in question can be defined. The knowledge of the nature of soul leads to the realisation that knowledge itself constitutes what is truly good and the knowledge of God is the supreme good. Furthermore, the knowledge of Reason dictates that the virtue of man consists in acting according to the laws of man’s nature. It is again desire then that defines what is truly good for man, but it is the rational desire that constitutes an active affect.
The functionalism of the knowledge of good and evil, which is now also true, is examined in relation to action in the sixth and last chapter. In what way is the true knowledge of good and evil related to human action? And to what kind of ethics is the philosopher finally led to, judging by the way in which he deals with the notions of good and evil? The cause that leads to the formation of an exemplar is related to the mechanisms of desire and its functionalism is determined by the very nature of rational knowledge, which is abstract and is projected in the future, highlighting the main weakness of Reason to lead to action. Drawing on that we then proceed to the exploration of the conditions necessary for the development of an initially immature Reason and examine to what extent the same mechanism related to the formation of an exemplar can be exploited in conjunction with knowledge and through knowledge, which now has the drive of imagination to its benefit. The tail–piece seeks to find to what extent and in what mode the road indicated by Spinoza’s philosophy can meet with an empirical route, in which man is not equipped with the deductions of philosophical knowledge. We underline the notion of attention that is a direction to further investigation.
After summarising the basic views highlighted by our analysis we conclude wondering about the character of Spinoza’s ethics. We ascertain the grades of ethics, which are nevertheless established from beginning to end within the same ontological principle, the nature of man viewed as desire, a desire which goes through different stages of self-consciousness, to wonder in the end if the philosopher finally proves to be consistent in his dismissal of teleology.
Teaching Documents by Anna Boukouvala
Η λογοτεχνία ςτην εκπαίδευςη: Αξιοποίηςη ψηφιακού υλικού και εφαρμογών "Αγαπητέ μου φίλε, σας απο... more Η λογοτεχνία ςτην εκπαίδευςη: Αξιοποίηςη ψηφιακού υλικού και εφαρμογών "Αγαπητέ μου φίλε, σας αποστέλλω ένα μικρό έργο, για το οποίο δεν θα μπορούσαμε να πούμε, δικαιολογημένα, ότι δεν έχει αρχή και τέλος, αφού αντίθετα κάθε τμήμα είναι αρχή και τέλος, εναλλακτικά και αμοιβαία. Πάρτε υπόψη σας, παρακαλώ, ποια αξιοθαύμαστη ευχέρεια προσφέρει αυτός ο συνδυασμός σ' όλους, σ' εσάς, σ΄εμένα και στον αναγνώστη. Μπορούμε να κόψουμε όπου θέλουμε, εγώ την ονειροπόλησή μου, εσείς το χειρόγραφο, ο αναγνώστης το διάβασμα" Σαρλ Μπωντλαίρ, Η μελαγχολία του Παριςιού-Πεζά ποιήματα (1855-1864) «Δεν ξέρω αν θα μπορέσω να αντέξω πολύ. Είμαι ένα βιβλίο κατακερματισμένο, το να έχεις πολλές ζωές και πολλές ψυχές είναι σαν να μην έχεις καμία [...] Θα' θελα πάρα πολύ να ήμουν ένα χάρτινο βιβλίο που να περιέχει την ιστορία εκείνου του κυρίου που επισκέπτεται την κόλαση, το καθαρτήριο και τον παράδεισο. Θα ζούσα σ' ένα ήρεμο σύμπαν, όπου η διάκριση ανάμεσα στο καλό και στο κακό θα ήταν ξεκάθαρη, όπου θα ήξερα πώς να κινηθώ για να περάσω απ' το μαρτύριο στη μακαριότητα, και όπου οι παράλληλες δεν συναντιούνται ποτέ.» Ουμπέρτο Έκο, «Εςωτερικόσ Μονόλογοσ ενόσ e-book», Aναμνήςεισ επί χάρτου
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Το εγχείρημα αυτής της εργασίας, που εντάσσεται εξίσου στη σκοποθεσία της Jaquet, ακολουθεί τον ίδιο δρόμο με αντίθετη φορά. Αξιοποιώντας την ανάλυσή της σχετικά με τη διαδικασία που οδηγεί στην εκ νέου δόμηση της ατομικής ταυτότητας των διαταξικών και επιτρέπει την απόσπαση από το καταγωγικό τους παράδειγμα, θα προσεγγίσουμε έννοιες της σπινοζικής ανθρωπολογικής θεωρίας επιχειρώντας λεπτότερες διακρίσεις και διεύρυνση του πεδίου εφαρμογής τους και θα αναδείξουμε την ουσιαστική συμβολή της λογοτεχνίας σε αυτή τη διαδικασία, παραμένοντας στο πλαίσιο της σπινοζικής φιλοσοφικής θεώρησης.
Ηuman being, as a finite mode in Spinoza's ontology, consists from body and mind and is an exceptionally complex individual, constituted by a big number of equally complex individuals. Regarding the body, his complexity is expressed through the coexistence of his individual constitutive parts and that complexity is reflected in its corresponding idea, which is his mind. Whatever happens in the body is reflected or expressed in the mind. Human being exists in duration as the result of a long chain of causes, which create the suitable conditions. Existence, to the extent that it is a relation, is determined by the laws or by the nature of the substance that will exist, forming thus her individual identity. The role of memory in the maintenance of individual identity is essential. Human being therefore, as a finite mode, comes to existence from the moment where his constitutive parts, determined from a chain of causes acquire a concrete relation and continues existing as long as his force, his conatus, is able to maintain this relation against the exterior forces that act upon her. On the contrary, human being ceases existing when his constitutive parts enter in a new relation, which determines the existence of some other or certain other ways. Death is a modification that exceeds the capability of adaptation of a certain body and the corresponding mind and their dispositions to act and be acted upon. Each body can meet another body which will be in position to destroy him. Human desire, the very nature or essence of a man, expresses human essence's active existence and strives to persevere in it, as far as it can by its own power. The desire of death that leads to suicide cannot, in this frame, be comprehended despite through the distinction activity-passivity, which consists a key doctrine in Spinoza's anthropology and ethics, which tries not to judge but to understand, through the notion of necessity, human nature and human relations.
Thesis Chapters by Anna Boukouvala
If the objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, as it is formulated in his central work, the Ethics, is to lead man to happiness as if taking him by the hand, then he should define what this happiness consists of and he should also delineate the basic content lent to the moral principles of good and evil. Yet what kind of content can these terms acquire in a philosophy according to which a) both God as well as each and every singular thing comply with the law of causal necessity, b) where will, be it God’s or man’s, is not free but is always determined causally and c) perfection is induced to reality?
This thesis focuses attention on the study of the notions of good and evil. More specifically, it attempts to elucidate the way in which three different views are articulated within Spinoza’s system of philosophy and to see the outcome of their correlation. The philosopher discards any ontological status regarding the notions in question and considers them to be modes of thought and more specifically beings of reason, relevant notions that are created by man in an effort to comprehend things through their interrelation. Nevertheless, people act aiming at the achievement of goals and deem things as good or evil, even though the philosopher insists that “we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we judge something to be good because ……we desire it”. Why is it then that he believes that despite this “still we must retain these words (vocabula)”? “For because we desire to form an idea of man as a model of human nature, which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words, with the meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by wich we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before ourselves. By evil what we certainly know prevents us for becoming like that model”. And furthermore why does he proceed to genetic definitions of the notions of good and evil defining as good “what we certainly know to be useful to us” and as evil “what we certainly know prevents us from acquiring something good”?
The chapters of our thesis follow the train of thought indicated by our questions. In the first chapter we are attempting to define and determine the real by studying beings and their distinctions. According to Spinoza in nature there are only substances and modes. More specifically there is a substance called God related to innumerable attributes, eternal and infinite, each in its own right, and independent from one another. Each one of them is expressed through modes (modi) or modifications (modificationes) infinite or finite. Man is one of God’s finite modifications. A singular thing (res singularis) consisting of body and soul, which constitute expressions of its essence in relation to the attributes of extent and thought respectively. Good and evil can’t have an ontological status, as they do not pertain to any of the categories of beings. What does their characterization as beings of reason mean then?
In the second chapter we are analysing the gnosiology principles by which man approaches the real, one’s ability for knowledge and the limits to this knowledge, the mechanisms through which knowledge is gained, as well as further distinctions related to the kinds of knowledge laid out in Spinoza’s philosophy. A fundamental axiom in Spinoza’s system is the principle of absolute comprehensibility of all that is real, based on which man can know things in the same way God does, through intellect, so that man’s truth is God’s truth. But in order to understand how man knows, we must know the nature of man’s soul (mens). The human soul is an idea, the idea of the body as actually existing, but this is the idea God has of it. The soul itself, does not have the idea that is, but it knows itself and other bodies through its own body, and more specifically through the modifications it undergoes during its interaction with surrounding things, and then forms ideas about these modifications.
If human knowledge is to perceive things as they are, it should be able to distinguish between things that really exist, modes of thought, and the impact of the use of language on this process. The kinds of knowledge that man can gain fall within three categories. The first is imagination, that is the way in which the soul perceives through the images that things imprint on its body. The analysis of the way imagination works allows us to grasp the notion of beings of reason. The first kind of true knowledge is Reason, that is the perception of common notions. This knowledge is a result of an innate ability of the soul, is related to the psychosomatic status of man, and it is definitely true. Reason is an attribute of man and all men. At the climax of the progress towards knowledge man can attain a third kind of knowledge; intuitive knowledge. At the last part to this chapter we are also examining the role of experience in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge.
In the third chapter, in the light of our familiarisation with the basic principles governing Spinoza’s philosophy, we attempt an analysis of the ontological status of good and evil. We present the views pertinent to the relativity of the notions of good and evil through different works of his, only to conclude that they remained unalterable from his first Treatises to Ethics. Within the framework of this chapter we quote the correspondence of the philosopher with Blyenbergh, elaborating on the topic of evil, and then we present the theory on the perception of good and evil emanating form the theory of the encounter of bodies.
In the fourth chapter we highlight that these notions have a meaning viewed in the light of man, perceived as good and evil for man. We proceed thus to the analysis of human nature through the study of the fundamental notion of conatus and its expression as desire. We define the notion of affect (affectus) and then go on to the basic distinction between active and passive affects, a distinction based on the knowledge they comprise, which alludes to the distinctions touched upon in chapter two. The definition of good and evil refered on desire, integrates these notions in the very human nature, which is expressed as a desire and is oriented towards things according to the other two fundamental human emotions; joy and sorrow. We examine the mechanism of imitation based on the perception of the other man as same, as a thing like us (res nobis similis) and then we analyse how good and evil are defined by desire as a passion.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the definition of notions based on the distinction between good and evil and truly good and evil, as perceived by Reason. It then goes on to explore the notion of an exemplary human nature and elucidate on the definitions of truly good given according to that exemplar, aiming at finding the reason that leads the philosopher to the preservation of the phonemes and allows him to proceed to genetic definitions. The ability of Reason to grasp what is common is bound to lead to the true knowledge of human nature, so that by this yardstick the content of the terms in question can be defined. The knowledge of the nature of soul leads to the realisation that knowledge itself constitutes what is truly good and the knowledge of God is the supreme good. Furthermore, the knowledge of Reason dictates that the virtue of man consists in acting according to the laws of man’s nature. It is again desire then that defines what is truly good for man, but it is the rational desire that constitutes an active affect.
The functionalism of the knowledge of good and evil, which is now also true, is examined in relation to action in the sixth and last chapter. In what way is the true knowledge of good and evil related to human action? And to what kind of ethics is the philosopher finally led to, judging by the way in which he deals with the notions of good and evil? The cause that leads to the formation of an exemplar is related to the mechanisms of desire and its functionalism is determined by the very nature of rational knowledge, which is abstract and is projected in the future, highlighting the main weakness of Reason to lead to action. Drawing on that we then proceed to the exploration of the conditions necessary for the development of an initially immature Reason and examine to what extent the same mechanism related to the formation of an exemplar can be exploited in conjunction with knowledge and through knowledge, which now has the drive of imagination to its benefit. The tail–piece seeks to find to what extent and in what mode the road indicated by Spinoza’s philosophy can meet with an empirical route, in which man is not equipped with the deductions of philosophical knowledge. We underline the notion of attention that is a direction to further investigation.
After summarising the basic views highlighted by our analysis we conclude wondering about the character of Spinoza’s ethics. We ascertain the grades of ethics, which are nevertheless established from beginning to end within the same ontological principle, the nature of man viewed as desire, a desire which goes through different stages of self-consciousness, to wonder in the end if the philosopher finally proves to be consistent in his dismissal of teleology.
Teaching Documents by Anna Boukouvala
Talks by Anna Boukouvala
Conference Presentations by Anna Boukouvala
Το εγχείρημα αυτής της εργασίας, που εντάσσεται εξίσου στη σκοποθεσία της Jaquet, ακολουθεί τον ίδιο δρόμο με αντίθετη φορά. Αξιοποιώντας την ανάλυσή της σχετικά με τη διαδικασία που οδηγεί στην εκ νέου δόμηση της ατομικής ταυτότητας των διαταξικών και επιτρέπει την απόσπαση από το καταγωγικό τους παράδειγμα, θα προσεγγίσουμε έννοιες της σπινοζικής ανθρωπολογικής θεωρίας επιχειρώντας λεπτότερες διακρίσεις και διεύρυνση του πεδίου εφαρμογής τους και θα αναδείξουμε την ουσιαστική συμβολή της λογοτεχνίας σε αυτή τη διαδικασία, παραμένοντας στο πλαίσιο της σπινοζικής φιλοσοφικής θεώρησης.
Ηuman being, as a finite mode in Spinoza's ontology, consists from body and mind and is an exceptionally complex individual, constituted by a big number of equally complex individuals. Regarding the body, his complexity is expressed through the coexistence of his individual constitutive parts and that complexity is reflected in its corresponding idea, which is his mind. Whatever happens in the body is reflected or expressed in the mind. Human being exists in duration as the result of a long chain of causes, which create the suitable conditions. Existence, to the extent that it is a relation, is determined by the laws or by the nature of the substance that will exist, forming thus her individual identity. The role of memory in the maintenance of individual identity is essential. Human being therefore, as a finite mode, comes to existence from the moment where his constitutive parts, determined from a chain of causes acquire a concrete relation and continues existing as long as his force, his conatus, is able to maintain this relation against the exterior forces that act upon her. On the contrary, human being ceases existing when his constitutive parts enter in a new relation, which determines the existence of some other or certain other ways. Death is a modification that exceeds the capability of adaptation of a certain body and the corresponding mind and their dispositions to act and be acted upon. Each body can meet another body which will be in position to destroy him. Human desire, the very nature or essence of a man, expresses human essence's active existence and strives to persevere in it, as far as it can by its own power. The desire of death that leads to suicide cannot, in this frame, be comprehended despite through the distinction activity-passivity, which consists a key doctrine in Spinoza's anthropology and ethics, which tries not to judge but to understand, through the notion of necessity, human nature and human relations.
If the objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, as it is formulated in his central work, the Ethics, is to lead man to happiness as if taking him by the hand, then he should define what this happiness consists of and he should also delineate the basic content lent to the moral principles of good and evil. Yet what kind of content can these terms acquire in a philosophy according to which a) both God as well as each and every singular thing comply with the law of causal necessity, b) where will, be it God’s or man’s, is not free but is always determined causally and c) perfection is induced to reality?
This thesis focuses attention on the study of the notions of good and evil. More specifically, it attempts to elucidate the way in which three different views are articulated within Spinoza’s system of philosophy and to see the outcome of their correlation. The philosopher discards any ontological status regarding the notions in question and considers them to be modes of thought and more specifically beings of reason, relevant notions that are created by man in an effort to comprehend things through their interrelation. Nevertheless, people act aiming at the achievement of goals and deem things as good or evil, even though the philosopher insists that “we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we judge something to be good because ……we desire it”. Why is it then that he believes that despite this “still we must retain these words (vocabula)”? “For because we desire to form an idea of man as a model of human nature, which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words, with the meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by wich we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before ourselves. By evil what we certainly know prevents us for becoming like that model”. And furthermore why does he proceed to genetic definitions of the notions of good and evil defining as good “what we certainly know to be useful to us” and as evil “what we certainly know prevents us from acquiring something good”?
The chapters of our thesis follow the train of thought indicated by our questions. In the first chapter we are attempting to define and determine the real by studying beings and their distinctions. According to Spinoza in nature there are only substances and modes. More specifically there is a substance called God related to innumerable attributes, eternal and infinite, each in its own right, and independent from one another. Each one of them is expressed through modes (modi) or modifications (modificationes) infinite or finite. Man is one of God’s finite modifications. A singular thing (res singularis) consisting of body and soul, which constitute expressions of its essence in relation to the attributes of extent and thought respectively. Good and evil can’t have an ontological status, as they do not pertain to any of the categories of beings. What does their characterization as beings of reason mean then?
In the second chapter we are analysing the gnosiology principles by which man approaches the real, one’s ability for knowledge and the limits to this knowledge, the mechanisms through which knowledge is gained, as well as further distinctions related to the kinds of knowledge laid out in Spinoza’s philosophy. A fundamental axiom in Spinoza’s system is the principle of absolute comprehensibility of all that is real, based on which man can know things in the same way God does, through intellect, so that man’s truth is God’s truth. But in order to understand how man knows, we must know the nature of man’s soul (mens). The human soul is an idea, the idea of the body as actually existing, but this is the idea God has of it. The soul itself, does not have the idea that is, but it knows itself and other bodies through its own body, and more specifically through the modifications it undergoes during its interaction with surrounding things, and then forms ideas about these modifications.
If human knowledge is to perceive things as they are, it should be able to distinguish between things that really exist, modes of thought, and the impact of the use of language on this process. The kinds of knowledge that man can gain fall within three categories. The first is imagination, that is the way in which the soul perceives through the images that things imprint on its body. The analysis of the way imagination works allows us to grasp the notion of beings of reason. The first kind of true knowledge is Reason, that is the perception of common notions. This knowledge is a result of an innate ability of the soul, is related to the psychosomatic status of man, and it is definitely true. Reason is an attribute of man and all men. At the climax of the progress towards knowledge man can attain a third kind of knowledge; intuitive knowledge. At the last part to this chapter we are also examining the role of experience in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge.
In the third chapter, in the light of our familiarisation with the basic principles governing Spinoza’s philosophy, we attempt an analysis of the ontological status of good and evil. We present the views pertinent to the relativity of the notions of good and evil through different works of his, only to conclude that they remained unalterable from his first Treatises to Ethics. Within the framework of this chapter we quote the correspondence of the philosopher with Blyenbergh, elaborating on the topic of evil, and then we present the theory on the perception of good and evil emanating form the theory of the encounter of bodies.
In the fourth chapter we highlight that these notions have a meaning viewed in the light of man, perceived as good and evil for man. We proceed thus to the analysis of human nature through the study of the fundamental notion of conatus and its expression as desire. We define the notion of affect (affectus) and then go on to the basic distinction between active and passive affects, a distinction based on the knowledge they comprise, which alludes to the distinctions touched upon in chapter two. The definition of good and evil refered on desire, integrates these notions in the very human nature, which is expressed as a desire and is oriented towards things according to the other two fundamental human emotions; joy and sorrow. We examine the mechanism of imitation based on the perception of the other man as same, as a thing like us (res nobis similis) and then we analyse how good and evil are defined by desire as a passion.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the definition of notions based on the distinction between good and evil and truly good and evil, as perceived by Reason. It then goes on to explore the notion of an exemplary human nature and elucidate on the definitions of truly good given according to that exemplar, aiming at finding the reason that leads the philosopher to the preservation of the phonemes and allows him to proceed to genetic definitions. The ability of Reason to grasp what is common is bound to lead to the true knowledge of human nature, so that by this yardstick the content of the terms in question can be defined. The knowledge of the nature of soul leads to the realisation that knowledge itself constitutes what is truly good and the knowledge of God is the supreme good. Furthermore, the knowledge of Reason dictates that the virtue of man consists in acting according to the laws of man’s nature. It is again desire then that defines what is truly good for man, but it is the rational desire that constitutes an active affect.
The functionalism of the knowledge of good and evil, which is now also true, is examined in relation to action in the sixth and last chapter. In what way is the true knowledge of good and evil related to human action? And to what kind of ethics is the philosopher finally led to, judging by the way in which he deals with the notions of good and evil? The cause that leads to the formation of an exemplar is related to the mechanisms of desire and its functionalism is determined by the very nature of rational knowledge, which is abstract and is projected in the future, highlighting the main weakness of Reason to lead to action. Drawing on that we then proceed to the exploration of the conditions necessary for the development of an initially immature Reason and examine to what extent the same mechanism related to the formation of an exemplar can be exploited in conjunction with knowledge and through knowledge, which now has the drive of imagination to its benefit. The tail–piece seeks to find to what extent and in what mode the road indicated by Spinoza’s philosophy can meet with an empirical route, in which man is not equipped with the deductions of philosophical knowledge. We underline the notion of attention that is a direction to further investigation.
After summarising the basic views highlighted by our analysis we conclude wondering about the character of Spinoza’s ethics. We ascertain the grades of ethics, which are nevertheless established from beginning to end within the same ontological principle, the nature of man viewed as desire, a desire which goes through different stages of self-consciousness, to wonder in the end if the philosopher finally proves to be consistent in his dismissal of teleology.