Matt Gordner
I'm a Tunis-based PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto and Co-Founder of Tanmiya for Social Change. My graduate work examines long-term development patterns and social transformation in Tunisia from the Ottoman period to the present, with a strong focus on NGO-ization after the 2010-2011 uprising, while my consulting work focuses on democratization, human rights, (de-)radicalization, youth politics and social movements, innovation and entrepreneurship, and the Arab public sphere.
Supervisors: Paul Kingston
Supervisors: Paul Kingston
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Papers by Matt Gordner
The UDC is the oldest and most important organization that groups unemployed persons in Tunisia under one umbrella. Its slogan: “Work, Freedom, National Dignity” dates back to 2006. It also became the master frame of the Tunisian uprising, also known as the ‘Jasmine Revolution.’ The purpose of the UDC was to fill the vacuum in representation created between the UGET (L'Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie) student’s union and the UGTT (L'Union générale tunisienne du travail) labor union in Tunisia. The creation of the UDC responded to a significant threat to local, independent, and unsanctioned groups dedicated to unemployed graduates in the country. Namely, it was often the case that regime officials would arrest one group without the knowledge of the others. This left all groups vulnerable and without recourse to legal action or counsel. Prior to the organization’s establishment, there was no formal leadership structure or communication strategy for channeling concerns or efforts over the rights of unemployed graduates in Tunisia.
Upon formalizing the umbrella organization in 2006 (though still illegal), the regional offices of the UDC were able to act in concert with one another and with the support of the UGET, UGTT, LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme), Tunisian Communist Worker’s Party, and the Tunisian Bar Association, among others, which greatly strengthened their organizational capacity and impact. Thus, upon the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid in December, 2010—the single act often attributed as the catalyst to the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ and ‘Arab Spring’—the UDC were one of the first groups to carry out organized protests throughout Tunisia.
Jemna thus serves as an example of successful grass-roots mobilization and cooperative economics. As exemplar, the APJO also threatens the state’s claims to be able to provide for its citizens at a time when the legitimacy and confidence in state institutions and political parties is at an all-time low (Yahya, 2016). The ‘case’ of Jemna is in the spotlight. If reached, a future resolution will undoubtedly be considered as a precedent for other towns in the south of Tunisia making similar land claims. The cooperative model may also stand as a challenge to Tunisia’s decades long neo-liberal turn.
Westphalian international order. Starting with a critique of the colonial nature
of the international State system, Gordner refutes the notion that the regions held
by the Islamic State are in fact ‘ungoverned.’ He shows how indeed the
Islamic State offers many key characteristics of a State (such as regular
income, military power, unified ideology), except for sharing the Westphalian
notion of borders and exclusive sovereignty within the territory specified by
these. Indeed, the Islamic State is marked by ‘the erasure of the border’ and
its attempt to create a ‘transnational Islamic polity,’ thus questioning the
fundamental tenets of the Westphalian international order. The Islamic State
‘refus[es] to recognize the sovereignty of other states’ in terms of proposing a
radically different model of the state rather than simply in terms of conquest
and taking control of other states. It therewith undermines the reification of
the nation-state model as the ‘natural’ model of human political organization
and forcefully questions the centrality of both the state and the status of
borders in IR.
powerholders, the events of 2010-2011 changed the trajectory of innovation and
entrepreneurship only slightly and in specific, local contexts. This paper endeavours to
compare Egypt, Tunisia, and the UAE with three major objectives in mind.
First, the paper reviews the history of the region, and in particular the reasons for and
impact of its late and uneven development. Second, it demonstrates that the general
business and innovation trends across the region remained mostly unaffected by the
“Arab Spring.” Drawing upon the Doing Business World Bank data, we find that among
the three countries under study, the UAE has made steady improvements, while Egypt
and Tunisia have remained relatively constant. Examining each case further, it appears
as though government support for entrepreneurialism alone only goes so far, though the
conditions for doing business are contingent on the removal of government constraints.
Civil society (Tunisia) and the private sector (UAE and Egypt) are also important actors
albeit not in quite the same way.
For the UAE, “angel investors” have made a significant difference, though civil society
has yet to find its footing. In Tunisia, civil society was a driving force behind recent
achievements, perhaps notably vis-à-vis the Startup Act. In Egypt, civil society remains
closed under the Sisi regime, yet some initiatives by the private sector provide a silver
lining to its post-2011 context and have influenced the government to pay new attention
to the private sector as integral to its economic (and political) vitality and survival.
Notably, SMEs kept the engine of the Egyptian economy going during its uprisings when
the government was mostly shut down. Finally, the paper suggests that Tunisia may
soon prove to be an outlier in terms of the new opportunities posed by the “revolution”
in both the altered state of corruption combined with government and civil society
attention paid to the new entrepreneurial landscape.
The UDC is the oldest and most important organization that groups unemployed persons in Tunisia under one umbrella. Its slogan: “Work, Freedom, National Dignity” dates back to 2006. It also became the master frame of the Tunisian uprising, also known as the ‘Jasmine Revolution.’ The purpose of the UDC was to fill the vacuum in representation created between the UGET (L'Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie) student’s union and the UGTT (L'Union générale tunisienne du travail) labor union in Tunisia. The creation of the UDC responded to a significant threat to local, independent, and unsanctioned groups dedicated to unemployed graduates in the country. Namely, it was often the case that regime officials would arrest one group without the knowledge of the others. This left all groups vulnerable and without recourse to legal action or counsel. Prior to the organization’s establishment, there was no formal leadership structure or communication strategy for channeling concerns or efforts over the rights of unemployed graduates in Tunisia.
Upon formalizing the umbrella organization in 2006 (though still illegal), the regional offices of the UDC were able to act in concert with one another and with the support of the UGET, UGTT, LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme), Tunisian Communist Worker’s Party, and the Tunisian Bar Association, among others, which greatly strengthened their organizational capacity and impact. Thus, upon the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid in December, 2010—the single act often attributed as the catalyst to the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ and ‘Arab Spring’—the UDC were one of the first groups to carry out organized protests throughout Tunisia.
Jemna thus serves as an example of successful grass-roots mobilization and cooperative economics. As exemplar, the APJO also threatens the state’s claims to be able to provide for its citizens at a time when the legitimacy and confidence in state institutions and political parties is at an all-time low (Yahya, 2016). The ‘case’ of Jemna is in the spotlight. If reached, a future resolution will undoubtedly be considered as a precedent for other towns in the south of Tunisia making similar land claims. The cooperative model may also stand as a challenge to Tunisia’s decades long neo-liberal turn.
Westphalian international order. Starting with a critique of the colonial nature
of the international State system, Gordner refutes the notion that the regions held
by the Islamic State are in fact ‘ungoverned.’ He shows how indeed the
Islamic State offers many key characteristics of a State (such as regular
income, military power, unified ideology), except for sharing the Westphalian
notion of borders and exclusive sovereignty within the territory specified by
these. Indeed, the Islamic State is marked by ‘the erasure of the border’ and
its attempt to create a ‘transnational Islamic polity,’ thus questioning the
fundamental tenets of the Westphalian international order. The Islamic State
‘refus[es] to recognize the sovereignty of other states’ in terms of proposing a
radically different model of the state rather than simply in terms of conquest
and taking control of other states. It therewith undermines the reification of
the nation-state model as the ‘natural’ model of human political organization
and forcefully questions the centrality of both the state and the status of
borders in IR.
powerholders, the events of 2010-2011 changed the trajectory of innovation and
entrepreneurship only slightly and in specific, local contexts. This paper endeavours to
compare Egypt, Tunisia, and the UAE with three major objectives in mind.
First, the paper reviews the history of the region, and in particular the reasons for and
impact of its late and uneven development. Second, it demonstrates that the general
business and innovation trends across the region remained mostly unaffected by the
“Arab Spring.” Drawing upon the Doing Business World Bank data, we find that among
the three countries under study, the UAE has made steady improvements, while Egypt
and Tunisia have remained relatively constant. Examining each case further, it appears
as though government support for entrepreneurialism alone only goes so far, though the
conditions for doing business are contingent on the removal of government constraints.
Civil society (Tunisia) and the private sector (UAE and Egypt) are also important actors
albeit not in quite the same way.
For the UAE, “angel investors” have made a significant difference, though civil society
has yet to find its footing. In Tunisia, civil society was a driving force behind recent
achievements, perhaps notably vis-à-vis the Startup Act. In Egypt, civil society remains
closed under the Sisi regime, yet some initiatives by the private sector provide a silver
lining to its post-2011 context and have influenced the government to pay new attention
to the private sector as integral to its economic (and political) vitality and survival.
Notably, SMEs kept the engine of the Egyptian economy going during its uprisings when
the government was mostly shut down. Finally, the paper suggests that Tunisia may
soon prove to be an outlier in terms of the new opportunities posed by the “revolution”
in both the altered state of corruption combined with government and civil society
attention paid to the new entrepreneurial landscape.