La 'fiducia' in diritto romano. Atti costitutivi, causa, oggetto

2020

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in La garanzia nella prospettiva storico-comparatistica. V Congresso Aristec, 2003

1. Si usa dire che il diritto romano conobbe un sistema insoddisfacente di garanzie reali 1 , tuttavia già da epoca risalente 2 veniva utilizzata la fiducia cum creditore 3 , che, se pure non può tecnicamente definirsi diritto reale di garanzia, svolgeva indubbiamente analoga funzione economica 4 . Consisteva nell'alienazione di un bene, di qualunque tipo, mobile o immobile, res mancipi o nec mancipi, compiuta da parte del fiduciante, che di solito coincideva col debitore, a favore del creditore-fiduciario; poteva essere effettuata solo tramite uno degli atti formali e astratti di trasferimento della proprietà conosciuti già dall'antico diritto romano, mancipatio o in iure cessio, atti utilizzabili solo dai cittadini romani, ed era funzionale allo scopo di garanzia 5 : il creditore-fiduciario, infatti, assumeva l'obbligo di ritrasferire il bene al debitore-fiduciante, qualora venisse soddisfatto il credito garantito. Quest'istituto, nato da un adattamento a nuove esigenze delle strutture negoziali esistenti in età arcaica 6 , doveva essere molto utilizzato ancora in epoca classica: ci sono pervenuti, infatti, vari documenti della prassi attestanti la sua ampia diffusione ancora nel corso del I secolo d.C. 7 . La fiducia cum creditore 1 2 Cfr. N. BELLOCCI, La tutela della fiducia nell'epoca repubblicana, Milano, 1974, ?; V. MANNINO, s.v. Garanzie dell 'obbligazione, in Dig. disc. priv. Sez. civ., 8, Torino, 1992, 620. 3 Sul tema vd., da ultimo, B. NOORDRAVEN, Die fiduzia im römischen Recht, Amsterdam, 1999. 4 "Die fiducia ist insoweit dem pignus noch nur ähnlich, sondern sie ist selbst eine Erscheinungsform des pignus "im weiteren Sinn" des Wortes": M. KASER, Studien zum römischen Pfandrecht II, 'Actio pigneraticia ' und 'actio fiduciae', in TJ, 47 (1979), 328 = Studien zum römischen Pfandrecht, Napoli, 1982, 108 (cui si riferiscono le successive citazioni). 5 In realtà, lo scopo, cui era finalizzata la proprietà trasferita al fiduciario, poteva essere il più vario: il gran valore della fiducia, come oggi del trust, è di essere un istituto estremamente flessibile e aperto agli impieghi più disparati in tutti i campi, compresi quello successorio e familiare; in tali casi il diritto romano parlava di fiducia cum amico. 6 Per mezzo dell'elemento fiduciario i Romani riuscivano a soddisfare adeguatamente le proprie esigenze, malgrado la scarsità di forme negoziali a loro disposizione, e potevano superare la rigida tipicità di effetti propria dell'ordinamento cui appartenevano; all'autonomia privata era dunque lasciato, già a partire da un'epoca piuttosto remota, un ampio margine di libertà. Cfr. N. BELLOCCI, La struttura del negozio della 'fiducia' nell'epoca repubblicana.

The paper examines the birth, evolution and use of the trust in Anglo-American law, and then go through the Italian legal institutions similar to the trust, proposing finally the use of the trust even in Italy as a flexible contract

Il contributo mira a collocare il problema disciplinare del trust in un quadro di comparazione tra discipline nazionali e normativa europea con particolare riguardo ai progetti di uniformazione del diritto dei contratti in Europa.

Teoria e Storia del Diritto Privato, 2022

ITA: Il contributo prende le mosse dall’esame dell’ordinanza n. 9997/2020 della Corte di Cassazione nella quale viene esaminato il tema della funzione svolta dal caso fortuito a fronte dell’obbligo contrattuale, sussistente in capo al debitore, di prevedere o evitare il verificarsi di un dato eventus damni. Il ragionamento logico-giuridico appare sviluppato dal Collegio con particolare attenzione al dato storico, ritenuto essenziale per la soluzione del caso di specie in virtù della matrice romanistica dei princìpi in tema di caso fortuito presupposti al vigente codice civile italiano. Partendo dal rescritto di Alessandro Severo del 225 d.C. conservato in C. 4.24.6, si procede con l’analisi, in chiave storico- comparatistica, di alcuni articoli del codice civile, aventi ad oggetto il ‘casus fortuitus’, i quali mostrano una spiccata coincidenza (stilistica e contenutistica) con le fonti romane. Nella parte finale del contributo, viene esaminato il passo del commentario all’editto del pretore di Ulpiano, trascritto in D. 9.2.11pr., anch’esso richiamato dalla Suprema Corte in relazione al caso esaminato, e se ne valuta l’incidenza ai fini della decisione assunta nell’ordinanza in commento. ENG: The paper is based on the examination of the order no. 9997/2020 of the Corte di Cassazione in which is examined the issue of the function of the unforeseeable circumstances in relation to the contractual obligation, existing on the part of the debtor, to foresee or avoid the occurrence of a given eventus damni. The logical-legal reasoning seems to be developed by the Commission with particular attention to the historical data, considered essential for the solution of the case by virtue of the Roman matrix of the principles on the subject of unforeseeable circumstances presupposed by the current Italian civil code. Starting from the rescript of Alexander Severus of 225 AD preserved in C. 4.24.6, we proceed with the analysis, in a historical-comparative key, of some articles of the civil code, concerning the ‘casus fortuitus’, which show a marked coincidence (both stylistic and of content) with Roman sources. In the final part of the contribution, the passage of the commentary on the edict of the praetor by Ulpian, transcribed in D. 9.2.11pr., also recalled by the Corte di Cassazione in relation to the specific case, is examined and its impact evaluated for the purposes of the decision taken in the order.

LIBER Warszawa, 1997

The structure of the universal fideicommissum gave rise to certain difficulties – the intention of the testator was to make the fideicommissary the universal successor. While corpora hereditaria could be easily handed over, transferring rights and duties posed a serious problem. This was due to a lack of appropriate norms and a proper form. Originally, the issue was resolved by selling the estate – venditio hereditatis nummo uno – to which mutual stipulations were attached in order to transfer claims and debts (stipulationes emptae et venditae hereditatis). Yet, the sale of the estate resulted only in singular succession, due to which the fideicommissary could only be included emptoris loco. He did not become the subject of a passive or active title to appear before the court, while, at the same time, the heir was not protected against actions brought by the creditors of the inheritance. The actual reform was carried out by the Senate on 25 August 55 by issuing the resolution on the initiative of Marcus Trebellius Maximus, who was consul together with Lucius Annaeus Seneca. The essence of the regulation was the transfer of inheritance actions from the heir to the universal fideicommissary. As a result of senatus consultum Trebellianum, the rights and duties of the inheritance were transferred directly and without undertaking individual acts. The fideicommissary obtained the status of an heir as a result of the actiones utiles, fideicommissaria hereditatis petitio, utile familiae erciscundae iudicium granted to him, and also as a result of the exceptio granted to the heir, in which he was released from any liability by indicating that the inheritance had been made over. This was not treated as the solutio of an obligation, but as an actual transfer of the succession. The fideicommissary thus became heredis loco rather than emptoris loco. Universal succession was achieved through the intermediation of the heir, who retained the title of heres irrespective of having made the inheritance over to the fideicommissary. What was even more important was the fact that the heir accepting the inheritance was the condition for the existence of fiduciary bequest. This issue was addressed almost twenty years later – probably in AD 72, when – under the Emperor Vespasian’s rule, Plotius Pegasus and Lucius Cornelius Pusio Annius Messala were consuls. Senatus consultum Pegasianum introduced a procedure compelling the heir to accept the inheritance. At the motion of the universal fideicommissary, the magistratus issued a relevant order – iussum, on the basis of which the heir had to accept the inheritance. It was logical that in such case, he was exempt from any liability, which was transferred to the fideicommissary; based on the senates consultum Trebellianum, all claims were also transferred. The initiators of the Pegasian resolution of the senate also wished to create an incentive to accept the inheritance voluntarily. Inspired by lex Falcidia, they wanted to ensure that the heir received one quarter of the hereditas. If this had been provided for by the testator – that is, when the testator imposed a universal fideicommissum not exceeding three quarters of the inheritance – senatus consultum Trebellianum was still applied. In such case, the heir was held liable for any debts on the part of the inheritance he retained. If the testator had not guaranteed one quarter of the net estate for the heir, senatus consultum Pegasianum granted the heir the right to keep it. At that moment, the issue of transferring rights and duties of reappeared resepectively to the part retained. If the heir did not exercise his right, but – in keeping with the testator’s wishes – handed over more than three quarters of the inheritance, then stipulations were applied that were modelled on those used in the event of the sale of the inheritance (venditio hereditatis). Taking this aspect into account, senatus consultum Pegasianum reinstated the regulation so that it was as before the Trebellian reform and the fideicommissary was again made emptoris loco. However, the situation was even worse if the heir himself decided to keep a quarter. In such case, the Pegasian resolution required the inclusion of stipulations as in case of a partial legacy (partito legata). Consequently, the fideicommissary was put in the place of the legatee under civil law. He was neither obliged nor authorized to participate in the court proceedings concerning the inheritance. In practice, the entire responsibility for any excessive debts encumbering the inheritance remained with the heir. He was not entitled to any recourse against the fideicommissary with respect to legacies paid, which resulted in the universal fideicommissum being considered “competitive” vis-à-vis other legacies. The Pegasian resolution of the senate is another example in legal history of a justified legislative initiative which instead of ordering and improving the existing regulations caused commotion only because it had not been sufficiently well-thought out. Firstly, senatus consultum Pegasianum actually limited the testator’s freedom to dispose of property mortis causa to three-quarters of the inheritance. Secondly, allocating a quarter to the heir by virtue of the law led to effects that were contrary to the last wishes of the deceased. The consequences of applying the Pegasian resolution were, in practice, so complex that it would be difficult to expect that the testator had been able to predict who and what each person would have received from the inheritance. Thirdly, being promised a part of the inheritance was not really sufficient inducement to accept it, because in addition to the obvious – ostensible – benefit, the heir was held fully responsible for the debts. What is more surprising is the conservatism shown in maintaining all the adverse consequences of senatus consultum Pegasianum – changes were not introduced until Justinian’s Institutes. The Institutes maintained only the best solutions introduced by the Pegasian resolution of the senate: obligatory acceptance and delivery of the inheritance and the right to a quarter which were, however, subjected to the principles of senatus consultum Trebellianum.

Diritto penale romano. Fondamenti e prospettive, I. Le discipline generali, 1 , 2022

GIUSTIZIA INSIEME, 2022

Sommario. 1. «Là dove abbonda la sfiducia, sovrabbonda il diritto». O no? – 2. Goodbye, Kelsen! – 3. Non sanzione, ma fiducia. Il diritto come creatore di aspettative. – 3.1. (Segue). Doveri senza sanzioni? – 4. L’esperienza della fiducia: filosofia, economia. – 5. Fratelli tutti. - 6. Conclusioni.

Actio in rem Actio in personam, In ricordo di M. Talamanca, I, Padova, 2011,