UNLOCKING THE TREASURY OF THE BEAUTIFUL: HOW IS VIRTUE THE KEY

UNLOCKING THE TREASURY OF THE BEAUTIFUL: HOW IS VIRTUE THE KEY? By Randall B. Bush, Ph. D., D. Phil (Oxon) University Professor of Philosophy Union University Aristotle famously wrote that happiness (eudaimonia) is best attained by the practice of virtue, but often his understanding of the relationship of virtue to the beautiful has been ignored in favor of a dominantly ethical interpretation of his thought concerning virtue. However, an investigation of Aristotle’s Poetics in the light of his Nicomachean Ethics reveals that he anticipated ways of bridging the dimensions of the ethical and the aesthetic. His insights suggest one way in which the dimensions of the moral and the beautiful can be reunited as to promote human flourishing. The Unity of Ethics and Aesthetics in Aristotle 1. The Practice of the Virtues: Their Orientation and Goal: Aristotle employs his principle of the Golden Mean to ascertain the proper boundary between excess and deficiency in the application of virtue to any given range of circumstances. He holds the overall goal of the practice of virtue to be eudaimonia or happiness.1 Happiness qualifies as the intrinsic end that people desire for its own sake and for no other reason. Aristotle equates the pursuit of happiness with the pursuit of the good (kalon),2 a term that entails not just the concept of moral goodness, but the idea of the beautiful as well. Aristotle’s full treatment of the idea of the beautiful appears in his Poetics. Poetics is a translation of the word poesis. The word poetics, however, has a narrower meaning today than it did in Aristotle’s time, so it is Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1. 4. 2. Eudaimonia is perhaps better translated as “wellbeing.” It does not so much mean “emotional happiness” as it does “happiness with regard to one’s total life-situation.” 1 2 Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7. 1. 2 important to underscore the fact that Aristotle used this term in the broader sense of “to make.” Aristotle specifically employed this broader connotation in his discussion of aesthetics. In the Poetics, his discussion of the practice of virtue does not focus exclusively on the dimension of the moral, but includes within its purview a focus on the dimension of the beautiful, as well. Virtue, for Aristotle, thus entails an aesthetic as well as an ethical component; and the very presence of this aesthetic component requires that we investigate Aristotle’s aesthetic theory in relation to his discussion of ethics.3 To embark on such a discussion of the ethical-aesthetic relationship, I shall thus attempt, first, to provide a brief description of key elements of Aristotle’s ethical theory. One key element entailed in the pursuit of eudaimonia is the practice of the cardinal virtues—prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. These virtues stand out as the four indispensably important ones, though they are not the only ones Aristotle discusses. 4 Like Plato, Aristotle preferred to orient the virtues in a principle of limit. To highlight the way Aristotle orients the virtues in this principle, Limit=good I shall now illustrate how he associates it 900 with the Pythagorean ideal. By glimpsing Unlimit=evil Aristotle’s system in its entirety, we can ascertain how the Pythagorean principle of limit properly orients all the virtues.5 A clear way of visualizing Aristotle’s overall theory of virtue is to imagine a right-angle triangle that situates the right angle directly above the hypotenuse. In Pythagorean symbolism, the right angle represents 3 Nicomachean Ethics 1. 1. 1-4. 4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2. 1. 3. Nature only gives us the capacity to practice virtue. The virtues only become habit through practice. 5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2. 6.14. 3 the principle of limit (also the principle of the good), whereas the hypotenuse opposite the right angle represents the principle of unlimit (evil). The right angle in the triangle can thus also be taken to symbolize the principle that has the potential to govern all tangible reality (represented by the hypotenuse). As far as the virtues are concerned, prudence (phronesis) or practical wisdom is symbolized by the right angle, for prudence functions as the virtue that effectively steers the other virtues in much the same way that the charioteer of reason steers Prudence Plato’s chariot of the soul. 6 Because 900 prudence is connected to the faculty of reason, Aristotle classifies it as an Deficiency Excess intellectual virtue.7 Prudence is, however, the intellectual virtue that also connects chiefly with the most important of the moral virtues; viz., the virtues of courage, temperance, and justice. 8 As we transition from a discussion of prudence to a discussion of those virtues which prudence guides, we can visualize how Courage the two acute angles opposite the right 900 angle represent the opposing principles of excess and deficiency. 9 Therefore, if 900 Deficiency 6 Nicomachean Ethics 2. 2. 2. 7 Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13. 20. 8 Ibid. Excess 9 Nicomachean Ethics 2. 2. 6-7. Excess and deficiency impair and destroy virtue, just as too much or too little exercise impairs health. 4 deficiency stands at the left side of the triangle’s hypotenuse and excess at the right side, then the virtue of fortitude or courage can be brought to bear upon the tangible situations that the hypotenuse represents. Courage, in Aristotle’s estimation, veers in the direction of excess rather than deficiency. Therefore, if the vices that attend the virtue of courage happen to be rashness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency), then courage will stand closer to rashness than to cowardice.10 Rash responses, insofar as they are based in emotion rather than reason, will appear extreme, hasty, and careless. However, when compared with the rash response, a courageous response will appear more measured and reasonable. Courage is expressed through measured and reasonable responses because it allows prudence to govern the way it is exercised. Thus, the courageous response is judged virtuous, while the rash response must be deemed vicious. The right angle, as it pertains to the virtue of courage, must therefore shift in the direction of excess and away from deficiency. The perpendicular line extending from the hypotenuse to the right angle opposite it forms two additional adjacent right angles. This pair of right angles illustrates how the virtue of courage should be brought to bear in a right way upon concrete lifesituations which this virtue needs to rectify. The proper exercise of the virtue of courage thus entails the application of a right principle in the right way. When properly applied, courage thus rectifies a situation by steering a middle way between vices of excess and deficiency. Unlike courage, the virtue of Temperance temperance veers not in the direction of excess, 900 900 Deficiency 10 Excess Nicomachean Ethics 2. 7. 2. 5 but in the direction of deficiency. 11 The vice of profligacy or licentiousness is one of excess, while the vice of insensibility is one of deficiency. At the one extreme, the profligate or licentious person typically lives a life of unbridled hedonism. The profligate thus veers toward excess because he is wholly preoccupied with self-gratification and is unrestrained in his indulgence of the basic human pleasure drives. At the other extreme are insensitive persons, though these sorts are rare. Since insensitive persons veer in the direct of deficiency, they appear apathetic, unmoved, and detached in the face of pleasure-stimuli that would induce most other persons to seek gratification. Thus temperance, in a manner different from courage, depends upon prudence to limit the human tendency to veer in the direction of excess when pursuing what is pleasurable. In exercising the virtues of courage and temperance, Aristotle further notes that pain and pleasure are always factors to consider. 12 Courage, for instance, calls upon one to embrace pain voluntarily.13 On the other hand, people do not voluntarily choose cowardice, for it is the natural default position persons settle into to avoid pain. Profligacy, on the other hand, entails the willful pursuit of pleasure, and this distinguishes it from the vice of cowardice.14 Humans pursue pleasure to satiate their bodily appetites, a pursuit that they share with the animals. The unbridled pursuit of pleasure is animalistic and thus makes humans bestial.15 Furthermore, whereas men who exercise the virtue courage are ennobled, men who engage in the unbridled pursuit of pleasure become debased and irrational. The virtue of courage thus differs from that of 11 Nicomachean Ethics 2. 7. 3. 12 Nicomachean Ethics 2. 3. 1–4. 13 Nicomachean Ethics 3. 12. 1. 14 Nicomachean Ethics 3. 12. 2. 15 Nicomachean Ethics 3. 10. 9–11. 6 temperance, for whereas courage calls upon one voluntarily to endure pain for a noble purpose, temperance calls upon one willfully to restrict pleasure for the same reason. 16 Aristotle thus views the vice of profligacy as being worse than cowardice, since profligacy is more willful in its aims. Justice, according to Aristotle, is Justice 900 the most comprehensive of all the virtues, for justice, more than any of the virtues, seeks the “good of others.”17 Whereas 900 Deficiency Excess prudence guides the exercise of the virtues, justice is the virtue that achieves through its practice the greatest degree of rectification in all situations where rectification is called for. Courage, on the one side, and temperance on the other, bring limited kinds of rectification. Justice, by contrast, represents the “whole of virtue” in that it aims at the most comprehensive kind of rectification possible. 18 In a similar way, injustice, as the opposite of justice, represents the entirety of vice. 19 Justice in the general sense is the most perfect and sublime virtue.20 There are, however, examples of justice and injustice in the particular sense. The existence of injustice in the particular sense is proved when individuals display vices such as cowardice, profligacy, etc. Injustice manifests itself in particular ways under two aspects; 16 Nicomachean Ethics 3. 11. 5. 17 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 1. 15–19. 18 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 1. 19. 19 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 1. 20. 20 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 1. 15. 7 viz., as unlawfulness and as unfairness.21 Likewise, justice in the particular sense, as the means of redressing injustice, aims to rectify particular instances of unfairness and unlawfulness. While distributive justice addresses the problem of unfairness, corrective justice addresses the problem of unlawfulness.22 More specifically, distributive justice aims at achieving fairness where episodes of unfairness are exposed, while the practice of corrective justice rectifies illegality regarding private transactions. Since distributive justice assigns goods based on what is deserved, it is proportional.23 Corrective justice, by contrast, attempts to equalize what is unequal.24 In cases of inequality, the law weighs the losses sustained by the victim against the gains acquired by the perpetrator. By applying justice, the law then aims to reinstate equality by taking away the ill-gotten gains from the perpetrator and restoring to the victim what the victim has lost. Aristotle’s formula of the Golden Mean works well for the practice of the cardinal virtues, but he clearly admits that certain vices exist for which no virtuous mean exists. 25 Because the cultivation of virtue always depends upon practical wisdom (i.e., phronesis or prudence), however, human experience sometimes trumps logic. Presumably, the phronimos, as a person who has inculcated phronesis through adequate experience, would be a guarantor of the 21 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 2. 8. 22 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 2. 12. 23 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 3. 4–7. 24 Nicomachean Ethics 5. 4. 4–6. “Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice, shamelessness, envy, and of adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we blame. It is impossible therefore every to go right in regard to them—one must always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right manner; the mere commission of any of them is wrong.” Nicomachean Ethics 2. 6. 18–19 (trans. H. Rackham, in The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 19, p. 97). 25 8 proper practice of virtue, but such is not always the case. Vagueness and ambiguity sometimes interfere with the proper application of virtue, as, for example, happens in cases where dilemmas cloud one’s ability to make choices that are clearly right. The extreme complexity of some situations can also cause ethical decision-making to appear next to impossible. Added to this complexity is the element of timing, for ethical decisions must sometimes be made quickly. When faced with making snap decisions, the ethical practitioner may experience a kind of paralysis. As he encounters various sorts of impossible scenarios, the principle of limit may fail to help him identify the proper boundary that can determine the correct and timely application of the principle of limit. Such situations invite the possibility of the tragic, for the tragic hero is often too late smart. The flaw in the tragic hero’s character is of the sort that anybody acting as a phronimos can possess. Indeed, tragic outcomes can reveal how the principle of limit has the power to destroy rather than to guide. Such outcomes elicit the question, “Is such a thing as tragic beauty possible?” This is a question that Aristotle’s aesthetic insights seek to address. 2. Aesthetic Activity and Its Correlation with Ethics: Because Aristotle has a more positive understanding of the role of sense experience in accumulating knowledge than Plato, he exhibits, as well, a more positive attitude than Plato towards the role of aesthetics in his theory of beauty. Plato’s view that beauty is, first and foremost, a transcendent Form precludes him from embracing an aesthetic theory of beauty. All efforts at imitation of the perfect Form of beauty, Plato believes, cannot themselves be beautiful. By contrast, Aristotle’s location of the Forms inside material existence instead of outside it makes his theory of beauty an aesthetic one. Key elements of his theory appear in his Poetics. 9 Aristotle holds that poesis entails a kind of activity that is indicative of all types of artistic renderings.26 Therefore, “poetics,” in the Aristotelian sense, goes well beyond what modern people have come to call “poetry.” While Plato wanted to exclude the reading of poetry from his Republic,27 Aristotle fundamentally disagreed with his teacher’s dismissive assessment when he both approved of Homer and held him up as the best example of the poetic genre. When Aristotle considers the topic “what makes poetry, poetry,” he compares poetry to history. The creative element involved in the making of poetry immediately becomes apparent in the way Aristotle’s compares the two. History restricts itself to statements of facts about events that have happened in the past, but history does not speculate about the ramification of past events for future actions. The history of Herodotus, for example, could be put into verse, but this would not automatically qualify it as poetry. Poetry differs from history in one important respect: While history relates to the learner what has happened, poetry describes to the listener what may happen. Poetry is thus concerned with probabilities in a way that history is not. Furthermore, poetry opens the possibility of the experience of transcendent meaning in a way that history does not make possible. Poetry is also more philosophical than history, for history expresses only the reality of the particular. Poetry, on the other hand, expresses the reality of the universal. Expressing the universal is the aim of poetry, for poetry endeavors to connect the realm of the tangible with the dimension of transcendent meaning. We find almost from the beginning of Aristotle’s Poetics a more positive assessment of the role of mimicry in artistic enterprises than can be found in Plato’s philosophy. Plato’s demiurge, for instance, is a “maker” who endeavors to make something that imitates the world of 26 Aristotle, Poetics 1. 2–13 (1447b); 9. 9–10 (1451b). 27 See Plato, Republic, Book X. 10 the Forms. What the demiurge renders in this process of making, however, always appears inferior to the ideal world that he tries to mimic. Against this view, Aristotle argues that mimicry is a fundamental human characteristic that can be found already in children. 28 Without mimicry, the learning of language would be impossible. Language also serves as the basis of everything meaningful about human society. Therefore, Aristotle notices that all art involves mimicry, and since mimicry should not be viewed a substandard kind of enterprise, neither should the making of art be deemed an inferior activity. Aristotle is, therefore, much less speculative than Plato in the way he develops his theory of beauty. Ever the scientist, Aristotle observes what human beings consider to be exemplary of beauty in epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and music. He observes that all these artistic modes are modes of imitation, though they differ from one another about the medium (means), the objects, and the manner or mode of imitation.29 Aristotle proceeds to discuss what he means by these three categories. First, the medium (means) of imitation may entail color or form, or the music of the flute or lyre or shepherd’s pipe where harmony and rhythm are employed, or in dancing where rhythm is employed without harmony. 30 Among these examples, differences between the various media of imitation are noticeable. Language, too, can function as a medium of imitation, as occurs in the recitation of poetry. The various media, however, need not become isolated from one another so that they are kept in air-tight categories. Indeed, they can be combined into higher artistic 28 Aristotle, Poetics 4. 1–7 (1448b). 29 Poetics 3. 3 (1448a). 30 Poetics 1. 2–14 (1447a–1447b). 11 expressions. Some arts, such as Dithyrambic and Gnomic poetry, 31 Comedy, and Tragedy may employ some, or all, media in various kinds of combinations. Second, the “objects” of imitation consist of men in action whose character is either of the higher or lower types.32 Aristotle integrates into his aesthetic theory a role for both virtuous and vicious characters. Characters of the higher types are usually portrayed in tragedy, while those of the lower type are depicted through comedy. 33 In tragedy, for instance, poets such as Homer tended to represent men as better than they are, while the writers of comedy aimed at depicting men as worse than they are.34 Aristotle thinks that tragedy surpasses comedy in the way that it deals with loftier and nobler subject matter. Because tragedy qualifies as the highest form of artistic expression, it thus exceeds comedy as an art form. 35 Third, the manner or mode of imitation may differ among various sorts of artistic renderings. While the medium and the objects may be the same in poetry, the poet may choose differing manners of imitation, such as narration. Or, he may place himself in the role of different characters. Or, he may choose to present all his characters as living and moving before the audience.36 Differing manners and modes of imitation produce such differences as exist between the epic poetry of Homer and the tragic plays of Sophocles. The poetry of Homer and tragedy of Sophocles may both agree regarding the medium and objects of imitation; that is, they 31 Poetics 1. 13 (1447b). The Dithyramb was a wild choral hymn usually dedicated to the god of wine, Dionysius. Gnomic poetry consisted of aphorisms put into poetic form. 32 Poetics 2. 1–6 (1448a). 33 Poetics 4. 8–10 (1448b). 34 Poetics 2. 1 (1448a). 35 Poetics 2. 6 (1448a). 36 Poetics 3. 1-6 (1448a). 12 may both imitate higher types of character. However, they may differ in the manner of execution. Tragedy, for instance, may have more in common with comedy that with the epic poetry of Homer because tragedy and comedy are dramatic forms of poetry that involves action whereas the epic poetry of Homer may be read aloud by one narrator and not require this additional element of action. In judging between what human beings observe to be more beautiful or less beautiful, all three elements alluded to above should be taken into consideration. Aristotle discusses at length what goes into the writing of a great tragedy. For example, in the constructing of a given tragedy, complex plots are preferable to simple ones.37 At the same time, the plot must be such that the audience can see how all the parts connect to form a whole. Six characteristics appear in the construction of a great tragedy; namely, plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and song. 38 These six elements are cut across by the medium, objects, and manner of imitation used by the poet. Of all these elements, plot is most important because plot entails action and character is best revealed by action. 39 Plot is “the soul of tragedy” and is the unifying thread of the dramatic work of art. All other elements are, as it were, brought into the orbit of the plot and are contextualized by it. Throughout Aristotle’s discussion of the six elements that comprise a great tragedy, one can detect a predilection for such qualities as excellence, skill, symmetry, balance, and believability. Thus, extremes, such as too much spectacle, should be avoided. Aristotle discusses at length what techniques should be employed and to what degree, as well as what excesses 37 Poetics 13. 1–3 (1452b). 38 Poetics 7. 10–11 (1450a). 39 Poetics 6. 19–21(1450a). 13 should be avoided in the writing of a tragedy. Clearly, we see, in the above qualities, an emphasis on what I previously referred to as the principle of limit as the standard that governs Aristotle’s poetics, and not just his ethics. Aristotle proceeds to discuss what the ends of the poetic work ought to be. In doing so, he answers our third question, viz., “What is the aim of the beautiful?” In some instances, the beautiful aims toward a practical end, but in other instances pure enjoyment constitutes the desired end. Some beautiful things do not do anything, they simply are. The idea of enjoyment connects with Aristotle’s ideal of “happiness” (eudaimonia) as the goal that we desire for its own sake and not for anything more. Tragedy, however, is superior to all other art forms because it seeks to produce catharsis (purgation or cleansing) as its ultimate end. 40 At the heart of tragedy lies the “sin” (hamartia) or fatal flaw of the hero’s character that finally overtakes him and leads to his undoing.41 Factors working against the tragic figure are ignorance, lack of time, and missed opportunities. He is overcome and destroyed by his flaw because he learns too late that his fate has already entrapped him. The sin is a contamination that must be eliminated, and cleansing can only be effected through the untimely death of the tragic hero. Upon comparing Aristotle’s ethics with his aesthetics, we thus find that catharsis or purgation stands as the intrinsic end of aesthetics in the same way that eudaimonia or happiness stands as the intrinsic end of ethics. The life lived virtuously is the means of achieving the goal of eudaimonia, but “sin” or the fatal flaw in the tragic hero’s character is the obstacle standing in the way of eudaimonia that brings to pass the opposite result; namely, misery. 42 Tragedy 40 Poetics 6. 1–3 (1449b). 41 Poetics 13. 5 (1453a). 42 Poetics 6. 12 (1450a). 14 produces catharsis in the audience precisely because the tragic hero as a superior exemplar is ultimately overtaken by his flaws in a horrific and untimely manner. The comparison between the superior and the inferior cannot help but be felt by the audience as it contrasts its own inferiorities with the hero’s superior character. Because the hero is of nobler character than the audience’s members, they experience the emotions of fear and pity.43 Fear arises when they compare their own lack of virtue with the virtuous character of the tragic victim. Each person is made to think, “If such a tragic fate can befall a man more virtuous than I, then how much worse might my own fate be if I fail to rid myself of excessive emotions that are the basis of my own similar vices?” Pity is evoked when one compares one’s own undeserved good fortune to the fate of the tragic hero who was perhaps so undeserving of the excessive misery entailed in the fate that overtook him. One cannot help but feel pity for the tragic hero as one compares the hero with oneself. The example of the tragic hero thus inspires members of the audience through fear and pity to purge themselves of all vice and rededicate themselves anew to living virtuously. 44 Aristotle’s focus on the goal of tragedy as catharsis links up closely with ways that transcendent meaning can be mediated through tangible existence. The “sin” (hamartia) or “fatal flaw” that overtakes the tragic hero is a contamination of which he may be unaware. Here, the principle of limit ceases to function as an ethical guide but instead becomes the “sword of Damocles” that looms over the tragic victim’s head. In tragic scenarios, tangible reality always veils transcendent meaning. Such veiling is akin to the way the world of maya (illusion) veils truth in Shankara Hinduism and to what that school of thought calls advidya (ignorance). Karmic law, however, 43 Poetics 26. 1–3 (1461b). 44 Poetics 9. 11–12 (1452a). 15 which operates despite this ignorance, demands that the tragic hero pay for his mistakes. As wisdom is finally revealed through the unraveling of the plot, the transcendent meaning breaks through into the tangible dimension in the experience of catharsis. This is akin to the Hindu experience of moksha (salvation or release). Transcendent meaning is no longer veiled, but is revealed in the experience of the one who experiences catharsis. The members of the audience are inspired in this way to purge themselves of the contamination of sin and vice and to embrace virtue with a sense of renewed devotion. 45 Because Aristotle chooses tragedy as an art form superior to comedy, we find him, despite his disagreements with Plato, favoring the dimension of the transcendent over that of the tangible. The tangible dimension is important for Aristotle to the degree that it can mediate the transcendent, but when it fails to do so, the solution is to bring the tangible into the service of the transcendent by striving for poetic excellence. Aristotle’s views do, however, make possible a more “incarnate” view of beauty than what can be found in Plato. Aristotle’s emphasis on particulars again surfaces in his aesthetic theory. Therefore, unlike Plato, who focuses to too great an extent on the way that particulars veil the transcendent and are therefore a negative to be overcome, for Aristotle particulars can have a much more positive role in revealing the transcendent meaning once they are brought into connection with that meaning’s unity and universality. One further comment should be made about the function of tragedy. For Aristotle, its main purpose was not entertainment in the modern sense of the world. The performance of a tragic play was, rather, a means of contributing to the spiritual and moral health of the 45 See, e.g., Shlomo Giora Shoham, The Measure of All Things: Anthropology (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 123. 16 community. The participation of the audience, and their collective experience of catharsis, are both necessary for this communal function to be fulfilled. Aristotle’s emphasis upon the quality of the audience reveals how important this communal aspect is. He certainly does not favor “casting pearls before swine” when it comes to presenting a tragic play before an audience. He expects something of the audience just as he does from the makers of tragedy. Aristotle’s focus upon collective experience could certainly stand to be recovered in modern times, as the multiplication of media and all its venues has fostered social and cultural disunity. Instead of upholding high standards for admittance when determining the quality of an audience, little is now expected of attendees, if, indeed, there are attendees at all. Aristotle’s loftier goal of communal aesthetic participation should stand as a corrective to individualized entertainment. 3. Virtue as a Key to the Beautiful: In examining the correlation between Aristotle’s ethics and aesthetics, we now see how his principle of limit can be applied in a positive way to determine how virtue should be exercised properly in a variety of contexts. Justice, as the most comprehensive of virtues, must, however, always focus on the good of the collective. The good of the collective, in turn, must form the ultimate context that reveals how virtue is to be distinguished from vice. Indeed, prudence, fortitude, and temperance have justice as their true telos. All the virtues thus ultimately support the good of the collective, making the scope of Aristotle’s practice of ethics inimical to the vagaries of radical individualism. The principle of limit, however, can also function negatively; and this is seen in the way that the tragic victim sins against the principle of limit and brings catastrophe upon himself. Nevertheless, the tragic victim does not serve an end that is without meaning or purpose, for his demise, being witnessed by the audience, produces in them catharsis as its proper end. In this 17 sense, tragic beauty only becomes meaningful when a proper response from the collective—i.e., the audience’s experience of catharsis—contextualizes it. The principle of limit upon which ethics relies thus need not portend complete failure, for catharsis itself enables the audience as a collective to transcend the most negative manifestations of limit. The sense of release that catharsis produces thus overcomes the audience’s tendency to despair of the practice of the ethical. Instead, the audience is inspired to rid themselves of the contamination of vice and commit themselves anew to living virtuously.