Policy Contribution
Issue n˚13 | May 2017
Central Asia at 25
Uuriintuya Batsaikhan and Marek Dabrowski
Uuriintuya Batsaikhan
(uuriintuya.batsaikhan@
bruegel.org) is an Affiliate
Fellow at Bruegel
Marek Dabrowski
(marek.dabrowski@bruegel.
org) is a Non Resident
Fellow at Bruegel
The authors would like to
thank Giuseppe Porcaro for
creating maps and Roman
Mogilevskii, Ben Slay,
Simone Tagliapietra, Georg
Zachmann, Suman Bery,
Guntram Wolff and other
Bruegel researchers for their
comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
Executive summary
Central Asia, though referred to as a single region, consists of five culturally
and ethnically diverse countries that have followed different political and economic
transformation paths in the last 25 years since independence from the Soviet Union.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have in relative terms made strides in market reforms, while
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan still have not completed their transitions to a market economy
and Tajikistan represents an intermediate case.
In many respects, the historical legacy of the twentieth century and their unique
geographical and geopolitical location have not helped Central Asian countries in their efforts
towards economic development and integration.
After experiencing more than a decade of growth based on hydrocarbon booms,
Central Asian countries are faced with increasing challenges resulting from falling commodity
prices, declining trade and lower migrant remittances. The main policy challenge is to
move away from commodity-based growth strategies to macro-oriented diversification and
adoption of a broad spectrum of economic, institutional and political reforms. However,
structural diversification is easier said than done.
The major obstacles to political reform and economic diversification in the five Central
Asian economies are internal and external geopolitical factors and deeply embedded
institutional weaknesses within countries, particularly in areas where economic management
interacts with authoritarian political systems and legal institutions. Our analysis suggests five
key policy lessons that could serve as points of departure as these countries move ahead.
1 Introduction
At the end of 2016, the five countries of post-Soviet Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of their
independence, after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is a good occasion to examine where
they stand now, the results of their transitions from centrally planned to market economies
and the challenges the region faces. Central Asia also makes an interesting study because of
its landlocked location and its historic legacy, including seven decades of communist rule
and central planning. Moreover, Central Asia remains relatively understudied compared to
other regions.
Despite their shared history, and being referred as a single region, the countries differ
in their levels of political and economic development, cultural and ethnic composition and
relations with the outside world.
In the 1990s, Central Asia experienced many of the same hardships of economic transition
as central and eastern European and other former-communist countries, such as skyrocketing inflation, partial de-industrialisation and the collapse of Soviet-type welfare systems.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan still have not completed their transitions to a market economy.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have joined the upper middle-income group, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan remain in the lower-middle income category1.
The Central Asia countries are landlocked, though Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
border the Caspian Sea, which is not an open sea (Figure 1)2. Furthermore, the Soviet
transportation network was concentrated on Russia and other Soviet republics, while
connections with the outside world were almost non-existent. Despite some infrastructure
investment in the last quarter of century, the lack of connectivity between Central Asia
and the outside world remains a major obstacle to trade and economic development. This
is also true of intra-regional trade relations, which are impaired by the incompatibility of
individual economic regimes, continuous political tensions, prolonged conflicts in the
neighbourhood (Afghanistan) and partly closed borders.
In addition, the recent decline in commodity prices has challenged, through trade,
migrant remittances and financial market channels, Central Asia’s commodity-based
growth strategies of 2000s and first half of 2010s, creating new sources of social and political
risks in individual countries.
In this Policy Contribution, we analyse the socio-economic and political developments
in Central Asia and the policy challenges faced by this region. Our paper is based on
available cross-country comparable statistical sources, primarily those offered by the
international organisations of the United Nations system. However, there are numerous
data gaps, in particular for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, whose national statistical
methodologies and data availability do not meet international standards. In those cases, we
leave the gaps rather than try to present incompatible data.
2 Historical background
In the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire conquered most of Central Asia except for
the northern part of what is now Kazakhstan. Under Russian rule, Central Asia was split into
the Governor-Generalships of Turkestan (with Tashkent as its capital) and Steppes (capital:
1
See https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519.
2
The legal status of the Caspian Sea and its territorial delimitation are the subject of international controversy.
Russia and Iran consider it a lake rather than a sea (see Janusz-Pawletta, 2015).
2
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
Omsk). The Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Khiva remained autonomous under the Russian protectorate until 1920 when they were defeated by Bolsheviks.
In the 1920s and 1930s, under Soviet rule, the territorial division of Central Asia changed
several times with the Soviet Union republic status of the five now independent states, and
their current borderlines, emerging only in 1936.
Until the 1920s, the Central Asian economy retained its traditional agrarian/pastoral
profile, which reflected the largely nomadic and rural character of the region’s population.
Industrialisation arrived in the Stalin era in the 1930s and was intensified during the
Second World War when many industrial enterprises from the European part of the Soviet
Union were evacuated to Central Asia. At the same time, large irrigation projects such as
the Great Fergana Canal were implemented. Similarly to other parts of the Soviet Union,
agriculture was forcibly collectivised in the early 1930s.
The human costs of the Soviet modernisation of Central Asia were enormous. They
included several rounds of famine in the 1920s and 1930s, repression and terror in the
1930s, the building of a large network of labour camps (the so-called Gulag system) where
political opponents from the entire Soviet Union were imprisoned and where they perished
in large numbers, and mass-scale resettlements (ssylka in Russian) of populations from
the European part of the Soviet Union. The latter affected social groups such as the kulaks
(better-off farmers) and included the deportation of entire ethnic groups in the 1940s,
including Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Crimean and Caucasian
Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Koreans, Karachays and Poles.
After the death of Stalin in 1953 and the partial dismantling of the Gulag system, the
Soviet-type forcible modernisation and industrialisation continued but with the use of
less coercive methods. These included the conversion of pastures (‘virgin land’ or tselina
in Russian) in northern Kazakhstan into large-scale wheat farms, the building of the Main
Turkmen and Karakum canals, and the operation of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site
and the Baikonur Cosmodrome (both in Kazakhstan). Many of those projects caused
severe environmental damage (such as the disappearance of the Aral Sea and radioactive
pollution over large areas of Kazakhstan), which have not been overcome yet.
Unlike the Baltic and Caucasus regions, the Central Asia republics were not at the
forefront of the national emancipation movements in the late Soviet era. Until November
1991, their leaders participated in negotiations on a ‘renewed’ Soviet Union agreement with
the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. However, once the Soviet Union was dissolved in
December 1991, the local political elites (mostly former leaders of the republican structures
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) grasped the opportunity and started to
establish new authoritarian regimes (except Kyrgyzstan), based on national rather than
communist ideologies.
The rapid and forcible industrialisation of the Soviet era (with a strong focus on military
needs) was associated with huge structural distortions and microeconomic ineffectiveness.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many industrial enterprises in Central Asia lost
their previous markets and were unable to compete under the new market conditions.
Partial de-industrialisation in the post-Soviet period was thus no surprise.
After a painful transition period, growth picked up in 2000s, largely driven by growing
exports of commodities such as oil and natural gas (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan), aluminium (Tajikistan), gold (Kyrgyzstan), cotton (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)
and other metals (Kazakhstan).
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
3 Geography, geopolitics and economic
integration
Uzbekistan is the most populous country with 31.3 million people, followed by
Kazakhstan, 17.5 million, Kyrgyzstan, 6 million, Tajikistan, 8.5 million and the least populated
Turkmenistan, 5.4 million.
Figure 1: Political map of Central Asia
Source: Bruegel.
For many reasons, geography and geopolitics in Central Asia are not helpful to the region’s
economic development.
First, the region is distant from the major centres of world economic activity: North America, Western Europe, East and South East Asia.
Second, all countries are landlocked (Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country in
the world and Uzbekistan is double landlocked, ie it borders only landlocked countries)
with limited transportation connections inside and outside the region. Major Central Asia
transportation routes built during the Soviet era crossed and re-crossed the borders of Soviet
republics. The transformation of formerly intra-Soviet administrative borders into borders
between newly independent Central Asian states, with border and custom controls and, quite
frequently, with visa requirements, created a huge challenge to intra-regional trade and to
the domestic movement of people and goods within individual countries, especially in the
densely populated Fergana Valley shared between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Third, on various occasions Central Asian countries have suffered from political instability
(underpinned by ethnic, sectarian, clan and regional conflicts and authoritarian regimes)
and an even more unstable neighbourhood. It is sufficient to mention the Tajik civil war in the
1990s, ethnic riots in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990 and 2010, the popular uprising in Andizhan
(Uzbekistan) in 2005, two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan (2005 and 2010), and occasional incursions by jihadists from Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Political ambitions and
personal animosities between authoritarian leaders have additionally limited the opportunities for intra-regional cooperation.
Central Asia’s neighbourhood also poses numerous security risks and, therefore, places
limits on the potential for trade, transit, investment and tourism. Risks include the continuous
civil war in Afghanistan (since the mid-1970s), the separatist movement in the Xinjiang region
of China, the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus
and the long-lasting economic and political isolation of Iran.
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
Fourth, the Central Asian countries are not ethnically homogenous. The dominant ethnic
groups amount to 63 percent of the population in Kazakhstan, 72 percent in Kyrgyzstan
and between 80 and 85 percent in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan3. The Turkmen,
Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh languages belong to the Turkish language family while Tajik
belongs to the Persian family. However, Russian continuous to play the role of regional lingua
franca, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Fifth, the region borders global and regional powers: Russia, China and Iran. Although
Turkey does not border Central Asian countries, it seeks close economic, political and cultural
links with them based on shared historical and language roots. The US as the global political
and economic superpower has also been present in the region, especially at the time of the
NATO-led combat mission in Afghanistan (2001-14) when Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan hosted US military bases and offered transit and logistic support to NATO troops.
While Russia clearly dominated the region for the last two centuries, in the last twenty
years China rapidly expanded its presence in Central Asia, especially in connection with large
infrastructure investments (Box 1). As a result, Central Asian countries will face an increasingly difficult challenge of navigating between the two4. In addition, the increasingly nationalist and revisionist tendencies in Russian politics, especially in the context of annexation
of Crimea and the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, have raised serious concerns in Kazakhstan,
which has a large Russian-speaking minority and long land border with Russia, and in Uzbekistan, in relation to its autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan (The Guardian, 2015).
Figure 2: Main trading partners’ shares in total exports and imports
2008
2015
2015
2001
2001
2008
2008
2015
2015
2001
2001
2008
2008
2015
2015
2001
2001
2008
2008
2015
2015
2001
2001
2008
2008
2015
2015
Turkmenistan
Kyrgyzstan
2008
Tajikistan
Imports
2001
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Exports
2001
0%
20%
40%
Russia
60%
80%
0%
100%
China
Turkey
EU28
20%
Iran
40%
60%
Intra-regional
80%
100%
RoW
Source: Bruegel based on International Trade Centre. Note: missing are intra-regional trade data for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, exports of natural gas from Turkmenistan to Russia and large part of Uzbek exports of gold and cotton. Iran’s data is for 2005 instead
of 2008 and 2011, instead of 2015, for all countries.
3
4
2012-14 census data for all except Uzbekistan, for which the most recent data is from 1996.
Hypothetically, the Shanghai Cooperation Council consisting of Russia, China and four Central Asian countries (all
except Turkmenistan) should ease potential tensions and facilitate political, security and economic cooperation in
the region. However, the actual role of this organisation remains limited.
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
All the Central Asian countries are relatively open to trade. The least open is Uzbekistan,
reflecting its autarkic development strategy and largely unreformed economic system (see
section 4). In terms of exports and imports (Figure 2), Russia’s share tends to decrease
over time while China’s increases. The EU is the largest export market for Kazakhstan and
the EU remains quite significant as a source of imports into Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. Turkey is an important destination for Tajikistan’s exports and source for
Turkmenistan’s imports (see also Mogilevskii, 2012).
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can benefit from the transit trade between China and
Iran. In 2015, when sanctions on Iran were lifted, the first train from China arrived in
Tehran after travelling through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which took two weeks
instead of one month for goods sent by sea.
The list of Central Asia’s major trading partners reflects the geography and geopolitics of
the region, as well as its institutional trade arrangements (Table 1). Only three countries out
of the five belong to the World Trade Organisation: Kyrgyzstan (since 1998), Tajikistan (since
2013) and Kazakhstan (since 2015). The importance of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), the organisation created by the former Soviet republics at the end of 1991 to
retain free trade and visa-free movement of people, has decreased over time (Turkmenistan
does not belong to the CIS). The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, which intends to
create a single market, involves Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, its member states
have put little effort into it and its economic modernisation potential is limited. Recently,
the Eurasian Economic Union has been negatively affected by geopolitical tensions related
to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, such as the western sanctions imposed on Russia, Russia’s
trade countersanctions against the US and the EU (which have not been replicated by other
Eurasian Economic Union members) and Russia’s unilateral trade sanctions against Ukraine.
The intergovernmental Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) includes all Central
Asia countries and their southern neighbours5. However, its preferential trade agreements
involve only some of them. The ECO Framework Agreement on Trade Cooperation was
signed in 2000 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan but has been ratified only by
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The ECO Trade Agreement was signed in 2003 and entered
into force in 2008. Of the Central Asian countries, only Tajikistan has signed and ratified this
Agreement (as of 2016).
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
World Trade Organisation Yes Yes Yes
No
No
Uzbekistan is an observer
Commonwealth of
Independent States
No
Yes
All former Soviet Union
states except Baltics, Georgia,
Turkmenistan and Ukraine
No
No
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Russia
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey
Kyrgyzstan
Membership
Organisation
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Table 1: Trade and economic integration
Yes Yes Yes
Eurasian Economic Union Yes Yes
Economic Cooperation
Organisation
Source: Bruegel.
5
6
See http://www.ecosecretariat.org.
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
No
Interestingly, despite its increasing share of Central Asia’s exports and imports, China has
not advanced formal free trade arrangements with the region, and trades with its Central Asia
partners on WTO terms.
The EU concluded bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with each
country, which offered the Most-Favoured Nation tariffs in bilateral trade relations, even
before the accession of Central Asian countries to the WTO. In 2015, the new-generation
Enhanced PCA between the EU and Kazakhstan was signed in Astana. Kazakhstan remains
the most important economic and political partner of the EU in the region because of its role
as an oil exporter. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan benefit from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and Kyrgyzstan benefits from a more generous GSP+ scheme, granted to them by
the EU on a unilateral basis6.
Box 1: China’s role in Central Asia and the new Silk Road
The ancient Silk Road went through Central Asia with Samarkand and Bukhara (today
in Uzbekistan) being among the biggest and most prosperous trading centres along the
route. Today China is reviving the old trading route through its ambitious One Belt One Road
project, which will develop infrastructure across Central Asia, South Asia and onto Europe.
Three major belts/roads have been proposed: North, Central and South. The North Belt will
go through Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. The Central Belt will go through Central Asia,
Western Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Finally, the South Road will stretch
from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. All Central Asian countries,
except for Turkmenistan, are members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which
will fund this project along with the Asian Development Bank and other sources.
In the last decade, China has actively increased its presence in Central Asia through
investments in energy and infrastructure. Total trade between China and Central Asian countries has surpassed Central Asia’s trade with Russia (Figure 3), with commodities dominating.
Figure 3: Central Asia, total trade with China and Russia, $ billions
24.7
25
China
21.0
Russia
20
15
10
5
3.3
0.9
0
2001
2015
Source: Bruegel based on Trademap (data for Central Asian countries). Note: Total trade is a sum of exports and imports.
China has been actively investing in oil and gas pipelines, roads and railways, and accompanying infrastructure (Figure 4). These projects include:
• Oil: China constructed the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which came on stream in 2006;
China’s oil imports from Kazakhstan increased almost tenfold between 2005 and 2008.
• Gas: China has completed the construction of a major gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. A
second pipeline, the Line D through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is scheduled
for construction, increasing China’s gas imports from Turkmenistan even further (Farchy,
6
7
See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/.
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
2016). The pipeline broke the previous dominance of Russia’s Gazprom but at the cost
of making Turkmenistan nearly totally dependent on China. Turkmenistan’s exports to
China constituted 1 percent of its total exports in 2009, increasing to almost 80 percent
by 2015, almost all of which is natural gas; Turkmenistan’s second largest trading partner,
Turkey, takes only 5 percent of its total exports.
Figure 4: Map of the newly built and planned pipelines and railways in Central Asia
Source: Bruegel.
•
Railways and other infrastructure: China committed to building the railway from Khorgos on the China-Kazakhstan border to the Aktau port on the Caspian Sea, including supplementary industrial and infrastructure projects in Khorgos as the hub. Another project,
the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail route is under discussion.
4 Reform progress and external support
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic system in 1991, economic transition in
Central Asia started with a delay and has progressed slowly and unevenly. One reason for the
delay was the continuation of the common ruble area in 1992 and most of 1993 in which the
single currency (Soviet ruble) was managed by several central banks (Dabrowski, 2016a). This
led to very high inflation in the entire post-Soviet space, including Central Asia (Figure 11 in
section 5). Kyrgyzstan was the first to introduce its own currency in May 1993 followed by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (all three in November 1993) and Tajikistan (May 1995).
8
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
Figure 5: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition
Indicators, 2014
5
4
3
2
1
0
Large scale
privatisation
Kazakhstan
Small scale
privatisation
Governance and enterprise
restructuring
Kyrgyzstan
Price
liberalisation
Tajikistan
Trade & Forex
system
Turkmenistan
Competition
Policy
Uzbekistan
Source: Bruegel based on EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Note: the scale goes from 0 (no reforms) to 4.33
(reforms completed).
As a result, macroeconomic stabilisation and market-oriented reforms in Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan started only in 1994-95. In Tajikistan they started a few years later, after the
end of its civil war (1997). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan resisted market transformation
for much longer, and have tried to retain many of the instruments of a command economy.
Figure 5, which shows the latest available EBRD transition indicators, reflects the uneven
pace of economic reform. The scores of the two regional reform leaders – Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan – are similar to those of countries in south eastern Europe and the Caucasus but
below those of the EU’s former-communist member states. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
show little progress (except small-scale privatization in Uzbekistan). Tajikistan represents an
intermediary case.
All Central Asian countries are doing poorly in the areas of governance and enterprise
restructuring and competition policy, pointing to their limited progress in more complex
institutional and legal reforms. This observation is confirmed by other available surveys and
rankings.
Corruption remains a major problem in the region, particularly in Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan (Table 2). Corruption is an additional burden, especially on the poor, in
terms of their access to public and private services. Corruption, nepotism and favouritism
hinder private sector development, particularly of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Furthermore, according to the Heritage Foundation (HF) Index of Economic Freedom (Table
2) only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have managed to achieve partial economic freedom (the
HF category of ‘moderately free’). Tajikistan is rated as ‘mostly unfree’ (similarly to Russia)
and the two other countries are considered ‘repressed’.
When we disaggregate the summary HF ranking into individual policy fields (Figure 6)
most Central Asian countries score low in terms of property rights, freedom from corruption and financial freedom, which, among other things, reflect their low quality judicial
systems and their inability to enforce contracts. Moreover, weak judicial systems discourage foreign investors and, therefore, are slowing down the modernisation of Central Asian
economies. Generally, the business environment remains difficult and poses a big obstacle
to the diversification of Central Asian economies away from their commodity dependence
(see sections 5-6).
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have achieved some progress in building market-oriented
financial sectors. Kazakhstan has attracted meaningful foreign investment into this sector.
It has also the largest banking sector as measured by the ratio of credit to the private sector
to GDP, which was 58.9 percent of GDP in 2007 but then declined as result of the 2007-08
9
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
banking crisis (Figure 7). The currencies of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not
convertible even for current account transactions, resulting in multiple exchange rates. The
financial sectors of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan remain highly repressed.
Table 2: Governance indicators, 2015
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic
Freedom, world ranking and status, 2015
Country
World Rank in
Economic Freedom
Status
Transparency
International,
Corruption Perception
Index (100 = very
clean), 2015
Kazakhstan
69
Moderately free
28
Kyrgyzstan
82
Moderately free
28
Tajikistan
140
Mostly unfree
26
Turkmenistan
172
Repressed
18
Uzbekistan
160
Repressed
19
Source: Bruegel based on Heritage Foundation and Transparency International.
The largely authoritarian character of the political systems in Central Asia is the main
cause of their poor governance and business climate, and their insecure property rights and
rule-of-law deficit. According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2017 report7, only
Kyrgyzstan is rated as ‘partly free’, while the others are ‘not free’. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
belong to the group of the 10 most politically oppressive countries in the world, alongside
North Korea and Eritrea.
Figure 6: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom by components, 2015
Property rights
100
Financial freedom
Freedom from corruption
80
Kazakhstan
60
40
Investment freedom
Fiscal freedom
Kyrgyzstan
20
Tajikistan
Trade freedom
Government spending
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Monetary freedom
Business freedom
Labour freedom
Source: Bruegel based on Heritage Foundation.
7
10
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
Figure 7: Domestic credit to the private sector as percent of GDP
60
Kazakhstan
50
Kyrgyzstan
40
Tajikistan
30
20
10
0
2000
2007
2010
2013
2015
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank World Development Indicators (updated 23 March 2017). Note: data for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is
missing.
External parties could play a significant role in supporting reforms in Central Asia, as they
did for the central and eastern Europe region. Unfortunately, a disadvantageous geographic
location and geopolitics have limited these opportunities (section 3).
Although the two big powers directly bordering the Central Asia region – China and
Russia – provide financial and development aid it largely serves their national and geopolitical interests. The same is true of investment from China and Russia, the major part of which
is provided by state-controlled corporations or companies that are close to their respective
governments. Often these projects lack transparency.
To lesser extent, the same is true of the two other regional players – Turkey and Iran. None
of these neighbours is interested in supporting more political freedom or deeper institutional
reforms in Central Asian countries.
The roles played by the US and EU in the region have remained limited. Both provide
technical assistance but its scale has reduced over time. The US interest in the region declined
after NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan ended. The extent of future US engagement
under the Trump administration remains unclear.
The EU’s interests are also limited. In the first period of post-communist transition, the
EU through its external policy tried to follow a common regional approach to all CIS countries, including via the single development aid framework – the Technical Assistance to
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). However, with the start of the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the Central Asia region, which remained outside this
policy framework, was moved into a general basket of developing countries, also in terms of
technical assistance programmes. The EU’s relations with the region are governed by ‘The
European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ adopted in 20078 and by
bilateral PCAs (section 3).
Occasionally, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have received EU Macro-Financial Assistance (in
the form of loans and grants) as a supplement to their International Monetary Fund programmes (see the next paragraphs). Given Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s membership of the
Eurasian Economic Union, the EU cannot offer them negotiations on free trade agreements,
as it has done with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The same limitation in terms of opportunities for free trade arrangements with the EU applies to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which
8
11
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_10113_2007_init_en.pdf.
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
are not WTO members and have not completed basic market reforms. Thus, the potential EU
toolkit of policies that could support economic and political transition in Central Asia is limited.
In the context of the limited engagement of bilateral donors9, the IMF, World Bank, various
UN agencies and the Asian Development Bank, have provided major financial and technical
support to modernisation in Central Asia, particularly in terms of eradicating poverty and infrastructure investment. This has included IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank lending
on concessionary terms to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s relationships with the IMF and World Bank are less developed because of their non-market economic
systems and information closeness. Because they have reached upper-middle-income status
(section 5), Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are no longer eligible to participate in most development aid programmes.
Overall, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have received the largest amount of official development assistance (ODA) as a share of gross national income in the region (Figure 8), on a level
comparable with the group of least developed countries to which they belonged during most of
the analysed period. The peak for ODA came at the end of 1990s (Kyrgyzstan) and early 2000s
(Tajikistan) and has since gradually declined for the entire region (except for Kyrgyzstan where it
grew again after 2013). In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, ODA almost disappeared after 2005.
Figure 8: ODA as a percentage of gross national income
25
Kazakhstan
20
Kyrgyzstan
15
Tajikistan
10
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
5
0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Least Developed Countries
Source: Bruegel based on OECD DAC2a database. Note: The list of least developed countries contains 48 countries (see: http://www.oecd.
org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014%20final.pdf).
5 Economic and social performance since
independence
In the first half of the 1990s, Central Asian countries went through a painful process of correction of huge macroeconomic imbalances and structural distortions inherited from the Soviet
era. They also had to adapt to the partial loss of the Soviet Union market (especially in the
military-industrial sector) and the termination of direct and indirect transfers from Russia.
9 With the exception of Japan, which has financed some infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on concessionary
terms.
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
Growth recovery started in 1995-97 (Figure 9) but accelerated only in the 2000s with new investment in hydrocarbons and other mineral resources and the start of the global commodity
boom. However, annual growth rates have remained volatile, largely because of fluctuations
in global commodity prices.
Figure 9: Year-on-year GDP growth rate, percent
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
2013
2014
2015
2010
2011
2012
2009
2008
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2002
1999
2000
2001
1997
1998
1996
1994
1995
1993
Tajikistan
1992
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
-25%
-30%
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank WDI.
Figure 10 summarises economic progress since independence. After the period of output
decline in the first half of the 1990s, GDP per capita in current international dollars in PPP
terms has systematically increased in all Central Asian countries. However, only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have managed to grow rapidly, thanks primarily to the hydrocarbon
bonanza. Both countries continue to have higher GDP per capita in PPP terms than rapidly
growing China. Kazakhstan overtook Turkey (at the beginning of the twenty-first century) and
caught up with Russia in 2015. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan grew at a slower pace.
As result, the income per capita differences between those two subgroups of Central Asian
countries have increased in the last 15 years.
Figure 10: GDP per capita in PPP terms, current international $, 1992-2015
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
China
2014
2015
2013
2011
2012
2010
2009
2006
2007
2008
2005
2003
2004
2002
2000
2001
1998
1999
1996
1997
1994
1995
Russia
1992
1993
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Turkey
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016. Note: IMF staff estimates for Turkmenistan (2005-15),
Uzbekistan (2014-15) and Tajikistan (2015).
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Figure 11: Inflation, end of period, percent (logarithmic scale), 1995-2015
Source: Bruegel based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016.
Other macroeconomic indicators have behaved similarly to growth rates. The turbulent
1990s, especially the first half, were characterised by three- or even four-digit inflation in
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Figure 11) and three-digit government debt as a share of GDP in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Figure 12). Part of that debt was owed to Russia, another part to the
World Bank, other international development institutions and official creditors. The period
of the global commodity boom (2000-08) was marked by high growth rates, annual inflation
in the range of 8-10 percent, fiscal consolidation and growing international reserves. Then
the global financial crisis of 2008-09 led to slower growth and some deterioration in fiscal
accounts and balance of payments. Finally, the decline in commodity prices in 2014 further
deteriorated the macroeconomic environment. The currencies of all Central Asian countries
sharply depreciated (in particular, the Kazakhstani tenge), inflation went up, fiscal balances
and balance of payments deteriorated, and growth further slowed down (Dabrowski, 2016b).
Figure 12: General government gross debt, percent of GDP, 1997-2015
150
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
120
Tajikistan
90
Turkmenistan
60
Uzbekistan
2015
2014
2013
2011
2012
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2003
2004
2002
2000
2001
1999
1998
0
1997
30
Source: Bruegel based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016.
Kazakhstan (since 2000) and Turkmenistan (since 2008) used the boom years to create
oil and gas-related sovereign wealth funds. However, their transparency remains either low
(Kazakhstan) or non-existent (Turkmenistan)10. Furthermore, the Kazakhstan National Fund
has served, to a great extent, as the source of financing for large infrastructure projects and
10 See http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/.
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
other public investment rather than as a reserve fund for rainy days. Kazakhstan has also used
an increasing part of its oil revenues for current spending purposes. As result, its fiscal breakeven oil price, ie the price at which the fiscal balance is zero, went up from $65.4 per barrel
in 2009-13 to $88.1 in 2015, exactly at the time when oil prices sharply declined to the level
below $50 per barrel. Turkmenistan managed to bring down its fiscal break-even oil price
from $81.6 per barrel in 2009-13 to $50.4 in 2015 (IMF, 2016, Table 5).
Despite its decreasing importance, agriculture continues to contribute around a quarter
of value added in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Figure 13). All Central Asian countries recorded
an expansion of mining and quarrying, especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and probably
Turkmenistan (for which data is missing, see Figure 13), attributable to the oil and natural gas
industry. Manufacturing in Central Asia is concentrated in labour-intensive sectors, such as
food and textiles. The service sector remains relatively underdeveloped, except in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan.
Figure 13: Value added by sector, percentage of GDP
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1995 2005 2015
1995 2005 2015
1995 2005 2015
1995 2005 2015
1995 2005 2015
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan*
Uzbekistan
Agriculture
Mining and quarrying
Services
Manufacturing
Source: World Bank. Note: Industry is disaggregated between (1) mining and quarrying, and (2) manufacturing. (*) Comparative share of
both sectors for Turkmenistan is missing for 2005 and 2015.
Agriculture’s share in total employment (Table 3) is higher than in total value added
(Figure 13), indicating that a substantial part of labour force is locked in this low-productivity
sector. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the share of agriculture in total value added is 16 percent
while its share in total employment is almost twice as high. The situation is similar in Tajikistan. Since natural resource extraction is capital rather than labour intensive, it does not have
the capacity to create significant employment. As result, employment in the industry sector
(dominated by mining and quarrying) is small compared to agriculture and services. Underdevelopment of the services sector could be explained by the fact that between half and three
quarters of the population in Central Asian countries lives in rural areas (Table 5).
Table 3: Employment by sectors, percent of total employment
Country
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Year
Agriculture
Industry
Services
1999
26.7
20
53.2
2013
24.2
19.8
56
1999
52.4
11.6
36.1
2013
31.7
20.2
48.1
2004
55.5
17.9
26.2
2009
52.9
15.6
31.1
1999
38.5
19.4
35.2
2013
-
-
-
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Note: data for Turkmenistan is missing. Industry includes manufacturing; because of data limitations no separate data is available.
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Remittances from migrants play an important role in the economies of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Figure 14). Russia is the major receiving country for migrant labour
from Central Asia (UNDP, 2015). Turkey and Kazakhstan also attract migrants from Central
Asia. For Tajikistan, remittances account for approximately one-third of GDP. Remittances
help low-income households escape poverty and also boost consumption and growth in the
receiving economies, help finance their large trade deficits and contribute to the development of their financial sectors.
Figure 14: Personal remittances received, percent of GDP
50%
1999
40%
2007
2015
30%
20%
10%
0%
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Note: earliest possible data for Tajikistan is 2002 instead of 1999.
However, labour migration is not without social and economic costs. It involves the loosening family ties, brain drains, migrants being employed below their skill levels and integration problems in the receiving countries. Individuals from remittance-receiving households
are less likely to enter labour market, putting additional pressure on the domestic supply of
labour (Justino and Shemyakina, 2012). Better policies are needed to reduce the potential
negative effects of labour migration in both sending and receiving countries, and to foster
closer cooperation between them.
As we have noted, the early years of transition from central planning in Central Asia
involved substantial social hardship. In 1990s, in all Central Asian countries except Kazakhstan, the poverty headcount rates at $1.90 and $3.10 a day (in 2011 PPP) were high or very
high (Table 4). In the 2000s, as a result of rapid growth, these rates started to decline systematically, apart from in Tajikistan, where they remained high and increased again in the 2010s.
There is no data for Turkmenistan (since 1998) or Uzbekistan (since 2003). Most likely, however, the share of their populations living below both World Bank absolute poverty thresholds
in Turkmenistan decreased as result of the hydrocarbon boom.
Table 4: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 a day (2011 PPP)
(% of population)
Country
at $1.90 a day
1993
1998
c
2003
at $3.10 a day
2007 2013
1993
Kazakhstan
6.5
6.3
4.5
0.5
0.0
23.1
Kyrgyzstan
44.3
30.6
28.1
9.9
3.3
63.9
54.4b
30.8
10.4
22.6
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
80.9
Uzbekistan
42.3
94.2
45.5
66.8
b
d
2003
21.3
3.7
0.3
51.5
67.6
33.6
24.0
86.1b
64.8
32.7
60.8
2013
69.1
69.2
87.8
b
57.0
40.5
32.0
14.7
1.9
82.3
67.2
56.4d
33.0e
11.1
Russia
2.4
1.7
1.1
0.2
0.0f
10.1
7.3
5.1
1.2
0.5f
Turkey
a
0.3
a
13.2
6.3
2.6
3.7
1.4
12.1
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Notes: a = 1994, b = 1999, c = 1996, d = 2002, e = 2008, f = 2012.
16
2007
China
2.6
e
1998
Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
Overall, cross-country differences in poverty statistics reflect differences in levels of GDP
per capita (Figure 10). The same observation applies to the comparison with Central Asia’s
three major economic partners – China, Russia and Turkey.
The first period of transition was also marked by increasing income inequalities (Figure
15). However, since 2000, Kazakhstan has succeeded in bringing its Gini coefficient below
30, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have stabilised it between 30 and 35, ie below the high levels
recorded in China, Russia and Turkey. That is, income inequality in three Central Asia countries resembles that in EU economies rather than in other former Soviet Union and developing countries. Recent data for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is not available.
Figure 15: Gini coefficient of income inequality
60
50
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
40
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
30
2014
2013
2011
2012
2010
2009
2007
2008
2006
2005
2003
2004
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
Russia
1992
20
China
Turkey
Source: Bruegel based on Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Solt (2016), last updated July 2016, http://fsolt.org/
swiid/.
About half of the populations of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and slightly above 35
percent of the populations of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan live in urban areas. In Tajikistan,
this share is even smaller – 26.8 percent in 2015, having hardly changed since the beginning
of the twenty-first century (Table 5). This corresponds with the still high poverty level in that
country (Table 4) because of low productivity in agriculture and other employment in rural
areas (Table 3 and Figure 13). The low urban population share also means constrained access
to public services, quality education, healthcare and business opportunities. On the other
hand, if large swathes of the rural population start migrating to urban areas, it can result in
increased pressures on already-constrained public services and might lead to social and
political tensions.
In the Soviet era, health services were provided largely by the state-owned health institutions and financed by the state budget, but informal out-of-pocket payments by patients
and their families played an important role. After transition to a market system, healthcare is
financed from three major sources – out-of-pocket financing by households, general budget
financing and social health insurance systems (Leive, 2010).
Despite attempts to legalise and cap the amounts of patients’ co-payments for healthcare
services, the practise of informal payments and bribes remains widespread in the region
(Scheil-Adlung and Kuhl, 2011). If one adds costs of medicines, which are rarely subsidised
or refunded, total out-of-pocket payments for healthcare constitute substantial financial burdens for households, particularly low-income households.
Public health insurance financed by mandatory contributions from employees and
employers was introduced in Kyrgyzstan in 1996, and Kazakhstan in 2016 (Rechel et al, 2012).
However, this mechanism is not easy to operate in Central Asian countries where a large part
of the population is either engaged in the informal sector or works abroad. Kazakhstan is the
only country where voluntary private health insurance plays some role.
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Since the beginning of the 2000s, male and female life expectancy have increased, especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Table 5). Child mortality has decreased, in
particular in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in line with progress accomplished in the rest of
the developing world. Fertility rates have increased in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while they
slightly decreased in other countries. They remain high (over 3) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
which can be partly explained by the large share of population living in rural areas.
Table 5: Other socio-economic indicators, %
Indicators
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Lowermiddle
income
countries
Uppermiddle
income
countries
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
2001
2015
2001
2015
2001
2015
2001
2015
2001
2015
2015
2015
Unemployment rate
(percent of active
labour force)
10.4
4.1
7.8
8.1
12.0
10.9
11.3
10.5
10.9
10.6
5.3
5.9
Urban population
(percent of total)
55.5
53.2
35.3
35.7
26.5
26.8
46.1
50.0
37.3
36.4
39.0
64.1
Fertility rate (births
per woman)
1.9
2.7
2.4
3.2
3.9
3.5
2.8
2.3
2.5
2.2
2.8
1.8
Under 5-mortality
rate (per 1000 live
births)
41.2
14.1
46.4
21.3
86.6
44.8
79.2
51.4
61.4
39.1
52.6
18.5
Life expectancy
(male)
60.5
67.1
65.0
66.5
60.3
66.2
60.2
61.5
63.8
65.0
65.5
72.4
Life expectancy
(female)
71.3
75.9
72.6
74.5
68.0
73.2
68.0
69.9
70.4
71.8
69.1
76.8
Health expenditure
(percent of
government
expenditure)
8.4
10.9
11.9
11.9
6.4
6.8
13.7
8.7
9.6
10.7
6.7
n/a
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Note: most recent data available.
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Table 6: Education, gross enrolment ratios, %
Level of education/
gender
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Lowermiddle
income
countries
Uppermiddle
income
countries
2000
2015
2001
2014
2001
2015
2001
2014
2001
2011
2014
2014
Female
96.7
110.6
94.7
107.0
91.2
98.4
-
88.6
102.6
95.7
106
104.1
Male
96.1
110.5
96.7
108.3
98.3
98.0
-
90.1
102.1
98.0
103.8
106.7
Female
95.4
111.0
85.4
91.2
67.8
-
-
83.7
85.0
94.9
64.7
94.4
Male
91.5
107.3
85.4
90.4
81.7
-
-
86.9
87.9
95.9
65.9
91.9
Female
34.1
51.7
41.1
52.1
10.2
21.1
-
6.2
12.0
6.9
22
47.7
Male
29.4
40.5
39.3
39.9
25.1
31.5
-
9.7
15.0
10.9
22.5
40.3
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank WDI.
Overall, Central Asia’s high share of population under the age of 14 and continued population growth (which is rapid in some countries) point to favourable demographic perspectives
with an ample supply of young labour in the coming decades (in contrast to other former
Soviet Union countries, Europe and East Asia). Moreover, Central Asian secondary education
enrolment is high (Table 6), reflecting the positive legacy of the Soviet education system.
While the tertiary education system is not without imperfections, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan almost half of the respective age cohorts enrol in universities, with female enrolment
exceeding male enrolment. At the other end of the regional spectrum, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan have tertiary enrolment rates below 10 percent. The challenge for Central Asian
countries is to retain young talent, strengthen links between education and the labour market
and improve the quality of education at all levels (Chubrik et al, 2011).
6 The way ahead and policy lessons
The decline in the prices of oil, natural gas, metals and agricultural raw materials in the
second half of 2014 meant Central Asia suffered a huge adverse shock. The vulnerability of
Central Asian economies to changes in the world commodity markets was exposed and the
need for their structural diversification towards more manufacturing and services became
even more urgent (see Linn, 2016).
In any economy, policies aimed at structural diversification are not easy to conceptualise,
coordinate and implement. The right approach is to rely on market forces, including
international trade and investment, rather than administrative dirigisme, government
planning and public investment (except in infrastructure, for which public authorities have
an important role to play). However, in Central Asia where memories of central planning
and dominant public ownership are relatively fresh, there is a natural temptation towards
etatism and dirigisme (often associated with corruption and favouritism). This is particularly
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017
the case for reform laggards Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Going in the direction of more
state control would mean welfare losses and would further the region’s marginalisation in the
world economy.
Market-oriented diversification requires a supportive macro- and microeconomic environment. The decline in commodity prices led to nominal and real depreciation of Central
Asian currencies, especially the Kazakhstani tenge. In theory, this could improve the international competitiveness of the non-commodity sector. However, given the geographical
structure of non-commodity exports (to Russia and Kazakhstan, whose currencies depreciated more than those of other Central Asian countries), this did not happen. In some countries, policies to keep official exchange rates over-appreciated at the cost of foreign exchange
restrictions (section 4) made things even worse. That is, product diversification needs to be
accompanied by geographical diversification of trade, underpinned by liberal trade policies
and full current account convertibility.
Looking at the microeconomic environment, economic agents in non-commodity sectors
must be able to develop and expand their businesses with minimum administrative obstacles,
low transaction costs and protection of their property rights. This requires, in turn, improvements in the business climate and governance, which means adopting a broad spectrum of
economic, institutional and political reforms.
The list of required reform measures differs between countries but also contains a
common agenda for the entire region.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan must complete basic market reforms: domestic price liberalisation, reducing explicit subsidies for food, energy and water, and cross-subsidisation (in
public utilities), unification of exchange rate and current account convertibility, trade liberalisation, WTO accession, greater privatisation and elimination of barriers to private entrepreneurship, both domestic and foreign, and building financial market infrastructures.
On the other hand, all Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where reforms
are more advanced, face the same challenges of oppressive and predatory post-Soviet states11.
These are deeply rooted corruption, rent seeking, state capture, administrative harassment
of business and more broadly, a high degree of business uncertainty and insecurity over
property rights. The situation looks particularly bad in all areas where economic management
interacts with authoritarian political systems and legal institutions, especially those related to
the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and public administration. Resolving these problems
will not be possible without at least partial political reforms. If the above-mentioned dysfunctionalities and pathologies continue, they might ultimately provoke social and political
instability and lead to political radicalisation.
Closer intra-regional cooperation would also improve the business and investment
climate. Given the region’s remote geographical location, its complicated borders, infrastructure inherited from Soviet times and cultural proximity (section 3), unrestricted movement of
goods, services, people and capital between Central Asian countries would greatly contribute
to their economic development. Closer cooperation would also help Central Asian countries
to jointly promote their interests vis à vis those of their major neighbours.
Overall, our analysis suggests some general policy lessons, which may also apply to countries outside the Central Asia region:
1. Geography matters. Central Asia’s remote geographic location (far from major centres
of world business activity), landlocked situation and underdeveloped transportation
infrastructure do not help the region’s integration into the world economy and therefore
their economic development, even if a given country/region is well-endowed with natural
resources and educated labour.
2. Geopolitics also matters. Geographic disadvantage matters even more if it is associated
with adverse geopolitical factors – an unstable neighbourhood with unresolved conflicts,
11 The same challenge is shared by other former Soviet Union countries, including Russia and Ukraine.
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limited appetite for intra-regional cooperation, assertive policies of regional powers and
limited interest from the two global powers (the US and EU), which traditionally support
democratic and market reforms.
3. Importance of institutional legacy. The total absence of the traditions of modern capitalist economies, political freedom and democracy in Central Asia has not helped its political and economic transition since independence. However, such a historical background
cannot be seen as the fatal factor, which will be in force forever. Good policies can help
overcome poor institutional legacies, as happened, for example, in some Asian countries.
4. Authoritarianism does not help in economic reforms. Our analysis suggests that there
is a correlation between progress in political and economic reforms in the Central Asia
region, as elsewhere in transition economies. The least politically free regimes (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are also economically the least free, with several remnants of centrally-planned systems. On the other hand, politically partly-free Kyrgyzstan is a regional
leader in economic reform. In all Central Asian countries, hard or soft authoritarianism is
an obstacle to reform of predatory post-Soviet institutions, and to the establishing of the
rule of law and the fight against corruption, nepotism and rent seeking.
5. Natural resources are both a blessing and a curse. The presence of mineral resources,
especially hydrocarbons, helped Central Asian countries to grow rapidly, to eradicate poverty and to start large infrastructure projects, despite their geographic, geopolitical and
institutional disadvantages and, in some cases (Turkmenistan), in the absence of genuine
market reforms. However, resource booms have their limits, as shown by the 2014-15
decline in commodity prices. Furthermore, the presence of large natural resource rents
creates obstacles (via the real appreciation of the exchange rate) to the development of
internationally competitive manufacturing and service sectors. It also encourages corruption and helps to consolidate authoritarian regimes.
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Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2017