The Moral Animus of David Hume (review)

The Moral Animus of David Hume (review) Stuart D. Warner Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 31, Number 2, April 1993, pp. 295-297 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1993.0028 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/226133/summary Access provided at 9 Jan 2020 03:06 GMT from Queen Mary University of London (+1 other institution account) BOOK REVIEWS 295 apprehensions cannot. Gassendi, following Epicurus, holds that every sensation (and indeed every apprehension) is true; error occurs only where there is opinion, that is, where something is affirmed or denied of an apprehension. T h e apprehension of a round tower or o f a tower as being r o u n d cannot be mistaken, whether there is a round tower in the field o f vision or not; error can occur only when, on the basis of such an apprehension, one believes that the tower one sees is round, that is, holds it true that the tower is round. Puster thus fails to explicate properly Gassendi's notion of the truth of apprehensions. But Puster succeeds in his principal aim, which is to provide valuable evidence o f the influence o f Gassendi on Locke. FREDERICK S. MICHAEL EMILY MICHAEL Brooklyn College, CUNY Donald T. Siebert. The Moral Animus of David Hume. Newark, Delaware: University o f Delaware Press, 199o. Pp. 245- $36-5 o. This work seeks to direct o u r attention to parts o f Hume's corpus that have been unjustly neglected: The Natural History of Religion, "A Dialogue," certain o f the essays, My Own Life and, above all, The Histor3 of Englancl. A n d it does so for one most important reason: to allow us to recognize H u m e as a moralist, and one with a quite distincfive practical morality. Scholars will find this a useful book, but not one without its flaws. Following a helpful introduction, The Moral Animus of David Hume divides into five chapters: "In Search o f the Hero of Feeling"; "Religion and the 'Peace of Society' "; "The Things of the World"; "Moral Scepticism"; and "David Hume's Last Words." T h e first two chapters rely heavily on The History of England, and they are far and away the most insightful parts o f the book. The first, in conjunction with the introduction, argues that the History is a work o f moral instruction, an attempt to remake the moral sensibilities of its readers. H u m e aims at this effect, Siebert claims, by imaginatively reshaping the past, implicitly projecting an ideal H u m e a n character, a hero o f certain sensibilities, one who is "proud and dignified; distinguished by birth, fortune, talents; dominating and self-controlled; superior to his fate, even though that fate involves his own death," and, above all, possessing the quality o f greatness o f mind (29). Although the characters that H u m e contemplates in the History are not entirely satisfactory ones, some embody features o f the above sensibilities, and Siebert rehearses many of Hume's own discussions, frequently, as in the case o f his discussion o f the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, with a discerning eye. One leaves this chapter with a deep sense that an understanding of character is of central importance to Hume. The second chapter of this work, occupying a third of its pages, presents Hume as quarreling with religion because he conceives of religion as an enemy o f morality and public order. Here Siebert carefully weaves together an analysis of various discussions of religion found in the History with an analysis of The Natural History of Religion. Siebert 296 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 1 : 2 APRIL t 9 9 3 argues that H u m e sees the sects o f Christianity--both Catholic and Protestant--as erecting standards o f morality which are antithetical to those o f the worldly person that H u m e takes to be the paragon o f virtue; and it is Puritanism, more so than Catholicism, that is in Hume's understanding the principal miscreant. T h e hero o f Hume's reading of religion is polytheism--although his appraisal of the Druids is far from an e n d o r s e m e n t - - f o r polytheistic religions refrain from the dominance over a person's life that H u m e finds in Christianity generally; and polytheism, in contrast to Puritanism in particular, does n o t entail breaking the ties of c o m m o n morality. Religion is one o f the cardinal corrupters o f morality in Hume's History, and Siebert nicely portrays Hume's treatment o f Cromwell and o f the Crusades as providing evidence o f the threat that religion poses. Most important in this chapter is Siebert's perceptive and carefully nuanced treatment o f Hume's j u d g m e n t of religious symbols. Whereas prior to the first volume o f the H/story in 1754 H u m e had been dismissive o f the symbolization o f religion in icons and sacred rites o f various kinds, he exhibited much more sympathy to them in both the H/story and The Natural H/story of Religion. Siebert contends that Hume's grounds for this shift lie in his seeing these symbols as connecting an individual to more worldly things, and thus mitigating a retreat from the world of experience to a world o f self-deluding rapture. T h e attention paid to the History diminishes in the last three chapters o f this book, and we find Siebert focusing on several o f Hume's essays, "A Dialogue," and one lengthy letter that H u m e wrote in 1748 to his brother about his travels with General James St. Clair. T h e intent o f the third chapter is to portray H u m e as providing "an ethics that is essentially worldly and materialistic" (186), and it is in that context that he makes fine use o f H u m e ' s letter to his brother which shows the interest that H u m e takes in the material well-being o f those he sees in various parts o f Europe. In his analysis of this letter and a few o f Hume's political essays, Siebert casts H u m e as setting aside "monkish virtues," and embracing this-worldly ones. We see a H u m e who morally embraces prosperity, commerce, luxury, and status. T h e penultimate chapter o f this work is dominated by a discussion o f " A Dialogue" and a quartet o f Hume's essays: "The Epicurean," "The Stoic," " T h e Platonist," and "The Sceptic." Siebert maintains that the intention o f the dialogue is to defeat moral absolutism, while the g r o u p o f essays aims at showing the impotence o f moral philosophy, its inability to move individuals to action to which they are not already disposed. Although t h r o u g h o u t the book Siebert is concerned with literary matters, these matters come to the fore in the final chapter, as Siebert presents what is essentially a literary analysis o f Hume's My Own Life. What does shine through in this autobiographical piece, Siebert concludes, is the lesson o f Hume's philosophy: "to live with dignity and compassion--and with h u m o r - - i n a chaotic world" (~o8). The Moral Animus of David Hume is a work worth consulting, both for specialists and nonspecialists of H u m e alike. However, there are some mistakes in j u d g m e n t that are hard to fathom. For example: "In Hume's optimistic vision o f civilized life, there is little possibility o f crime or violence" (163); and "Hume's whole disposition [is] to build virtue on a foundation o f hedonism and materialism" (18o). T h e Sceptic in " T h e Sceptic" adopts the position that "each individual must tailor philosophy to fit himself BOOK REVIEWS 297 and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimately, what these quotations reveal is a lack o f philosophical sophistication which does get in the way o f the arguments that Siebert presents. T h e r e are, I believe, more significant difficulties. First, informing the whole book is the idea that H u m e shapes his history for didactic purposes. What seemingly never enters Siebert's mind is that in his H/story, H u m e is interested in getting at the truth of historical matters 0 5 9 is a possible exception). Second, outside o f the first two chapters, Siebert does little to connect the arguments of the book together, leaving readers with an impressionistic mosaic that they have to piece together. Third, Siebert never discusses the tension between the central claim o f the first chapter, that the purpose o f the H/story is moral instruction, and the claim o f the fourth chapter that moral philosophy is impotent. Finally, in several places, Siebert severs H u m e the philosopher from H u m e the historian. I would like to suggest that this leads to a distortion o f both Hume's philosophy and his history. STUART D. WARNER Roosevelt University Leslie A. Mulholland. Kant's System of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press, 199o. Pp. xvii + 434. Cloth, $49.00. With this book, Professor Mulholland has made a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature on Kant's political philosophy by offering us an interpretation of Kant as a natural-law theorist. His goal is to demonstrate that Kant's theory of rights is grounded in a system of natural law. Professor Mulholland contrasts his reconstruction with what he considers to be the more prevalent consent or contractualist interpretations. T h e first four chapters explore the moral basis for Kant's political theory. Mulholland begins with an examination o f Kant's rejection o f teleological ethics, which he locates in Kant's conviction that morality must ultimately be grounded on a selfreferential law prescribing obedience to law as such. He then proceeds to the analysis and derivation o f the categorical imperative and its relationship to moral goodness. Mulholland holds that the account developed by Kant in the first section o f the Foundat/ore suggests the distinction between persons and things and presents "the conception that principles governing h u m a n action must be compatible with reason as the power determining action having moral worth" (69). From this starting point, he considers Kant's law of nature formula as a principle regulating h u m a n conduct. Mulholland construes this principle as mandating rational consistency in willing as applied to h u m a n nature in both its causal and teleological aspects. In determining whether a maxim can be a law of nature, one must consider"how the moral, rational features of the individual person can cohere in a unified whole with the natural desires and inclinations and the undeveloped talents and abilities" (99)- T h e author concludes his exposition o f the moral underpinnings o f Kant's theory by examining the idea o f humanity as possessing intrinsic value. Mulholland claims that Kant's formulation o f humans as ends in them-