The Integrity of Intentionality:
Sketch for a Phenomenological Study
Matthew Ratcliffe
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to formulate a phenomenological question that I think is seldom
considered, or at least seldom explicitly stated, and then to sketch the beginnings of an
answer. That question is, ‘what constitutes the sense that one is in one kind of intentional
state, rather than another?’ 1 In other words, in virtue of what do we experience ourselves as
currently perceiving that p rather than, say, currently imagining or remembering that p? My
discussion is exclusively phenomenological in emphasis. I am concerned with the experience
of being in an intentional state, regardless of whether or not the relevant experience is taken
to be necessary or sufficient for actually being in such a state. For the sake of simplicity, I
will focus, for the most part, upon the categories ‘perceiving’, ‘imagining’, ‘remembering’,
and ‘thinking’. These four modalities of intentionality are to be construed broadly; they
encompass numerous subcategories that will need to be distinguished by a comprehensive
phenomenological analysis. In the course of addressing my question, I also seek to indicate
how a productive phenomenological research programme can be pursued by engaging with
first-person accounts of anomalous experiences, such as those that arise in the context of
psychiatric illness. The principal example I will consider here is ‘thought insertion’:
somehow experiencing one’s own thoughts as someone else’s. I will also address the nature
of certain so-called ‘hallucinations’.
One might wonder whether and how an enquiry that relies on interpreting the
accounts of experience offered by other people still resembles classical, first-person
1
phenomenology, as practiced by Edmund Husserl and others. Despite adopting what might be
termed a ‘hermeneutic, second-person phenomenological approach’, I retain a broad stance or
attitude towards the study of experience, which preserves what I take to be the essence of the
‘phenomenological reduction’. I construe the reduction in a liberal way, as something
common to phenomenology as practiced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger and
various others, rather than as something specific to Husserlian phenomenology.2 Whenever
we perceive that p, remember that q, think that r, or imagine that s, such attitudes arise in the
context of an already given relationship with the world, something that is easily overlooked,
even when one is reflecting philosophically upon the nature of experience. Performing the
phenomenological reduction involves coming to recognize the ordinarily presupposed sense
of belonging to a shared world as itself a phenomenological achievement, and striving to
study its structure. As will become clear towards the end of this chapter, the question that I
address here ultimately concerns this sense of belonging to a world, and cannot be adequately
addressed if intentional states are conceived of in isolation from a wider phenomenological
context. Indeed, the question provides us with a way into the phenomenological reduction;
clarifying and then attempting to answer it involves a shift in perspective, whereby one
comes to explicitly acknowledge phenomenological achievements that are more usually
presupposed. In the next section, I will formulate my question as clearly as I can. Then I will
sketch a potentially fruitful way of responding to it, one that opens up a substantial subject
matter for future phenomenological enquiry.
The Sense of Being in a Type of Intentional State
I am currently looking out of the window at what appears to be a bird. I might well be
mistaken about what I am looking at. Indeed, I have a degree of doubt concerning what I see.
However, I have no doubt that I am seeing something or other. Even though I am not sure
2
what I see, the status of my experience as one of seeing is not in question. Furthermore, I do
not have to explicitly infer that I am seeing; I have a pre-reflective, immediate, unproblematic
appreciation of my experience as one of seeing. To be less specific, I take myself to be
perceiving something, rather than—say—remembering it. Amongst other things, the
experience of perceiving something through one or another modality involves a sense of its
being ‘here’, ‘now’. In cases of externally directed perception, there is also a sense of its
being distinct from and usually in close proximity to oneself.3 Let us focus on this prereflective sense that something or other is both distinct from me and also ‘here’, ‘now’. Call it
the sense of ‘presence’. This may not be sufficient for a sense of perceiving, and it is
certainly not sufficient for the sense of perceiving something through one sensory modality
rather than another, but presence is at least necessary for the unproblematic appreciation that
one is in a perceptual state in relation to p. Granted, one might have an experience of p that is
somehow ambiguous in this respect, and then infer from other sources of evidence that one
perceives p rather than imagines it. However, we only resort to such inferences in cases of
unusual experience, which lack something that more usually distinguishes an experience as
one of perceiving.
An analogous point applies to other kinds of intentional state. In remembering rather
than imagining or perceiving that p, we usually have an immediate, unproblematic sense of p
as past, rather than present, imagined, or anticipated. And, in the case of imagining, there is a
sense of p as neither past nor present. In some cases of imagining, p may be anticipated. In
others, one recognizes p as counterfactual or even impossible.4 Our pre-reflective ability to
distinguish the various kinds of intentionality thus implies a grasp of distinctions such as the
following: ‘is here/ is elsewhere’; ‘was here/was never here’, ‘never existed/has ceased to
exist/does exist/will exist’, ‘might have existed/might exist now/might come to exist’. Were
we wholly unreceptive to such distinctions, we would be unable to distinguish the various
3
types of intentional state from each other. More specifically, if our experience were
unreceptive to these distinctions, we would be unable to experience ourselves as in one
intentional state and not another. Given that this is not the case, it is legitimate to ask what the
relevant aspect of experience consists of: in virtue of what do I experience myself as
perceiving, remembering, imagining, or anticipating that p, as opposed to encountering p in a
different or less determinate way? 5
To make the question clearer, a distinction can be drawn between (a) actually being in
an intentional state of type x, (b) having an experience that is characteristic of being in an
intentional state of type x, and (c) having the sense that one is in an intentional state of type x.
It is plausible to maintain that we can be mistaken about the kind of intentional state we are
in. On one interpretation of dreaming, we take ourselves to perceive that p and/or to believe
that p, when we in fact dream that p or imagine that p. Certain kinds of emotional state
provide less contentious examples. It is arguably commonplace to take oneself to be in an
emotional state of type x towards p when one is actually in an emotional state of type y. I
might take myself to be happy about B’s achieving p when I am actually resentful, or I might
think that I am not angry with C and later come to realize that I was.6
How should such examples be interpreted? One option is to adopt a wholly nonphenomenological account of what it is to actually be in an intentional state of one or another
type. On such an account, I could have an experience that is indistinguishable from one of
perceiving, but not be in a perceptual state at all, or, conversely, be in a perceptual state
without experiencing it as such. Thus (a) and (b) come apart. A complete divorce between
intentional states and associated experiences would be contentious, raising the sceptical
worry that our experiences of perceiving, remembering, or imagining that p do not give us
grounds for thinking that we really are perceiving, remembering, or imagining that p (a
concern that would apply equally to one’s experience of thinking sceptical thoughts).
4
However, one could also allow for (b) in the absence of (a) by making the weaker claim that
the phenomenology of perception is at least not sufficient for perception, given that a
genuinely perceptual experience also requires relating to an object in an appropriate way.
Alternatively, one could maintain that taking oneself to perceive p in the absence of p does
not in fact involve having much the same experience but in the absence of an appropriate
object. According to certain ‘disjunctivist’ approaches, the phenomenology of perception is
partly or wholly constituted by actual properties of mind-independent objects that perception
gives us access to. Hence, if one did not relate to an object in the required way, one could not
have the relevant experience.7 Nevertheless, this would not prohibit one’s being mistaken
about the kind of experience one is having. Such a scenario would involve (c) in the absence
of (a) or (b).
In what follows, I want to bracket, to set aside, all non-phenomenological concerns, in
order to focus exclusively upon the nature of (c). Even the disjunctivist can admit the
possibility of having the same sense of perceiving a table both when table p is present and
when table p is absent, so long as it is granted that other aspects of the experiences differ.
Both experiences incorporate the sense of encountering something in a way that differs from
imagining, remembering, and so forth. We can address the question of what this sense
consists of, and talk in a non-committal way of ‘perceptual experience’, while remaining
agnostic over what does and does not count as a genuine case of perception, and over whether
veridical experiences necessarily differ in character from non-veridical ones.
So I have nothing to say about the hypothetical case where one has an unproblematic
sense of encountering p as present even though p is not actually present. But I do want to
consider another kind of case. Here, one does not have an unwavering, although mistaken,
sense of being in intentional state x. Rather, there is an experienced lack of clarity over the
nature of one’s intentional state. Again, emotions provide us with a range of potential
5
examples. It is not uncommon for people to say ‘I don’t know how I feel about p’ or ‘I don’t
know what I’m feeling right now’. Sometimes, the apparent indeterminacy can be explained
away in terms of uncertainty over what one should feel in a given situation, rather than what
one does feel. In others, it may turn out to be a matter of language: the person struggles to
describe her feelings. Other cases may involve ambivalence: two or more conflicting
emotions are focused upon a common object. Nevertheless, it is plausible to maintain that
there are at least some instances where a person has an emotional experience but is unsure
what kind of emotional experience it is, whether she is in state x or state y with respect to p.
Have I stopped caring about p, or am I just really tired? Am I angry with p, or upset about
something else? Less common experiences of uncertainty regarding intentional state types
involve wondering, ‘am I dreaming this?’; ‘did that just happen?’ or ‘am I remembering
something that actually happened?’
If it makes sense to ask, ‘am I having an experience of a given type?’, then a
distinction can be drawn between having a type of experience and having the sense that one is
having a type of experience. I do not mean to suggest that the two can be neatly separated.
That would be unlikely. Indeed, on some accounts of perception, it would be impossible. For
instance, perception has been conceived of as an exploratory process that involves
appearances unfolding in a structured fashion, in accord with one’s movements and
associated expectations.8 One would not act in ways characteristic of a perceptual process
unless one took oneself to be perceiving, and how one acts shapes what one then experiences.
Hence, if a sense of perceiving were absent from the experience, that experience could not be
preserved intact. The point applies equally to other modalities of intentionality. So, for the
sake of argument, let us grant that the sense of having a certain type of experience is integral
to that experience, rather than separable from it. Thus, one could not have two identical
perceptual experiences, one associated with a sense of perceiving and the other with a sense
6
of imagining. Even so, there is more to the experience of a given type of intentional state than
having the sense that one is in a state of that type. So we can continue to address our
question, by asking what this specific aspect of the experience consists of. The answer, I will
now suggest, is non-obvious.
Perceiving Thoughts
On one account, my question has a very simple answer: types of experience are distinguished
from each other by their characteristic contents. Indeed, one could insist that experiences of
all kinds are ‘transparent’: in reflecting upon any given experience, the only thing that can be
discerned is its content. For instance, there is nothing more to an experience of seeing than
what is seen.9 On such a view, the sense of perceiving something, and doing so visually,
would amount to no more than the having of an experience with a certain, characteristic type
of content, one that is specific to visual perception and distinguishes it from, for instance,
visual imagination and non-visual perception. The same goes for all other modalities of
intentional experience: broad categories such as imagining, remembering, and thinking are
distinguished from each other by their characteristic contents. If that is right, then the
question, as I have set it up, is unnecessarily complicated. There is nothing more to an
experience of type x than its content, and there is nothing more to the sense of having an
experience of type x than a x-specific experiential content. So a ‘type of experience’ and the
‘sense of having an experience of that type’ are not, after all, distinguishable. Once we have
dealt with the former, there is nothing left to say about the latter. On such a view, one could
still accept the possibility of a case where content p, which is constitutive of a type x
experience, is associated with the mistaken judgment or belief that one is having a type y
experience, so long as the relevant cognition -whatever it consists of- is construed as wholly
7
distinct from the relevant perceptual phenomenology, including any ‘sense of perceiving’ that
might be integral to that phenomenology.
Perhaps this is one reason why my question is seldom formulated. But, as I will now
show, it is not a good reason. It should instead be acknowledged that perceptual experience is
much more complicated than some philosophers take it to be. Let us suppose that experiences
are exhausted by their contents. That being the case, it is difficult to specify what aspect of
the content is altered when a person complains that everything looks unreal or dream-like,
that a dream seemed especially real, or that a memory feels more like re-living an event in the
present than recalling something past. This is especially so in certain cases of non-localized
phenomenological changes. For instance, a person might report that everything she perceives
looks exactly as it did before and yet—at the same time—profoundly different, strange, and
unreal.10 So, if erosion of the sense that one is in an intentional state of type x is to be
accounted for in terms of x-specific contents, it should at least be acknowledged that the
relevant contents are elusive.
However, I propose that certain kinds of anomalous experience are more obviously
incompatible with a content-based approach. There can be a double dissociation between the
sense of being in intentional state x and one’s experiencing the characteristic content of x;
either can arise without the other. This is not to insist that experiential content can persist
undisturbed, in isolation from the sense that one is in a kind of intentional state. As I have
already acknowledged, it is unlikely that the two are neatly separable. But this admission is
compatible with the view that the sense of being in an intentional state of type x is not wholly
dictated by content. My position is as follows: one can have the sense of being in an
intentional state of type x (or at least an intentional state that more closely resembles x than it
does any other familiar state type of intentional state) while experiencing its content as more
akin to that of a type y intentional state. A strange, chimerical experience thus arises, one that
8
might be interpreted and described in a range of different ways. To illustrate this, I will offer
a detailed example: the phenomenon of thought insertion.
Thought insertion involves experiencing thoughts while at the same time not
experiencing them as one’s own.11 It is most often associated with schizophrenia, but is not
exclusive to that diagnosis. Philosophical descriptions of the phenomenon are generally
unclear over what exactly is experienced as inserted. On one interpretation, thought contents
are experienced as having arisen from elsewhere, from someone else’s act of thinking. On
another interpretation, the act of thinking is itself experienced, but both thinking and thought
content are attributed to another agency. Graham adopts the latter view: ‘In thought insertion,
thinking is experienced as an activity. However, although episodes of thinking are
experienced as occurring in oneself (as subject), the activity itself is experienced as if
conducted or engaged in by someone else (as the agent)’.12 But I think the content view is
more plausible. We can make a case for it by starting from the frequently noted affinity
between thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucination.13 On the misattributed-act-ofthinking view, the alleged similarity or even identity between the two is puzzling. While
auditory verbal hallucination (hereafter, AVH) is generally claimed to involve confusing
one’s own inner state (usually, one’s own ‘inner speech’) with externally directed perception,
and thus confusing one type of intentionality with another, thought insertion (hereafter, TI)
involves correctly identifying a type of intentional state but wrongly attributing a state of that
type to another person rather than oneself.
Now consider the content view. Suppose that the contents of our thoughts can be
distinguished, at least to some degree, from the acts of thinking in the context of which they
arise, in the way that seeing might be distinguished from what is seen, and an act of
imagining from what is imagined. The phenomenology of ‘thinking’ therefore needs to be
construed broadly, as encompassing more than just effortful, goal-directed thinking; TI is
9
equally distinguishable from random and sometimes incongruous thoughts popping into one’s
mind, songs that one can’t get out of one’s head, and a range of other seemingly involuntary,
effortless experiences of thought. On the content view, TI involves experiencing thought
content as present but also as originating from outside one’s psychological boundaries. In
other words, the experience differs from that of thinking, insofar as it incorporates something
that is specific to, and also integral to, the phenomenology of externally-directed perception:
a sense of encountering something distinct from oneself as present. Hence TI could just as
well be construed in terms of having a (not necessarily unproblematic, unambiguous) sense of
being in a perceptual state, but one with an uncharacteristic content. The connection between
TI and AVH thus becomes clear: both involve a perception-like experience of thought
content.
It might be objected that AVH is unlike thought insertion, as it is specifically auditory
in nature while inserted thoughts are not. However, AVHs are widely acknowledged to be
heterogeneous in numerous respects, including their auditory character.14 Some so-called
‘auditory’ hallucinations are not so obviously auditory in nature. This is clear from firstperson descriptions of AVHs that explicitly distinguish between two different kinds of
experience: auditory experiences, which are more often taken to originate in the external
environment, and perception-like experiences of thought content that more often seem to
originate within one’s bodily boundaries:
‘The voice inside my head sounds nothing like a real person talking to me, but rather
like another person’s thoughts in my head. The other voices are to me
indistinguishable from actual people talking in the same room as me.’ (#1)
‘I feel like I have other people’s thoughts in my head and also hear other people
having conversations outside my head.’(#3)
10
‘There are two kinds—one indistinguishable from actual voices or noises (I hear them
like physical noises, and only the point of origin (for voices) or checking with other
people who are present (for sounds) lets me know when they aren’t actually real. The
second is like hearing someone else’s voice in my head, generally saying something
that doesn’t “sound” like my own thoughts or interior monologue.’ (#17)15
Non-auditory cases can involve an equally pronounced sense of the relevant content as
something presently occurring and non-self-produced, even when the ‘voice’ is not
experienced as emanating from a source outside of one’s own body.16 So, although a simple
identification between AVH and TI is not plausible, it is, I think, plausible to maintain that
some reports of TI and some reports of AVH amount to different descriptions of the same
phenomenon: an anomalous, quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. This is perhaps
most clearly illustrated by first-person accounts that describe the same experience in terms of
both ‘voices’ and ‘inserted thoughts’, or blur the boundary between the two types of
description:
‘The voice inside my head sounds nothing like a real person talking to me, but rather
like another person’s thoughts in my head.’ (#1)
‘The voices inside my head are like thoughts, only they are not my own…’ (#2)
‘..there are things I “hear” that aren’t as much like truly hearing a voice or voices.
[….] Instead, these are more like telepathy or hearing without hearing exactly, but
knowing that content has been exchanged and feeling that happen.’ (#7)
‘…it definitely sounds like it is from inside my head. It’s at some kind of border
between thinking and hearing.’ (#18)
11
‘The voice is not strictly audible, does not turn my head toward a speaker, there is no
real speaker, just a thinker who can make their thought known to me. I hear but I
don’t hear with my ears.’ (#30)
‘The best way to describe it is telepathy, in different grades of vividness, from
bearable to intrusive.’ (#33)
Hence the same kind of anomalous experience can be described in terms of an
audition-like, perceptual experience with an unfamiliar content and/or a thought content that
is experienced in an odd, perception-like way. Of course, there is the risk of misinterpretation
here. This is inevitable when engaging with and seeking to make sense of first-person
testimonies, especially those relating to unusual and hard-to-describe experiences.
Nevertheless, all I need is a very weak claim: at least some of those experiences that are
described in terms of either TI and/or AVH involve experiencing something thought-like in
content, but in a perception-like way. If even that much is right, the simple view that we
identify the type of experience we are having solely in virtue of its characteristic content is to
be rejected. The sense of being in an intentional state that is similar to or indistinguishable
from one of type x can be associated with a content that either resembles or is
indistinguishable from that of a y-type intentional state, resulting in an intrinsically peculiar
experience.17 Where a content is more usually associated with y, it may well be altered to
some degree by the sense that one is in an intentional state of type x, rather than y.
Nevertheless, this sense of being in an x-type state does not fully constrain the content, which
can remain more y-like than x-like. So we can, after all, distinguish the sense of being in an
intentional state from a wider-ranging experience of being in an intentional state of that kind,
where the latter also includes characteristic content.18 By reflecting upon certain anomalous
experiences, such as TI, we can thus come to better appreciate that there is indeed a
12
phenomenological question to be addressed here, one that does not have an obvious answer.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will sketch what I think the right answer should look like.
Intentionality and Anticipation
How do we account for the sense of being in an intentional state of type x, despite
experiencing a y-like content? The answer, I propose, is that the experience of being in a
given intentional state with respect to p involves experiencing certain characteristic types of
possibility. To develop this response, I think it is also helpful to consider certain kinds of
‘hallucination’, which are described as like perceiving p and yet—at the same time—quite
different from perceiving p. For example, in his first-person account of mescaline-induced
hallucinations, the phenomenologist and psychiatrist J. H. van den Berg describes how, in
one sense, he saw and heard nothing in addition to what he would more usually have seen or
heard.19 But, even so, he really was hallucinating. It was, he says, ‘as if the hallucination
offered itself in the guise of perception so that it could be communicable’, adding that such
hallucinations have a kind of intentionality that ‘distinguishes them from perception and also
from imagination’. His account is consistent with a wider literature on delusions and
hallucinations, which draws attention to a kind of ‘double-bookkeeping’, whereby the patient
speaks and acts in ways that are—to some degree—consistent with believing or perceiving
that p but also speaks and acts in other ways that distinguish her attitude towards p from her
ordinary perceptions and beliefs.20
In my view, the most plausible way to make sense of such tensions involves appealing
to what Husserl calls the horizonal structure of experience.21 In brief, the claim is that our
experience of a given entity incorporates a sense of the characteristic possibilities that it
offers.22 For instance, my perceptual experience of a toothbrush includes the possibility of
picking it up and turning it around to reveal its hidden side, whereas my experience of a cloud
13
does not. Now suppose that one’s perception of an entity, such as a chair, were associated
with a horizonal structure more usually integral to the experience of a different entity or kind
of entity, such as a hungry tiger. In one sense, the content of the experience would be
unchanged. One would see a brown entity with four legs, a flat, horizontal surface, and a
vertical back. At the same time, one would have the ‘feeling’ of encountering something
different. The degree of tension becomes clearer if we extent Husserl’s account (in a way I
think is phenomenologically accurate) by maintaining that that the horizonal structure of an
entity includes not only prescriptions for manipulating it in order to further advance a
perceptual process, but also various kinds of significant, practical possibility. Thus, as one
encounters the chair, one does not see something for sitting on, but something that offers
threat, something to flee from, something menacing. It is debatable whether an anomalous
horizonal structure could be sufficiently specific to constitute the sense that what one faces is
a tiger. Perhaps some further imaginative/cognitive work is needed in order to arrive at such a
narrow interpretation. Nevertheless, one could at least get to the point of somehow
experiencing both a chair and, at the same time, feeling that one is faced with an animate,
predatory, unpredictable, and imminent threat. 23
Now, the difference between a mundane case of perceiving p and a horizonal
hallucination of p does not involve a sense of being in two different kinds of intentional state
with respect to p. Even in the hallucinatory case, one has the sense of being in a perceptual
state, or at least a state that is more like a perceptual experience than any other familiar kind
of experience. There are various possible scenarios to consider though. In the kind of case
just described, one experiences the possibilities associated with p, but when one encounters q.
One therefore has at least a partial sense of being in the presence of p, even though one can
still see q. Alternatively, one might experience the possibilities associated with p, but without
superimposing them on q. So, rather than seeing a chair as a tiger or somehow tiger-like, one
14
would have a sense of p as present, while at the same time experiencing the scene as devoid
of anything with the same physical properties as p. We can also distinguish between
hallucinatory experiences of types and tokens: whether one senses the possibilities associated
with a particular entity or agent, or those associated with a certain type of entity. Different
degrees and kinds of ‘horizonal hallucination’, which depend on the extent to which an
experience involves the full spectrum of possibilities associated with p, are also to be
distinguished. For instance, one might sense the presence of a particular person, but without
the inclusion of significant possibilities such as actually addressing her or turning round to
see her. Where the relevant horizonal structure is incomplete, the experience could take
various different forms, depending on which kinds of possibility are present and which
absent.24 However, in addition to all of this, there is another kind of case to consider: one
does not experiences the possibilities associated with entity p in the absence of p, or in
relation to q rather than p. Rather, in virtue of the possibilities that are associated with p, one
takes oneself to be in intentional state x towards p, rather than intentional state y.
But how should we conceive of these ‘experienced possibilities’? One option would
be to maintain that they are integral to entities as experienced and thus enrich experiential
content. So there is, after all, no more to the sense of having a given kind of experience than
its characteristic content. The problem is just that we have under-stated the scope of content
and failed to recognize the possibility of tension between two different types, or perhaps
‘aspects’, of content. It could be added that, when we set aside experiential content and seek
out a wholly separate experience of the possible, there is nothing to be found—experience
remains transparent. This way of thinking presupposes, from the outset, a separation between
intentional attitude and content. We first split them off from each other. Then we describe
experienced content. Then we set aside anything that is attributable to content, ask what is
left of the attitude, and don’t find anything. However, the ‘sense of the possible’ that I am
15
appealing to here does not respect an attitude/content distinction. As Husserl observes, the
possibilities we experience as integral to entities in the surrounding environment are at the
same time felt as bodily dispositions, as phenomenologically accessible movement tendencies
of various different kinds.25 When an entity says ‘turn me around to reveal my hidden side’;
we feel drawn towards it in a specific way. It is not that we experience the possibilities and
also the bodily dispositions; they are one and the same thing. The relevant dispositions are
not themselves objects of experience, at least not ordinarily. It is through certain bodily
dispositions that we experience possibilities as inherent in things.26 And my suggestion is that
characteristic configurations of possibility contribute not only to what one experiences but
also to the way in which one experiences it, the sense of what kind of intentional state one is
in.
To be more specific, different kinds of intentionality are associated with different
anticipatory profiles. Again, it is informative to draw upon Husserl, who, in Experience and
Judgment, maintains that all intentionality presupposes a more primitive sense of rootedness
in a world, something comprised—at least in part—of a distinctive style of anticipation. One
ordinarily anticipates things in the mode of habitual confidence or certainty, and they
generally unfold in line with one’s expectations, resulting in a largely coherent, dynamic
interplay between anticipation and fulfilment. This is not to suggest that we anticipate exactly
what we will see next or exactly what the immediate outcome of an action will be. Rather, we
have a variably determinate sense of what is coming next, which becomes progressively
clearer as it unfolds in line with anticipation. For example, ‘the other side of this cup will be
smooth and have one or another colour’ is consistent with then finding that ‘the other side of
this cup is smooth and red’. Husserl maintains that it is only in the context of a habitual,
practical, bodily sense of confidence or certainty that doubt and uncertainty become
intelligible. Only against a backdrop of more general confidence can something appear
16
potentially or actually anomalous—one might be uncertain over what it is, or harbour more
concrete doubts over whether it is p or q. In addition, having an explicit sense that ‘p is the
case’ involves the restoration of certainty, and its intelligibility therefore depends upon the
possibility of doubt. The same applies to negation, to any sense we might have that ‘p is not
the case’. Hence the modalities of belief (uncertainty, doubt, negation and affirmation), and
thus the attitude of belief itself, presuppose a certain kind of anticipatory profile, a sense of
confidence or certainty that is more primitive than any instance of believing that p.
I think it is right to maintain that the anticipatory structure of experience is essential to
its integrity. Nevertheless, the relevant structure should not be thought of in terms of a
singular, all-enveloping style of habitual, confident anticipation. Different kinds of
intentionality have different kinds of anticipation-fulfilment profile. Indeed, to experience a
characteristic type of anticipation-fulfilment profile is to have the sense of being in a certain
kind of intentional state. Hence anticipatory profiles contribute to both (a) the sense that one
is encountering a specific entity or type of entity and (b) the sense that one is experiencing
that entity in one rather than another way. So far as I know, very little has been written on the
anticipation-fulfilment profiles of different intentional states, and how they contribute to a
sense of being in one or another kind of intentional state. One exception, though, is Straus,
who maintains that some experiences, including certain hallucinations, ‘originate in the
medium of distorted modalities’.27 Different kinds of intentionality, he observes, have
different temporal structures. For instance, ‘In my recollection I can transport myself to past
decades; in waking sensory experience I can only advance from present to present into the
future’. When it comes to imagination, ‘I can cross the ocean in one leap; in sensory
experience there are no leaps’. Hence a principal difference between perceptual experience of
one’s surroundings and dreaming or imagining is that the former involves a distinctive, more
tightly structured pattern of anticipation and fulfilment: ‘waking experience has its own
17
peculiar order and precision. Every moment is directed to the following one in a meaningful
anticipation, and in the continuum of anticipation we grasp our wakefulness’. It is not
because one experiences oneself as perceiving or imagining that experience has a certain kind
of structure, involving the anticipation of some things and not others, as well as finding some
things and not others anomalous. Rather, these patterns are constitutive of one’s sense of
what intentional state one is in. Thus, as Straus indicates, disturbances in this aspect of
experience erode the experienced modalities of intentionality.
Thought Insertion and Anticipation
The approach I have outlined, although admittedly schematic, is consistent with the
phenomenology of TI (and the subset of AVHs that are equally describable in TI terms).
There is a general emphasis in the TI literature on lack of anticipation, construed
phenomenologically and/or in terms of non-conscious mechanisms.28 Shaun Gallagher
proposes a phenomenological account of TI, which draws upon Husserl and appeals to the
disruption of experience’s anticipatory structure.29 He takes, as a starting point, Husserl’s
account of the protentional-retentional structure of experience. In brief, experience of the
present is permeated by a variably determinate anticipation of what is about to happen,
something that usually involves a coherent pattern of anticipation and fulfilment. As one’s
anticipations are fulfilled, they continue to feature in one’s current experience but as ‘just
past’, as retentions.30 Gallagher maintains that TI involves a disturbance of protention.
Unruly emotions associated with certain thought contents disrupt anticipation, such that the
thoughts arrive unannounced, as if from elsewhere.
However, there is an alternative option. Rather, than adopting the view that
experience in general has a singular, uniform, anticipatory structure, we should take into
account the possibility that different kinds of intentional state have different anticipatory
18
profiles. Many people do anticipate the coming of their ‘voices’ or ‘inserted thoughts’: ‘I can
feel them coming on and find it hard to focus on what I’m doing’ (#18); ‘Sometimes, it’s like
a wave and then I hear them’ (#22). Furthermore, even if one does not initially anticipate
their coming, the relevant contents are often elaborate and thematically coherent. As one
starts to ‘hear’ an abusive ‘voice’ saying ‘you are a worthless piece of…’, one inevitably has
a clear sense of what is coming next, which is arguably just as confident and determinate as
one’s anticipation of thoughts that are not experienced as inserted.31 So it is not that one fails
to anticipate. Instead, I suggest, one anticipates in a way that more closely resembles the
structure of perceptual experience than that of thought. As Straus puts it, ‘The voices are
heard, they are acoustic phenomena, but they are also quite different enough to contrast with
all else that is audible. The mode of their reception is rather a being-affected, similar to
hearing’.32
What could this ‘being-affected’ consist of, such that it is ‘similar to hearing’ in some
respect? It is clear that hearing is not devoid of anticipation. Nevertheless, there may be
certain styles of anticipation involved in perceptual experience, which are not ordinarily
associated with the arrival of one’s own thought contents. One plausible candidate is anxious
anticipation. Think of how one might hear a noise in the night and then wait in silence,
anxiously anticipating further noises that might confirm the presence of an intruder. One
anticipates the relevant events in a distinctive, affectively charged way. It is not usual to
anticipate one’s own thought contents in this way. Granted, one might be anxious about a
potential or actual situation that one is thinking about. But it is the state of affairs one thinks
about that elicits the anxiety, rather than the ‘having of a thought about that state of affairs’.
However, consider a scenario, not uncommon, where the ‘voices’ hurl abuse and feed a
growing sense of inadequacy, shame, and/or guilt. In such as case, one might come to dread
the arrival of thoughts with contents such as ‘you are a failure’ or ‘everyone hates you’, while
19
sensing their coming. This, I propose, could constitute a quasi-perceptual experience of
thought content (at least in some cases; I concede that the relevant phenomena may turn out
to be quite diverse). One anticipates one’s thoughts in an affectively charged and atypical
way. This mode of anticipation is not essential to the sense that one is having a perceptual
experience. All the same, it is more typical of perception, and contributes to a sense of one’s
experience as perception-like rather than thought-like. Some first-person descriptions suggest
something along just these lines:
‘Due to the murmuring voice experiences being so distressing with each successive
occurrence however, I grew to dread ever more either whenever another experience
would appear to possibly be forthcoming or, once in the midst of an actual ongoing
experience, what would come next; waiting for the next shoe to drop.’ (#31)
‘It’s very difficult to describe the experience. Words seem to come into my mind from
another source than through my own conscious effort. I find myself straining
sometimes to make out the word or words, and my own anxiety about what I hear or
many have heard makes it a fearful experience. I seem pulled into the experience and
fear itself may shape some of the words I hear.’ (#32)
‘I have come to recognise the voices as expressions of anxiety, perhaps even a
recognition of a fear I have about myself that I am not prepared to entertain as being
part of my personality.’ (#34)33
The general approach may also apply to a range of other experiences. For instance,
elsewhere, I have proposed that something similar may occur in the case post-traumatic
‘flashbacks’, memories that are experienced as strangely perception-like, more akin to
reliving an event in the present than recalling something that occurred in the past.34 More
20
usually, memories are embedded in the context of a life, in relation to other relevant events
and also one’s current projects, commitments and concerns—where one is heading. One thus
anticipates the arrival of occurrent, episodic memories in certain, coherent ways. However,
traumatic events are sometimes not integrated into a coherent, purposive sense of one’s life.
So they are experienced as anomalous, as unlike other memories in their anticipationfulfilment profile.
Intentionality, Self, and World
In this chapter, I have sketched a phenomenological project: that of describing the various
modalities of intentionality and the interconnections between them in terms of their
distinctive anticipation-fulfilment profiles. Reflecting upon certain anomalous experiences
gives us some grounds for thinking that this is a promising approach to take, in addressing the
question of what it is to experience oneself as perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so
forth. It should be added that the anticipatory profiles of an intentional state type will also
include characteristic relations with other kinds of intentional state. Hence intentionality has a
singular, integrated structure, rather than consisting of however many circumscribed
anticipation-fulfilment structures existing in isolation from each other. I take this structure to
be inextricable from our most basic sense of self, from a sense of being a singular locus of
experience, occupying a place in space and time, distinct from other subjects and also from
its surroundings.35 What would experience be like if one could not distinguish perceiving
from imagining, remembering, anticipating, and various other kinds of intentional state?
Insofar as one failed to distinguish perceiving from imagining, one would lack any sense of
being spatially located, and an inability to discriminate between remembering and perceiving
would amount to a loss of temporal location. If one could not identify one’s own thinking as
21
distinct from one’s perception of others’ thought contents, the distinction between self and
other would be equally unsustainable. It is not clear what sense of self could remain.
Hence an account of the anticipation-fulfilment structure of intentionality turns out to
concern our sense of self, world, and the relationship between them. Its subject matter
ultimately coincides with what the phenomenological reduction seeks to make explicit: a
coherent sense of belonging to the world that we take for granted whenever we have an
unproblematic experience of perceiving that p, imagining that q, or remembering that r. A
comprehensive analysis of the sense of being in a given type of intentional state will equally
need to address the structure of temporal experience, the distinction between self and other,
and the phenomenology of the body, insofar as bodily experience relates to one’s sense of the
possible. These are all familiar topics for phenomenological enquiry, but what I have tried to
do here is sketch a distinctive route that we might take in seeking to address them, one that
starts from a beguilingly simple question.
Notes
1
I use the term ‘intentional state’ to refer to types and tokens of intentional directedness, such
as ‘perceiving’ and, more specifically, ‘perceiving that p’. The term ‘state’ has certain ‘static’
connotations, which I wish to avoid. As employed here, it is a philosophically non-committal
term of convenience. I could equally have used the term ‘attitude’. I similarly use the term
‘content’ in a non-committal way, where the content of an experience is synonymous with
what it is that one perceives, remembers, or imagines.
2
M. Ratcliffe, Experiences of Depression: a Study in Phenomenology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), pp. 21-3.
22
3
The proximity claim is questionable in some cases, depending on what the content of
perceptual experience is taken to consist of. If we can correctly be said to ‘hear something
exploding’, then we can perceive some things through audition that are a considerable
distance away. Similarly, if it is right to say that we can ‘see a star or galaxy’, rather than first
seeing something and then conceiving of it in those terms, vision is not a proximity sense
either. In the latter case, it can be added that what we perceive need not be present, given that
the light has taken millions of years to reach us. However, even if that were allowed, we
experience something as present, and it is this experience of perceptual presence that
concerns me here.
4
However, it is questionable whether our phenomenology is sensitive to more refined
distinctions, such as that between physical, metaphysical, and logical possibility.
5
Although I have phrased the question contrastively, the relevant achievement need not take
that form. It could be that I take myself to be perceiving, pure and simple. That I am ‘not
remembering’ is implied by this, rather than integral to it.
6
For more general scepticism concerning the reliability of what he calls ‘introspective’
access to our own mental states, see E. Schwitzgebel, ‘The Unreliability of Naïve
Introspection,’ Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 245-73.
7
For example, see M.G.F. Martin, ‘The Transparency of Experience,’ Mind & Language 17
(2002): 376-425. For a very good summary of the disjunctivist position, see also F.
Macpherson, ‘The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction’, in
Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, eds. F. Macpherson and D. Platchias (Cambridge
MA: MIT Press, 2013), pp.1-38.
8
For example, see E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J.S. Churchill and K.
Ameriks (London: Routledge, 1948/1973); Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to
a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer
23
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1952/1989); A. Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge MA: MIT Press,
2004); and Ratcliffe, Experiences of Depression.
9
See Martin, ‘The Transparency of Experience’; M. Tye, ‘Representationalism and the
Transparency of Experience,’ Noûs 36 (2002): 137-51.
10
See M. Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry, and the Sense of Reality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and ‘Delusional Atmosphere and the Sense of
Unreality’, in One Century of Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, eds. G. Stanghellini
and T. Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 229-44.
11
For example, see G.L. Stephens and G. Graham, When Self-consciousness Breaks: Alien
Voices and Inserted Thoughts (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000).
12
G. Graham, ‘Self-ascription: Thought Insertion,’ in The Philosophy of Psychiatry: a
Companion, ed. J. Radden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp 89-105, p. 96.
13
See C. Frith, The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia (Hove: Psychology Press,
1992); Stephens and Graham, When Self-consciousness Breaks.
14
See T.H. Nayani and A.S. David, ‘The Auditory Hallucination: a Phenomenological
Survey,’ Psychological Medicine 26 (1996): 177-89.
15
These testimonies, and others quoted in the chapter, were obtained via a 2013 questionnaire
study, which I conducted with several colleagues as part of the Wellcome Trust funded
project ‘Hearing the Voice’ (grant number WT098455). The study received ethical approval
from the Durham University Philosophy Department Research Committee. Study design was
closely based on earlier work addressing the phenomenology of depression (for details, see
Ratcliffe, Experiences of Depression).
16
As observed by Hoffman et al., identification of a ‘voice’ as non-self-produced ‘was more
important in differentiating voices from thought than either loudness or clarity of sound
images’. In other words, something can be experienced as just as alien from oneself, even if it
24
lacks some of the characteristics associated with veridical auditory perceptual content (R.E.
Hoffman, M. Varanko, J. Gilmore, and A.L. Mishara, ‘Experiential Features used by Patients
with Schizophrenia to differentiate “Voices” from Ordinary Verbal Thought,’ Psychological
Medicine 38 (2008): 1167-76, p. 1167.
17
For a more detailed defense of this view, see M. Ratcliffe and S. Wilkinson, ‘What is it to
Experience One’s Own Thoughts as Someone Else’s?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies
22/11-12 (2015): 246-269.
18
My interpretation of TI complements, in certain respects, an approach to delusions
suggested in G. Currie, ‘Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations,’ in Pathologies of Belief,
eds. M. Coltheart and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 167-82; and G. Currie and J.
Jureidini, ‘Delusion, Rationality, Empathy: Commentary on Davies et al.,’ Philosophy,
Psychiatry & Psychology 8 (2001): 159-62. Delusions, they suggest, are not beliefs but
imaginings that are mistaken for beliefs. One could similarly maintain that TI involves
confusing thinking with perceiving. Nevertheless, it also needs to be acknowledged that what
we have, phenomenologically, is an intrinsically strange experience, one that involves
features of x and y, rather than non-problematic sense of being in state y when one is actually
in state x. Currie and Jureidini later suggest that the distinctions between intentional state
types are non-categorical, thus allowing for in between cases (‘Narrative and Coherence,’
Mind & Language 19 (2004): 409-27). If this applies equally to the relevant phenomenology,
then it is more accurate, at least for the kinds of case I consider here.
19
J.H. van den Berg, ‘On Hallucinating: Critical-Historical Overview and Guidelines for
Further Study,’ in. Phenomenology and Psychiatry, eds. A.J.J. Koning and F.A. Jenner
(London: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 97-110, pp. 105-6.
20
See, for example, L.A. Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the
Schizophrenic Mind (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and L. Bortolotti and M.
25
Broome, ‘Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions,’
Emotion Review 12 (2012): 187-91.
21
Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy: Second Book.
22
For a detailed discussion of the horizonal structure of experience, see Ratcliffe,
Experiences of Depression, Chapter 2.
23
What I have suggested here complements, to some extent at least, Merleau-Ponty’s
remarks on hallucination in Phenomenology of Perception (Phenomenology of Perception,
trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge, 1945/1962), Part II, Chapter 3). Merleau-Ponty similarly
maintains that a bodily sense of the possibilities associated with entity p can arise in the
absence of p. For a detailed account of Merleau-Ponty on hallucination, see K. RomdenhRomluc, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Hallucination,’ European Journal of Philosophy 17
(2007): 76-90.
24
I do not wish to maintain that all of those experiences labelled ‘hallucinations’ take the
form of horizonal hallucinations. It is likely that there are other, very different kinds of
‘hallucination’, where one does experience something resembling p (in one or more
modalities) in a situation where p is absent. In conjunction with this, the usual horizonal
structure may be partly or wholly absent, resulting in an experience of p as somehow lacking.
For example, Sacks describes hallucinatory experiences that are clearly different from the
kinds of case I am concerned with here and much more like veridical perceptions (O. Sacks,
Hallucinations (London: Picador, 2012). Perhaps there are cases where the ‘hallucination’ is
completely indistinguishable from a veridical experience. However, although philosophers
routinely appeal to the in-principle possibility of these cases, I am doubtful of their
psychological reality.
25
Husserl, Experience and Judgment.
26
26
For a much more detailed discussion and defence of this point, see Ratcliffe, Experiences
of Depression, chapters 2 and 3.
27
E.W. Straus, ‘Aesthesiology and Hallucinations,’ in Existence, eds. R. May, E. Angel, and
H.F. Ellenberger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pp. 139-69, pp. 162-4.
28
See, for example, Frith, The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia; and J.
Campbell, ‘Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process,’ The
Monist 82 (1999): 609-25).
29
S. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
Chapter 8.
30
E. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917),
trans. J.B. Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
31
It may well be that some kind of non-conscious prediction or monitoring failure is
implicated here. However, insofar as there is still conscious anticipation, and insofar as
conscious processes are not entirely autonomous of brain processes, some kind of nonconscious prediction process must also remain in operation. Hence explanations that appeal
to failure of predictive processes need to be more specific about which processes fail and
which do not.
32
Straus, ‘Aesthesiology and Hallucinations,’ p. 166)
33
For a more detailed account of the relationship between verbal hallucination/thought
insertion and anxiety, see also M. Ratcliffe and S. Wilkinson, ‘How Anxiety Induces Verbal
Hallucinations’ Consciousness and Cognition (in press).
34
M. Ratcliffe, M. Ruddell, and B. Smith, ‘What is a Sense of Foreshortened Future? A
Phenomenological Study of Trauma, Trust and Time,’ Frontiers in Psychology 5 (Article
1026) (2014): 1-11.
35
This sense of self is, it has been argued, not an additional content of experience; rather it is
27
integral to the structure of experience, relating to the “distinct manner, or how, of
experiencing” (D Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 22). I am inclined to maintain that it simply is the
integrity of intentionality, the sense of different kinds of intentional state as interrelated but
distinct from each other (M. Ratcliffe, ‘Schizophrenia, Selfhood, and the Interpersonal
Regulation of Experience’ (forthcoming).
28