Managing peace in Malaysia: A case study

UKM Ethnic Studie s Pa p e r Se rie s No . 18, Ma y 2011, Institute o f Ethnic Studie s (KITA), Unive rsiti Ke b a ng sa an Ma la ysia (UKM), Ba ng i, Ma la ysia MANAGING PEACE IN MALAYSIA: A CASE STUDY By Shamsul A.B.1 and Anis Y. Yusoff 2 Background Malaysia is an independent nation state with a parliamentary constitutional monarchy and a federal government structure. It is located in the South East Asia region and be made up of thirteen states and three Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya). The thirteen states and three Federal Territories stretch across two major geographical areas separated by the South China Sea. The first is known as Peninsular Malaysia, physically part of the mainland of Southeast Asia, also known popularly as West Malaysia. The second, is located on the island of Borneo, and also referred to popularly as East Malaysia. Malaysia is considered a medium-size country in terms of area and of population as can be seen in Table 1 below. TABLE 1 COUNTRY Indonesia Vietnam Philippines Thailand Myanmar MALAYSIA Cambodia Lao PDR Singapore Brunei Darussalam AREA (‘000 KM) POPULATION (‘000) 1,904 222,611 325 82,481 300 81,408 513 63,763 677 50,101 330 25,493 181 14,482 231 5,787 1 4,261 5 366 (Source of Data: ESCAP, 2004) In 1970, per capita income levels were much higher in Malaysia (US$387) than in countries such as Indonesia, China, and India (all below US$115), the Philippines (US$183), or Thailand (US$196). It is important for this to be kept in mind, because one factor to be considered in assessing the relevance to other countries of Malaysia’s ranking in the Global Peace Index today is whether its wealth distribution since 1970 in the country has contributed to its stability. Shamsul A.B. is Distinguished Professor and Founder Director of the Institute of Ethnic Studies, the National University of Malaysia. <www.kita.ukm.my> Anis Y. Yusoff is Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnic Studies, the National University of Malaysia. 1 Basic History The evolution of Malaysia is best captured in a three-stage historical-structural analytical scheme, namely, pre-colonial (before 16th century), colonial (16thmid-20thcentury) and post-colonial (after 1957). Even though socio-politically Malaysia is characterized by a seemingly continuous system of governance called kerajaan (raja/royalty-centred polity, or often translated simply as ‘kingdom’), the sociological underpinnings of the kerajaan during each of the three eras are rather different. During the pre-colonial era, which is before the invention of the modern state, Malaysia was non-existent. What existed was the ‘Malay world’, physically consisting of the Malay-speaking archipelago, that was made up of numerous small feudal polities, or kerajaan. A few was located in Mainland Southeast Asia, in countries known today as Burma, Thailand and Cambodia, but mostly in Island Southeast Asia, where Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and The Philippines are today. Each kerajaan was run by a Raja with the governance system based on the non-separation of ‘church and state,’ whether they were indigenous, Hindu or/and Buddhist kingdoms. It was during this period, in the 13th century, that Islam came to the Malay world, hence Malaysia. The onset of the European imperial-colonial era in the Malay world began in the 16th century, after the discovery of the New World and the major improvement of the navigational and ship-making technologies in the Iberian peninsula. The European imperial/colonial actors came one after another over 500 years, from 16th to 20th century, led by Portuguese (16th century), Spanish (16th century), Dutch (17th century), British (early 19th century), French (late 19th century), and the USA (late 19th century). This era was shaped by what happened in Europe. Before the church and the state were separated the imperial powers of Europe ruled from afar in Europe. But afterwards the two revolutions in Europe shaped the way European established their presence around the world including in the Malay archipelago. First, there was the Industrial Revolution, which began in Great Britain in the 1750s. Second, it was followed by the bloody French Revolution a century later, in July 1848. The former made it imperative for the Europeans to colonise the resource-rich Malay archipelago. The latter, consolidated the separation of the church from the state in Europe and subsequently became the model how they ruled the region. The ‘new’ kerajaan in the Malay archipelago in the colonial era experienced the separation of the church (read religion/Islam) and the state. The term kerajaan remained but the content divided and separated, namely, religion in the hands of the Sultans and the state under the control of the Europeans. It was during this era, Malaysia was shaped in politically, economically, socially and in way religion became the ethnic markers. The colonial era is often called the ‘divide-and-rule-era.’ The historical-structural characteristics of the modern state that Malaysia is today, still known as kerajaan, was invented during the colonial era. 2 The society, market and kerajaan of Malaysia in the post-colonial era remains modeled on the British colonial one. Modifications have been made to the model, especially with the introduction democracy, mainly through the modern electoral system that has been implemented successfully until today, the structure remains similar to that of adopted during the British colonial period. It could be argued that, some elements that could be identified today as structures of peace have already been adopted or established in late colonial British Malaya, from 1945 until 1957, the defining decade of Malaysia’s future. It is in this context Malaysia’s inter-ethnic negotiated existence have survived, in spite of being severely tested in the 1950s, in May 1969, and in March 2001. Not even the big defeat of the ruling party, that is, the National Front, in the March 2008 General Election has been able to bring about of Malaysia’s demise as a country, written off by the many prophet of dooms as ‘a failed state.’ On the contrary, the structures of peace have been consolidated and strengthened further within a positive situation of social cohesion. The history of Malaysia could be said as one which is built not only from conflicts and contestations but mostly from negotiations, compromises, consensus and cohesion. In short, it is a history characterized by a continuous tireless peace-making effort and, indeed, a huge amount of energy, visible and abstract have been invested by Malaysians from all walks of life in ensuring that social sustainability in the country persists. Summary of ethnic diversity and demographics Malaysia’s population rises from 10.4 million in 1970 to 22.1 million in 2000. In the most recent national census (2010) it was reported that the figure has increased to 27.6 million and close to 30 million if non citizens are included. However if one were to look at the average annual population growth rates, one will see the rates were declining from decade to decade, though again if non citizens are included in the figures, the deceleration of population growth becomes apparent in the 1990s. The average annual population growth rate (2000-2010) is at 2.17%.3 Population growth rates for the main ethnic groups have been substantially different over the entire period since 1970. The main ethnic groups are Bumiputera (includes Malay, Orang Asli (the Aboriginal people) and the native communities in Sabah and Sarawak), Chinese and Indian. The growth rate of the Bumiputera population has more than doubled that of the Chinese over the period of 1980-2010. The Bumiputera share of Malaysia's population has steadily increased from 56 percent in 1970 to 66.1 percent in 2010. Over the corresponding period, the Chinese and Indian shares fell respectively from 34 percent and 9 percent to 25 percent and 7.5 percent. Almost 80% of the total population is located in Peninsular Malaysia and just under 10% each in Sabah and Sarawak. http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/ 3 For a long time, the major ethnic groups not only lived in particular geophysical areas from the others but also dominate particular economic activity, for example, Malays dominated the rural peasantry, Chinese urban commercial activities, and majority of Indians, who are Tamils, worked in the plantation. After the 1969 ethnic riot and the subsequent introduction of the NEP, there was a conscious abstract and practical effort to break down these ethnic barriers to allow them to converge as Malaysians both in physical and non-physical spaces. The Department of National Unity, established in 1970, was given the critical; role of consciously fostering unity and integration, adopting the top-down approach, among the various ethnic groups with the ambition of creating that elusive national identity called ‘Malaysian.’ The Department implemented successfully a host of policies, from educational to neighbourhood watch campaigns, involving cooperation and participation of all ethnic groups. These activities have come to be deeply embedded in the society so much so that they have been perceived by many Malaysians as something ‘natural’ or ‘given.’ Bottom-up, Malaysians at the grassroots have existed in what could be termed as ‘negotiated existence’ in which formal community-based organizations (CBOs) within each ethnic groups as well as between ethnic groups have played major role in providing the social and cultural bridges to sort out differences in opinions over many apparently mundane matters. More importantly, the CBOs have also played the ‘social welfare’ role especially on matters related to education, health and also employment. Ethnic-based political party organizations, especially at the branches at the grassroots, have also played important role in complementing the CBOs’ efforts in playing the role of interlocutors between ethnic groups over contested matters related to, for example, whether a Hindu temple could be built in a Muslim majority area or an aboriginal group could be relocated to another place with full compensation. Another important and critical macro-institutional framework that helps resolve many of the cultural and linguistic differences has been the plural legal system. The civil court, Islamic court and the Native court co-exists and function simultaneously to resolve not legal matters but also cultural and religious ones in the last 100 years or so. Although the Islamic court and the Native court function to serve Muslims (native and non-native) and natives (Muslim and non-Muslims) in certain selected matters, the fact that these matters include religious, customs and traditional cultural practices is indeed providing a significant avenue to resolve differences in those matters. Structures of Peace Malaysia has been very fortunate that since 1970, it has achieved a number of its development objectives. These achievements and the positive position Malaysia now occupies in economic, social and peace development owe a great deal to a centralized planning approach adopted since 1950, especially, 4 with the ground breaking policies and strategies that were envisaged in the Outline Perspective Plans (1971-1990) and systematically implemented through Malaysia’s national five-year plans. In 1970, Malaysia’s future stability and economic growth were by no means certain. The country at that time had just recovered from an open ethnic conflict which will be explained in detailed in the next section. However, Malaysia’s advantages could be acknowledged in terms of its per capita income and physical and administrative structure. Clearly, the process of development could not be implemented by administrative measures alone, as each ethnic, religious and social group comprising Malaysian society needed to have a stake in the outcomes as well. It was in recognition of these major challenges that the New Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated and launched in 1971. It has been argued that the NEP became the driving force of the structures of peace for Malaysia since then, admittedly, it has undergone, in the last 40 years, a metamorphosis of sorts due to economic and political circumstances generated internal and external to Malaysia. The two preliminary aims of the NEP were, firstly, to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities among all Malaysians, irrespective of race; and, secondly, to restructure Malaysian society to correct economic imbalances, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. The National Development Policy adopted for the following ten years (19912000), maintained the basic strategies of the NEP but introduced several significant shifts in specific policies to eradicate hard-core poverty; increase the participation of Bumiputera in the modern sectors of the economy; place greater reliance on the private sector to generate economic growth and income; and emphasize human resource development as a primary instrument for achieving the objectives of growth and distribution. Many of the essentials elements of the structures of peace can be identified in these earlier policies. Malaysia’s future stability and economic growth were by no means assured, but its development strategy was continuously under intensive review, with the intention of ensuring that growth with equity, particularly equity between ethnic groups, would be achieved. History of Conflict: Malaysia a country in the state of ‘stable tension’ It was some 42 years ago, on May 13 of 1969, that an open and bloody ethnic conflict broke out in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. Ethnic violence also occurred in a few other locations but away from Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia at that time was a plural society created by British colonial economic policies, with a population of 56 percent Bumiputera as the majority group, 34 percent Chinese Malaysian, 9 percent Indian Malaysian and one percent Others. The ethnic diversity is significantly complicated by other form of diversities, namely, cultural, religious, regional, political orientation and economic activity. 5 Although the conflict was localized and successfully contained, the aftermath was felt throughout the country. It was the severest test of ethnic relations in post-Independence Malaysia. It became a watershed event in the political and sociological analyses of Malaysian society, and in the consciousness of individual Malaysians, because it was so traumatic. It conscientized people and most importantly, it redefined the perceptions of ethnic relations in the country and changed their dynamics. Ordinary Malaysians were rudely awakened to the fact that the ethnic harmony that they had enjoyed since independence could not be taken for granted anymore. The government was quick to mobilize all its resources to find immediate remedies and long-term solutions, both economic and political ones. The government declared a national Emergency in 1969, and democracy was suspended. A National Consultative Council was set up to seek solutions palatable to all the ethnic groups, especially the Malays. It was in these circumstances that the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced, in 1971, to address, in short and long-term, the intra and interethnic socio-economic differences resulting from the complex diversities in the country – ethnic, cultural, religious, regional, political orientation and economic activity. The Rukunegara (National Charter) was created as an ideology to be embraced by Malaysians from all walks of life. A Department of National Unity was established as a bureaucratic instrument to keep watch over the state of ethnic relations in Malaysia. Malaysia had since been in a country in the state of ‘stable tension,’ which means that the people have been living in a society dominated by many contradictions but have managed to solve most of them through a continuous process of consensus-seeking negotiations, sometimes the process itself became a solution. The downside of the on-going negotiation between ethnic interest groups in Malaysia is that the potentially negative and divisive ethnic fault lines, based on very significant differences in religion, language, dress and diet, have become highlighted more so than ever before. To the prophets of doom, notably foreign journalists, Malaysia has been perceived as a society facing an imminent danger of breaking down for the slightest of reasons. In general, Malaysians themselves remain more optimistic and believe that they have learnt the bitter lesson that nobody gains from an open ethnic conflict manifesting in violence. But they remain sociologically vigilant and chose consensus and cohesion, not conflict, as the path for the future. Nevertheless, they also realize that sweeping things under the carpet was not the solution. Indeed, they have become acutely aware that contestation between the different ethnic groups will not simply disappear and cannot be ignored. 6 So, instead of choosing street violence as a solution to settle their differences, they decided that the only rational and reasonable avenue left for them was in the realm of public discourse. Nonetheless, sometimes, Malaysians do at times engage themselves in peaceful street demonstrations. Whenever the authorities felt that the public discourse on ethnic differences, especially at times in the form of street demonstrations, was slowly getting out-of-hand they were swift to dampen the tinder before it broke into a fire. As a result, the public discourse on ethnic differences amongst Malaysians since 2007-burst of public demonstrations has become highly sensible and has been handled with great sensitivity. The discourse thus far has been a healthy one, whether it is through traditional mass media platform or through the channels of the more recent electronic media, such as the internet, blogs, sms and other social media, such as Facebook, Tweeter etc. Malaysians prefer ‘tongue wagging not parang (machete) wielding’ Generally, discussion on the state of ethnic relations in Malaysia, whether in the open or in private, has been a reasoned and rational one, although it can become heated at times. But in the aftermath of May 1969, Malaysians have clearly stated that they prefer “tongue wagging not parang (machete) wielding.” This simply means that they prefer to talk instead of resorting to violence. We hereby present two instances for our reflection. Instance 1 In 2006, a public discourse on ethnic relations in Malaysia was triggered by comments made in a local newspaper by Professor Khoo Kay Kim (The New Sunday Times, 19 February 2006), a well-known and respected historian, indeed acclaimed as one of the architects of the Rukunegara (National Charter). He was concerned about the “worrying state” of the relationship between ethnic groups in Malaysia. His remarks drew equally important and healthy reactions from a broad spectrum of the concerned public, in the printed and electronic media. Professor Khoo expressed concerned that ethnic unity in Malaysia was still in a ‘fragile state.’ He suggested that one of the possible solutions would be to teach cultural history. Some agreed and others disagreed with him. It is useful to point out that the main concern of Professor Khoo was a legitimate one, indeed one often expressed by Malaysians from all walks of life. They feel that ethnic relations in Malaysia seemed to be continuously in a “worrying and fragile state.” They also argue that the situation has become so because there have been numerous misunderstandings and incidents of miscommunication between the different ethnic groups. This situation arises from the fact that they know so little about one another beyond the prejudices and stereotypes that they learnt from bedtime stories and the rumour mongering ‘tradition’ at the family and grassroots level in Malaysia. 7 It is not uncommon for young Malaysians to grow up and survive until adolescence cocooned in their specific ethnic socio-cultural environment, be it Malay, Chinese or Indian. This happens partly because of the barriers created by significantly different languages and religious traditions, partly because different ethnic groups live in segregated physical locations, and partly as a result of the institutionalization of the vernacular school system, where one is most likely to attend a school where one’s own mother tongue is a primary focus of the curriculum. The overall end result of all these is the thickening of the barriers creating ethnic insulation and segregation at the individual personal level. The ‘vernacularization,’ at the macro-national level, of Malaysia’s modern electoral politics, namely, in the form of ethnic-based political parties which survives on ‘ethnic support and loyalties’, further shaped the making of an insulated, segregated and ethnicised individual Malaysians who are only at home in their own ‘vernacular’ social collectives. In other words, Malaysians are usually united or homogenized within their respective ‘ethnic psychic’ realms within everyday-life. However, at the official macro-national level, they do sometimes symbolically express a form of shared viewpoints and unity as Malaysians, but this is mostly a ‘situational’ rather than lasting phenomenon. The continuous swinging of the identity pendulum between a ‘situational’ and ‘official’ ethnic positions experienced thus far by Malaysians, both as individuals and social collectives, has generated the perception amongst Malaysians themselves, as expressed by Prof. Khoo, that ethnic relations in Malaysia are in a “worrying and fragile state.” Professor Khoo then suggested that as one of the possible solutions to stop this worry and make Malaysia less fragile is to teach cultural history. The moot question here is that in the vernacular education system that Malaysia has had for more than a century now, and which is still functioning well, would the ‘cultural history’ proposed be a ‘vernacularised’ and ethnicallyspecific version or a ‘homogenised’ national one? Professor Khoo Kay Kim’s contribution would have been enhanced if he had analysed the limited success in the history of the mainstream national school system that uses the national language, Bahasa Malaysia, as its medium of instruction and how the vernacular schools which use Mandarin, Tamil and a few other languages have thrived. In other words, we would argue that there has been an active process promoting the reproduction of ethnic differences and the polarization of ethnic groups in Malaysia through the presence of vernacular schools, partly funded by the government. The public schools in the mainstream education system, which uses Bahasa Malaysia, the official national language as their medium of instruction becomes the ‘educational canopy’ over the whole system. However, only about 70% of school-going children are enrolled in these. It is an irony that at the basic primary level of the education system Malaysia continues to reproduce ethnic differences, and yet at the higher levels, the efforts at integration are earnestly pursued, albeit an incomplete one. We 8 would argue that this is one of the central factors that has been generating Malaysia’s state of stable tension, or as Prof. Khoo’s words suggest, a “worrying and fragile state of “ethnic relations” in Malaysia. The vernacular education system provides the language and idiom of opposition whether in official or daily contexts, and is the perfect breeding ground for different ethnic viewpoints and embedded interests. In contrast to this, the national language based mainstream education is still the most important ‘trans-ethnic canopy,’ providing the over-arching structure which holds the society together, along with the federalist form of governance and the capitalist market forces. Instance 2 The debate on ethnic unity became more active and widespread after the Malaysian 12th General Elections held on the 8th March 2008, which resulted in the coalition of opposition parties gaining a strong foothold of representation and the ruling National Front coalition losing its two-third majority in the Malaysian parliament. Matters considered taboo and sensitive previously, such as on the issue of corruption in the public service, nepotism in the awarding of huge lucrative public construction projects, and the not-so-transparent quality of government agencies were discussed and debated openly, not surprisingly in a highly critical manner. But underlining all the debates is the fact that the issues were all “ethnicised” in one way or another, meaning that each was discussed within the context of a particular ethnic group’s agenda or viewpoint. The most obvious example is when Malaysians discussed matters relating to the distribution of economic wealth in the country. When the violent ethnic riots occurred in Kuala Lumpur on May 13 1969, after the 3rd General Elections of May 10, 1969, there was widespread concern that violence would characterize future of ethnic relations in Malaysia. The multi-ethnic National Consultative Council set up in 1970, as a reaction to this incident, decided that the root of the problem was the economic backwardness of the indigenous groups, or bumiputera as they are known, the majority of whom were Malay Muslims. Their brainchild, the New Economic Policy (NEP), was introduced in 1971. It was to run for 20 years, until 1990. It had two main objectives: first, the eradication of poverty in Malaysia irrespective of the race or ethnicity of the poor; second, the restructuring of Malaysia society, so that occupation were no longer associated with particular ethnic groups – Malays with the rural and largely subsistence peasant economy, the Chinese Malaysian with urban based entrepreneurial activity and wealth, and the Indian Malaysians with underprivileged rural plantation labour. The over-arching long-term aim of the NEP was to create national unity through top-down economic-oriented public policy instruments of the NEP to effect a more equitable distribution of the country’s wealth among the different ethnic groups. The single most highlighted aspect of the NEP has been about the creation of wealth ownership for the economically backward indigenous Malay peasantry 9 who made up 56 per cent of the population at the time but who owned only two per cent of the national wealth. A target was set for them to achieve 30 per cent ownership of the national economic wealth in 20 years. When the 20year period was over, only 20 per cent of the equity share had been achieved by the Malays, according to the government. But recently, a group of researchers argued that the target had in fact been achieved. So, the debate goes on about the NEP until today especially concerning its success or failure. The main criticism has been that the distribution of the NEP’s wealth among the indigenous people resulting from the NEP has been uneven, and indeed the internal disparity in income within the indigenous group had increased. The distribution process has been said to have been dominated by almost uncontrolled corrupt practices. On the positive side, a number of studies have shown that the size of the indigenous middle class expanded significantly in the short period of 20 years. But the biggest public complaints concerning the outcomes of the NEP so far have come from the Indian Malaysian community, who on November 25 2007 launched a massive street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur. This was organized by HINDRAF (Hindu Rights Action Force), led by a group of disgruntled Indian middle-class professionals, mainly lawyers. What began as an intra-ethnic class struggle has now become a national inter-ethnic one, with the indigenous-Malay dominated government as the target. The issues that were raised by the group were not only economic ones but also religious, educational and a host of others. The present government is doing its level best to address the demands of the Indians in an amicable and peaceful way. One significant effect of these discussions and protests on Malaysian society as a whole is that Malaysians have realized that they have been able to deal with them in a more matured manner than ever before. This was demonstrated during the recent 2008 General Elections. In spite of the large victory obtained by the opposition coalition, unlike in the case of the 1969 General Election, there was no outcome of ethnic rioting or violence. Everyone was cool and composed, the winners and losers accepted what happened in a reasoned and rational manner, demonstrating the contemporary Malaysian attitude that “tongue wagging and not parang waving” is the preferred choice. In short, every Malaysian is a winner. Maintaining a middle ground Everybody knows that Malaysia has many ethnic groups of various cultural backgrounds but Malaysians are always striving to survive in one peaceful nation. This is the most striking and positive feature of Malaysian society in the last 40 years or so. It is very clear that in Malaysia, violence is not an option. Malaysians will no doubt continue in the future to discuss openly or in private about matters concerning their personal ethnic woes, intra- and inter-ethnic difficulties, in the search for a middle ground in order to safeguard their lifestyles and allow them to continue to enjoy the quality of life the country is blessed with. 10 We must accept the fact that we do need to conduct continuous public discourse such as the above-mentioned three instances, to remind us that we are living in a state of ‘stable tension,’ and therefore have to work very hard to maintain peace and stability in the country. However important, famous and charismatic a Malaysian, a leader or public figure is, his or her personal interest is never above the interest of the rakyat, the people. We, therefore, have to work very hard to make harmonious ethnic relations prevail, not only in the abstract realm of social theory but also in the practical sense, in the midst of daily life. Like citizens in many other countries that have embarked on the modernization project, Malaysians have to remind themselves of the fact that there are two major components in such an endeavour, namely, economic and political factors. Finding and maintaining a balance between them is the both a necessity and also the greatest challenge. To measure the success of the economic component is relatively easy. Growth figures help us to ascertain where we are heading in our industrialization push. GNP figures and the poverty line indicate the economic spread, even or uneven. The thriving shopping malls demonstrate the healthy expansion of our middle class and our love for the globalised consumerist lifestyle. However, to achieve the political target of nation-building, by realizing national integration, to be conducted through the implementation of various national policies -- in the fields of education, language and culture -- is not an easy task. In fact, the exercise of nation-building, on the whole, is a nebulous one. The measurement of its success is equally an imprecise one. However, we hope to establish in the near future set of ‘national integration indicators’ or ‘unity index’ in Malaysia. In 1991, our former Prime Minister, Tun Mahathir Mohamed, outlined the nine challenges in creating a united Malaysian nation, or Bangsa Malaysia, in his famous ‘Vision 2020’ statement. With this, he clearly implies that we are still building the nation, we will to work hard to achieve it. He hopes it could be accomplished by the year 2020. When proposing his Vision 2020, he must have realized that we are still saddled with a number of historical-structural impediments in the nationbuilding process, be they in the education, socio-cultural and economic spheres as well as Malaysia’s modern electoral system. Perhaps the only useful method for measuring our success in nation-building, obviously complemented by our economic achievements, is to compare our overall performance with that of other multi-ethnic countries which were once considered to be success stories, such as Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. That we have been perceived as a model of success by the developing countries, sufficient for them to have confidence in selecting to play the leading role as the Chair for NAM (Non-Aligned Movement which has 118 11 member countries), OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference which has 57 member countries) and ASEAN (Association Southeast Asian Nations which has 10 member countries), speaks volumes for our achievement. Therefore, the state of ethnic relations in Malaysia cannot be evaluated solely based on subjective personal evaluations of the phenomenological kind by a few Malaysians, however famous and serious they are. We appreciate their concerns. We value their reminders. But we have to reject their rather simplistic and skin-deep comments. It is important to remember that “unity is not uniformity.” Total unity and absolute integration are but utopias. Crying for their absence could mislead others and would generate alienating, indeed, violent anomic consequences that must be avoid at all cost. We have to live with our differences. Indeed, we have been doing so for decades, even if the situation is not completely perfect. We are proud as Malaysians that we have done much better than other countries with similar multi-ethnic societies. A need for an early warning system of Ethnic Relations (KITA MESRA™) The Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA) at the National University of Malaysia is in the midst of developing a Monitoring System of Ethnic Relations (KITAMESRA). This project provides an early warning system on the ‘health’ level of ethnic relations in Malaysia. Prevailing monitoring projects on ethnic relations in the country tend to focus on the negative aspects of these relations such as ethnic-related grievances and the number of ethnic group conflicts taking place. This project uses a positive indicator based on good governance and quality of life indices as a way to understand the level or quality of ethnic relations in Malaysia. One would not deny the importance of sensitivity in a multi-ethnic society. Often it is not the failure to manage ethnic sensitivity that causes conflict, but it is the disregard to ensure justice, equality and inclusiveness of all citizens irrespective of race, religion and socio-economic status. Thus in this monitoring project, the ability to understand the intersection of ethnicity and the quality of life index would be used as the basis to determine the health of ethnic relations or the level of social cohesion already enjoyed in the country. Twenty parliamentary constituencies have been identified for the pilot project. Field work in five Parliamentary Constituencies have been completed and the project is continuing in 15 other places. The completed field work in the five Parliamentary constituencies, namely Tasek Gelugor in Penang, Serdang and Kota Raja in Selangor, Temerloh in Pahang and Sri Aman in Sarawak, have been analysed. The initial findings indicate that ethnic relations is fairly good. Each ethnic individual has a positive perception of the other ethnic groups and their concern, irrespective of ethnic differences, are related to crime, quality of services by the local authority and the issue of inadequate household income. 12 Paradoxically, such good ethnic relation patterns of findings are in contrast to the political discourse and media reporting being thrown onto the citizens. A system like KITA-MESRA becomes more crucial in a country like Malaysia, especially when the present government is putting all efforts to strengthen national unity and integration under the 1Malaysia programme. Lessons learnt However, to maintain ethnic harmony at any cost is not an easy task. To ignore this is to invite unfathomable difficulties and dire consequences, such as we have witnessed in the black events of May 13 1969. Perhaps it is against such a background that the government has recently made the effort to introduce “Ethnic Relations” as a subject to be offered to our students at institutions of higher learning. This program may not create national integration and ethnic unity overnight but it is a starting point that we all need to have access to, not only in relation to our cultural history, as suggested by Professor Khoo Kay Kim, but concerning matters much more far reaching, such as economic equality and equity, and building a strong democratic tradition. Malaysia will remain one of the few nations in the world today, whose experience and track record in dealing with many ethnicities and many cultures is a useful one. It is not a perfect one. It is not easily replicated but it is a useful for other states to study closely and perhaps gaining some useful insights from it. We wish to end this case study on Malaysia with a quotation from Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize Winner for Economics in 2001, about Malaysia and how it had handled the massive Asian economic crises of 1997-1998 that, if not managed sensitively and successfully, could have led to grave and violent consequences for the state of stable tension in Malaysia’s ethnic relations. He said: “I had the opportunity to talk to Malaysia’s prime minister after the riots in Indonesia. His country has also experienced ethnic riots in the past. Malaysia has done a lot to prevent their recurrence, including putting in a program to promote employment for ethnic Malays. Mahathir knew that all gains in building a multiracial society could be lost, had he let the IMF dictate its policies to him and his country and then riots had broken out. For him, preventing a severe recession was not just a matter of economics, it was a matter of the survival of the nation.” [Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization & its Discontents, 2002, p.120] The good management and balance of economic growth and distribution is necessary to any nation, but more so it seems in a multi-ethnic society. But the case of Malaysia proves the fact that economic development and prosperity alone is not sufficient to maintain political stability. We have to turn 13 to the realm of non-economic factors in the end. In this context, the message is very clear. In dealing with the non-economic factors there is a huge contribution made by knowledge generated within the social sciences and humanities. Sadly, these are usually neglected in developing economies like Malaysia because we are often overwhelmed by the pursuit of science and technology to bring about much needed economic development and prosperity. This neglect has to be urgently addressed. Conclusion The above narrative and analysis has woven and embed the structures of peace in Malaysia into a complex whole which is meant to capture the actively evolving dynamics of the social, political, economic, and cultural processes involved in maintaining an overall social sustainability in Malaysia. The New Economic Policy (1971-1990) is identified as the single most important element in the structures of peace in Malaysia. Indeed, it is economic, political, social and cultural all at once. The underpinning concept of NEP is based on the spirit of and a number of relevant provisions found in the negotiated Federal Constitution, symbolically also known as a ‘social contract’, namely, between the different ethnic groups in Malaysia. This concept informs the orientation of the subsequent five-year development plans after the NEP ended, that is, from 1991 onwards until at present. In short, for the last 40 years, the NEP, and its variants, has been then central structural pillar of peace in Malaysia. In spite of its success, the NEP has been contested, even riled, by various interest and ethnic groups and a collection of persistent prophet of dooms, whose understanding of peace seems to be informed by rather a nonpeaceful framework as a solution. The World Bank, IMF, developed countries and Nobel Prize winning economists have endorsed the NEP and its successful socio-economic transformation impact. It even passed the stringent test imposed by the 1997-98 Asian economic crises which Malaysia handled very well without the predicted ethnic unrest. The NEP therefore, both in peaceful and economic troubled times, has become the major conduit through which an equitable distribution of resources amongst the different ethnic groups has been done. It is not only to the benefit of one particular ethnic group, namely, the bumiputera (lit. sons of soil), as many critics have suggested, it is also for other ethnic groups, in particular the Chinese who are already controlling a major share of the country’s wealth. The private sector, with participants who are local and foreigners, enjoys an excellent business environment and attracted huge foreign investments. In fact foreign investors could easily repatriate their profits and with their property rights secured and protected. In terms of governance, Malaysia has a well-functioning government that continues to conduct fair and peaceful general elections in the last 40 years 14 even with results not necessarily in favour of the ruling party. Indeed, opposition parties have been controlling some of the state/provincial legislative assemblies. The General Elections in 2008 demonstrated that in spite of losing its two-third majority control of the federal parliamentary seats, the supporters of the ruling party remained calm and the public was mature enough to accept the decision without creating any dissension. Corruption is still a major issue in Malaysia. However, it has been openly admitted by the government that is so and successfully established institutional structures to address and solve the problem in the short- and long-term. With the passing of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Act 2009 on January 1st 2009, the MACC is now an independent Commission with several structural changes and added prosecutorial powers to further enhance its capability and effectiveness to make Malaysia corrupt free. In addition to this, MACC has appointed 42 people from among the general public to five boards and panels that are aimed at maintaining its independence and effectiveness. Among the appointees are the former Chief Justice, former Commissioner of Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, retired judges, academics, journalist, accountants, former senior civil servants, Civil society leaders and parliamentarians from both side of the divide. Internationally, Malaysia through MACC has also taken various initiatives to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2008 to promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention and fight against corruption including recovery of assets or illicit proceeds. One significant element in the structures of peace in the Malaysian context is its education system. Malaysia’s ability to democratize the education system, allowing the public institutions and private sector enterprises to operate handin-hand in the process of building quality human capital has been highly successful. The relatively low level of unemployment enhanced the fruit of this success, to an extent that Malaysia has now become the hub of private education for the region attracting students from the Asia-Pacific region. With 90% literacy rate amongst its population the awareness within the populace regarding the role of education and national unity also contributes to the maturing of the society in dealing with inter-ethnic issue. With the recent expansion of the new media, a relatively high educated society and an ever expanding middle class, most Malaysians have the opportunity to access information from anywhere at anytime. The so-called globalization of the Malaysian mind has allowed them to appreciate what peace could bring for them, not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and social spheres. Indeed, the peace and socio-political stability that they have enjoyed has been the very result of both their maturity and the maturity of the social system. 15 Bibliography Anis Yusal Yusoff. 2010. Managing Social Cohesion in Malaysia: A Case Study in Developing An Early Warning System of Ethnic Relations (KITA MESRA™). 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