2023 TheoLogica
An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
S. I. SIN AND VICE
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.82063
Editorial: Sin and Vice
MARIA SILVIA VACCAREZZA
University of Genoa
mariasilvia.vaccarezza@unige.it
MICHELE PAOLINI PAOLETTI
University of Macerata
m.paolinipaoletti@unimc.it
Albeit often overlapping, sin and vice are two related yet clearly distinguished
concepts. It would require an extremely long detour to sketch the history of such
thick, central notions in Western culture, as well as their similarities, differences,
and overlappings. Sin is a polysemic notion. The word refers, primarily, to an
action whereby an agent intentionally fails to live up to the will or commands of
God (see Stump, 2018). However, sin can be also considered as a disposition of the
will, i.e., an inclination to engage in sinful actions (Plantinga 2000). Finally,
according to parts of the Christian tradition, sin is a metaphysical state, i.e., a
condition of “uncleanness” which marks a fundamental ontological difference
between human beings and God (M. Adams 1991, 20f). While according to the
Christian thought vice can be a cause of sin, and a sinful disposition may closely
resemble a vice, the two concepts shouldn’t be confused. First, while sin pertains
to a theological vocabulary, talking of vices is perfectly compatible with a secular
philosophical discourse, as the recent success of virtue ethics and virtue-vice
epistemology testifies. This comes as no surprise, if one thinks that the very origin
of the concept is rooted in the secular philosophical tradition tracing back to Plato
and Aristotle. Secondly, within character-based moral and epistemic theories, a
vice is, unequivocally, a trait of character. As such, it is part of an agent’s
psychological makeup, which means that it is a stable feature of their moral
psychology, independently of its specific behavioral manifestations. And while
an action may well be vicious, it can be so only insofar as it springs from a vicious
trait, which has—so to speak—ontogenetic, conceptual, and even normative
priority over the actions it elicits.
In this special issue, we aim to further clarify the nature of sin and vice and
the connection between sin and vice. The issue includes seven contributions.
Three contributions concern topics in philosophy of religion, two further
contributions deal with metaphysical issues and the last two contributions
mostly focus on ethical problems.
Kevin Timpe, in his “The Inevitability of Sin”, explores the idea that all
humans (except Christ and maybe Mary) cannot freely avoid sinning, at least
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following the Christian doctrine of original sin. Timpe models this idea using
Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals. Indeed, the inevitability of sin is a modal notion:
roughly, if a human were in specific conditions, s/he could not avoid sinning.
However, to understand this notion and evaluate the relevant counterfactuals
connected with it, it is necessary to restrict the set of accessible worlds (from the
actual world in which humans cannot avoid sinning) by introducing specific
restriction condition(s). The author then shows how such restriction conditions
should be singled out from the standpoint of two theological doctrines, i.e.,
theological determinism and Molinism. On theological determinism, the
restriction condition is a certain volition of God, i.e., that each human in the
relevant world commits at least one sin. On Molinism, the restriction condition
is Plantinga’s transworld depravity thesis. Finally, Timpe faces libertarianism.
Libertarianism seems to be at odds with the inevitability of sin. However, the
author suggests two options. The first option consists in accepting two theses:
that someone may freely and responsibly do something even without having
alternative possibilities and that all humans are (partly) identical with the first
sinner by virtue of some volition of God. The second option amounts to operating
on the restriction conditions for the accessibility relation connected with the
relevant counterfactuals.
In “On the Privation Theory of Evil: A Reflection on Pain and the Goodness of
God’s Creation”, Parker Haratine reconsiders the privation theory of evil in
connection with two theological theses, i.e., that God is the creator of everything
and that being and goodness are interconvertible. The privation theory of evil
seems to follow from the conjunction of these theses. According to it, evil cannot
have a positive existence or, better, it is entirely ontologically dependent for its
existence on something else, which is good. Thus, evil is the privation of the
latter. Otherwise, qua existent, evil would turn out to be good. However, Haratine
examines pain as a classical counterexample that stands in the way of the
privation theory of evil. Pain is evil, but it is not necessarily a privation. Pain has
a positive reality. The author defends this thesis against three main responses on
behalf of privation theorists: that pain is not real, since it is an evaluative mental
state; that pain is not evil, since it has some function or utility; that pain actually
is the lack of something, so that it squares well with the privation theory.
Haratine’s conclusion is twofold. First, even if pain is a positive evil and the
privation theory of evil is false, the privation theory does not actually follow from
the theological theses mentioned above. For those theses are actually compatible
with the non-existence of evil, which is incompatible with the privation theory.
Secondly, one may accept an alternative view of evil: the opposition view.
According to the latter, evil is good insofar as it enjoys absolute existence—which
is good by itself. However, evil is bad insofar as it does not have kind-existence,
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i.e., it does not have any proper nature or end. In this respect, evil is nothing but
the opposite of something which enjoys kind-existence.
Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt, in their “Schleiermacher and the
Transmission of Sin: A Biocultural Evolutionary Model”, explore
Schleiermacher’s account of the transmission of sin. They first point out that the
traditional Augustinian account of original sin—which includes one specific
‘primal sin’ episode and some biological mechanism of transmission of sin—is
affected by at least two drawbacks: it is not supported by current biological
evidence as concerns the existence of a single ancestral pair and it does not
explain why transmission mechanisms were implemented by God in the first
place. Schleiermacher’s account is based upon God-consciousness, i.e., selfconsciousness and species-consciousness coupled with a feeling of absolute
dependence upon God. God-consciousness emerges in humans from biological
mechanisms, when humans start to perceive their relative dependence upon
natural resources and then recognize that God is the source of nature itself. Sin
enters the stage when there is a mismatch between one’s own God-consciousness
and one’s own social and bodily self-consciousness. This mismatch is due, on the
one hand, to our ‘seeds of sin’, i.e., our biological tendencies to commit evil acts,
and, on the other hand, to the negative impact upon ourselves of the cultural
communities where we live, that contribute to transmitting sinful tendencies.
Therefore, Schleimermacher’s model is a ‘biocultural’ model of the transmission
of sin. The authors then present empirical evidence for the existence of Godconsciousness and for the social transmission of sin, through the influence of
peers, parents and social models. Finally, they adapt the cultural Price equation
in order to show how changes in adhering to social norms from one generation
to another turn out to depend upon the number of cultural descendants of an
individual (divided by the population mean number of cultural descendants), the
perceived cultural prevalence of that trait (i.e., adhering to social norms) and
some cognitive attractors that work as distorting biases.
In their “Vices, Virtues, and Dispositions”, Lorenzo Azzano and Andrea
Raimondi draw some interesting connections between the metaethical inquiry
into the nature of virtues and vices and the metaphysics of dispositions. They
first point out that virtues are endowed with genuinely dispositional nature: one
has a given virtue insofar as one is disposed (to a certain degree) to behave in
given ways. Indeed, like dispositions, all virtues have typical manifestations and
triggering circumstances. Like a disposition, each virtue may be possessed even
if and when it gets unmanifested. And it may come in degrees and be interfered
with. However, vices need not be thought of as dispositions. But the metaphysics
of dispositions may be exploited in order to understand their nature. Indeed, the
authors distinguish between three types of vicious persons: the incontinent, the
malevolent and the indifferent. These types of persons may produce the same
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behavior, e.g., failing to help someone in need. Yet, they may produce the same
behavior in different ways. The incontinent possesses the virtuous disposition to
help someone in need, but s/he does not exercise it because of systematic
interferences due to negative character traits and/or negative external
circumstances. In this respect, the incontinent only mimics the exercise of a
vicious disposition, without possessing the latter. On the contrary, the
malevolent actually possesses vicious dispositions and s/he regularly exercises
them by deliberation. Finally, the indifferent lacks both virtuous and vicious
dispositions. Thus, when s/he finds herself in the typical circumstances in which
a given virtuous disposition should be exercised (e.g., meeting someone in need),
those very circumstances cause the loss of the disposition. They act as ‘finks’.
In “Presentism, Timelessness, and Evil”, Ben Page reflects upon divine
timelessness and evil from the standpoint of presentism. Divine timelessness
seems to be incompatible with the defeat of evil at some time in the history of
creation. Since the latter is part of Christian teaching, divine timelessness seems
to be incompatible with Christian teaching as well. To account for the defeat of
evil, one could resort to presentism. Yet, presentism needs to reject divine
timelessness. Against this line of reasoning, Page argues for two theses. The first
thesis is that it is possible to make sense of divine timelessness even from a
presentist perspective. For one may figure out a possible world with two island
universes that are temporally disconnected from each other. Both universes are
presentist. In one of such universes, there is only one instant, that it is ‘eternally
present’, so to say. It is the universe of God. In the other universe, there is only
one present instant (at a time) but there is also flow of time. This is the universe
of creation. Some complications are in order, since tenses and existence become
relative to island universes. Moreover, one may introduce some tenseless notion
of existence and argue that, even in the universe of God, the instants and the
entities living in the universe of creation enjoy tenseless existence, so that evil
enjoys tenseless existence as well. At any rate, evil may get defeated in the
universe of creation as time passes by and it stops existing. But Page also argues
for a second thesis. According to it, evil never gets completely defeated in the
‘presentist’ universe of creation. Indeed, consider a time at which evil does not
exist anymore. Still, at that time, there are past truths about past evils, which are
made true by presently existing truthmakers. Such truthmakers, even if they do
not bring about pain or suffering and even if they may only consist of vivid
memories in God’s mind, still reintroduce evil in the universe of creation.
Ian James Kidd, in his “From Vices to Corruption to Misanthropy”, explores
the connection between failings/vices, corruption and misanthropy. “Failing” is
a term broader than “vice”, since it is not necessarily connected with the
Aristotelian tradition. Kidd recognizes that failings are diverse, that some of them
are temporary, whereas others are persistent and/or linked to specific
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worldviews. Some failings only involve individuals, whereas others also or only
involve collectives (e.g., institutions, companies, societies, and so on). Corruption
results from failings and results in failings. More precisely, being exposed or
subjected to corrupting conditions either results in the erosion of virtues or in the
introduction or the strengthening of vices/failings. The author singles out
different types of corrupting conditions and different ways in which such
conditions work (e.g., through the acquisition of new failings, through the
activation of latent failings, and so on). In turn, generalized corruption may lead
to misanthropy. Kidd accepts one revisionary account of misanthropy—inspired
by David Cooper’s works—according to which misanthropy is a negative
appraisal of the collective character and performance of humankind.
Misanthropy may bring about different manifestations, stances and behaviors. It
may come together with different affects. At any rate, it is typically produced by
the experience of failings that are ubiquitous and entrenched in humankind.
Kidd concludes that there is also room for Christian misanthropy, insofar as
Christians recognize that humankind lives in a sinful condition, i.e., in a
condition characterised by fundamentally disordered tendencies when they
pursue goodness apart from God.
Charles Taliaferro and Emily Knuths, in their “How Sinful Is Sin? How Vicious
Is Vice? A Modest Defense of the Guise of the Good”, defend the guise of the
good thesis, according to which everyone acts upon what s/he conceives of as
good, or as least evil. They tackle three counterexamples against this thesis, i.e.,
that one may disapprove of one’s own actions and still feel compelled to make
them, that one may act upon conflicting and irrational urges and impulses and
that one may even seek annihilation or self-annihilation. Interestingly enough, in
the latter case, they argue that one still acts upon what counts as least evil (i.e.,
destroying something that is perceived as bad) or that one pursues the good by
identifying it with punishment or revenge. Taliaferro and Knuths then claim that
this thesis favors moral realism over moral subjectivism. Moral subjectivism is
incapable of explaining our moral attitudes when we do something because we
believe it is good. And it is incapable of providing reasons for abstaining from
some profoundly evil actions when we feel compelling urges towards them. They
also deal with two objections against moral realism, i.e., that it makes rightness
and wrongness mysterious and that it is at odds with the higher number of
existing moral disagreements. Finally, the authors examine the figure and the
actions of Darth Vader in light of the guise of the good thesis.
Bibliography
Adams, M. M. 1991. “Sin as Uncleanness”. Philosophical Perspectives, 5: 1–27.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2214089.
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Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0195131932.001.0001.
Stump, E. 2018.
Atonement. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813866.001.0001.
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