Social Media and Social Change
Noureddine Miladi, PhD
Qatar University
Doha, Qatar
Abstract
The growing impact of new media around the world has been the subject of study by
scores of scientists in multidisciplinary fields. Satellite TV and the Internet have been
viewed as instruments of social and political change — connecting communities,
educating the youth, and creating social networks previously unaccounted for, like
virtual groups. However, in the Arab World and the Middle East, such technological
developments have been hailed as tools for the empowerment of marginalized communities such as women and the youth, also brought new opportunities that have
resulted in the breaking of the communication monopoly by those in power and the
creation of a new communication environment. Such environment has — as part of
its manifestations — the current social transformations that the region is witnessing.
Drawing on examples from social media networks used in Tunisia and Egypt, this
article analyzes the extent to which new technologies have changed the rules of the
game regarding public opinion construction and the communication flow traditionally monopolized by the hegemonic power structures in Arab society. This study not
only reveals the decisiveness of platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in
the Arab Spring countries’ revolutions, but also the extent to which their availability
served in a complex manner the democratic transition that Tunisia have been undergoing and the political turmoil that Egypt is witnessing. Furthermore this study
argues that such online spheres of communication mark the emergence of the virtual
yet vibrant space of political campaigning and social empowerment, especially for the
youth and marginalized communities.
Introduction
A
lthough their development is a recent phenomenon, new media outlets have
not only opened up new opportunities for journalism, but also empowered
audiences and civil society organizations with unprecedented platforms for free
expression and social activism around the world. New technologies are said to have
reinvigorated a sense of a transnational public sphere and strengthened marginalized
communities and provided a platform for the voiceless. The possible consequences of
such rapid developments on social and political change are not hard to imagine. The
sweeping victory of America’s President Barak Obama in 2008 characterized by the
unprecedented outreach to marginalized communities including the youth through
DOI: 10.1111/dome.12082
Digest of Middle East Studies—Volume 25, Number 1—Pages 36–51
C 2016 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
V
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YouTube, Facebook, and other Internet platforms is a case in point which brought to
the world the power of social media networks in election campaigns. Subsequent examples on political campaigning by human rights activism and protest movements which
have been actively employing social media have become recurrent scenes around the
world. The events of the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in December 2010 and
culminated in the revolution of 14 January 2011 — followed by Egypt, Libya, and now
Syria prove the case for the role of social media in empowering social activists.
In this unprecedented actuality, the developments in mobile Internet use by activists has facilitated what Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, Qui, and Say (2007:250–251)
called the mobile society where people from all social strata become able to engage
in networks of relations free from all forms of constraints like time and space as well
as authoritarian control. Social media is argued to have growing ramifications for the
extraordinary changes we witness in the public domain. One of the results of the
proliferation of social media networks is the potential that comes with such free
spaces as sites of counter-hegemonic spheres of debate. The information flow being
disseminated allows the possibility of challenging the official perspectives regarding
the news coverage of crucial events also discloses any attempts at misleading by
mainstream broadcasting or print media.
This article sets out to analyze aspects of social media use in Tunisia and Egypt
during and after the revolutions of January 14 and 25, 2011. While attempting to
flag up these social and political changes, this study does not claim that there is a
direct causal relationship between Internet development and social change, given that
there are obvious methodological challenges in quantifying or measuring the impact
of technology in determining the course of the social unrests that led to overthrowing three regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. For instance, as of April 2011,
Facebook penetration was high in UAE (45%), Qatar (34%), Lebanon (23%), and
Kuwait (21%)1 but these countries did not experience social unrest and online protest movements. However, this article does not also downplay the significance of
development of and accessibility to technological tools in this very historical movement. The protest movement which led to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions
(January, 2011) was, on the one hand, the accumulation of social activism during the
last decade led by human rights groups, political activists and disenfranchised youth
groups; but on the other hand, it was the social injustices, political and economic
corruption, and the brutal dictatorial policies affecting political opponents and the
curtailment of every form of free speech. Furthermore, the development of social
media came at the right historical moment and served as a catalyst in the midst of
the social struggle. It was the right tool for the right moment where traditional
media in Tunisia for instance were totally controlled by the regime apparatus.
Also, while analyzing the growing influence of social media in the Arab region,
this work steers away from the technological determinism approach in assessing the
impact of social media during and after the Arab Spring revolutions. Such networks
are instead viewed here as tools that are crucial in advancing communication between
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various activists and protest groups, but do not determine society itself or social
movements.
Repression of Political Activists in Tunisia and Egypt
Prior to the revolution of January 14, 2011, Tunisia and Egypt witnessed their
darkest decades in media censorship and repression of free speech. Total control
of the media in Tunisia for instance and self-censorship were the norm. Human
rights and political activists rarely dared openly criticize the ruling regimes. Those
who crossed the line even in small gatherings, seminars or academic symposia
would be arrested and subsequently given a prison sentence. Um Ziyad, a wellknown Tunisian female journalist, was tortured and imprisoned for a month in
2003 for simply using her blog to highlight a few problems relating to the education system in the country and called for proper reform of this sector. Hamadi
Jebali, former editor of the al-Fajr newspaper2 in the 1980s and former prime
minister in the coalition government (2012–2013) was imprisoned for over 15
years under the Ben Ali regime. Systematic blocking of activists homepages or
Facebook and YouTube pages was common practice. For over 15 years, Internet
pages of al-Nahdah Net, al-Kalima, Tunis News, and al-Bawwaba, among others
were censored in Tunisia. Such pages remained thriving sites of discussions and
news reporting in diaspora about Tunisian politics.
In Egypt, the case was not so much different. Prior to the revolution, the Egyptian regime recurrently disrupted Internet access by controlling Internet providers.
TE Data, among other service providers in the country, was entrusted to do the surveillance and gate-keeping jobs. The Mubarak government had built a social control
system which guaranteed a strong grip on all state institutions, the media and political life. The strategic aims had always been to prolong the rule of the same regime
apparatus which had been in power for over three decades. Human rights organizations and international NGO’s have produced scores of reports which accounted the
human rights abuses and political repression, as well as media censorship and curtailment of free speech during the period of Hosni Mubarak.
Social Media in the Midst of the Arab Spring Revolutions
Since its inception, the World Wide Web came with promises in which users would
embrace a new world where consumers would be able to share ideas, contribute to
shaping their reality, and consequently break the monopoly on information flow by
those in power. The development of information technologies and social media in
the Arab region has been nothing short of phenomenal in its impact. As elsewhere,
the Arab region has witnessed unprecedented developments in information communication technologies (ICTs). New technologies, according to Spitzberg et al., have
“changed the velocity, the capacity, and the efficiency of communication” (2013:
110). By 2014, the International Telecommunication Union accounted for about
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82% of schools in Tunisia, for instance, to have access to the Internet, as compared
to 50% in Egypt and about 55% in Algeria.3 According to the Arab Social Media
Report, as of May, 2014 the total number of Facebook users in the Arab world was
81,302,064 — up from 54,552,875 in May, 2013. By May, 2014, a country’s average Facebook penetration in the Arab region was over 21.5% — up from 15% in
May, 2013. The percentage of female users has dipped slightly (from 33.4% in May,
2013, to 31.75% in May, 2014), after having fluctuated slightly between 33.4% and
34% in the past two years.4 Moreover, the report accounts for a significant number
of youth (under 30) users in the region. As of May 2014, the percentage of users
between 15 and 29 years old was 67%.5 This growing use of ICTs and the explosion
in social media subscription by users in the Arab region has been partly due to
investment in this sector by telecommunication companies, which brought about
fierce competition. This has led to improvements in terms of broadband provision,
and at the same time, to diminishing the cost of Internet access and mobile phones
which have become affordable to most people.
On January 14, 2011, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali who ruled Tunisia for 23 years
was forced to flee the country under the mounting pressure of the protest movement.
This movement had been in action since December 17, 2010, aided by social media
networks and satellite TV, namely al-Jazeera Channel. However, during the years
leading up to the revolution, a trend of social activism had been developing, partly
on social media networks. This trend evolved into protest movements when it
reached momentum through the increasing volume of discussions, video sharing, and
awareness campaigns aiming for political change.
During this period, new technologies facilitated the formation of interest groups
or subcultural societies on the Internet. Online social networks — in the case of the
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions — have proven very effective in developing group
dynamics. The uncontrollable virtual outreach of Facebook and Twitter has been a
source of discomfort to authoritarian regimes. The extraordinary Internet accessibility
in Tunisia and Egypt meant mass online mobilization which later on turned into
mobilization and mass protests in the streets and public squares. Needless to say,
audience around the world saw the events of the Tunisian revolution through the
lens of social media networks. Facebook videos and images of police brutality in the
capital Tunis became vital material for effective storytelling.
Accordingly, new technologies did certainly matter in rallying the public. It was
reported that #Egypt was the most popular hashtag on Twitter for 2011, which
served as a conduit for the consistent stream of news about the Egyptian revolution
and the dramatic events of ousting the regime of Hosni Mubarak. The protest
movement that was seeking democracy and freedom from a dictatorial regime managed to attract international attention. Even western governments that were previously supportive of the Egyptian regime withdrew their support when they realized
the extent of the regime’s atrocities against its own people. President Barack Obama,
along with other western leaders, voiced his explicit support and hoped that “the
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Google guy will win” (in reference to Wael Ghonim who runs the Facebook page
“We Are All Khaled Said”).
As argued by DiFelice (2013) “. . . the demonstrators that participated in protests,
in several latitudes and contexts in the last few years, inhabit extended spaces reached
through the power of connection of its mobile devices” (p. 20). In the case of the
Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said,” or other popular pages in Tunisia, social
media served as useful resources of information, and sometimes guidance and center
points for protesters and activists. While protestors were engaged in vigils and sitins, they continued to be digitally connected with each other. They received orders
about the next move, where and when the next action would take place through a
continuous stream of communication via Twitter or Facebook. Most of the time,
these moves were filmed, photographed and subsequently shared and widely distributed on social media networks. One might argue here that such platforms became
the safety valve for social activism in the Arab Spring countries. The environment it
created enhanced peaceful political and human rights activism as opposed to violent
protests, as in the cases of Raba‘h and Tahrir squares in Cairo.
The early snowball effect of Internet blogging and social media sites in Egypt
started with the Kifaya (Enough) movement. It has gained momentum since the
2004 elections and has emerged as the strongest in the Egyptian street in online
mobilization. “We are all Khalid Sai’d” initiated by Wael Ghonim (regional executive for Google at the time) and which accounted for Khalid Said’s torture and death
by the security forces attracted over a million in a short time. Such pages sparked
the protest movement which capitalized on the blogosphere for political rallying of
the public. The subsequent success of scores of social media sites such as Rassd
News, “6th of April Youth Movement,” and “el-Baradei President of Egypt 2011,”
among others, meant that the protest movement managed to break the wall of censorship and power grip of the regime’s apparatus in controlling information as well
as the public. Furthermore, the success of the Tunisian revolution in ousting the
regime of Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 added fuel to the Egyptian protest movement
which was turned into tangible revolutionary power in deposing the Mubarak regime
less than two weeks after.
In the course of those weeks (as it also emerged from the work of el-Nawawy
and Khamis, 2014), activists on social media networks acted as reporters of news in
the forms of tweets, images, and short videos; a data source immensely important to
news organizations closely monitoring the developments of events such as al-Jazeera
and other world media. Jenkins (2006) argues that in such circumstances, the impact
of social media gets amplified by the old media. Broadcasters possess the power to
magnify the exposure of news stories on a global scale. This worldwide exposure
served as a support mechanism and catalyst for social media activists who realized
that their citizen journalism was making a difference.
It is worth mentioning that the ousted president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak,
deployed the media and his government’s apparatus during the last few years leading
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to the revolution of January 25, 2011 to pave the way for the succession of his son
Jamal Mubarak. Hundreds of fake Facebook pages promoting the image of Jamel
were fashioned with a modern and youthful look. Run by the government apparatuses, such spaces attempted to reach out to the youth and educated people to establish a consensus that he was the natural successor to his father, and that he
symbolized a stable and prosperous future to Egypt. However, the “6th April Youth
Movement” discovered the plot and exposed this fake campaign by publishing a list
of all these pages actually run by the regime’s intelligence services. In the midst of
such social unrest, social media networks served as efficient spheres of information
exchange, networking between activists and tools for mobilizing the public. The slogan calling for the downfall of the dictatorial regimes became a key motto in the
protest movement in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Online activists further magnified
the call to challenge the regimes. Slogans such as “Ash-Sha‘b yurid isqaat annidham” (People want to topple the regime), or “Degage, Irhal” (go away) carried
more weight as tens of thousands of social media activists adopted the call on their
social media walls and changed their profiles to various revolutionary symbols.
Social Media Reversing the News Agenda
On a separate level, social media can be considered to have influenced the news
agenda in the region, as is the case elsewhere in the world. Although it is hard to
measure such influence, scores of examples during and after the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, for instance, account for the power of social media networks in
making their stories through to mainstream TV, radio or newspapers. Activists during the Tunisian revolution proved that they were not mere observers or followers of
news, but could become shapers of the mainstream media news agenda. Most noteworthy is that they proved influential in disrupting governments’ information management and their political communication channels both locally and internationally.
Ben Ali’s External Communications Unit, for instance, faced challenging times on
how to control the barrage of information spreading via social media and reaching
out to an international audience via satellite TV. Constant monitoring and partial
blocking of Facebook was the last resort of a failed regime’s attempt in containment
and control.
During the two weeks leading up to the downfall of the Ben Ali regime on 14
January 2011, complete censorship was placed on mainstream media in Tunisia. TV
and radio broadcasters stood on the side of the regime and sent recurrent messages
demonizing the unrests as “terrorist” acts and branded protesters as terrorists and
outlaws. International news outlets were already accustomed by then to the fact that
they would always be running behind social media networks for exclusive updates.
Therefore the majority of the stories which were beamed to international media
about the protest movement were dominated by footage and photos from social
media sources. Although al-Jazeera, which did not have an office back then in
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Tunisia, along with other international broadcasters, found it almost impossible to
verify the stories coming from social media sources. Content messages received from
activists in Tunisia or retrieved from Facebook pages and Twitter feeds constituted a
key component of the overall narrative about the dramatic developments.
Scholarly attention brought by the advent of new technologies in empowering
social movements is not new. Various studies that looked at the “Twitter revolution”
in Iran during 2009 had also signaled the potential of social media like Twitter in
the democracy movement in the Middle East. Similarly, various social media sites
have nowadays become the subject of scores of investigations which are dedicated to
the Arab Spring social media phenomenon. In their report on “New Media and
Conflict after the Arab Spring,” Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides, and Freelon (2012)
highlighted the “conduit” role of social media during the Tunisian and Egyptian
revolutions:
Twitter (they argued) connected Western and Arab individuals to participants, bringing unique and unfiltered content. In Egypt, this meant identifying with the protestors in Tahrir Square. In Syria, it meant watching horrific
videos of murdered civilians. There is also evidence that foreign governments
directly monitored these new media sites to supplement their limited knowledge of the actors on the ground. (p. 9)
Mainstream international media worked hard to incorporate user-generated content into their news programs about the developments in Tunisia. With all of the
successes of social media sites in reporting the events, one cannot ignore that the
news content of such networks has made a difference. Although channels like alJazeera found it uncomfortable to broadcast unverified reports they eventually
deemed it compelling to accept most of the material they received through social
media networks. The urgency of the live coverage and constraints of immediacy
within which TV channels operate forces many of them lean toward trading speed
for accuracy.
New Spaces for Political Discussion
The last decade has witnessed an explosion in the international TV and radio markets thanks to satellite technology. The Arab TV market is no exception. Independent satellite TV channels, especially in the Arab Spring countries, have mushroomed
due to the new avenues of freedom as well as the relatively cheap cost of sustaining
such media outlets in the region. This growth in the media industry has been followed by a significant outreach to Arab audiences. It has, therefore, become evident
that the congested western TV market does not seem to impress Arab audiences
anymore in terms of providing objective news coverage about the region, as is the
case regarding reality TV and other entertainment content.
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In his comparative study about news coverage on the BBC, ITN, Sky and alJazeera Network, Peter Lee-Wright (2012) analyzed the news values and standards
of objectivity through their coverage of the third anniversary events of the Arab
Spring. He was interested in the importance they attach to definitions of words such
as democracy and freedom. His study revealed that “Since 9/11 popular American
media had mostly followed the Bush agenda of characterizing the Middle East as
the crucible of terror, with only Israel as a symbol of democratic values. The Arab
Spring forced a re-think, though the popular media could not easily embrace the
philosophical recant that came more easily in Britain” (p. 5). The study also confirmed the popularity of al-Jazeera as the choice number one when it comes to balanced news coverage and diversity of opinions. “Al-Jazeera’s reputation in the region
was won through its apparent freedom from proprietorial bias, and its willingness to
engage in dialogue with its audience,” he argued (p.12).
Noteworthy here is that competition with al-Jazeera has also prompted Western
media companies to launch their own Arab services in a bid to reach out to Arab
audiences in the region as well as in Diaspora. After the BBC Arabic TV which
appeared in 2008, France 24 (Arabic service) emerged from Paris in April, Russia
Today in May 2007, DW Arabia (Deutsche Welle) in September 2011 and Sky
News Arabia was launched on 6 May 2012 from Abu Dhabi.
However, like other mass media across the world, TV and radio broadcasting, as
well as newspapers in the Arab world, have been buffeted by the development of the
Internet and its challenges, the most recent being the growing impact of social
media on journalism practice. Such an enduring impact ranges from the timeliness
of social media content, exclusive information, speed of outreaching to the public,
and the great potential of interactivity and network building. Social media have proven very popular, with a growing subscription from around the world. As noted earlier, most of the Arab countries’ statistical data show that countries from the Gulf
like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as the North African
countries account for significant users of Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. A growing novel space of discussion has been in the making, which has led to the emergence of influential players in the region.
From simple commentaries on the Internet, blogs evolved into significant spaces
for self-publishing through social media spaces. As argued by Brady, prior to social
media, blogs could be considered very important free “public space for distributed
knowledge-building” (2005:7). But through various transformations, personal blogs,
Facebook pages and Twitter feeds have become nowadays an interestingly contributive
medium with far reaching effects through what he calls permalinks (permanent links)
which points to numerous links and gives space for comments and questions from
other readers. Such online spaces have also the capability of carrying pictures reporting
various events and audio as well as video material from bloggers’ personal work.
On another dimension, social media activists have nowadays assumed the role of
fact-checkers by scrutinizing the news reports of various media outlets and the
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sources or statistical data they sometimes publish. Most importantly, one can point
to the role of grass-root reporters as a significant number of bloggers and social
media activists have currently assumed. Also, unlike newspapers, radio or television
journalism, social media does not work within the constraints of time, space, or capital. Nor does it depend on central editorial policies or gatekeepers’ interference. All
youth activists need are Internet access, an electronic devise, and time, of which they
have plenty in their lives. Consequently, in this new environment, traditional media,
especially newspapers seem to follow what is hot and buzzing in the public realms
more and more from Facebook pages and Twitter feeds.
Furthermore, in the early days of its appearance, blogging used to be mainly the
job of amateurs, but professional journalists slowly started to join in as they realized
the potential of the free space that the Internet allows. Nowadays, bloggers as well
as social media activists come from all strata of society. Professional journalists
actually constitute a large part of the blogosphere contributors. Scores of mainstream
journalists resort to social media to voice their personal opinions. The editors’ blogs
have become regular features in many newspapers in which journalists and editors
alike find the opportunity to express their personal opinions on various social, political or economic issues. Their viewpoints conveyed in such free spaces may well often
go against the official editorial line of their newspapers.
New Media and the Democratic Transition
The above analysis leads to one significant aspect of social transformations in the
Arab Spring countries during this democratic transition period which can be called
the democratization of information and knowledge. One of the aspects, which
deserves a close scrutiny, is the extent to which new technologies — especially social
media — have been harnessed as a democratizing tool post the Arab Spring revolutions. In fact, gone are the days when information was a monopoly in the hands of
those who are well-off, or in power. And it has become a part of history that authoritarian regimes could prevent information from reaching their citizens. The technological revolution that is sweeping the globe has meant that, under no circumstances
can any regime govern without being unchecked. The Facebook and Twitter revolution and its penetration of various social groupings has empowered the public with
the ability to expose their leaders in cases of corruption, human rights abuses or any
other forms of misconduct. The transformative potential of the Internet as part of
the libertarian worldview, argues Tuomi (2002), has been in action across the Arab
region and embodied in the events of the Arab Spring revolution. The free flow of
information available after the revolution in Tunisia, for instance has meant that
common people have become able to positively engage in the knowledge society.
Social media networks as well as personal blogs have enabled people to gather information and empower them with the ability to arrange that knowledge and reproduce
and circulate it by adding their own touch.
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New Forms of Political Participation
The democratization of information, signposted above, has meant the advent of new
opportunities that have impacted the current social transformations. The following
section of this article analyzes certain aspects in the contemporary social and political
transitions affecting the region. In doing so, this study accounts for the most significant aspects in this enduring change. However, it does not rule out other important
areas of influence such as education, the economy, and culture.
In the Arab region, as in other parts of the world, there has been an obvious paradigm shift in terms of the emergence of new forms of socialization or what has
been known by various scholars as virtual communities on the web (Rheingold,
2000; Kim, 2000). In this new environment, social media have the flexibility of
allowing free dynamic interaction between users. This new reality has facilitated the
fast and smooth transfer of ideas through the rapid creation of associations among
groups. Facebook and Twitter, for instance have become, in this case, significant
public domains of interaction among the youth and other strata in Arab society.
Thanks to these platforms, protest groups have proven capable of ably tapping into
their power and developing remarkable uses.
Moreover, the thriving environment of social media networks has led to the
emergence of new forms of political consciousness in the Arab region. The collapse
of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen has led to new practices of social organization which have started to form and take part in political
debates. Across the Arab Spring countries civil society organizations as well as political groups consolidated their presence on the Internet through online discussions,
campaigning, and news reporting, in addition to other forms of activism (Lynch,
2007). These tools have helped, over the past few years, to broaden the space for
political debate. Discussions on hot issues relating to human rights, good governance, political corruption, unemployment, reforming the health service have not
remained confined to private discussions among friends and colleagues in cafes, mosques or clubs, but now have found in the blogosphere a world of opportunities. Activists of all sorts have become confident in expressing their views in the new
democratic atmosphere aided by social media networks. Their virtual activism has
become a source of alternative news analysis and coverage of news which does not
usually find its way into the mainstream media.
For instance, with reference to the Tunisian elections of October 26, 2014, social
media can be argued to have affirmed an effective watchdog role. In this case, not
only monitoring candidates who are associated with the previous regime, but also on
the traditional media outlets (TV, radio, and newspapers) that openly supported
such candidates. Scores of media organizations like Nessma TV, al-Tounissia TV
and al-Wataniyya TV1 in addition to Almaghrib, al-Shurouq newspapers faced fierce
campaigns from Facebook and Twitter activists. The impact of social media networks have put in question the relevance of the agenda-setting powers of such media
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corps. As a consequence, old media networks found it a challenging task to influence
the agenda of voters because of Twitter and Facebook counter-campaigns. The systematic effort, for instance, by many activists to expose corrupt politicians from the
Ben Ali regime who now market themselves as democratic and proponents of progressivism cannot be missed. Beji Caid Sebsi, Slim Riyahi, Mohamed Jgam, among
others, were recurrently tarnished on social media pages; and their history of collaboration with the former regime apparatus has been extensively documented.
Virtual Spaces for Political Campaigning
One of the historical moments in which social media in the Middle East became
instrumental was during the Iranian elections of June 2009. Twitter became the tool
by which opposition activists exposed to the world some of the corruption in rigging
the election results. In fact it was “. . .mobile phones and other digital cameras that
captured sometimes bloody street protests against election results, which the opposition said were rigged. Dramatic footage from all over the country was uploaded to
video-sharing and social media sites, as well as to mainstream media organizations
like CNN and the BBC, which once used to receive “up to five videos a minute”
(Newman, 2009:2). Newman (2009) further argues “Twitter feeds such as “#Iranelections49 became the central aggregation point for those hungry for news and for
those wishing to distribute new pictures or information” (p. 3).
The power of social media in Iran yet again came to the forefront of public
concern in 2013, but this time for the benefit of political elites. A study on the
use of social media during the Iranian presidential election of 2013 confirms the
“shift toward planned and targeted use of social media” by various candidates
(Naeli, 2013:1). Hassan Rouhani and other candidates, for instance found in
Twitter and Facebook valuable tools to engage with the public. In Iran, as elsewhere, politicians have become mindful of the tremendous opportunities social
media can provide them with to reach out to an inordinate public support (Naeli,
2013:1). During the last few years, as president, Rouhani further remained active
in social media networks as a way of keeping abreast with the public concerns.
His Twitter account @HassanRouhani has become one of his most effective diplomatic outreach tools, through which he keeps members of the public updated
about his activities, speeches and important announcements. Also, with the help
of his media team, he would answer questions and sometimes anxieties raised by
members of the public.
Further compelling evidence of social media networks in action can be traced
to various other studies, such as the work of Khamis and Mahmoud (2013) entitled Facebooking the Egyptian Elections: Framing the 2012 Presidential Race. In
their work, Khamis and Mahmoud revealed compelling evidence regarding the
potential of social network activists in mobilizing the voters and the emerging
decisiveness of new technologies in political campaigns. But considering the
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Tunisian parliamentary and presidential election campaigns of October–December,
2014 significant conclusions can be also drawn. An analysis of the candidates’
online activism during that period reveals that contenders learned from the lessons
of previous years and understood that social media was as equally important as old
media, especially in reaching out to the young voters. Activities in the online
sphere indicated that Facebook and Twitter became battle grounds for ideological
fights which the contestants and their supporters had to manage skillfully. Facebook pages have also become critical platforms for thriving citizen journalism. The
Tunisian president-elect at the time, Moncef Marzouki, who also stood as a presidential candidate, was disregarded by some of the mainstream TV channels, radio
broadcasters and influential newspapers. However, along with other candidates
who were not favored by the mainstream media, Marzouki had conducted his election campaign mainly via social media. The speed with which his messages were
distributed via social networks about his activities, gatherings and speeches worked
well to his advantage in getting his voice heard.
In sum, and banking on the above analysis, one would support the claim that the
proliferation of the Internet has impacted the way political activism and affiliated
groups operate online. In addition to being a space for political communication, the
Internet has become a tool for mobilization and participation. During the election
campaigns, scores of links in Facebook pages simply display citizen-generated videos
about candidates and their activities in the election campaign. However, others discuss more sophisticated issues related to the economic problems and suggestions on
how to sort out the growing unemployment rate. Other extensive content material
concerns link to brief clips from TV debates which attempt to expose one candidate,
or praise another.
Another obvious impact is about the significant aspect of how political parties/
groups have been interacting in cyberspace, the type of communities that were developed, and the various alliances that were forged online. However, saying this does
not undermine the traditional old methods and spaces of interaction in social mobilization. In fact, physical spaces in the case of town squares are still considered strategic in the human activity (Erickson, 2010) especially considering their symbolic
standing in any given country. Al-Kasba in Tunisia, Tahrir in Egypt, and others
remain central in the mobilization of protest movements.
Social Empowerment: When Consumers Become Producers
The current evolving social changes vis-a-vis media technologies can be understood
through McLuhan’s (1994) emancipatory social function theory of the media.
McLuhan observed that the media have extended the human ability to interact with
each other on a wider scale and empowered their natural capabilities. This aspect of
the media’s social empowerment has been further developed by various scholars. In
his book, The Information Age (2002), Manuel Castells attributes to the media
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technologies significant social functions and sees it as radically impacting on social
transformation. In these new “technological conditions,” he considers information as
key aspect to social life and digital networks constitute the nerve system and a decisive tool for social transformation. According to him “the networked society” means
a situation where people become more efficient in accumulating, storing and using
information, thus becoming more and more empowered.
Banking on Castell’s line of analysis, one may argue that firstly, the development
of the World Wide Web has opened new ways during the last two decades for social
activism. The new forms of online campaigning for instance, which have been attributed various terms such as “Cyberactivism,” “Internet Activism,” “Electronic
Advocacy,” “Electronic Resistance,” or “Electronic Intifadah” (in the Palestinian context) constitute facets of this aspect. All of these emergent terminologies have signified the potential of the Internet platforms for the circulation of information,
organizing public relations campaigns, connecting members, calling for action and
organizing protest movements. This new environment allows according to DiFelice
(2013) “all actors in a technologically symmetrical fashion the faculty of construction
and diffusion of content” (p. 15).
Second, it can be argued that changes in technologies have clearly impacted the
traditional linear flow of communication around the world. The new mediated communication has blurred the distinction between producers and consumers where
these last have become active producers of media content. Numerous cases in the
Arab region and beyond suggest that human rights and political activists on the web
influence the news agenda of well-established media organizations by injecting news
stories and exclusive information on the web. TV channels, and radio stations, as
well as newspapers sometimes capitalize on social media sources for exclusive stories
which in turn give them legitimacy and unlimited exposure to an international audience. Breaking news tends more and more to appear on social media first, followed
by the mainstream media outlets.
Third, one may also highlight another dimension proposed by Castells (2009),
who anticipated that the rise of social media networks will contribute to the change
in power relations in society. The mass self-communication theory (p. 63) involves
the ability of individuals in society to amplify their outreach in expressing their views
and influence on public opinion. The fact that human rights or political/apolitical
activists have tens of thousands of members as friends or followers on their Twitter
and Facebook pages has meant that such individuals have become potential competitors to media organizations in spreading news content. Some of them can be considered influential opinion makers in this process. In her book, Life on the Screen:
Identity in the Age of the Internet (1995), Sherry Turkle anticipated the role of the
Internet as a potential “space for growth.” This newly emerging platform for interaction at the time presented a significant tool for self-expression and communication
with the others. All of this happens according to Turkle in what can be understood
as a transitional space of identity expression.
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Spring 2016
Conclusion
The social and political developments sweeping few of the countries in the Arab
region have been partly aided by the unprecedented developments in satellite TV
and social media networks. Such networks have increasingly advanced communication and information sharing among protest groups and activists in the Arab
spring countries. Also, such networks seem to have circumvented the established
mainstream media outlets in various countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and
Yemen, at least during the times of turmoil they have been through. Authoritarian
regimes in those countries have lost control over the flow of information and
online content documenting political corruption, human rights abuses and curtailment of basic freedoms. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have been utilized by
activists inside and outside those countries as unscathed platforms for the free
flow of information.
Alluding to Rheingold’s (2000) concept of virtual community, this state of
affairs is attained when a sophisticated web of relations develops through discussions, exchange of information and debates long enough to maintain a networked
group online. One may argue, based on the above analysis, that social media in
the Arab world have currently attained that state. The new freedom of interactivity, namely in the Arab Spring countries, has probably accomplished Rheingold’s
prophesy in the evolving sense of community which crosses not only towns and
cities, but also borders across the Arab region. The Tunisian as well as the Egyptian and Libyan revolutions created a link of interactivity between activists and
protest movements which would have not been possible to attain without social
media.
In sum, one may affirm that the Arab media scene has dramatically changed since
the Tunisian revolution of January 14, 2011. The subsequent political transformation
in the region has also meant that a new era of media plurality has been taking place.
Such transformation has entailed that not only the emergence of countless TV, radio
channels in addition to newspapers across the region which characterize the varying
political and cultural spectrum, but also lifting the control on mainstream media or
public service broadcasting media from governments’ control at least in the case of
Tunisia. The Arab minsters of information who met on January 24, 2010 in Cairo
and proposed banning such satellite TV channels like al-Jazeera (and failed to do so)
for its daring journalism seem unable now to control the mammoth change in the
Arab media scene and its increase in quantity and kind.
On a final note, it is worth stressing that what was expected from the success in
ousting such dictatorial regimes from power as Ben Ali’s, Mobarak’s and alQadhafi’s was that violent groups such as al-Qaida would lose support from potential
followers in various Arab countries where there has been direct external military
intervention by western powers as in Iraq. Also, the power of social media networks
in advancing the successful move towards peaceful regime change have been
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embraced worldwide as an excellent example of the power of the public to bring
down a whole regime apparatus in the cases of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt in a nonviolent manner. However, four years after political change in those countries, extremist groups such as al-Qaida seem to be gaining even more support through capitalizing on social media networks to get their message across. The Ability of the rapid
emerging group called “Islamic State of Iraq” or ISIS/ISIL in recruiting thousands
of supporters from the Arab region as well as the west can be attributed, among
other reasons, to their effective use of social media and the shrewd yet influential
management of their communication operations.
Notes
1. Dubai School of Government. Arab Social Media Report. Civil Movements: the Impact of Facebook and Twitter. Retrieved from http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/Facebook/LineChart.aspx?&PriMenuID518&CatID524&mnu5Cat.
2. Al-Fajr newspaper was the mouthpiece of the el-Nahda movement until 1991, when the newspaper was banned and the leaders of el-Nahda were jailed.
3. Measuring the Information Society, International Telecommunication Union, 2014. Retrieved
from http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/mis2014.aspx.
4. Arab Media Report. Retrieved from http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/Facebook/LineChart.aspx?&PriMenuID518&CatID524&mnu5Cat#sthash.bbnLbkEf.dpuf.
5. Ibid.
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