War in Ukraine: Lessons of Information Campaign and Diplomacy

Lasha Tchantouridze, PhD Professor, Director of Graduate Programs Norwich University – the Military College of Vermont Northfield, VT, the United States A paper presented at the 6th International Conference “Crisis of the Modern International Security System: Lessons from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” hosted by Ivano Franko National University, Lviv, Ukraine, April 12 2024. War in Ukraine: Lessons of Information Campaign and Diplomacy The success and failure on the battlefield of Ukraine’s armed forces heavily depend on the support of its Western allies. To maintain and deepen this support, Kyiv has to manage its information campaign, aiding the war efforts very carefully. Ukraine has not done too badly in this regard; however, one major failure was an uncontrolled information noise about the 2023 “counteroffensive.” In the United States, other English-speaking countries, and probably elsewhere in the West, the 2023 information campaign about the Ukraine-Russia war started with heightened expectations about Ukraine’s upcoming counteroffensive. The narrative emphasized Ukraine’s readiness, with weapons, equipment, and manpower, to overcome the Russian troops and retake the occupied Ukrainian land. However, the summer 2023 offensive by the Ukrainian ground forces did not produce spectacular results. The ground troops could not deliver because of the hard facts on the ground: the Russian troops were well-entrenched in much fortified defensive positions; they outnumbered the Ukrainian troops; they had more equipment; they could fire more ordinances and generally outgunned the Ukrainian troops. In addition, the Russian Air Force and army aviation always retained air superiority to their Ukrainian counterparts. Regardless, the narrative about Ukraine’s 2023 campaign was a 1 more significant loss with respect to the Western audience because the emphasis was placed on its alleged “counteroffensive” essence. In actual military terms, the June 2023 campaign was not “counter” anything. Counteroffensive is an imprecise concept. The U.S. military does not even define it. In comparison, “counterattack” is defined as a special purpose attack by the infantry, specifically by smaller units. According to a regular military understanding of this concept, “a counterattack [is] normally conducted from a defensive posture.” Further, “to be decisive, the counterattack occurs when the enemy is overextended, dispersed, and disorganized during his attack” (Section 6, Chapter 4, ATP 3-21.8). Ukraine’s 2023 ground offensive was a head-on clash against a wellentrenched enemy with much-improved supply lines and battle formation. The Russian troops in Ukraine have been in a strategic defensive posture since the May 2022 retreat from Kyiv. In June 2023, they were primarily defending the lines held since 2014. Further, they had almost a year to fortify their defensive positions with various engineering structures and hundreds of thousands of landmines. Most importantly, by spring-summer 2023, the Russian troops reversed their serious 2022 weaknesses, making them “overextended, dispersed, and disorganized.” From fall 2022 to June 2023, they had months to abandon their earlier method of deploying troops in a battalion formation, fill the ranks through partial mobilization, and additional contract troops and labor. The results of the 2023 campaign have encouraged Moscow. It is confident it will win the war against Ukraine in 12 to 18 months, with emphasis on traditional definitions of success and failure on the battlefield. However, the victory on the battlefield, defined in a traditional sense, may well be a political defeat in the long run. Russia’s ruling group may not understand this – they are too preoccupied with the military problems at hand. Besides, they are largely isolated from regular contact with their Western colleagues. For that reason, it is 2 helpful to talk with some of those from Russia’s ruling class who might be more intellectually open to considering long-term perspectives for Russia within a broader international context. Diplomatic steps may help in this regard, especially for those seen by Moscow as not anti-Russian but also trusted by Kyiv to be fair. The traditional definition of success in contemporary war is attained primarily by mechanized infantry in ground battles with the support of air and missile forces. The Russian leadership is confident that in the current war of attrition, the Russian forces can outlast and outgun the Ukrainian opposition, break their resistance, and capture the additional Ukrainian territory. This additional territory, presumably, have to be sufficiently large to bring the Russian army to the administrative borders of those Ukrainian provinces that were formally annexed by Moscow in 2022. Indeed, if the Western support of Ukraine were to weaken further, such an outcome would not be entirely implausible. On the other hand, defeat in this war for Russia, according to the traditional understanding of military defeat, equals crippling the Russian ground forces so much that they are no longer able to hold their current positions to fight a war of attrition. This to them seems highly unlikely because the Russian battle positions are backed by the entire country, and to destroy most, if not all, military and logistical targets within Russia is nearly impossible. Such targets are more than 100 thousand throughout Russia, and destroying all of them is an unattainable task for any military force save that of the United States. Within a wider international context, Russia’s gains on the ground in Ukraine will not help it secure a long-term presence in the Black Sea. Before the Ukraine invasion in early 2022, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet afforded Russia a dominant status in the Black Sea region. During the first two years of the war, Russia lost approximately one-third of its Black Sea navy complements, and if the war drags on, it will lose more. As Ukraine acquires more sophisticated 3 weapons, including those supplied by the West, it will gradually erase the Russian assets in the Black Sea area of operations, including shore facilities in Crimea and other areas currently under Russian military control. Ground logistics supporting naval presence and operations can be destroyed, transportation and communications lines will be seriously weakened and disrupted. To achieve this, Ukraine does not have to control the administrative districts formally annexed by Russia. It does not even have to control the left back of the Dnipro River. Ukraine can accomplish the destruction of the Black Sea Fleet through long-range missiles and stand-off attacks from the air, longrange drones, and already-tested navy drone boats. NATO can further use the newly acquired members, Sweden and Finland, to undermine Russia’s Baltic Sea Fleet’s operational status. The erosion of Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea, combined with its weakened position in the Baltic Sea, will much diminish its great power status alongside its influence in European and Middle Eastern affairs. Another aspect of the long-term consequences of Russia’s ground victory in Ukraine is the historical legacy of Russia’s current leaders. Suppose Kyiv loses all administrative units formally annexed by Russia. The free parts of Ukraine, a more significant part of the country, can still join NATO or secure continuing military support from NATO. Kyiv will not recognize Russia’s annexation of its provinces, and Western powers will not be happy with Russia setting an example of military annexation of parts of its neighbor. This will trigger a long-term military stand-off between Russia and the West, in the tradition of the 20th-century Cold War. Thus, the Berlin Wall, the main symbol of the Soviet-West Cold War, would be erected at the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. If there is no bilateral settlement of the war, but Russia forces it through the arms, that wall in Donbas will remain there for a long time. In other words, President Putin of Russia and his associates will go 4 down in history as the Russian rulers who (a) undermined Russia’s great power status, and (b) “succeeded” by moving a Cold War wall from Berlin to Donbas. These types of far-reaching effects are not a historical legacy that Mr. Putin or his associates would want. 5