National NGOs Draft-chapter, out now as part of the The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, edited by Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny H Peterson, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxford. Gëzim Visoka, Dublin City University Introduction In the last two decades the changing nature of conflicts has also changed the nature of humanitarian action and expanded the role of internal and external agents. A shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts has opened up opportunities for states and donors to involve international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in delivering aid and undertaking developmental tasks. Only in the last two years, humanitarian actions were undertaken in over 150 natural disasters and around 50 complex emergencies, including war, humanitarian crises, refugee situations, and large-scale violence (ALNAP 2012: 22). The expansion of international actors in humanitarian emergencies has also mirrored with the creation of national non-governmental organizations (N-NGOs) as key domestic partners in assisting in humanitarian actions. In the last two decades, N-NGOs have become an important agent in responding to humanitarian crisis. It is estimated that donor countries channel over half of their humanitarian and developmental aid through NGOs. According to the most recent statistics, there are around 4,400 NGOs worldwide engaged in humanitarian action and the current number of 240,000 humanitarian workers is growing steadily (ALNAP 2012: 43). From these figures it is estimated that 64 per cent are N-NGOs while the INGOs continue to possess most of the resources, preserve the asymmetric power, and decide on the flow of aid. This chapter focuses on examining N-NGOs as one of the key actors involved in humanitarian action. The analyses are concentrated only on those NGOs who operate nation-wide and have their activity spread in more than one particular sector. The discussion is more thematic and analytical rather than chronological and it draws from many cases and levels of analysis. The main focus of this chapter is in exploring the role and function of N-NGOs in different stages of humanitarian action, the advantages and disadvantages of delivering humanitarian aid through national NGOs, as well as critically examining their interaction and relationship with donors, INGOs, governments and other grassroots groups. The chapter also explores the challenges that national NGOs face in the evolving nature of humanitarian aid, the merging of development and security, and the emergence of resilience and post-interventionary discourses and practices. Moreover, the chapter will also explore some of the unintended and adverse effects of N-NGOs’ engagement in humanitarian action. 1 N-NGOs are positioned as an intermediary and connecting mechanism between external donors and organizations, and national government, belligerent groups and beneficiary communities. They are perceived as critical for assisting in delivering relief in complex emergencies, useful and capable in undertaking state-like functions of basic service delivery, instrumental in collecting information and transmitting local knowledge, necessary for the development of civil society, democratization and liberalization of society, politics, and economy, and important for legitimizing peacebuilding and conflict transformation initiatives (Paffenholz 2012). Furthermore, N-NGOs are perceived as being more flexible and often more cost-efficient than INGOs. They have higher local legitimacy, knowledge of context, culture and situation at the grassroots level. They have become an alternative to overcoming the pathologies of donor bilateral support and cooperation (Lavers, 2008). N-NGOs being part of civil society are also as an end itself whereby an active civil society is seen as guardian of democratic governance, promoter of human rights and social emancipation (Richmond and Carey 2005). Moreover, donors engage N-NGOs as a way to improve the chance for succeeding in humanitarian and developmental actions and in post-conflict transformation through widening local participation, improving socio-economic conditions, and maintaining public order and stability (Belloni 2008). N-NGOs are also perceived as a platform for legitimizing humanitarian intervention and generating social acceptance. Nevertheless, N-NGOs are exposed also to a number of disadvantages, which undermine their efforts in humanitarian action. These include their dependency on donor funding and lack of autonomous and long-term self-sufficiency, inadequacy and inability to meet the popular expectation for representation, legitimacy and accountability, and obstruction of their work from government and spoiler groups. Cases of N-NGOs abuses of funds, detachment from their intended beneficiaries and dependency on donors have brought into question their essential attribution and ethos of altruism and charity, as well as their civility and quest for better society (Transparency International 2008). The paternalistic and asymmetric relations between donors and N-NGOs undermines the effectiveness of humanitarian engagement due to the conditionality of aid and the imposition of programmatic and ideological orientations. A domestic competitive environment is created by controlling who gets, what, and when, and by frequently changing donor priorities and operating in permanent temporality. Similarly, the fragile and competitive relations with the host government and the incompatibility of action has complicated the work of N-NGOs and often reduced their agency. Also a weakness in deeply divided societies such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Georgia N-NGO’s are inclined to be affiliated and favour one community over the other – creating thus barriers for meaningful grassroots and cross-community conciliatory interactions. Roles and Functions of N-NGOs in Humanitarian Action The roles and functions of N-NGOs are not static but they change and transcend depending of the scale of conflict and humanitarian crisis or disaster, availability of donor support and accessibility to funds, acceptance by host government and public opinion, and the contextual transformation of internal and external agenda and priorities. The role 2 of N-NGOs in humanitarian actions also differs depending on the form of international engagement (intervention). If the humanitarian action is provided in a context of internal crisis or civil war with the consent of the host state and some of the local parties involved, then the role of national NGOs is much more complex and can be held hostage to limitations exposed by the sovereign role of the national government, the limited role and scope of international humanitarian actions, and the constant risk that could come from belligerent groups. If the humanitarian action takes place after a peace process and international intervention and a post-conflict reconstruction stage takes place, then the NNGOs have a broader scope of roles and functions, starting from most technical tasks to more influential policy related and institution-building functions. For example, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste, N-NGO activity has focused in multiple directions, starting from delivering humanitarian aid, reconstruction of houses, roads, public buildings and public utilities, and micro-financial activities, to supporting democratization, mass media, human rights, and civil society building. N-NGOs are also seen as a knowledge resource for donors and international organizations (Belloni 2001). One of the most important functions of N-NGOs is serving as a local knowledge and information resource, which is essential for planning, implementing and evaluating humanitarian projects. For example, during conflict or in the early phases of a disaster, N-NGOs serve as a source of information on what is happening on the ground and act as an early warning system for international humanitarian intervention. N-NGOs report on the human rights abuses, physical destruction and violence, refugee flows, as well as report on the changes in government practices (Clark 2000). N-NGOs in some contexts serve as liaison for the international media in securing access to humanitarian sites as well as alerting journalists to interesting cases (Rotberg and Weiss 1996). Moreover, NNGOs possess knowledge about the local culture and history, as well as the population needs and the aspects on which the international aid and assistance could make a difference. N-NGOs in humanitarian action constitute the roots for building a civil society sector in post-conflict societies. They fit the essential agenda of the international community to pluralize and de-concentrate local-international interaction beyond only traditional communication channels and contact with governmental representatives (Richmond and Carey 2005). Increasingly, N-NGOs are becoming reliable partners of the donor community due to their capacity to empower local communities, deliver aid and capacity building assistance directly to the communities in need, and above all respond immediately to emergency responses. The provision of aid through N-NGOs might have several benefits, as they are more acquainted with local needs and less costly. Delivering humanitarian assistance through N-NGOs is considered as a cost-efficient approach as opposed of contracting external experts who demand higher pay and take longer to become acquainted with the context, the environment. N-NGOs in humanitarian situations are better positioned to engage with non-state armed groups through acts of everyday interaction and alternative informal forms of dialogue and close the gap of interaction between the state and the non-state armed groups (Hofmann 2006). Engagement of NGOs with peace spoilers avoids giving the latter 3 legitimacy and political recognition and status that otherwise they would gain if they would interact with the host state government or external agencies, such as representatives of UN, regional organizations or informal groups of states. NGO approaches to dealing with non-state armed groups have a higher likelihood that the latter respect certain international humanitarian norms and ban certain violence practices (Hofmann 2006). The work of NGOs such as Geneva Call and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers are examples of successful and fruitful interaction through ‘track two’ diplomacy, reduction of hostilities, and contributions to peacebuilding. These organizations have been able to exercise their influence by encouraging non-state armed groups adhere to humanitarian and military norms, for example in relation to the usage of land mines and child soldiers (Hofmann 2006: 403). While this undertaking risks unintentionally prolonging the conflict, the interaction of NGOs with non-state armed groups could address humanitarian concerns ‘in a way that decreases the sufferings of non-combatants in conflict’ (Hofmann 2006: 404). Increasingly, aid is perceived as a form of governing social reconstruction and as strategic tool for conflict resolution (Duffield 2002b). With the instrumentalization of humanitarian aid for security purposes, N-NGOs have moved from being traditional providers of relief delivery to more professionalized agents of advancing international agendas related to regime change, mitigating new threats of terrorism from non-state actors, dealing with security sector reform, and working on grassroots peacebuilding and conflict transformation. They are seen as important local agents who provide an opportunity for enacting global governance and advancing the interests of the international community. In Afghanistan, senior American officials have regarded NGOs as instrumental multipliers of US policy in the country, as well as part of their combat team (Powell 2001). Privatization of security provision has resulted also in the privatization of humanitarian action, as is evident with health care provision in Iraq and organization of community participation in local authorities (Prescott and Pellini 2004). This challenges the traditional role of national NGOs, and risks reducing them to serving as business-like agents contracted and subordinated by international agencies. The turn towards resilience planning among bilateral donors, international organisations and INGOs has the potential to reinforce the significance of N-NGOs. Resilience aims to integrate with notions of sustainable development, vulnerability and risk reduction with ecological systems and climate change adaptation (Levine 2012: 1) As instrumentalised by international humanitarian actors, resilience is seen as enhancing local response and survival capacities to reduce dependency on external support. International actors need local interlocuters for such activities and N-NGOs, in certain circumstances, may be able to provide assistance, and even exploit the resilience agenda. The role of N-NGO’s in humanitarian action has evolved and expanded in the last two decades. While N-NGOs have initially had a supplementary contribution to the efforts of national governments in humanitarian crisis, they have gradually consolidated their identity, received direct international support, and have taken important role in humanitarian action. To a certain extent, the growing role of N-NGOs in humanitarian action has been influenced by the growing number of non-state actors in international arena, the prevalence of global social forces in support of international engagement in humanitarian and conflict situations, and 4 the suitability of liberal states to use N-NGO’s as loyal partners in implementing their foreign policy The interaction between N-NGOs and Donors in Humanitarian Action Increasingly, donors, mainly from OECD countries and international organizations such as the UN and EU, are channelling a large portion of their funds through NGOs (Frangonikolopoulos 2005: 52). The decrease of the bilateral cooperation and support for governments in fragile and under-developed countries is mainly due to political, strategic, and technical reasons. A central role in the withdrawal of bilateral aid has been perceptions of the poor quality of governance, widespread corruption, non-compliance to international conditionality, and prolongation and legitimization of authoritarian regimes (Lavers 2008). N-NGOs are becoming an alternative solution hoping to overcome the weaknesses of bilateral donor assistance and deliver aid more effectively. Beyond official discourses, many donors perceive N-NGOs as their local dependencies through whom they advance a number of interests starting from channelling their funding and delivering aid directly to local beneficiaries to implementing policy and normative agendas and making indirect pressure to national governments. N-NGOs may feed in to a donor agenda of providing humanitarian assistance with the self-interested intention of keeping markets stable and opening up new markets, exploiting cheap labour, preventing refugees crossing borders, as well as a mechanism to contain the conflict within its tolerable scope and avoid its spill over effect (Duffield 1997: 530). Another overarching reason why donors strengthen N-NGOs is to deliver humanitarian assistance through local civilian actors and not through military personnel, which would exacerbate destabilization. While, in general, relations between donors and N-NGOs are cooperative, in many cases N-NGOs are ontologically sub-ordinated to donors due to asymmetric power and financial dependency, and their inherent closeness to the epicentre of emergency. But, working through N-NGOs, many leading international humanitarian organizations generate and claim legitimacy. For example, Oxfam stresses its work with a large number of N-NGOs, respect from local and international partners, and employment of people who understand the local issues and needs, and sees these as a key source of legitimacy and authority (Oxfam 2013). N-NGOs that preserve autonomous operations from the external actors risk suffering exclusion from civil society mainstream activities and donor support. This is the case, for example, with the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, whose donor support was cut off when it took a critical stance towards the internationals in Kosovo. However, the asymmetric relationship between N-NGOs and donors often does not last long after the incentives end. The compliance power of INGOs and donors countries works towards N-NGOs only as long as there is a supply of external funds (Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). The incentivizing power of international aid lies in the perception of the local agents that they will gain policy influence and power, secure external legitimacy and maintain access to resources. However, as evident from several cases in Kosovo, once these incentives end national 5 NGOs often try to reclaim their autonomy and engage in hybridity, resistance, and new alternative discourse and narratives (Visoka 2011; Visoka 2013). In humanitarian crisis and post-conflict countries with extensive and protracted international presences, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, problematic donor-national NGOs relationships are often very evident (Kappler and Richmond 2011). With the intention of reducing any misuse of funds, international donors develop strict reporting and quantitative evaluation systems. These technocratic mechanisms include reporting in a particular template, using a particular language and quantifying the impact in a set format (Mac Ginty: 2012). Donor set fixed rules by which they provide funding. This often challenges N-NGOs because of the competitive environment that donors create (EvansKent and Bleiker 2003: 108). Donors narrow down NGO autonomy by setting fixed application formats, and demanding the use of a specific language. Project and programme goals, intended outcomes, and implementation methodologies are often set in far-away cities where donors are headquartered. In this regard, INGOs are often better equipped with expertise and funds to hire grant writers than N-NGOs. Indeed, these technical details constitute the technology of international dominance over local actors. Furthermore, national NGOs may be exposed to uncertainty as the donor priorities and expectations change due to exogenous and endogenous factors. For example, in Bosnia N-NGOs had to ‘alter their project regularly to suit the changing priorities of donors’ and re-write their mission goals to fit to donor requirements (Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003: 108-9). As Evans-Kent and Bleiker (2003: 109) argue, such changes do not create the conditions for developing a vision and a long-term sustainable engagement. Similar evidence of the fragile relation between N-NGOs and donors can also be seen in Timor-Leste. While a small number of older Timorese N-NGOs have established solid partnership with international donors, many newer NGOs have been marginalized due to a lack of experience in managing projects according to donor requirements, including here the condition that project proposal must be prepared in the English language (Brunnstrom 2003: 312). In this context, it can be argued that the donor assertion of funding themes and application criteria obstructed the generation of local solutions to the local problems (Brunnstrom 2003: 316). Another significant failure of donor community in Timor-Leste was its over-concentration around the Dili district, and a consequent under-representation in the peripheries (UNDP 2002: 4). The interaction of N-NGOs with the donor community is a collusion engrained in mutual dependency. On the one hand, donors need N-NGOs to conduct their humanitarian action that is locally grounded, acceptable, and in accordance with the externally imposed rules. On the other hand, NNGOs forego their rights and autonomy and give priority to complying with donor policies and fulfilling their ideational and material needs to be able to exercise a humanitarian function that is perceived as deeply engrained with donor support, and to legitimize their existence in relation to the national government and general population. Found in this power relation, the agency and autonomy of N-NGO’s is linked to the range of donor support and the political space provided to perform a role in humanitarian situations. This contingency is likely to affect the future of NGOs in humanitarian action, especially after the recent cuts in humanitarian aid and the attempts to promote local resiliency and sustainability as a withdrawal strategy from humanitarian action. 6 N-NGOs and National Governments in Humanitarian Action N-NGOs in humanitarian crisis and post-conflict situations are often exposed to near irreconcilable dilemmas concerning the nature of the relationship they should build with local and national governments. While N-NGOs usually have asymmetric power relations with donors due to material dependency and political leveraging, N-NGOs may have a different type of relationship with government authorities, sometimes involving, conflict, complementarity, and mutual de-legitimization. While the precise relationship between N-NGOs and the government will vary from one humanitarian context to another, one could infer that the weaker the host government, in terms of governance capabilities, then the stronger will be the role and agency of N-NGOs in taking responsibilities that under normal circumstances would be delivered by governments. Essentially, N-NGOs are challenged on their political and ideological take towards domestic processes. If N-NGOs take a neutral stance, opposition groups often challenge them. If they express themselves against the national government their agency is reduced in the face of government and in some cases among the international donors. Similarly, if humanitarian N-NGOs take a supportive stance they are seen as government sympathisers. For example, in Kosovo, Movement for Self-Determination (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje), which later became an opposition political party, arose against N-NGOs in Kosovo and blamed them for not resisting the political compromises the Kosovo institutions and for complying with donor policies when it came to accommodating the rights and needs of Serb community during the final status negotiations (Visoka 2011). Similarly, another non-conformist NGO in Kosovo (ÇOHU) because of its critical voice against the corruption of government and the tolerance by international community was gradually marginalized by the donors, other NGO’s, and constantly ignored by government. Notwithstanding this, there are also examples of N-NGOs affiliating with political parties in power in order to maximise access and protection (Helton, and Loescher 2013). Beyond ideological difference, there can be points of friction between N-NGOs and national governments, one of which is differential salary levels. N-NGOs often attract skilled and educated local staff due to favourable conditions and good pay rates, sometimes leaving state institutions poorly equipped in terms of human resources. Under these conditions, N-NGOs can hardly maintain political and social neutrality. Seen from the needs-based approach, N-NGOs can represent hope for the local population who suffer from limited relief supply, shortages of food and chronic insecurity. However, for authoritarian and undemocratic governments, local NGOs might represent a threat to national interests and sovereignty as they are often unable to supervise the flow of relief aid, something which may reduce their popular legitimacy and influence over the local population. They may also be faced with surveillance, sabotage, and obstruction to fieldwork. The emergence of ‘new’ threats such as terrorism from non-state actors has securitized further the deliver of humanitarian aid and with that the role of national NGOs (Frangonikolopoulos 2005: 59-60). Furthermore, they fear that relief aid could end up in the hands of insurgent groups and nurture further their resistance and spoiling behaviour (Perrin 1998). 7 In some societies N-NGOs and broader civil society may be seen as creatures created by and sustained by international interveners. As a result, they may be subject to delegitimization by politicians, parliamentarians, media, and alternative interest groups and social movements (Walton 2012: 19-34). Transitions are often a time of turmoil, and in the short run N-NGOs may find it expedient to adhere to liberal norms, values, and discourses of governance and politics. Such a stance is likely to be rewarded with external legitimacy and donor financial support. However, in the long run the same NNGOs may find that they have to reach an accommodation with the national government, and with political parties, nationalist, indigenous and populist groups who have popular legitimacy and are opposed to the worldviews promoted by liberal internationalist interveners (Visoka 2013). N-NGOs often must walk a delicate path between maximising autonomy, currying favour with the government, and exploiting what international actors can offer. This requires finding a balance between short and long-term organisational goals. Afghanistan provides a good example of tensions between national NGOs, donors and the domestic government. It is estimated that international aid to the country since 2001 has reached US$25 billion, with a large proportion of it was distributed and distilled through N-NGOs (Rahmani 2012). As a response to this, the Afghan government has increasingly accused national NGOs for being ‘self-serving, corrupt, and wasteful’, and accused them of prioritising the demands of international donors rather than the needs of local communities (Rahmani 2012: 296). We have seen the blurring of differences between international and N-NGOs, military, and local reconstruction teams, the negative depiction of NGO sector by government, and the arrogance and irresponsible practices of NGOs themselves (Rahmani 2012: 297). As a result, the general public perception of NNGOs tends to be negative. The interaction of N-NGOs with national government forces is often complex and can become a source of contestation by all sides in the conflict. When encountering this spectrum of contestation, it is difficult for N-NGOs to maintain neutrality when they want to have a political role and when they operate under conditions of pressure from other social groups and government forces. Often to be able to deliver humanitarian aid, NNGOs are obliged to develop and maintain connection with government forces to be able to access insecure zones. While the beneficiary community might appreciate this, other factions of society can attribute these N-NGOs as collaborators of the regime. Opposing the regime could mean failing to provide humanitarian assistance in the short-run to the people in need. Equally, affiliation of N-NGOs with international forces could have serious consequences from national government and other radical faction once the international donors and forces exist the country. Therefore, moral dilemmas to uphold neutrality are inherent and almost irreconcilable when there are multiple internal and external actors involved in humanitarian actions with blurred lines of authority and responsibility and all conflict parties have committed violence. 8 Challenges and Implications of N-NGOs in Humanitarian Action The policy and academic literature regularly points to a core stock of criticisms of NNGOs in humanitarian crisis and post-conflict situations (Abiew and Keating 2004). A lack of accountability often features heavily in these criticisms. A large number of NNGOs suffer from weak accountability, where many national-level and urban-based NGOs lack meaningful bonds with local and rural communities. In this context, NGOs do not pursue transparent and democratic practices and suffer from poor financial management and reporting. This is largely affected by the donor-oriented accountability and responsibility, which ultimately detaches these organizations from local constituencies and targeted beneficiaries. N-NGOs have been accused of having insufficient procedural constraints, irrelevant organizational mandates, values that are insensitive to the local cultural and social context, and limited ability for self-assessment and learning (Logister 2007: 169). Belloni argues that donor-driven NGO initiatives limits the prospects for creating domestic social capital and ownership which is essential for humanitarian recovery and peace processes, thus leaving local communities in a weak and subordinate position (Belloni 2001). N-NGOs in many complex emergencies lose their legitimacy and popular support. They have also been accused of N-NGOs operating according to exclusionary practices based on ascriptive criteria such as: ethnic belonging, religion, social status, and geographical location. Such exclusionary practices often reinforce division between groups and as a result of these differences, vulnerable groups, such as minorities, women, and the poor and disabled people remain unrepresented (Fowler 1997). Although NGO agendas are meant to be people-centred, they are not always able to emancipate the subaltern and the subordinated that are unable to speak up for themselves. N-NGOs that operate in urban zones tend to be more favoured by donors as they are perceived to have greater managerial efficiency and professional expertise, and are familiar with the management of project life cycles (Zetter 1996: 38). It is asserted that ‘when civil society organizations are not civic, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious their contribution to democracy and peace might be spurious’, thus deepening ethnic hostilities and bonding social capital across ethnic lines fragments society and undermines a integrative social cohesion (Belloni 2009: 192). The nature of humanitarian action is under threat due to the tendency of Western influential powers (mostly the United States) to make NGOs an extension of their military interventions and political agendas (Abiew 2012). From the perspective of local population and opposition groups, NGOs are no longer seen as ‘neutral, but as agents of outsider powers’ (Abiew 2012: 204). Consequently, the merging of security with development and the exploitation of NGOs as instrumental actors to achieve these objectives, the number of attacks targeting humanitarian aid workers has increased, as evident with multiple cases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and DRC (Humanitarian Outcomes 2012). New humanitarianism, combining human rights protection with reconstruction and peacebuilding, has complicated the role of N-NGOs and their association with civil society. ICRC’s traditional values of humanitarian universalism have been threatened by the holistic nature of modern warfare as practised by the US and its allies that combines development and economic levers with war9 fighting. Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) have acted as pioneers of a new humanitarianism, and have replaced neutrality with political advocacy in favour of the powerless and supressed. Yet the expansion of new frontiers have opened the space for abuse by leading western intervening powers and accordingly damaged the credibility and image of NGOs as politically neutral agents. Politicization of humanitarian action risks reducing humanitarian impact and prolonging violence, human suffering and destabilization. The merging of politics with humanitarian action replaces the primacy of addressing human needs with the protection of national or particular interests (Duffield, Macrae and Curtis 2011: 269). The very idea of humanitarian action is to reduce human suffering in extreme situations (Vaux 2006: 240). The doctrine of new humanitarianism and the security-development nexus has detached the needs-based and rights-based approach to humanitarianism with an interest-based strategic orientation. In this regard, N-NGOs unintentionally could implement the foreign policy of great powers and advance their hidden self-interests that are about exerting power, advancing security goals through development assistance, and implement the regime change (Helton and Loescher 2003). N-NGOs in cases like Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan have received assistance from NATO military forces and have used them to ease cooperation and communication with local communities. The politicization of aid has led to another unintended consequence, that of detaching humanitarian workers from beneficiary communities. As a result of the politicisation of aid, aid workers and their humanitarian resources have been target of attacks. In 2011, 304 aid workers were killed, wounded or tortured (Humanitarian Outcomes 2012). Consequently, UN and other international workers have chosen to be fortified in compounds, create gated-communities away from the beneficiary communities. Duffield argues that this is ‘symptomatic of the deepening crisis within the development-security nexus’ (Duffield 2010: 453). Such a physical detachment from the communities makes difficult the local acceptance of aid workers, complicates interaction with N-NGOs and delivery of aid, and the understanding of local needs. Furthermore, resilience and risk management are becoming obligatory and doctrinal aspects of UN preparation of its international and local personnel across the world, no matter if they are exposed to real threats or not. In this ‘bunkerization of aid’ paradox, N-NGOs are found in an awkward situation of having limited access to international workers’ safe zones, while remaining constantly exposed to dangerous zones of conflict. Under these conditions, N-NGOs become more vulnerable and loose the protection that they would otherwise benefit from operating together with international agencies in the field. N-NGOs as subcontractors of INGOs are subcontractors of donor countries. Such hierarchical relationships can reduce the amount of welfare aid that the targeted beneficiaries get due to management and overhead costs of each intermediary agency, as well as the identification of priories and programmatic focus is determined by external forces and not local needs. The complex network of humanitarian aid providers increases relief expenditure at the cost of the reducing aid to intended beneficiaries (Duffield 1997: 540). In certain cases, N-NGOs are inclined to deviate from their holistic purpose to operate more like business entities that worry more about securing their own material 10 benefit and preserve their influence as a local stakeholder than prioritizing the needs and interests of the beneficiary community on whose behalf N-NGOs receive donor money (Barber and Bowie 2008). Finally, involvement of N-NGOs in delivering humanitarian assistance defuses the collective responsibility of international community and creates the pre-conditions for an exceptional interventionism were self-centric near and far interests are the primary reasons for engaging in complex emergencies. In addition, Duffield rightly argues that aid has, in many cases, reinforced the subordination of the people suffering from structural injustices and insecurity rather than enhancing their autonomy, and lifting them from chronic suffering (Duffield 2002a). NNGOs can contribute to social repression of subalterns as a result of their attempts to govern the provision of aid. Humanitarian action can have the potential also to create a culture of dependency and reduce the chance for self-realization and liberal selfmanagement. In regions where N-NGOs provide aid, there is evidence of the subjugation of the labour force, pushing them to work as cheap labour and, when they resist, threatening to reduce food and other humanitarian aid (Duffield 2002a). Found in these challenging and controversial circumstances, N-NGOs can unintentionally reduce their agency in humanitarian action, and above all deviate from their primary mission of alleviating human suffering, as well as reduce poverty and human insecurity. Addressing these controversies is utmost necessary for N-NGOs to save their credibility and make a positive impact in humanitarian situations. Conclusion This chapter has shown the complexity, fluidity, uncertainty, and contradictory nature of national non-governmental actors in humanitarian and complex emergencies. N-NGOs have become necessary agents, taking an important place in the complex map of actors in humanitarian situations, located in the interaction between communities in need, donors, national government and belligerent factions. As suggested here, N-NGOs must navigate a thin line between the agendas of donors and the national government, as well as minister to the needs of the beneficiary community. In this complex space of actors, NNGOs are expected to execute multiple functions and often become a multi-functional toolkit and agents for all seasons. Arguably, N-NGOs are fluid, adaptable and resilient agents who change their intentions and conduct their activities based on donor and externally-set priorities, re-arrange the organizational and topical orientation according to the availability of financial aid, and adjust to the discursive requirement of the dominant and authoritative local and international agents. Nevertheless, N-NGOs are exposed also to uncertainty that comes from financial dependency, evaluative and transformative dynamics of humanitarian needs, and the political space provided by the national government. N-NGOs also often undertake contradictory practices – often as a result of combining having to serve different masters with the demands of the humanitarian crisis. While N-NGOs often operate under such complex circumstances, they may also be provided with windows of opportunities for renewing agency and preserving their holistic identity. Perhaps, N-NGOs can reduce their adverse and unintended consequences by trying to promote a good donorship through a honest dialogue, mutual equality and 11 correct relations; by working together, networking and bringing together all relevant stakeholders; by prioritizing consistency and reliability towards the beneficiary communities, government and donors; and by building national capacities that promote resilience and sustainability. In this regard, appropriate forms of recovering the image of N-NGOs are considered the avoidance of being appropriated by political agendas of Western governments, operations based on clearly defined goals and realistic and impactdriven actions, adaptation of strict moral standards, appropriate use of evaluation and assessment criteria, and avoid duplication of activities but instead coordinate them with other NGOs and other stakeholders (Okumu 2003: 132-3). 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