Gohar Grigoryan_Interview with Tessa Hofmann

Gohar Grigoryan Interview with Dr. Tessa Hofmann What do you see as the humanitarian consequences of the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh (2020-2023), particularly in terms of forcibly displaced people in Artsakh and their well-being? How do you see the long-term impact of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh on regional stability and prospects for reconciliation? I do not use the term "ethnic cleansing". This is perpetrator jargon, because genocide perpetrators dehumanize their victims by denigrating them as filth, rats, bacteria, dogs and so on. Moreover, this term does not constitute a criminal offense under international law. In connection with the crimes committed in Arzach, it also serves to trivialize them. Since August 2022, national and international human rights organizations and scholars have pointed to a significant genocide risk for Armenians in the South Caucasus, especially in the de facto Republic of Artsakh. Among these early warnings were the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, Genocide Watch, the International Association of Genocide Scholars, the Association of Threatened Peoples (Germany) and the Working Group Recognition -Against Genocide, for International Understanding (Germany). There were two wars in and around Nagorno Karabakh in 1991-1994 and in the fall of 2022. As is well known, the Second Karabakh War ended in a devastating defeat for the Armenians. The territory, which was still controlled by the Republic of Artsakh after the Second Karabakh War, was sealed off by Azerbaijan in December 2022 under the pretext of ecological protests. The blockade turned into a starvation blockade. Fewer and fewer everyday goods, food and medicines, reached the Republic of Artsakh, as the only land route that still connected it to the Republic of Armenia was controlled by Azerbaijan. This had a direct impact on the health of the population: the number of premature deaths and stillbirths increased by a third, and a man aged 45 starved to death in August 2023. Fuel also stopped reaching Artsakh in July 2023, meaning that local passenger transport had to be suspended and private passenger transport came to a virtual standstill. After nine months of starvation blockade, Azerbaijan then attacked the Republic of Artsakh militarily in violation of international law, including bombing residential areas. After a day and a half, the political and military leadership of the Republic of Artsakh decided to surrender in order to avoid further bloodshed in hopeless battles with a far superior opponent. This was followed by the mass expulsion and flight of the population. The Republic of Armenia registered 100,800 displaced persons, 6,400 ended up in the Russian Federation; I do not know the number of those taken in by Georgia. Dr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, the first Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (2003-2012), classified the hunger blockade of Azerbaijan as genocide since August 2023, as well as the mass expulsion. On 24 April 2024, in a speech in Frankfurt/Main, he again described this as genocide: "Massive killings are not the only form of genocide. Starvation and mental harm are also forms of genocide prescribed by Article 2 (b) and (c) of the Genocide Convention. Both tactics were used against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in full sight of the international community." https://www.aga-online.org/wp-content/uploads/Frankfurt-2024-statement.pdf The "de-armenization" of Nagorno-Karabakh has been Ilham Aliyev's goal for at least ten years. As early as April 2015, President Aliyev published a statement on the government's official web-site warning ethnic Armenians: "If you do not want to die, then get out of Azerbaijani lands. [...]." On 17 October 2020, President Aliyev celebrated the forcible displacement of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh during several televised addresses, declaring, "I said that if they [ethnic Armenians] do not leave our lands of their own free will, we will chase them away like dogs, and we are doing that." President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (2020). “Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation”, October 17.https://president.az/en/articles/view/43334 It would be extremely cynical to claim that genocide and expulsion are the basis for regional stability and reconciliation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The opposite is the case. In fact, the starvation of the Artsakh population, their displacement and their social and material misery make reconciliation more difficult than ever. The Ottoman genocide of 1915/6 and the Azerbaijani genocide of 2022/3 form a continuum in the consciousness of most Armenians, the traumatizing effect of which increases with every further humiliation and every further loss of territory by Armenia in favor of Azerbaijan. In addition, it is not only the Armenians' genocide experience that is repeated, but also the experience of being completely abandoned by the so-called world community. It will take at least two generations before a process of normalization, let alone reconciliation, can even begin. The prerequisite for this is that Azerbaijan completely ends its Armenophobic rhetoric and indoctrination of the population. But unfortunately, we are experiencing the opposite. Azerbaijan continues the narrative that Armenians are a threat to Azerbaijan. At his press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on 26 April 2024, I. Aliyev addressed journalists who had asked critical questions: "Azerbaijan liberated a large part of its sovereign territory from occupation in 2023. Last September, Azerbaijan restored its full sovereignty." https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-und-dem-praesidenten-der-republik-aserbaidschan-alijew-am-26-april-2024-in-berlin-2274882 How should we understand this? Has Azerbaijan completely liberated itself from the occupation by "Armenia" in 2023 or are there still areas of its "sovereign" territory that remain to be "liberated"? Could proactive international intervention have prevented the blockade of Artsakh and prevented the human rights violations and ethnic cleansing witnessed during Azerbaijan's military aggression? What action could have been taken, and what steps can the international community take to prevent further violence and protect civilians in the conflict zone? Of course, the blockade, the military attack and the expulsion could have been prevented if it had been in the interests of the so-called collective West. However, it is primarily in the West's interest to push back Russian and Iranian influence in the South Caucasus and to secure its own energy interests - be they fossil or non-fossil raw materials. Azerbaijan's battle for Karabakh is essentially a battle for its largely untapped raw materials, including the coveted lithium: "E-cars, cell phones and e-bikes - nothing will work without batteries in the future. And the market for these batteries is booming. This requires vast quantities of so-called critical raw materials, such as lithium. But these are in short supply. Azerbaijan has recognized this and conquered the Karabakh region (...)." Kampf um Rohstoffe: Deutsche Doppelmoral in Aserbaidschan. „Das Erste“, 6.3.2024, https://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/report-mainz/sendung/2024/03-05-kampf-um-rohstoffe-100.html At the end of July 2020, three months before Azerbaijan attacked the Republic of Artsakh, Samir Gurbanov, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Agency for Mineral Resources Management of Azerbaijan, said: "According to official data, there are 163 deposits in the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia, including numerous mineral springs and deposits of zinc, gold, coal, copper, silver, lead, gold, marble, limestone, chromium and iron. Most of Azerbaijan's mineral resources are located in the territories currently occupied by Armenia. The gold, silver, copper, molybdenum and mercury deposits in the regions of Kälbajär, Lachin, Tärtär and Aghdam, the iron and chromium deposits in the districts of Jabrajil, Kälbajär and Lachin, and the sulphur deposits in the districts of Tärtär, Kälbajär, Aghdam and Fisuli are currently being developed by Armenia. In addition, deposits of gravel, sand, clay and other mineral sources are being mined and extracted here." „Weltgemeinschaft soll ihre Stellung zur illegalen Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen Aserbaidschans in von Armenien besetzten Gebieten nehmen.“ „AZERTAC“, 28. Juli 2020, https://azertag.az/de/xeber/weltgemeinschaft_soll_ihre_stellung_zur_illegalen_ausbeutung_naturlicher_ressourcen_aserbaidschans_in_von_armenien_besetzten_gebieten_nehmen-1548611 In North America and Europe, the Karabakh conflict was not perceived as a conflict between the international legal principles of national self-determination and territorial integrity, but as a bilateral territorial dispute between the post-Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nor has the territorial, military and economic asymmetry between the two countries been taken into account; instead, an apparent equidistance has been and continues to be adopted. In fact, it is a case of pro-Azerbaijani partisanship. In the West, it was never about granting the people of Nagorno-Karabakh the right to self-determination, but rather about enforcing Azerbaijan's claim under "international law" to Karabakh, which is important for the energy industry, in order to share in the spoils. Since 2020 in particular, both states have been pressured into a peace agreement, although it is clear that this will be unilaterally at the expense of Armenia. The victor Azerbaijan dictates, Armenia obeys. This is the only way for Armenia to please the West, and the Armenian government leadership is increasingly seeking this favor without having so far achieved any significant advantages or security guarantees in return. Russia is also partly to blame for the duration and outcome of the hunger blockade, but its share of the blame is less than it is perceived to be by many Armenians. The specific obligations of the Russian peacekeeping contingent remained undefined in the trilateral ceasefire agreement of 9 November 2020 and were also not specified later. In any case, Russia did not have an internationally recognized peacekeeping mandate - for example from the United Nations. The Republic of Armenia's share of the blame, on the other hand, has not been dealt with self-critically to this day. Let us remember: in 1988, up to one million people demonstrated in Yerevan with the slogan "Miatsum!" and in solidarity with the irredentist movement of Nagorno Karabakh. However, the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia was never united with Artsakh. The Republic of Armenia did not dare to do for Artsakh what Turkey did for occupied northern Cyprus: recognition under international law. The Republic of Armenia's Artsakh policy was inconsistent and contradictory: in the fall of 1997, the first president of post-Soviet Armenia, who had come to power thanks to the Miatsum movement, ensured that Artsakh was excluded as an equal negotiating partner in the Minsk Group, as were the civil societies of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Instead, the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia negotiated on behalf of Artsakh (without ever recognizing Artsakh itself). Levon Ter-Petrosyan was succeeded by two presidents from Artsakh, during whose term of office a peace agreement was delayed, much to Azerbaijan's growing annoyance. The Armenians believed that the issue would resolve itself, as Artsakh actually existed and was developing. It was believed that the displaced and refugee Azerbaijanis would forget their homeland, but the Azerbaijani government did everything to keep the IDPs' pain of loss alive. During his first and only visit to Stepanakert in 2019, the current head of government of Armenia declared Artsakh to be part of Armenia in a completely undiplomatic manner, thereby adding fuel to the fire without having the means to fulfill this irredentist claim. In the meantime, Azerbaijan had rearmed very successfully, enabling it to win the Second Karabakh War in 2020 after various military test runs. These military test runs against the Republic of Armenia, in particular the "Easter War" in 2016, demonstrated to Azerbaijan that the global community was indifferent to its military advances, as did the further attacks on the Republic of Artsakh. Under the impression of the Azerbaijani military attack on the Republic of Armenia in September 2022 and under pressure from the EU, Pashinyan declared Nagorno-Karabakh to be part of Azerbaijan in Prague in October 2022, thus heralding the beginning of the end of the de facto republic there. Which raises the question: can we expect third parties to intervene when our own head of government hands over a region? The answer is: in principle, yes. This is because all signatory states to the UN Genocide Convention are obliged to prevent genocide as soon as they become aware of the risk of genocide. But neither Germany, nor Russia, France or Great Britain acted accordingly. As far as the European Union observer mission in Armenia is concerned, its task is exactly that: to observe, not to protect. They are not allowed to intervene and are instructed to leave an area immediately if even one shot is fired in their presence. The Armenians of Artsakh have already learned very painfully from the behavior of the Russian peacekeeping contingent that observation is not the same as protection. What measures can be taken to ensure accountability for human rights violations and war crimes committed during conflicts? Is it possible to hold perpetrators accountable after conflict, and how could international tribunals contribute to justice for victims? Recently, the US NGO Center for Truth and Justice (Los Angeles) applied to the International Criminal Court in The Hague to initiate genocide proceedings against Ilham Aliyev and others. This would actually be the task of the Republic of Armenia or the exiled Artsakh authorities. But the latter do not feel any support from the government of the Republic of Armenia, which sees them as an obstacle to its peace negotiations with Azerbaijan. These conflicting interests between the Republic of Armenia's "peacekeeping" and the interests of the Karabakh Armenians, which are focused on criminal prosecution, further complicate the situation. In fact, it should be the common interest of all Armenians to achieve a criminal prosecution of the hunger blockade and expulsion as quickly and comprehensively as possible, with the means of every legal possibility. Punishment can be a tool of preventing future aggression and crimes. How has the deliberate destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the forcibly displaced Armenians in Artsakh, reshaped the cultural landscape? What are the motives behind Azerbaijan's targeting of Armenian cultural heritage? The Russian peacekeeping contingent only withdrew from Artsakh in April 2024, so it is not yet clear what form the threat to Armenian cultural heritage will take in the "de-Armenianized" Artsakh region: Will it come to complete destruction and annihilation as in the historical cemetery of the town of Jugha in the Nakhichevan region once populated by Armenians? Will there be cultural appropriation? There would be two variants of this: "Albanization" or "Russification" and Islamization, i. e. the conversion of Armenian sacred buildings into mosques. As we have already seen with the Azerbaijani warfare, the country is also working with test runs here. These already took place during the Soviet era, but have increased considerably since the Second Karabakh War. The areas affected were those that came under Azerbaijani control at the time. Monument Watch (Yerevan) writes on its website: "Many destroyed, damaged, desecrated memorials and monuments in the occupied territories of Artsakh (since 2020 to the present day) can be mentioned - the shelled and blown up Kanach Zham Church [Հովհաննես Մկրտիչ եկեղեցի - Surb Hovhannes Mkrtich, founded in 1847], the Cathedral of Ghazanchetsots in Shushi, the blown up Mekhakavan Church." https://monumentwatch.org/en/?s=Kanach+Zham While the Church of St. John the Baptist in Shushi was first "Russified" on a trial basis and then completely blown up, the Cathedral of the Savior (Ghazanchetsots) in Shushi is apparently to be converted into a mosque. During "Albanization", the pyramidal domes characteristic of Armenian sacral architecture are usually removed, as are the inscriptions in Armenian. Overall, it is still unclear what exactly is to happen to the numerous monasteries and churches, the cross-stones and other objects bearing Armenian inscriptions. As in Turkey, nationalist and economic interests are at odds here. The economic interests usually stem from the need of the local Muslim population to stimulate tourism. In several cases in Turkey, Armenian churches have been protected and even restored, such as the Surb Sarkis Church in the town of Çepni (near Sivas). https://virtual-genocide-memorial.de/region/the-six-provinces/sivas-vilayet/sancak-sivas-%cf%83%ce%b5%ce%b2%ce%ac%cf%83%cf%84%ce%b5%ce%b9%ce%b1-sebastaia-%d5%bd%d5%a5%d5%a2%d5%a1%d5%bd%d5%bf%d5%ab%d5%a1-sebastia-%d5%bd%d5%be%d5%a1%d5%bd-sva/kaza-sarkisla-sehirkiska-seyhkesla-tenus-%d5%a9%d5%b8%d5%b6%d5%b8%d6%82%d5%bd-tonus/?searchedfor=Cepni Cultural genocide, i. e. the willful neglect or destruction of the cultural property of an ethno-religious or religious group that has been destroyed, is one of the last acts associated with genocide. The aim is to prove that this group never lived in the territory in question and never had a cultural significance. Where there is no evidence of their former existence, there is no claim, according to the underlying logic. Significantly, Armenians never appear in Azerbaijani political rhetoric as indigenous inhabitants of Artsakh, but the Armenian presence there is always paraphrased as the "occupation by Armenia". Occupiers have no claims to make. The wife of I. Aliyev and Vice President of Azerbaijan, Mehriban Aliyeva, was awarded the title of "Goodwill Ambassador" by UNESCO in 2004, at a time when the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nakhichevan was at its peak. It would be worth investigating the extent to which she personally influenced UNESCO. In view of the Azerbaijani influence on UNESCO, it is therefore not surprising that UNESCO does not fulfill its protective function with regard to Armenian cultural heritage in Azerbaijani-controlled areas, or does so only inadequately. At the latest since the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, an inventory of the Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh is urgently needed in order to document the condition in which it is found and what has already been destroyed, willfully damaged, or intentionally neglected in comparison with previous inventories. The Republic of Armenia has proposed such an international expert commission for the inventory on various occasions. What are the main obstacles to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, and what steps can be taken internationally to address these challenges? How could the international community work with local communities to preserve cultural sites in conflict zones? On February 28, 2024, the European Parliament adopted its annual reports, notably the Report on the Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy for 2023 (2023/2117 (INI)) and the Annual Report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (2023/2119(INI)). These reports underscored the significance of safeguarding the Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh and advocated for the imposition of sanctions against Azerbaijan. However, concrete steps to document and protect the Armenian cultural heritage do not appear to have been taken so far, which is probably due not least to the Azerbaijani refusal to cooperate. Despite the end of the war, Azerbaijan continues with belligerent rhetoric and military aggression. How can diplomatic channels effectively reduce tensions and promote peace? And what measures should be taken to counter the inflammatory rhetoric of Azerbaijani officials? I am not a diplomat. But as a human rights defender, I would like diplomats to use clear and courageous language. In their contacts with representatives of authoritarian states or in talks with dictators such as Aliyev, they should have the guts to clearly address human rights violations and, if necessary, to threaten and implement sanctions. Unfortunately, we see that this is not being done consistently and uniformly. The "West" was very quick to impose sanctions against Russia. When German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock was asked at her last press conference in Yerevan whether she could imagine sanctions against Azerbaijan, she replied that Germany wanted good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Economic and geopolitical interests almost always take precedence over human rights considerations. Furthermore, the potential for violence in Azerbaijan and Armenia is very asymmetrical. In Azerbaijan, children are indoctrinated with anti-Armenian attitudes as early as kindergarten. School textbooks contain hate poetry and hate rhetoric. Insidious murderers of Armenians such as Ramil Safarov are revered as national heroes. Human rights-sensitive intellectuals such as Akram Aylisli, on the other hand, are threatened with death, and his books were publicly burned; less prominent intellectuals are in exile. There is no comparable situation in Armenia. However, Armenians and Azerbaijanis agree on one thing: that Azerbaijanis are Turks. The father of the current president, Heydar Aliyev, expressed this in the doctrine of "one nation in two states". In colloquial Armenian, Azerbaijanis are referred to as Turks or "tajk" and see themselves just as threatened by them as they are by the Turks of Turkey. Many Armenians are firmly convinced that both Azerbaijanis and Turks are acting in accordance with the Pan-Turanian ideology. In imitation of Armenia, Azerbaijan pursues a policy of remembrance and history that elevates itself to the status of a victim of the neighboring nation's genocide policy. Accordingly, architecturally impressive monuments and memorials have been erected, for example in Quba (2013) https://soyqirim.az/en/. Azerbaijan has constructed a history of persecution by Armenians dating back to 1904, with falsifications, distortions and simplifications. Such constructs are often created in the service of externalization: they are used to divert internal political conflicts or tensions onto an external "enemy". How can we get out of this dead end of memory politics? Ideally by transitional truth commissions and self-critical research. But I do not see that the Azerbaijani society is prepared for such initiatives. Do you believe that Azerbaijan is genuinely seeking peace, given its dual approach of advocating peace while asserting territorial claims over Armenia's current territories? If we deduce the future from the past, the answer to your question is no. Azerbaijan's hunger for land, or rather that of its ruling elite, is not yet satiated. L. Moreno Ocampo recently warned us: „Azerbaijan’s Parliament, controlled by Aliyev, shows that Nagorno Karabakh is not the final goal. It claimed the Republic of Armenia´s territory as West Azerbaijan. It has adopted a resolution titled ‘Statement on the return of Western Azerbaijanis to their historical homeland,’ claiming its sovereignty over the entirety of Armenian territory. There is no doubt about the intention to destroy. It is a genocide approved by a Parliament.“ Quoted from: Moreno Ocampo, op. cit., p. 2f.; https://www.aga-online.org/wp-content/uploads/Frankfurt-2024-statement.pdf Confusingly for foreigners, there is also talk of East Zangezur (Azerbaijani territory); where there is an East, there is a West, too. Western Zangezur (Armenian) is historically known as Syunik; but since there are mineral resources, too, and Syunik is the only remaining Armenian obstacle between Armenian-free Artsakh and Nakhichevan, a military attack is by no means out of the question. So far, Azerbaijan has been a winner in the shadow of Russia's war in Ukraine. But land-hungry Azerbaijan is also nibbling at the edges of its neighboring country in the north-east of the Republic of Armenia, as the border demarcation results in the province of Tavush show, where Azerbaijan will receive four villages, historically being Armenian and re-conquered by Armenian forces in 1991/92. In the 1990s and 2021/22, Azerbaijan in its turn has occupied 240 square kilometers of territory of the Republic of Armenia. There is no indication that Azerbaijan will stop its successful methods of annexing Armenian territories now of all times. And there is no indication that it would be stopped by the world community in the event of an attack. In the best-case scenario, the "West" would protest verbally, i. e. ineffectively. What strategic objectives does Azerbaijan seek to achieve through the continued detention of prisoners of war and Artsakh leaders? These prisoners are in the position of hostages. Azerbaijan can torture them even more by imposing stricter prison conditions such as solitary confinement, but also torture, should the leadership of the Republic of Armenia not be as compliant as it has increasingly been over the past two years. What objectives do you believe Turkey aims to achieve in Artsakh, given its involvement in providing military aid to Azerbaijan and subsequent infrastructure projects in Artsakh? Alongside Israel, Turkey is the most important supplier of modern armaments for Azerbaijan. Arms production in Turkey reached a real boom at the end of 2023, making Turkey strategically autonomous and independent of the West. An expert of the government affiliated German think tank Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (Foundation for Science and Policy) describes Turkey as the future "global arms exporter": "The Turkish arms industry has developed rapidly over the last ten years and its products have repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities. Bayraktar TB2 drones from the Turkish company Baykar are exported to numerous countries. The Ukrainian armed forces used them after the Russian invasion, the Azerbaijani armed forces used them in the conflict with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and they are also being used in Syria, northern Iraq and Libya. However, the drone is only the most visible sign that a new era has dawned in Turkish arms policy. The defense industry and the innovation ecosystem that has developed around it are intended to position Turkey as a "tech nation". This poses new security policy challenges for NATO partners in their cooperation with Ankara. Blocked deliveries of combat aircraft to Ankara, whether by Washington or Berlin, could further reinforce the strategic realignment of Turkey's arms policy." Bastian, Jens: Die Türkei auf dem Weg zum globalen Rüstungsexporteur. „Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik“. SWP-Aktuell 2024/A 05, 01.02.2024, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024A05/ At the same time, Turkey is historically and currently a hegemonic power in the South Caucasus, often in competition with Iran and Russia, but at the same time in close trade relations with these countries. All three - Turkey, Russia and Iran - share an anti-Western orientation. With its increasingly one-sided pro-Western orientation, Armenia threatens to isolate itself in this environment. The goals that Turkey is pursuing in Karabakh are similar to those of its Azerbaijani brother nation. Turkey is very interested in controlling international energy links and at the same time is dependent on energy supplies from Azerbaijan or via Azerbaijan (if it is trans-Caspian oil and gas, which is supplied via Azerbaijan as well as Russian oil and gas). Like Azerbaijan, Turkey is interested in reducing the Armenian presence in the region and establishing contact with the Central Asian, predominantly Turkic states via Azerbaijan. This policy can also be described as pan-Turkish. It is essentially irredentist, comparable to the former policy of the Republic of Armenia. But while Armenian irredentism met with international rejection, pan-Turkism is accepted. Amnesty International's recent report highlighted a crackdown on freedom of expression and human rights violations in Azerbaijan, stating that "the authorities have used the military victory to further consolidate their rule and tighten their grip on dissent". How has the war in Nagorno-Karabakh affected human rights in Azerbaijan, and do you see any links between the conflict and the crackdown on freedom of expression? The corresponding annual report by Amnesty International states: "More than a dozen activists were reportedly detained under administrative proceedings in September and October [2023] for criticizing the government and its military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh. Five men were arrested for posting anti-war content on social media. Three others - Nurlan Gahramanli, Emin Ibrahimov and Nemet Abbasov - were given 30 days' administrative detention for purportedly disseminating harmful information and disobeying the police." Amnesty International: The State of the World*s Human Rghts; April 2024, p.88 As in other post-Soviet states, the laws governing associations and the press have been tightened in Azerbaijan. too. All of this refutes President Aliyev's claim that Azerbaijan is a free country. A free country does not need to fear the critical opinion of its citizens. The genocidal Karabakh policy has not only met with approval in Azerbaijan, but these voices that deviate from the official doctrine are less and less able to articulate themselves and be heard. Considering documented human rights violations in Azerbaijan, how might diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions force Azerbaijan to comply with international agreements and uphold human rights standards? Until now, Azerbaijan has been able to rely on its human rights violations against its own citizens, as well as against Armenians, being more or less accepted by the world public, especially in the shadow of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Azerbaijan has even ignored repeated orders from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to evacuate the Lachin Corridor (2023), to protect Armenian cultural heritage and against Armenophobic rhetoric (2021) because the ICJ lacks effective instruments to enforce its judgments and orders. Sanctions would be the highest form of intervention that the West would presumably be prepared to take. However, even this means has not yet been used, for the geopolitical and energy considerations mentioned above. This implies that civil society NGOs active in the field of human rights need to step up their efforts to sanction Azerbaijan, as well as the state of Armenia and the organizations of the Armenian diaspora. I very much hope that we can achieve this soon, ideally in cooperation with Azerbaijani NGOs that are critical of the government but not nationalist. 12