Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification
Carlos Andrés Garzón-Rodríguez2018, 2013 World Congress Proceedings Vol. 75, Theories of Knowledge and Epistemology
In the paper, I present the basis for a pragmatic, contextualist and inferentialist strategy for understanding the concept of degrees of justification. I argue that each context has certain inferential criteria in order to do correct assertions, and that there are different standards of justification for an assertion to be regarded as highly, moderately or poorly justified in that context. What is a high, medium or low standard of justification is relative to the community in which certain inferential practices take place. Finally, I identify the methods of justification that in every social context confer different degrees of justification to certain assertions.
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2013 World Congress Proceedings
Vol. 75, Theories of Knowledge and Epistemology
Carlos A. Garzón
Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification
ABSTRACT: In the paper, I present the basis for a pragmatic, contextualist and
inferentialist strategy for understanding the concept of degrees of justification.
I argue that each context has certain inferential criteria in order to do correct
assertions, and that there are different standards of justification for an assertion
to be regarded as highly, moderately or poorly justified in that context. What is
a high, medium or low standard of justification is relative to the community in
which certain inferential practices take place. Finally, I identify the methods of
justification that in every social context confer different degrees of justification
to certain assertions.
KEY-WORDS: pragmatism, contextualism, inferentalism, degrees of
justification.
Contexts of Assertion
I assume that a context encompasses the set of behaviors that constitute
and regulate a range of behaviors aimed at fulfilling purposes [Niño 2011a,
2011b]. I also assume that each assertion context has different ways to perform
reasoning in accordance with the interests or purposes that it aims to solve1
and that to each context belongs a specific way of justification assertions that
provides the standard for what counts as justified assertion in each of these
contexts.
For the sake of the argument, I will only use to two types of contexts: (a) a
practical context and (b) a scientific context. In (a) the purposes are practical
in the sense that cover issues that require solutions and methods more or less
immediate and effective. The type of reasoning or inference that takes place
in (a) is not completely solid under formal logic, while effective in relation
to practical needs. In (b), purposes are theoretical in the sense that they don’t
need to be urgently resolved, which makes the search process slow, requiring
much effort (intellectual) and training, so that a group of people can participate
The idea of degrees of justification as I understand it was inspired by the work of Niño (2009,
2011, 2011a). However, as discussed in Garzón (2010, 2011), and especially Niño (2011) we
have several differences in the way we conceive the conditions for defining and determining
degrees and standards of justification.
1
94
Carlos A. Garzón
in their resolution. The modes of reasoning and inference in (b) closely follow
the rational method of scientific inquiry; a way that, as rational science,
necessarily is not the most rational to solve practical issues.
1.1 Kinds of propositions, inferences and assertive commitments
According to the position that I adopt (Gabbay & Woods, 2005) both
propositions and arguments have certain degrees of resistance. On the one
hand, there are robust propositions and inferences, i.e., propositions and
arguments that support various counterexamples. For example, “birds fly” is a
robust proposition despite claims that penguins do not fly. In addition to robust
propositions and inferences we also find fragile propositions and inferences.
Fragile arguments contain fragile premises, i.e., premises that do not support
counterexamples. For example, a proposition such as “All bodies have
potential energy” is fragile because the mere fact of finding a body without
potential energy would stop accepting the proposition as true.
Keep in mind that there are intermediate degrees between fragile and
robust. There may be entirely fragile propositions (which are false with a
single counterexample), very fragile and moderately fragile, until moderately
robust, very robust and completely robust2.
On the other hand, and adopting Brandom’s vocabulary, we say that a
subject acquires an assertive commitment towards a proposition when she
is able to vindicate the statement showing the reasons that she has and that
authorize or legitimate her to make the statement (Brandom 1994, 260). One
can give a set of reasons to support the proposition in question whether there
are counterexamples, and it is this support for the proposition that involves
being committed to it. However, it also indicates that a proposition such as “All
bodies have potential energy” is fragile because a single counterexample would
refute it, which would mean that we are willing to abandon the commitment to
the proposition if we find a single case against it.
Given the fact that a proposition is fragile or robust depending on whether it
supports counterexamples, then, these degrees of resistance to the propositions
should lead to the adoption of certain degrees of assertive commitments.
Following this line, we say that a commitment is firm when the propositional
content of the statement in question is robust and the commitment is unstable
when the propositional content of the statement in question is fragile. Keep in
mind that if an individual’s assertive commitments are gradual, there must be
a range of commitments that goes from the firmest to the most unstable. Thus,
the degree of commitment will be proportional to the set of cases against the
proposition that support its propositional content.
2
Until this point, I follow Gabbay & Woods, 2005.
Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification
95
In short, an individual takes a statement as having a robust or fragile
propositional content depending on the set of contrary experiences that such an
individual would be willing to accept or reject, and that provision constitutes
his degree (firm/unstable) of commitment to the propositional content of such
statements.
This framework gives us the key tools to develop the idea of degrees
of justification of assertions. But before that, let me say a few words about
inferential justification methods adopted in different contexts of assertion.
1.2 Justification methods
Having the task of justifying an assertion is looking for reasons to support
it, and to do the latter is to seek a kind of permission to make the assertion.
Now, having a reason to affirm it is to be able to show, among other things,
which method we used to support it or to hold it legitimately.
A method of justification includes one or more schemes of inference which
uses a speaker to authorize the support of (?) the proposition asserted. Inspired
by Peirce (1877), I will consider only four of these methods:3
Tenacity: “P is true, because I say it is true.”
Authority: “P is true because X (where X is an authority on the subject)
says is true.”
A priori: “P is true, because a priori ABC reasons show it”.
Scientific Method: “Possibly P is true because P is a set of Consequences
follow XYZ that are verified by experimental circumstances.”
It should be noted that these four schemes or methods are not entirely
exhaustive, but give us a guide for characterizing the dependence between
methods and degrees of justification in a context.
Here is where it comes into play the relationship between contexts of
assertion, their corresponding purposes, assertive commitments and methods
of justification. What matters here is that different justification methods
determine different degrees of justification of assertions based on the context
in which they are being used. I will explain this in detail.
Towards a theory of degrees of justification
Using the conceptual tools that we have seen, we can say that in each
context the assertion is made, different methods of justification are used, which
will confer on the conclusions certain degrees of resistance depending on the
degree of resistance from their premises. But these methods of justification,
along with the resistance of its premises and conclusions and the corresponding
Strictly speaking, these are for Peirce’s methods for fixing beliefs. I’ll take them as justification
methods by way of example only, to reflect some of the insights that I wish to develop.
3
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Carlos A. Garzón
degree of commitment that a speaker takes towards them, involve certain
justificatory degrees for certain assertive contexts.
With this in mind, one adopts commitments assertive towards the
conclusions of reasoning, depending on how fragile or robust the premises
are (or interpreted). In that sense the conclusion inherits the commitment
(firm / unstable) depending on the degree of resistance (fragile / robust) of the
premises. One takes a proposition as robust or fragile depending on whether
they are the result of defeasible reasoning, and ultimately, depending on the
purpose (practical or theoretical) in which the reasoning is used. For example,
if the argument is made in what I call a practical context, perhaps the premises
of this argument are taken in a robust way, i.e., as accepting counterexamples,
and as the conclusion of a form of reasoning by authority.
Each context requires different modes of commitment to the statements.
There are different degrees of justification for the contexts of assertion
depending on the degree of commitment required by the context of the
speaker. For example, in the practical context an assertion is highly justified
if the speaker’s commitment to the proposition is firm and if it is the result
of applying the method of tenacity or authority. But in the scientific context,
an assertion is highly justified if the speaker’s commitment toward the
proposition is unstable and is the result of the a priori or scientific methods.
Conversely, in the practical context an assertion will have a justificatory low
degree if the speaker’s commitment to the proposition is unstable and is the
result of the scientific method, and in the scientific context an assertion will
have a justificatory low degree if the speaker’s commitment to the proposition
is firm and is the result of the method of tenacity. This does not mean that
the assertions made in the practical context life can’t be the product of the
application of the scientific method. Indeed, if in this context a speaker makes
assertions that are the result of the application of the scientific method and
takes the premises in a robust way, then her commitment is firm, which will be
reflected in the firmness and robustness of the conclusion. Ultimately, there are
many possible combinations that can occur here between types of inferences
or justification methods, types of propositions (robust, fragile), the degrees
of assertive commitments (firm/unstable) and degrees of justification (high,
medium, low).
In conclusion, we might say that the kind of inferences that are made in
different contexts of assertion is based on propositions (premises of inferences)
whose content is fragile or robust, towards which we adopt firm or unstable
assertive commitments, and whose justificatory degrees are high, medium
or low. If this is true, at first glance this type of treatment would realize
the elements involved in our practices of justification. The elements and
relationships described in this paper are only a sketch to be fully developed
Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification
97
and whose required elements exceed the length of this paper. I hope, at least, to
have shown that it is possible to adopt gradualness of assertive commitments
and of justification and to provide an explanation pragmatically broader and
richer of the phenomenon of justification.
REFERENCES
Brandom, Robert. (1994) Making it Explicit. Harvard University Press.
Gabbay, D. &Woods, J. (2005) The Reach of Abduction. Insight and Trial. A
Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems. Vol. 2. Amsterdam : Elsevier.
Garzón, Carlos. (2010) “Normatividad y contextos de aserción”, en: Cuadernos
de Sistemática Peirceana No. 2. Zalamea, F & Oostra, A. (eds.) Bogotá:
Editorial Nomos, págs 125–143.
Garzón, Carlos (2011) “Indagación científica, actitud epistémica y verdad”.
En: Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana No. 3. Zalamea, F & Oostra,
A. (eds.) Bogotá: Editorial Nomos, págs. 103-142.
Niño, Douglas. (2009) “Algunas reflexiones sobre la duda y la creencia”, en:
Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana No. 1. Zalamea, F & Oostra, A.
(eds.) Bogotá: Editorial Nomos, págs. 159–180.
Niño, Douglas (2011) “El rango y el marco fiduciario. Reflexiones ulteriores
sobre la duda y la creencia”, en: Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana
No. 3. Zalamea, F & Oostra, A. (eds.) Bogotá: Editorial Nomos, págs.
143 – 174.
Niño, Douglas (2011a) “Agentes y circunstancias. Consideraciones en torno
a factores epistémicos y fiduciarios en la argumentación intercultural”,
en: Camilo Martínez (Ed.). Cuatro aproximaciones al diálogo
argumentativo intercultural. Bogotá, Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano
(en prensa). Forthcoming.
Peirce, Ch. S.[CP]Collected Papers, 8 vols. Hartshorne, Weiss& Burks (eds.)
Bristol: ThoemmesPress, 1998 (reedición de la edición original de
Harvard University Press, 1931-1958) Edición eléctrónica (CD-ROM):
IntelexCorporation, 1992.
Dr. Carlos A. Garzón
Universidad
Nacional
Colombia
Universidad dedeAntioquia
Colombia
carlosa.garzon@udea.edu.co
cagarzonro@unal.edu.co
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